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 Note on transcription and names 
Many of the Ottoman Turkish sources cited here (such as the parlia-
mentary minutes) are available as transliterated texts. All of these are 
cited in accordance with the respective publication. Only those 
sources that I cite directly from the original Ottoman text in Arabic 
script are transcribed using the system of the İslam Ansiklopedisi, at 
times with some minor modifications that correspond to modern 
Turkish usage (vergi instead of vergü etc.). Ottoman and Turkish 
terms that appear in the main text are written without diacritics, apart 
from those used in contemporary Turkish (“Kâzım Paşa” etc.). There-
fore, it is “tefviz” in the main text and “tefvīż” in the footnotes when 
the term appears in an Ottoman Turkish document, but “teffiz” when 
cited from an early republican law. Names are spelled according to 
modern Turkish conventions, unless when cited from other works.  
x 
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 1 
Introduction 
On March 28, 1925, Richard Reibel, a German citizen and resident of 
Mytilene, Greece, wrote a letter to the German embassy in Athens on 
behalf of a business acquaintance, a certain Mr. Illiopoulos. As Mr. 
Reibel explained in the letter, Mr. Illiopoulos had once been British 
vice-consul in Dikili, Turkey, where he owned “eines der groessten 
und bestbewirtschafteten Gueter Kleinasiens.” He was now willing to 
lease or sell it, possibly to a German company. On behalf of his friend, 
who stressed that he was in possession of all the relevant documents 
of ownership, Mr. Reibel now inquired whether the restitution of 
property owned by Greek citizens was proceeding smoothly.1 In his 
response letter to Reibel, the German consul at İzmir wrote: 
Über die Art und Weise, nach der die Rückgabe grie-
chischer Staatsangehöriger (sic) in Anatolien erfolgt, 
kann eine allgemeine Auskunft nicht erteilt werden. 
Nach einem Gesetz vom 19. Januar d. Js. Sollen die 
Güter der in der Türkei nicht ansässigen Griechen 
durch das Finanzministerium wie die „nationalen Gü-
ter“ (emlak-i - millie) verwaltet werden. Über die Ver-
teilung der Einnahmen trifft das Gesetz ebenfalls Be-
stimmung. Es ist danach wohl anzunehmen, dass ein 
freier Verkauf griechischer Güter nicht ohne weiteres 
zulässig ist.2 
Throughout the 1920s, great numbers of Greeks and Armenians from 
Turkey wrote letters similar to Reibelʼs to the embassies and consu-
lates of Western countries in Turkey.3 (Illiopoulos also wrote to the 
British; the story of his dispossession can be traced through the doc-
uments filed in London and is discussed further on in this study). 
 
1  PA AA, Izmir 93/50, Bd. 1, Grundbesitz Allgemeines. 
2 Ibid. The consul wrote about the “restitution of Greek citizens” – a Freudian slip?  
3 The archives of the American consulate in İzmir (kept at the National Archives 
and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland) hold hundreds of such let-
ters. 
2 
Having been forced to leave the country at the end of the Greco-
Turkish war in 1922, Greeks and Armenians were trying to sell or 
lease the land and houses they had left behind. As Mr. Illiopoulos, 
they were in possession of all documents of ownership, and thus 
assumed that they continued to enjoy their property rights in Turkey. 
Yet it turned out that this was no longer the case. As the German 
consul’s response letter makes clear, Turkish legislation made their 
property and the income it generated subject to administration by the 
Ministry of Finance. 
Estates such as that of Mr. Illiopoulos, who had resided in Turkey as a 
Greek citizen, as well as those owned by Ottoman Greeks (Rum) and 
Armenians, were known as “abandoned property” (emval-i metruke) 
or “national estates” (emlak-ı milliye) to contemporaries in Turkey.4 
(For reasons of practicability, both euphemisms are used without 
citation marks throughout this study). The owners of abandoned 
property had either been killed or forced out of the country after the 
Balkan Wars, during World War I or the subsequent Turkish War of 
Independence (1919–22), and their houses, farms, fields, vineyards, 
workshops and factories, including machinery, furniture, stocks, and 
personal belongings, were taken over by those who had stayed, usual-
ly local Muslims. From at least 1915 onwards, theses widespread prac-
tices of appropriation were declared illegal by a set of laws which stip-
ulated that abandoned property be administered by the state. Between 
1915 and 1945, a multitude of laws were issued, modified, revoked 
and rewritten in order to regulate the proper distribution and admin-
istration of this property, which was claimed not only by the Ministry 
of Finance, but also by a variety of other institutions and actors.  
Turkey is by far not the only country in which genocide and ethnic 
cleansing were accompanied and followed by the spoliation of the 
 
4 The terms “Rum” or “Rum Ortodoks” go back to the medieval word for the Byzan-
tine Empire, which simply was Rum – (Eastern) Rome. I shall use “Rum” 
throughout this study in order to refer to Ottoman Greeks. Citizens of the Greek 
nation state, on the other hand, shall be called “mainland Greeks.” Whenever the 
difference is negligible, I refer to both groups together as “Greeks”.  
 3 
victimsʼ wealth. The best-studied example for this economic side of 
genocide is the Nazi appropriation of Jewish wealth between 1938 and 
1945, which, thanks to the Allied victory over the Reich, was followed 
by limited policies of restitution and compensation.5 Those who were 
dispossessed in Turkey, however, were never compensated, and the 
Turkish case has more in common with British India and Mandate 
Palestine, where large-scale expulsions of the Hindu, Muslim, and 
Palestinian populations facilitated the establishment of modern na-
tion-states: Pakistan, India and Israel, respectively. The idea of an 
“exchange” of populations was discussed in both cases (before violent 
expulsions forced great numbers of people to leave), and Turkey was 
presented as a supposedly successful and peaceful precedent.6 India, 
Pakistan and Israel also developed policies for dealing with “aban-
doned property” that resemble the Turkish ones in important re-
spects.7  
 
5 See Dan Diner and Gotthart Wunberg, eds., Restitution and Memory: Material 
Restoration in Europe (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007); François Gues-
net, “"These are German Houses" Polish Memory Confronting Jedwabne,” in Res-
titution and Memory: Material Restoration in Europe, ed. Dan Diner and Gotthart 
Wunberg, 141–60 (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007). 
6 See Onur Yıldırım, Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek 
Exchange of Populations, 1922-1934 (New York, London: Routledge, 2006), 13. 
7 However, it is important to point out that both India and Israel continue to have 
substantial Muslim minorities which are comprised of people who were able to 
stay. Israel created a “custodian” office for abandoned property, which was treated 
as de facto state property. See Jacob Metzer, “Jewish Land - Israel Lands: Ethno-
Nationality and Land Regime in Zionism and in Israel, 1907-1967,” in Land Rights, 
Ethno-Nationality, and Sovereignty in History, ed. Stanley M. Engermann and Jacob 
Metzer (London: Routledge, 2004). For (failed) UN attempts at creating a compen-
sation scheme for Palestinians, see Michael R. Fischbach, “The United Nations 
and Palestinian Refugee Property Compensation,” Journal of Palestine Studies 31, 
no. 2 (2002). For India/Pakistan, see Vazira F.-Y. Zamindar, The Long Partition and 
the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories, Cultures of history 
(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2007). 
4 
The Turkish sociologist Çağlar Keyder has dubbed the property of 
Armenians and Greeks the “dowry of the state”.8 The metaphor illus-
trates the great significance that these houses, companies, and land 
had for the state-led creation of a Turkish bourgeoisie during World 
War I and the 1920s. The present study borrows Keyderʼs metaphor, 
but takes it one step further by arguing that this “dowry” – and the 
discourses and practices surrounding its distribution – was instru-
mental for the creation of a Turkish bourgeoisie, and, more im-
portantly, for the establishment and internal legitimization of a Turk-
ish nation-state. Calling abandoned property a dowry also makes it 
possible to take inspiration from anthropological approaches to gift 
exchange, and thus to shift the focus away from the actual objects in 
question and towards their function in the establishment of social 
relations between people.9 This implies that the present study is not 
so much concerned with the whereabouts and new owners of the 
stolen property in question (which included movable objects of all 
kinds, companies, workshops, businesses, landed estates, mansions, 
but also more humble dwellings, small fields, and orchards). Rather, 
it examines the social practices, rules and negotiation processes that 
shaped its distribution among the population of Turkey in the 1920s. 
The focus, so to speak, is on the other part of the gift exchange, that is, 
not the handing over of material things, but rather the discursive 
creation of political legitimacy and popular consent to the idea of a 
 
8 Çağlar Keyder, “The Consequences of the Exchange of Populations for Turkey,” in 
Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange be-
tween Greece and Turkey, ed. Renée Hirschon, 39–52 (New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 
2003), 45. 
9 These approaches can be traced back to Marcel Maussʼ groundbreaking essay first 
published in 1925. I worked with the English translation here: Marcel Mauss, The 
Gift. Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (London: Cohen&West, 
1966). The studies inspired by his work are too numerous to be listed here. My col-
leagues Sabine Hanisch and Rune Reyhé at BGSMCS in Berlin inspired me to 
think about the theoretical implications of the dowry metaphor. Moreover, the 
work of Vazira Zamindar has been of great importance in this respect: Zamindar, 
Partition. 
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Turkish nation-state. The temporal focus is on the years between 1922 
and 1930, which mark the emergence of Turkey first as a nation-state 
and then as a republic. These years also witnessed the Greco-Turkish 
population exchange and state policies of property compensation and 
distribution among immigrants, which further complicated the ques-
tion of abandoned property.  
Debates and conflicts concerning property distribution can be traced 
through laws, parliamentary minutes, newspapers, petitions and bu-
reaucratic documents that were produced in the course of those years. 
This study analyzes these sources as residues of an overarching dis-
course that was part of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the 
Republic of Turkey. These debates, as well as the popular and admin-
istrative practices that accompanied them, reshaped the way people 
perceived themselves, other groups in society, and the state. By focus-
ing on discussions of abandoned property, this study shows that laws 
and bureaucratic practices for the distribution of abandoned property 
were shaped in a complex process of negotiation between different 
groups in society and state administrations. It thus contributes to the 
growing field of studies interested in the social history of early repub-
lican Turkey, and more generally, something one may call the social 
history of nationalism. Resting on the contention that “[n]ations do 
not make states and nationalisms but the other way round,” this study 
shows how property previously owned by Rum, Greeks and Armeni-
ans came to be regarded as “national”. Moreover, it demonstrates that 
this category of property helped to produce another category for both 
people and the state which could only later be regarded as self-evident: 
Turkishness.10  
While chapters One, Two and Four are concerned with all of Anatolia 
(and partly, the Balkans), number Three and Five are mostly devoted 
to a specific location: İzmir/Smyrna, the most important port city of 
 
10 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 10. 
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Anatolia, and the surrounding province of the same name.11 İzmir is 
an interesting, yet no exemplary case for Anatolia: It held tremendous 
importance in the imagination of contemporary Turkish nationalists 
as the city’s military occupation, and eventual military re-conquest, 
was regarded as both the starting point and end of the Greco-Turkish 
War (1919–22).12 Due to its large Christian and Jewish population, the 
city was known as “Infidel” (Gavur) İzmir among Muslims in late 
Ottoman times. The almost complete forced migration of İzmir’s 
Rum, Greek and Armenian inhabitants at the end of the Greco-
Turkish war was therefore in itself regarded as a victory in the Turk-
ish nationalist mind-set. Economically, İzmir was the most important 
city of Anatolia, as well as the one that was most integrated to the 
global capitalist market. The Kaystros and Meander valleys offered 
rich, alluvial soil, and two railroad lines made it possible to ship the 
countryside’s agricultural products to the port. Sixty percent of late 
Ottoman exports, most notably dried fruit, nuts, olive oil and carpets, 
were handled in İzmir. The agricultural richness of the area translat-
ed into urban wealth among the traders and bankers of İzmir. Thanks 
to commercial agriculture, the area was one of the very few in Anato-
lia that had a full-grown market in land and real-estate. Prior to World 
War I, İzmir was one of the most important cities of the Mediterrane-
an, featuring a multilingual and cosmopolitan population. 13  Very 
 
11 Similar to Istanbul/Konstantinople, İzmir had two names in the period I am 
studying here. As in the case of Istanbul, these names were highly politicized and 
symbolized the struggle over cultural hegemony between Christians and Muslims 
in the city. Known as “İzmir” among authors writing and speaking in Turkish, the 
city was usually referred to as “Smyrna” by those writing in Greek, English, 
French, and German. Except for citations, I use “İzmir” throughout this study.  
12 See Çağlar Keyder, “A History and Geography of Turkish Nationalism,” in Citizen-
ship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey, ed. Thalia G. Dragonas and Faruk 
Birtek, 3–17 (London: Routledge, 2005). 
13 On İzmir’s importance in late Ottoman times see Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman 
and Alan Masters, eds., The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Istanbul, 
and Izmir (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Léon 
Kontente, Smyrne et l’Occident (Montigny le Bretonneux: Yvelinédition, 2005); 
Philip Mansel, Levant: Splendour and Catastrophe on the Mediterranean (London: 
 7 
much like the Çukurova plain in southern Anatolia, it also was a place 
where the development of commercial agriculture led to the emer-
gence of large landed estates which were often owned by Rum and 
Greeks (around İzmir) and Armenians (around Adana). This overlap-
ping of class and ethnicity was increasingly politicized during the 
early 20th century. It is the contention of the present study that this 
politicization of private property and wealth along ethno-religious 
lines (i.e., the tendency to explain class conflict as a problem of reli-
gious and/or ethnic difference) did not end when the Greeks and 
Armenians of Anatolia and Thrace were expelled, deported or killed 
between 1912 and 1922. Crucially, “Armenianness” or “Greekness” of 
abandoned property (i.e., the identity of absent or dead owners) con-
tinued to matter throughout the 1920s, and informed the way in 
which various groups and institutions sought to legitimate their eco-
nomic claims to these assets.  
İzmir was re-taken by the Turkish nationalist army on September 9, 
1922. On September 13, a devastating fire (which is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Three) broke out. The blaze destroyed most of 
the city, but still left enough wealth to trigger a major wave of internal 
migration from all of western Anatolia to İzmir. The agricultural 
richness (and sudden lack of manpower) in the surrounding country-
side also attracted important numbers of people. As a result, İzmir 
became one of the few areas in early Republican Turkey that experi-
enced a scarcity of land and housing, along with soaring rents and 
property prices, during the first years of the Republic. It is this excep-
tional combination of ideological and economic importance, a mass 
emigration followed by equally large-scale immigration and a capital-
ist conception of property that characterized İzmir during the 1920s. 
Comparable developments in other parts of Turkey only started in the 
late 1940s.  
 
                                                                                                                      
John Murray, 2010); Marie-Carmen Smyrnelis, ed., Smyrne, la ville oubliée? Mé-
moires d’un grand port ottoman, 1830-1930 (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2006). 
8 
State of the art  
The problem of “abandoned property” has mostly been studied as a 
secondary aspect of the history of the Armenian Genocide.14 As early 
as the 1930s, several Armenian scholars wrote about the fate of Ar-
menian property. Their works, however, were written in Armenian 
only and have not reached a wider scholarly public.15 Recently, schol-
arly interest in the material side of the genocide has started to in-
crease again.16 In the wake of this development, important and hither-
to unpublished work on the subject has finally been published. 17 
While it is completely uncontroversial and part of common wisdom 
that stolen Armenian property helped to create a Turkish bourgeoisie, 
very little work has been done in the way of actual case studies. 
Mehmet Polatel and Ümit Üngör’s monograph, which includes two 
chapters on Diyarbakır and Adana, constitutes a mere first step in that 
direction.18 The fate of Armenian property constitutes a “taboo within 
the taboo” of the genocide in Turkey, and important sources therefore 
 
14 Taner Akçam, A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish 
Responsibility (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); Fuat Dündar, Modern Türki-
ye’nin Şifresi. İttihat ve Terakki’nin Etnisite Mühendisliği (1913– 1918) (Istanbul: 
İletişim, 2008). 
15 For a discussion of these early studies see Der B. Matossian, “The Taboo within 
the Taboo: The Fate of 'Armenian Capital' at the End of the Ottoman Empire,” Eu-
ropean Journal of Turkish Studies, Complete List (2011): 1, 
http://ejts.revues.org/4411 (accessed June 26, 2013). 
16 See Hrayr S. Karagueuzian, A Perfect Injustice. Genocide and Theft of Armenian 
Wealth (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2009); Mehmet Po-
latel, “Turkish State Formation and the Distribution of the Armenian Abandoned 
Properties from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey (1915-1930),” (MA 
thesis, Koç University, 2009). 
17 Neither the French original nor the English translation has been available to me: 
Kévork K. Baghdijian, La confiscation, par le gouvernement turc, des biens arméniens 
dit 'abandonnés' (Montreal, 1987); Kévork K. Baghdijian, The Confiscation of Arme-
nian Properties by the Turkish Government Said to be Abandoned (Antelias: Printing 
House of the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia, 2010). 
18 Mehmet Polatel and Uğur Ü. Üngör, Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk 
Seizure of Armenian Property (London, New York: Continuum International, 2011). 
 9 
still remain unavailable.19 However, as Taner Akçam and Ümit Kurt 
have recently shown, even the easily available sources (most notably 
laws) offer important insights into the process of dispossession, pro-
vided they are read against the grain.20  
One greatly understudied aspect of economic dispossession during 
that period is that other groups were affected as well. The laws for 
“abandoned property” that were issued between 1915 and 1922 dealt 
not only with Armenian, but also with Rum and Greek property. 
Among the works addressing this point are some written by officials 
such as Salahaddin Kardeş of the Turkish Ministry of Finance. 
Kardeş’s book, which applies a rather positivist approach to these texts, 
is hardly more than a collection of laws, and is clearly intended for 
use as a handbook in Turkish governmental offices today. 21 
Governmental circles are clearly worried because heirs of Ottoman 
Greeks and Armenians have started to sue the Turkish state for 
compensation or restitution of their property at the European Court of 
Human Rights. Therefore, the subject is also studied by scholars who 
are looking for legal arguments to fend off such claims.22 
The journalist Nevzat Onaran and the Greek political scientist Ana-
stasia Lekka study Greek and Armenian property in conjunction. 
Lekka’s article is valuable insofar as it conceptualizes the disposses-
sion of Armenians and Greeks as part of the same policy, which it 
 
19 Matossian, “Taboo.” 
20 Taner Akçam and Ümit Kurt, Kanunların Ruhu: Emval-i Metruke Kanunlarında 
Soykırımın izini sürmek (Istanbul: İletişim, 2012); Taner Akçam, “Kanunların 
Ruhu ya da Emval-i Metruke Kanunlarında Soykırımın İzini Sürmek,” Altüst, 
no. 7 (2012); Taner Akçam and Ümit Kurt, The Spirit of the Laws. The Plunder of 
Wealth in the Armenian Genocide (New York: Berghahn, 2015). 
21 Salâhaddin Kardeş, “Tehcir ve Emval-i Metruke Mevzuatı,” (2008), 
http://eskiportal.sgb.gov.tr/Publications/Tehcir%20ve%20Emval-
i%20Metruke%20Mevzuat%C4%B1.pdf (accessed November 3, 2013). 
22 For a recent example, see Cavid Abdullahzade, “Emval-i Metruke Kapsamındaki 
Mülkiyet Davalarının Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi Süreci Açısından 
Değerlendirilmesi,” Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 62, no. 2 (2013): 
317 – 347. 
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traces through the 20th century. It is, however, full of mistakes and 
based on secondary sources written in European languages only.23 
Onaran’s monograph provides a very valuable discussion of both laws 
and parliamentary debates that centered on “abandoned property” 
between 1915 and 2001(!).24 While taking a much more critical per-
spective than Kardeş’s, the book largely fails to provide an interpreta-
tion of its sources. Moreover, the fate of Greek and Rum property is 
not traced beyond 1922. This gap is partly filled by a follow-up publi-
cation, which again does not provide much more than a (admittedly 
very helpful and important) list of laws and policies.25 
The seizing and appropriation of “abandoned property” has been 
described as part of a policy known as “Turkification” (Türkleştirme), 
which forms a somewhat distinct area of research. Ayhan Aktar has 
defined “Turkification” as all policies 
aiming at the complete dominance of an ethnically 
Turkish identity in all dimensions of social life, on all 
levels and without any concessions from the language 
spoken on the street to history lessons to be taught in 
school, from education to industry, from trade to the re-
cruitment policy of state agencies, from private law to 
the settlement of certain citizens in certain parts of the 
country.26  
 
23 For instance, Lekka insinuates that the Ottoman Empire was ruled from Ankara in 
1914. See Anastasia Lekka, “Legislative Provisions of the Ottoman/Turkish 
Governments Regarding Minorities and their Properties,” Mediterranean Quarterly 
18, no. 1 (2007): 137. 
24 Nevzat Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke Olayı: Osmanlı’da ve Cumhuriyette Ermeni ve Rum 
Mallarının Türkleştirilmesi (Istanbul: Belge, 2010). 
25 See Nevzat Onaran, Cumhuriyet’te Ermeni ve Rum Mallarının Türkleştirilmesi 
(Istanbul: Evrensel, 2013). 
26 “Burada Türkleştirme politikalarından kasıt, sokakta konuşulan dilden okullarda 
öğretilecek tarihe; eğitimden sanayi hayatına; ticaretten devlet personel rejimine; 
özel hukuktan vatandaşların belli yörelerde iskân edilmelerine kadar toplumsal 
hayatın her boyutunda, Türk etnik kimliğinin her düzeyde ve tavizsiz bir biçimde 
 11 
The term thus goes far beyond the realm of economic nationalism. In 
a narrower sense, it is used to refer to the “transfer of wealth from 
non-Muslim minorities to the other part of the population.”27 Much 
like the “Aryanization” of Jewish property in Nazi Germany and Nazi-
occupied Europe, “Turkification” can be regarded as a euphemism for 
a multitude of acts that ranged from forced sales to confiscations to 
outright robbery. Like “Aryanization”, “Turkification” as a research 
topic poses the theoretical question whether it was ideology or eco-
nomic interest that primarily informed the actions of those who prof-
ited from policies of dispossession.28 The term “Turkification” was 
hardly used by contemporaries, who instead spoke of their goal of a 
“national” economy (milli iktisat). The first one to use the term ap-
pears to have been Tekin Alp, who published a booklet with that title 
in 1928.29 Today, the term “Turkification” is mostly used from a criti-
cal perspective. One important, yet hitherto unaddressed, difference 
concerns the chronology of events: In the case of Armenian property, 
its transfer to Muslim hands was largely performed after the genocide, 
while “Aryanization” started years before the Shoah and actually 
helped to prepare it.30 
Early republican policies of economic Turkification were clearly root-
ed in those pursued by the Young Turk Committee of Union and 
                                                                                                                      
egemenliğini ve ağırlığını koymasıdır.” Ayhan Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve 
"Türkleştirme" Politikaları (Istanbul: İletişim, 2000), 101. 
27 “gayrimüslim azınlıklardan nüfusun diğer kesimine doğru bir servet 
transferi(nin)(...)” Aktar, “Türkleştirme”, 10. 
28 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 6. 
29 See Tekin Alp, Türkleşdirme (Istanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1928). 
30 The differences and similarities between the dispossession of Jews on the one 
hand and Armenians on the other have hardly been studied. For a first prelimi-
nary outline of these, see Ellinor Morack, “'As a Matter of Fact, it has Become 
Ownerless' – Text and Subtext in the Turkish National Assembly’s Deliberations 
on the 'Abandoned Property Law', 1921-22,” (Paper presented to the conference “A 
Civilisation Destroyed. The Wealth of non-Muslims in the Late Ottoman Period 
and Early Republican Era,” Istanbul, November 22, 2015). The conference pro-
ceedings are going to be published by the Hrant Dink Foundation.  
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Progress (henceforth: CUP) after 1909.31 The Young Turks, who had 
at first advocated economic liberalism, came to embrace ideas of eco-
nomic nationalism around 1908. Early nationalist writers such as Ziya 
Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura, Ömer Seyfeddin and Tekin Alp criticized the 
predominance of foreign (and later on, of non-Muslim Ottoman) 
traders and capital in the Ottoman economy, advocating the idea of a 
“national economy” (milli iktisat).32 This concept was first translated 
into boycott campaigns directed against mainland Greek and Austrian 
and then, from the Balkan Wars onwards, against non-Muslim busi-
nesses.33  
Some studies on Turkification concentrate on the propaganda of eco-
nomic nationalism, while others have focused on practices of actual 
 
31 See Murat Koraltürk, Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi 
(İstanbul: İletişim, 2011), 14. 
32 See Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 30. The development of Turkish nationalism 
has been studied for a long time. Standard works include Uriel Heyd, Foundations 
of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp (Westport, 
Connecticut: Hyperion, 1979); François Georgeon, Aux Origines du Nationalisme 
Turc: Yusuf Akçura, 1876–1935 (Paris: ADPF, 1980); Taha Parla, The Social and 
Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876-1924 (Leiden: Brill, 1985). 
33 See Yücel Terzibaşoğlu, “Land Disputes and Ethno-Politics: North-Western 
Anatolia, 1877-1912,” in Land Rights, Ethno-Nationality, and Sovereignty in History, 
ed. Stanley M. Engermann and Jacob Metzer, 153–80 (London: Routledge, 2004), 
173. For a discussion of the problem of foreign economic penetration from the 
perspective of labor history, see Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular 
Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908: Reactions to European Economic 
Penetration (New York: New York University Press, 1983). The book includes a 
discussion of the 1908 boycott of Austrian goods, which is also studied in more de-
tail in Y. D. Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu: Bir Toplumsal Hareketin Analizi (Is-
tanbul: İletişim, 2004); Y. D. Çetinkaya, The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement: 
Nationalism, Protest and the Working Classes in the Formation of Modern Turkey 
(London: Tauris, 2014). On the idea of milli iktisat, and a detailed discussion of 
these boycott campaigns, see Zafer Toprak, Milli İktisat, Milli Burjuvazi (İstanbul: 
Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995); Zafer Toprak, “Nationalism and Economics in 
the Young Turk Era (1908-1918),” in Enjeux et rapports de force, ed. Roland Perez 
and Salgur Kançal, 259–66, Varia Turcica / Institut Français d’Études 
Anatoliennes (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996). 
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confiscation and appropriation, especially those directed against Jews 
in republican times.34 As Polatel and Üngör have pointed out, earlier 
studies have generally failed to address the relationship between anti-
Christian ideology and practices of economic Turkification. 35 They 
themselves have attempted to close this gap by discussing theories on 
the one hand and practices on the other, arguing that both were intri-
cately interconnected. However, their discussion neglects the debates 
that took place among Ottoman Muslims, which, as this study shows, 
mark the very place where intellectuals’ ideas and bureaucratic and 
popular practice came into contact and influenced each other. 
This gap between studies of ideology and those of practice is probably 
rooted in a conceptual limitation which restrains almost all works 
dealing with the phenomenon of Turkification and abandoned prop-
erty: They usually study the issue only as a part of the history of mi-
norities in Turkey, and therefore do not consider the time after the 
minoritiesʼ forced emigration. The questions that can be addressed 
from this perspective are limited to the whereabouts of stolen goods, 
the names of new owners, and, possibly, their use of the stolen prop-
erty. Anything beyond this point does not seem relevant as long as 
“Turkification” is conceptualized as the mere act of property transfer 
from one owner to the other. Things change completely once we con-
ceptualize Turkification as a process within society that continued for 
a long time even after property had been stolen from non-Muslims. 
In this light, theft and confiscation appear merely as the starting point 
of the story. It becomes possible to also consider the distribution of 
abandoned property among the Muslim population of Anatolia, and 
their appropriation of this wealth, which had material as well as dis-
cursive dimensions. Furthermore, this shift has the advantage of 
making it possible to consider a whole range of sources that are rela-
 
34 Ayhan Aktar, “Economic Nationalism in Turkey: The Formative Years, 1912–1925,” 
Boğaziçi Journal: Review of Social and Administrative Studies 10, 1–2 (1996); Aktar, 
Varlık; Rıfat Bali, Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni 1923-1945. Cumhuriyet Yıllarında 
Türkiye Yahudileri (Istanbul: İletişim, 2010). 
35 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, xi. 
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tively easily available: much of the original appropriation, whether in 
late Ottoman or Republican times, went unregistered and was per-
formed according to principles that were never spelled out in laws.36 
The follow-up debates about abandoned property in republican times, 
however, are documented very well.  
First conceptual steps towards such an approach have already been 
taken: Bedross Der Matossian distinguishes between confiscation in 
Ottoman and appropriation in republican times. Nevzat Onaran and 
Murat Koraltürk cite from parliamentary debates about abandoned 
property and thus draw attention to the fact that there was a good deal 
of controversy about the whereabouts of abandoned property among 
contemporary Muslims.37 Mehmet Polatel points at the importance of 
property distribution as a means of winning support for the new re-
publican regime in Turkey and analyzes a number of republican 
laws.38 Justin McCarthy states that the “emigration of the Ottoman 
minorities from Anatolia and Thrace created a Turkish middle class” 
which had “every reason, economic and social, to appreciate the new 
order in Turkey.”39 Çağlar Keyder calls abandoned property the “dow-
ry of the state” whose distribution “served both to expedite the crea-
tion of a native bourgeoisie and also to make it beholden to the 
state.”40 Both Keyder and McCarthy make these statements with re-
gard to all abandoned property, i.e., both that of Armenians and of 
 
36 For the Ottoman case, see ibid. For the early Republican one, see Koraltürk, Erken, 
23. 
37 Koraltürk has written about the debate on the looting of İzmir. See Murat 
Koraltürk, “Türk-Yunan Nüfus Mübadelesinin İktisadi Sonuçları,” in Erken 
Cumhuriyet Döneminde Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi, 51–94 (İstanbul: İletişim, 
2011). 
38 Polatel, Turkish, 13. 
39 Justin McCarthy, “Foundation of the Turkish Republic: Social and Economic 
Change,” Middle Eastern Studies 19, no. 2 (1983): 144. 
40 Çağlar Keyder, “The Consequences of the Exchange of Populations for Turkey,” in 
Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange 
between Greece and Turkey, ed. Renée Hirschon, 39–52 (New York, 
Oxford: Berghahn, 2003), 45. 
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Ottoman Greeks. They suggest that the function of abandoned prop-
erty was essentially the same, regardless of the ethno-religious back-
ground of its owners. This observation is very important for the pre-
sent endeavor, as it shifts the focus towards a field of study that has 
already been worked on quite extensively: The mutual forced migra-
tion commonly known as “population exchange” that took place be-
tween Greece and Turkey between 1923 and 1925. Both governments 
agreed on an “exchange” of their respective Muslim and Greek Or-
thodox minorities in the course of the Lausanne peace conference, 
and signed a convention to that effect on January 30, 1923. The doc-
ument contained detailed regulations on the exchange not only of 
people, but also of movable and immovable property. It insinuated 
that migrants would be compensated through the appropriation of the 
property that their counterparts left behind: Muslim property aban-
doned in Greece and Greek (Rum) property in Turkey. As a result, 
both countries started to develop a distinct set of administrative tech-
niques dealing with property owned by people who were now referred 
to as “subject to the exchange” (mübadeleye tabii- for Ottoman Greeks) 
or “exchangee” (mübadil- for Muslims from Greece) in Turkey. They 
were supposed to be compensated for their losses, which were ap-
praised and verified during the course of a highly bureaucratic pro-
cess. This gargantuan task created impressive amounts of red tape, 
and thus archival material which, unlike that produced with regard to 
Armenian property, is accessible for research.  
According to Keyder, contemporaries regarded the population ex-
change as a “negotiated and legally acceptable – hence civilised – ver-
sion of ethnic cleansing.”41 It seems to be this notion of legality (as 
opposed to the blatant illegality of the Armenian case) that to this day 
leads historians to assume that the story of Greek (Rum) property is 
essentially different from that of its Armenian counterpart. As a result, 
the fate of Rum property (at least after January 1923) has hardly been 
 
41 Keyder, “Consequences”, 40. 
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considered in works dealing with abandoned property.42 Moreover, 
this notion greatly facilitated the archival research conducted for this 
study.  
Existing studies of the population exchange have suggested that prop-
erty distribution was far from being a pacifying and consent-creating 
device. In his seminal study of the exchange, Onur Yıldırım argues 
that the settlement and property distribution policies of the Turkish 
government were largely unsuccessful, leading to numerous conflicts 
that went on “well into the later years of the 1930s.”43 Exchangees 
actually held a public protest meeting in Istanbul in 1924, which, 
according to Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı, was the “first and only political 
activity” of that group.44 Ayhan Aktar, Kemal Arı and Murat Koraltürk 
have shown that there was severe criticism of the settlement and dis-
tribution process in the Great National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye 
Büyük Millet Meclisi, henceforth: TBMM) and the contemporary 
press.45 Working with local newspapers from İzmir, Kemal Arı has 
also shown that abandoned property was already contested and hotly 
debated before the exchangee refugees’ arrival, and remained so 
throughout the early 1920s.46 To this day, however, nobody has sys-
 
42 Neither Onaranʼs first book nor Kardeş, both of whom work with a thematic focus 
on abandoned property, consider legislation for Rum property issued after 1922. 
Onaran’s second book considers some of these laws, but by far not all the relevant 
ones.  
43 Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 150. 
44 M. A. Gökaçtı, Nüfus Mübadelesi: Kayıp bir Kuşağın Hikâyesi (Istanbul: İletişim, 
2004), 218. 
45 Ayhan Aktar, “Homogenising the Nation, Turkifying the Economy: The Turkish 
Experience of Population Exchange Reconsidered,” in Crossing the Aegean: An 
Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey, ed. 
Renée Hirschon, 79–95 (New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2003); Kemal Arı, Büyük 
Mübadele: Türkiye’ye Zorunlu Göç (1923–1925) (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1995); Murat 
Koraltürk, “Türk-Yunan,” in Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Ekonominin 
Türkleştirilmesi. 
46 Kemal Arı, “Yunan İşgalinden sonra İzmir’de "Emval-i Metruke" ve "Fuzuli İşgal" 
Sorunu,” Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi 5, no. 15 (1989), 
http://www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=891 (accessed 
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tematically studied the distribution of property to exchangees from 
the perspective of social history, nor regarded this topic as connected 
to the larger story of abandoned property in Turkey.  
Compensation policies and popular reactions to them are a promising 
field for anyone interested in the social history of early Republican 
Turkey. With regard to the messy details of property assignment 
(tahsis) to exchangees, important work has been done by Nedim İpek 
for the area around Samsun and by Tülay Alim Baran for İzmir.47 
Both have worked with state records documenting the distribution of 
property to exchangees (tahsis defterleri) and thus offered first insights 
into the bureaucratic procedure on the ground. However, the voices of 
the exchangees remain inaudible in their sources. Autobiographies 
and oral history projects provide some important information, but 
merely provide retrospective accounts.48 A noteworthy exception is a 
short article written by a first-generation exchangee in the 1930s, (and 
first published in the 1980s) which suggests that exchangees were 
                                                                                                                      
June 3, 2010); Kemal Arı, “1923 Türk-Rum Mübadele Anlaşması Sonrasında 
İzmir’de “Emval-i Metruke” ve Mübadil Göçmenler,” Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi 
Dergisi 6, no. 18 (1990). 
47 Nedim İpek, Mübadele ve Samsun (Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2001); Tülay A. Baran, Bir 
Kentin Yeniden Yapılanması (İzmir 1923-1938) (Arma, 2003). 
48 Autobiographies of exchangees include Zehra Kosova, Ben İşçiyim, ed. Zihni T. 
Anadol (Istanbul: İletişim, 1996); Engin Berber, Rumeli’den İzmir’e Yitik 
Yaşamların İzinde, Kent kitaplığı dizisi (İzmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür 
Yayınları, 2002). For works based on oral history projects see Tuncay E. 
Sepetçioğlu, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Yılllarında Girit’ten Söke’ye Mübadele Öyküleri,” 
(M.A. thesis, Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi, 2007), 
http://www.belgeler.com/blg/1895/cumhuriyetin-ilk-yillarinda-girit-ten-soke-ye-
mubadele-oykuleri-in-the-first-years-of-the-republic-population-exchange-stories-
from-crete-to-soke (accessed June 28, 2013); İskender Özsoy, İki Vatan Yorgunları 
Mübadele Acısını Yaşayanlar Anlatıyor (Istanbul: Bağlam, 2003); Raif Kaplanoğlu, 
Bursa’da Mübadele (Bursa: Avrasya Etnografya Vakfı, 1999); Tolga Köker, “Lessons 
in Refugeehood: The Experience of Forced Migrants in Turkey,” in Crossing the 
Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece 
and Turkey, ed. Renée Hirschon, 193–208 (New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2003). 
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intensely unhappy with what they received in the way of compensa-
tion.49  
Writing in 2006, Gavin D. Brockett suggested that the social history of 
the republican period “has yet to be written.”50 There is still very little 
in the way of studies that actually seek to enlighten the impact of early 
republican (reform) policies on ordinary people’s lives and the rela-
tionship between both. Western scholars have until very recently all 
but neglected the early republican period, and the available literature 
has been described as “completely dominated by the centre, its ideas, 
its plans and ambitions and its infighting.”51 Critical scholarship in 
Turkey itself was cut off almost completely by the 1980 coup.52 Turk-
ish historians writing after that date have been blamed for merely 
providing “minimal assessments” of social history, based on an “as-
sertion that what the Kemalist elite believed should happen was in-
deed taking place.”53  
Over the past few years, the situation has markedly improved. This 
positive development has become possible with the opening of the 
Republican Archives in 2005: Hale Yılmaz studied reforms in the 
realm of dress, the alphabet, and public gatherings as arenas in which 
ordinary people negotiated their relationship to the new regime, 
whereas Yeşim Bayar looks into the politics of language and citizen-
 
49 Ömer D. Tesal, “Azınlıkların Mübadelesi: Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinin Geçmişinden 
Bir Örnek,” Tarih ve Toplum 9, no. 53 (1988). 
50 Gavin D. Brockett, “Revisiting the Turkish Revolution, 1923– 1938: Secular Re-
form and Religious "Reaction",” History Compass 4, no. 6 (2006): 1062. 
51 Erik J. Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening: From the 
Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 212. 
52 The two most interesting books on the period were written prior to the coup and 
remain standard works of reference: Mahmut Goloğlu, Devrimler ve Tepkileri, 
1924–1930 (Ankara: Başnur, 1972); Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek 
Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması: 1923-1931 (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1981). 
53 Gavin D. Brockett, “Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a 
Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923–38,” Middle Eastern 
Studies 34, no. 4 (1998): 45. 
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ship during that period.54 Issues such as as girls’ education and pros-
titution have also been studied.55 As for the 1930s, Yiğit Akın analyzes 
petitions addressed to the ruling People’s Party as sites of contention 
of and negotiation with the Republican regime. 56  Murat Metinsoy 
points out that the Kemalist regime of the 1930s did indeed listen to 
popular demands and considered them in its decision-making on the 
Kurdish south-east.57 A recent edited volume makes a first attempt at 
gathering different approaches to the social history of the years im-
mediately before and after the establishment of the Republic in 
1923.58 Contributions to this volume deal with issues such as sur-
name legislation, family and nation, mid-level elites, and the provin-
cial press. However, they are again mostly limited to a discussion of 
the 1930s and 40s.59 So far, Hale Yılmaz (who considers petitions) has 
been the only one to include voices from below dating from the first 
 
54 Hale Yılmaz, Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in 
Early Republican Turkey, 1923-1945 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
2013); Yeşim Bayar, “Turkish Nation-Building Process: An Analysis of Language, 
Education, and Citizenship Policies during the Early Republic (1920-1938),” (PhD 
thesis, McGill University, 2008). 
55 Elif E. Akşit, “Girls’ Education and the Paradoxes of Modernity and Nationalism in 
the late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic,” (PhD thesis, State Uni-
versity of New York, 2004); Mark D. Wyers, “The New Republic’s 'Other' Daugh-
ters: Legislating National Sex and Regulating Prostitution in Istanbul, 1880-1933,” 
(PhD thesis, University of Arizona, 2008). 
56 Yiğit Akın, “Reconsidering State, Party and Society in Early Republican Turkey: 
Politics of Petitioning,” International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES) 39 
(2007). 
57 Metin Metinsoy, “Fragile Hegemony, Flexible Authoritarianism, and Governing 
from Below: Politicians’ Reports in Early Republican Turkey,” International Jour-
nal of Middle East Studies (IJMES) 43 (2011). 
58 Gavin D. Brockett, ed., Towards a Social History of Modern Turkey (Istanbul: Libra, 
2011). 
59 The only exception is Ryan Gingerasʼ contribution, which nevertheless does not 
consider sources written or commissioned by ordinary people. See Ryan Gingeras, 
“Gangsters, Kidnappers, Killers and Other Patriots: The Writing of a New Social 
History of the Turkish War of Independence,” in Towards a Social History of 
Modern Turkey, ed. Gavin D. Brockett, 39–58 (Istanbul: Libra, 2011). 
20 
six years of the republic (prior to the introduction of the Latin script in 
1928). She has had access to the otherwise closed archive of the Turk-
ish Ministry of the Interior.  
The present study takes a first step towards a consideration of ordi-
nary peoples’ experiences of the very first years of the Turkish Repub-
lic by analyzing petitions that immigrants (as well as locals) sent from 
İzmir to Ankara in those years. It seeks to provide a better under-
standing of the relationship between ordinary people and the early 
republican state, arguing that property distribution was one of the 
arenas in which this relationship was re-configured along national 
lines. By scrutinizing petitions, newspapers, parliamentary debates 
and archival documents dealing with Greek and Armenian aban-
doned property, this book provides insights into the process by which 
the Ottoman state was transformed into a republic and studies the 
impact this change had on ordinary peoples’ lives. The main assump-
tion is that the process of distribution was an important site in which 
both individual identities and that of the emerging state were re-
enacted along the requirements of a nation-state. Relationships were 
established through far more than simple transactions of wealth from 
one subject to the other. Rather, they took place in a setting in which 
abandoned property was already charged with a multiplicity of mean-
ings and expectations. Debates about abandoned property, however 
much they may have centered on objects, were also struggles over the 
character of the nascent nation state and the identities of the people 
living in it.  
The gap between studies of practices and ideology outlined above can 
be bridged with the help of an approach that conceptualizes aban-
doned property both as a discursive and a practical problem. Adminis-
trative practices (such as auctions, but also non-administrative ones, 
such as squatting), were both shaped by and took place within the 
context of a major debate on the meaning, as well as definitions of the 
proper and improper use of these assets. As this book shows, these 
meanings had to a large extent been shaped in the time preceding the 
population exchange. It is therefore both difficult and conceptually 
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misleading to separate the issues of Greek and Armenian property as 
problems in early republican history. For reasons of practicality 
(mostly related to the availability of sources), this study mostly focuses 
on Greek and Rum property.  
Until very recently, historians were mostly interested in 
İzmir/Smyrna before 1922 as the major trading hub that it was up 
until 1912, and in the political, economic and cultural activities of its 
overwhelmingly non-Muslim trading bourgeoisie, particularly the 
Greeks.60 Emre Erolʼs study of the district of Foçateyn (a peninsula 
comprising two coastal towns south of İzmir) is the first to bridge this 
gap by studying the two towns from late Ottoman to Republican 
times.61 It was, unfortunately, published too recently for detailed con-
sideration in this book.  
Other studies have paid virtually no attention to İzmirʼs history after 
1922, which was characterized by the loss both of its Greek and Ar-
menian inhabitants, and, largely as a result of that, of its economic 
importance. It comes as no surprise that the three recent studies cov-
ering this post-war history focus on those non-Muslim groups that 
were able to stay, i.e., Jews and Levantines. Moreover, one of these 
 
60 A few examples of the rich literature on Ottoman İzmir include Daniel Goffman, 
“Izmir, from Village to Colonial Port City,” in The Ottoman City between East and 
West: Aleppo, Istanbul, and Izmir, ed. Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman and Alan 
Masters, 79–134 (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
Alexander H. de Groot and Maurits H. d. van Boogert, eds., Ottoman Izmir: 
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books considers İzmir in tandem with Beirut and Alexandria.62 Writ-
ten for a non-scholarly public, all three monographs are based on 
extensive use of secondary and primary sources, but not on archival 
material from Turkish state archives. Apart from a few articles and 
monographs focusing on the economic history of Republican Turkey, 
most scholarly works on İzmir after 1912 and during the early Repub-
lican period have been written for a Turcophone public.63 There is 
 
62 See Henri Nahum, Juifs de Smyrne XIXe - XXe siècle (Paris: Aubier, 1997); Kontente, 
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in İzmir, where they grew up as members of the Jewish community, whose histo-
ry, unlike that of the Ottoman Greeks and Armenians, covers Republican times. 
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For information on the Kontente family, see 
www.levantineheritage.com/jaquinon.htm. On Henri Nahum, whose family was 
originally from Manisa, but was forced to move to İzmir in 1922, see 
www.iletisim.com.tr/kişi/henri-nahum-662.aspx (both last accessed on July 10, 
2013). 
63 See Çağlar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development 
(London, New York: Verso, 1987); Çağlar Keyder, The Definition of a Peripheral 
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Michael M. Finefrock, “Laissez-Faire, the 1923 Izmir Economic Congress and Ear-
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17, no. 3 (1981); Cem Emrence, “Turkey in Economic Crisis (1927–1930): A Pano-
ramic Vision,” Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 4 (2003); Devrim Dumludağ and 
Bülent Durgun, “An Economy in Transition: Izmir (1918–38),” Middle Eastern 
Studies 47, no. 6 (2011); Eyüp Özveren and Erkan Gürpınar, “Competition as Ri-
valry: İzmir during the Great Depression,” in Cities of the Mediterranean: From 
the Ottomans to the Present Day, ed. Biray Kolluoğlu and Meltem Toksöz (Lon-
don: I.B. Tauris, 2010). Studies in Turkish include Çınar Atay, Tarih İçinde İzmir 
(İzmir: Tifset Basım ve Yayın Sanayi, 1978); Nail Moralı, Mütarekede İzmir, Ön-
celeri ve Sonraları (Istanbul: Ülkü, 1976); Engin Berber, Bir İzmir Kâbusu. Mütareke 
ve İşgal Üzerine Yazılar, Kent kitaplığı dizisi 25 (İzmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediye-
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İzmir (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999); Erkan Serçe et al., Küllerinden Doğan Şehir: The 
City which Rose from the Ashes (İzmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayın-
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(İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayıncılık, 1998); Baran, Bir; Mesut Çapa, “İzmir Müdafaa-i 
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also the biography of Ferit S. Eczacıbaşı64 and a growing number of 
M.A. theses65 which have a strong focus on İzmir. 
Theoretical approach 
“Abandoned property” was (and continues to be) a legal term. My 
analysis of its development is informed by years of reading both Fou-
cault and scholarly works that rely on him without explicitly citing 
him. What Foucault once said about Marx is now also true for the 
importance of his own work for the present book:  
I quote Marx without saying so, without quotation 
marks, and because people are incapable of recognizing 
Marxʼs texts, I am thought to be someone who doesnʼt 
quote Marx. When a physicist writes a work of physics, 
does he feel it necessary to quote Newton and Einstein? 
(...) It is impossible at the present time to write history 
without using a whole range of concepts directly or indi-
rectly linked to Marxʼs thought and situating oneself 
within a horizon of thought which has been defined and 
described by Marx.66 
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Yaşamı ve Anıları, ed. Yaşar Aksoy (Istanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı, 1986). 
65 Hakan Erterzi, “Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası ve İzmir basını: The 
Progressive Republican Party and the İzmir Press,” (M.A. thesis, Dokuz Eylül 
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66 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings (Harvest-
er, 1980), 52–53. 
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Although Foucault himself hasnʼt written much about law, there is a 
rich literature that utilizes his conceptualization of power for studying 
the character of law in modern societies:67 Law in modern societies 
can thus be described as relational and productive, as constantly 
adapting to and containing popular resistance and demands.68 Rather 
than disappear with the advent of modernity, law merely changed its 
main function from prohibiting (and punishing) to normalizing cer-
tain kinds of behavior. Normalization, in turn, “tends to be accompa-
nied by an astonishing proliferation of legislation.”69 This form of 
legislation, which Ewald calls “social law”, is “not concerned with 
defining universal principles of right but rather with balancing the 
partial and contesting rights claims of members of a political com-
munity, and in doing so it has resort, perforce, to the norm.”70  
Such a conceptualization of law as productive, relational, and as an 
object of struggle has already been applied to the late Ottoman context 
with regard to the establishment of private property in agricultural 
land. Huricihan Islamoğlu has shown that the Ottoman Land Code 
(OLC) of 1858, which formally established exclusive, private property 
rights for agricultural land, nevertheless accommodated several other 
forms of land-rights (such as nomads’ grazing rights, and village 
commons). She argues that these elements of the OLC need to be 
seen as “attempts on the part of its drafters to mediate and reconcile” 
the interests of villagers and nomads.71 Martha Mundy shows that the 
 
67 Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s law (Milton Park: Routledge, 2009), 
16. 
68 Ibid., 54. 
69 François Ewald, “Norms, Discipline and the Law,” in Law and the Order of Culture, 
ed. Robert Post, 138–61 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 138. To be 
sure, the punishing side of law continues to exist to this day. Ewaldʼs work, how-
ever, is concerned with Foucaultʼs writings on sexuality, whose regulation very 
much changed from one of prohibition to normalization.  
70 Golder and Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s, 38. 
71 Huri İslamoğlu, “Politics of Administering Property: Law and Statistics in the 
Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” in Constituting Modernity: Private Property 
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three categories of property owner, property-thing, and tax obligation 
and their specific relationship as a “triangle of knowledge” were cru-
cial for the establishment of the modern Ottoman state.72 Far from 
being pre-existing categories, they were created in a “gargantuan task” 
of registration.73 This was a lengthy process in which bureaucrats 
literally walked from village to village, gathering local knowledge 
about existing property relations, and translating it into the language 
of the new land law, thus creating the registers that “could finally 
appear as merely rubber-stamping evidently distinct entities: person, 
property, family and tax.”74 
The present study is partly concerned with urban property, private 
property rights in which had been in existence for centuries. As far as 
agricultural land is concerned here, it had been treated as a commodi-
ty for decades, and was usually located in the area around İzmir, 
where commercial agriculture was common. (Things looked very 
different in remoter parts of the countryside, where such a conception 
of land was only fully established in Republican times).75  
The changes in rights that will be traced here were not ones from 
older, and usually pre-modern, forms of multiple rights to modern, 
exclusive, private ownership. They were private property rights that 
had been granted to Christian subjects by the Ottoman state and were 
later transferred to Muslims by the Turkish Republic. These Muslims 
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were often migrants from rural areas of Greece and Anatolia who may 
have been unfamiliar with a full-grown capitalist market in land. This 
may be one of the reasons why the acts of resistance against republi-
can legislation and administrative practice that are studied here show 
traces of older perceptions of land rights that prioritized need over 
ownership rights. In this sense, legislation for abandoned property 
distribution (and their implementation) form an important site of the 
full establishment of private property rights in the Republic of Turkey. 
Laws are studied here both as sites and as residues of struggles over 
the meaning of public vs. private property, the common good, and, by 
extension, of the new state. By considering legal texts alongside par-
liamentary debates, petitions and administrative documents sur-
rounding the problem of abandoned property, this book will show 
how the categories which the law was supposedly built on were 
shaped: far from being pre-existing, national identity (both that of the 
new state and of its population) and private ownership were created 
and negotiated between various groups in society. Once established, 
privately owned property could be taxed and mortgaged. Laws for 
property distribution and the practices tied to them can thus be seen 
as sites in which the nascent nation-state translated older Ottoman 
rights (as we shall see, both those of the previous owners and those of 
the exchangees) into ones intelligible and exploitable within the new, 
national framework. This approach is inspired by the work of Vazira 
Zamindar, who has shown how a system of travel permits, politics of 
abandoned property, and compensation claims actually brought about 
the notions of national identity in what only later came to be regarded 
as Pakistan and India.76 She has argued that “(i)t was through the 
making of refugees as a governmental category, through refugee re-
habilitation as a tool of planning, that new nations and the borders 
between them were made.”77 
Zamindar is by far not the only anthropologist whose work is metho-
dologically important for this book. Akhil Gupta and Aradhna Sharma 
 
76 See Zamindar, Partition. 
77 Ibid., 3. 
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have studied the sites of bureaucratic interaction between people and 
state administrations as the very places where “the state” actually 
comes into existence as a social reality in ordinary people’s lives. They 
have argued that the process of state formation can be traced through 
“such apparently mundane practices” as tax-collection, social services, 
and the issuance of official documents.78 Gupta has shown how bu-
reaucratic interaction and notions of corruption form what he has 
called the “imaginary state” in people’s minds.79 Inspired by his work, 
this study pays special attention to popular notions of corruption. 
The sources used here include relatively humble texts such as peti-
tions and readers’ letters, which are conceptualized as part of a dis-
course in the Foucauldian sense, a “Gesamtheit erzwungener und 
erzwingender Bedeutungen, die die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse 
durchziehen.”80 Foucault’s use of both “enforced” and “enforcing” is 
critical here: Meaning can be described both as a product of social 
conditions and as producing them. People cannot say anything they 
want: Their thinking, speaking, writing, and their actions are struc-
tured by certain patterns which limit the things they are able to say (or 
write or do). Analyzing laws, petitions and parliamentary debates as 
part of an overarching discourse implies that abandoned and “nation-
al” property as meaningful categories were created not by one specific 
person or group (such as the central government), but by the interac-
tion of a great number of different actors. In this sense, the aban-
doned property discourse can be thought of as a battlefield in which 
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“the arms constantly changed sides,” sometimes ending up serving 
other purposes than those they were originally intended for.81 While 
the battlefield might be too strong a metaphor for the conflict at hand, 
(which took place in a post-war setting), it is nevertheless important to 
note that there were certain groups involved, which, more often than 
not, were conscious of their group interests, and who in rare cases 
even spoke as groups. That said, the question of authorship is relative-
ly unimportant here. The conceptualization as discourse implies that 
individual writers could only operate within a limited field of more or 
less well-established patterns of meaning, which were prescribed by 
everything that had already been said on the subject (including laws) 
and had been taken up by others.82 However, it is at times possible to 
observe how individual experiences of war and deprivation were wo-
ven into rather common narrative patterns. In other cases (especially 
in the parliamentary debates, but also some petitions) it is sometimes 
possible to observe how older patterns of argumentation became in-
comprehensible. These cases fit Lyotard’s concept of “differend”: 
Im Unterschied zu einem Rechtsstreit [litige] wäre ein 
Widerstreit [differend] ein Konfliktfall zwischen (we-
nigstens) zwei Parteien, der nicht angemessen ent-
schieden werden kann, da eine auf beide Argumentati-
onen anwendbare Urteilsregel fehlt. Die Legitimität der 
einen Argumentation schlösse nicht auch ein, daß die 
andere nicht legitim ist. (…) Ein Unrecht resultiert dar-
aus, daß die Regeln der Diskursart, nach denen man ur-
teilt, von denen der beurteilten Diskursarten abwei-
chen.83  
 
81 “Hier nun geht es darum, den Diskurs als ein strategisches Feld auszuweisen, auf 
dem die Elemente, die Taktiken und die Waffen unaufhörlich von einem Lager ins 
andere wechseln, sich zwischen den Gegnern austauschen und sich gegen dieje-
nigen selbst wenden, die sie verwenden.” Foucault, Geometrie, 213. 
82 Natalie Zemon Davis has observed this for 16th century petitions from France: 
Natalie Z. Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-
Century France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 6. 
83 Jean-François Lyotard, Der Widerstreit (München: Fink, 1987), 9. 
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Such differend-type conflicts frequently arose in the course of the 
abandoned property debate. One of these conflicts revolved around 
the question whether land and houses ought to be sold, auctioned or 
rented out as commodities, or rather be used for (free) housing and 
small-scale agriculture.  
It would be presumptuous (and probably misleading) to conceptualize 
the debate on abandoned property as a discursive formation in its 
own right. The debate at hand did certainly not bring about a major 
new category of thinking like the ones Foucault traces (such as popu-
lation, sexuality, or madness). What the abandoned property dis-
course helped to firmly establish, however, was the idea that private 
property ought to have a national character. This was only possible in 
the ideological climate of a strong, if not yet hegemonic, Turkish na-
tionalism, which was essentially anti-Christian.84 Moreover, this de-
velopment rested on the pre-existing conceptualization of private 
property rights in the late Ottoman Empire.  
It is possible to describe property as both an institution and as a con-
cept which constantly influence each other.85 Property has, in other 
words, both a discursive and a practical dimension. In a famous essay 
written in 1927, Morris Cohen points out that property, contrary to 
liberal conceptions, is “a relation not between an owner and a thing, 
but between the owner and other individuals in reference to things.”86 
 
84 Erik J. Zürcher, “Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: 
Identity Politics 1908-38,” in The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awaken-
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2010), 231. 
85 See C. B. MacPherson, ed., Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1978), 1. 
86 Morris Cohen, “Property and Sovereignty,” in Property: Mainstream and Critical 
Positions, ed. C. B. MacPherson, 153–75 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1978), 159; Huri İslamoğlu, “Towards a Political Economy of Legal and Adminis-
trative Constitutions of Individual Property,” in Constituting Modernity: Private 
Property in the East and West, ed. Huri İslamoğlu, 3–34 (New York: I.B. Tauris, 
2004), 8; Martha Mundy, “The State of Property: Late Ottoman Southern Syria, the 
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This relationship can be described in terms of rights. Although the 
term “property” is commonly used to refer to things, from a legal 
point of view, any talk about these things implies a reference to the 
rights certain persons have on these things.87 Rights, in turn, can be 
described in terms of inclusion or exclusion: while private property is 
the right of one legal person to exclude all others from the use of a 
thing, common property is the right of everybody not to be excluded 
from the use of the object in question.88 Property relations therefore 
are power relations. 89  The difference between property and mere 
possession is that the first will be enforced “by society or the state, by 
custom or convention or law.”90 As this study will show, the aban-
doned property discourse can be read as one in which the young na-
tion state slowly, but steadily established its claim to being the only 
granter and enforcer of property rights – and one that only granted 
this privilege to those people whom it regarded as Turks.  
Petitions form an important part of the sources used in this study, 
and the available methodological literature on this kind of texts has 
strongly influenced my approach to them. These studies deal with 
petitions from various times and societies, such as early modern cen-
tral Europe, Stalinist Russia, and Ottoman Istanbul, Palestine, and 
Egypt (in the 1860s). Petitions are texts in which petitioners (whether 
they actually wrote them themselves or not) positioned themselves 
towards the sovereign power they addressed.91 They have been de-
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scribed as a “traditional instrument of political communication” be-
tween rulers and the ruled.92 A petitioner needs to performatively 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the ruler he or she is addressing – 
otherwise a petition makes no sense at all.93 Provided that this condi-
tion is met, however, there is ample space for negotiations of griev-
ances, claims and demands to be made by the petitioning subjects. 
There are two forms of petitions or grievances: the first was typical for 
pre-modern states, which essentially governed by granting privileges 
to individuals or groups.94 In this form, a petition used to be a de-
mand for the granting of a privilege. A second form were complaints 
that addressed local grievances directly to the respective highest au-
thority.95 Modern states have tended to restrict the first form of peti-
tioning (demands for privileges) while continuing to maintain the 
second. Possible causes for petitions were now limited to cases in 
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which a state agency had violated a principle of positive law.96 The 
petitions analyzed here clearly belong to the second type. The Otto-
man, as well as the Turkish constitution, only recognized such griev-
ances related to cases of abuse and corruption. As we shall see, this 
limitation had a profound impact on the way in which people framed 
their demands to the republican state. They did, however, find inter-
esting ways to also address problems that went beyond this frame, 
which I therefore shall analyze as – limited – challenges to the present 
state of affairs. In an article about petitions from Egypt in the 1860s, 
John Chalcraft observes that they contain “sophisticated engagement 
and negotiation with state practice and discourse.”97 Likewise, Yiğit 
Akın finds that petitioners in Turkey in the 1930s  
mediated and/or transformed the regime’s nationalist 
and populist discourse to further their own interests. In 
this sense, the regime’s founding principles and master 
narrative turned into a discursive field on which the 
meanings of state, nation, and citizen were being con-
stantly redefined and contested.98 
Such redefinitions and contentions were arguably facilitated by con-
flicting motifs and elements within what Akın has called a “master 
narrative”. As Heike Winkler points out with regard to the Soviet 
Union of the 1930s, it is especially in times of rapid change that dif-
ferent, conflicting or contradictory narratives co-exist.99 The very same 
 
96 This difference has often been described as one between the arbitrariness of 
despotism and the reliability of the rule of law. For an example of this view with 
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97 Chalcraft, “Engaging”: 304. 
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Identitäten kontingent und fließend. Dementsprechend bestehen mehrere, ei-
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was probably true for the 1920s in Turkey, when the republican re-
gime was established. One major question in dealing with petitions as 
historical sources is the role of the petition-writer. In the case of 19th 
century workers in Istanbul, Kabadayı finds that “scribes consistently 
overshadow the(se) genuine voices” of the petitioners.100 Akın, on the 
other hand, argues that the professionals “largely employed the struc-
tures to frame substance that was provided by the petitioner.”101 His 
observation is supported by the sources analyzed here. Indeed, pro-
fessional petition writers can be regarded as multipliers of state dis-
course and legal knowledge, i.e. as the very people who enabled ordi-
nary people to develop their own views on the law within a framework 
that remained comprehensible to state agencies.102 
Sources 
This study makes extensive use of local newspapers from the period 
such as Ahenk, Anadolu, Seda-yı Hakk, Türk Sesi and Hizmet which 
have been accessed at the Ahmet Priştina Town Archive and Museum 
(APİKAM) in İzmir. So far, these newspapers have by far been the 
most important source for historians of the period, who have shown 
that there were intense discussions on the issues of abandoned prop-
erty, squatting practices and refugee settlement in İzmir. 103 These 
discussions have largely been based on editorials, which usually cover 
more than a third of the papers’ title page, and presumably formed 
their most widely read pieces.104 Literacy in the city of İzmir was cer-
                                                                                                                      
nander scheinbar ausschließende oder zumindest stark divergierende Narrative 
nebeneinander fort, die alle als legitim gelten.” Winkel, Kollektive, 45. 
100 Erdem Kabadayı, “Working for the State in a Factory in Istanbul: The Role of 
Factory Workers’ Ethno-Religious and Gender Characteristics in State-Subject In-
teraction in the Late Ottoman Empire,” (PhD dissertation, LMU München, 2008), 
70. 
101 Akın, “Reconsidering”: 455. 
102 See Chalcraft, “Engaging”: 307. 
103 These works include Arı, Büyük; Arı, “Yunan”; Arı, “1923”; Baran, Bir. 
104 To this day, editorials are widely read and discussed in the Turkish public, with 
some famous editors receiving princely salaries for their work.  
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tainly higher than in the national average, and practices of public 
reading were still alive in the countryside.105 We can thus assume that 
the editorials were indeed read by the literate public, and listened to 
by a certain percentage of the illiterate. That said, Eric Hobsbawm has 
rightly pointed out the danger to “confuse (...) editorials in select 
newspapers with public opinion.”106 One limitation of these sources 
is that İzmir’s editorials were written by a very small circle of less 
than ten individuals, all of whom had been living and working in 
İzmir for a long time, and actively favored the interests of local home-
less people over those of exchangees from Greece. Sympathetic re-
ports on the fate of recent immigrants, which feature prominently in 
Istanbul-based Cumhuriyet, cannot be found in the İzmir press. 
A second important – and complementary – source are the records 
produced by the British, American and German consulates in İzmir. 
These documents have been accessed at the National Archives at Kew, 
London, the National Archives of Records and Administration in 
College Park/MD, and the Political Archive of the German Foreign 
Office (Politisches Archiv Auswärtiges Amt) in Berlin. Records of the 
German Protestant church in İzmir, which are today available at 
Evangelisches Zentralarchiv (EZA) in Berlin, have also been used. 
Consular reports often discuss events that the press does not mention 
at all, and can thus be used as an indicator for the extent of both self-
imposed and government censorship. Especially for the time after 
1925, when press censorship came to be applied very heavily, consular 
records form an essential source. The value of these documents varies 
greatly: the German consul appears to have been all but indifferent to 
local events and conditions, while the British and American ones 
(who usually spoke Turkish) often wrote rather interesting reports. 
 
105 The official rate of literacy among males in 1924 was 9 percent. See Geoffrey Lewis, 
The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 37. To this day, many of the coffeehouses where Turkish men sit and 
sometimes spend their whole day preserve the ancient name kıraathane, literally: 
(public) reading house.  
106 Hobsbawm, Nations, 11. 
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The Foreign Office in London also gathered a number of reports writ-
ten by travelers or other civilians touring the country. In sum, consu-
lar records turned out an indispensable source for the present study.  
The most important archive for this project has been the Republican 
Archive of the Prime Ministry in Ankara. Unfortunately, the Ministry 
of Finance and that of the Interior have not opened their archives yet. 
The Prime Ministry archive, however, grants access to the records of 
certain ministries and directorates, which have made it possible to 
consider important aspects that have until now largely been neglected. 
The Prime Ministry files (Başvekalet Fonu, Number 30) proved most 
valuable for a discussion of the inter-ministerial level. Yet, most of the 
documents cited throughout this study were produced at the direc-
torate for settlement affairs (iskan müdüriyeti), which was in charge of 
matters related to the population exchange from 1925 onwards. These 
documents include petitions addressed to various institutions, includ-
ing the TBMM, President Mustafa Kemal, Prime Minister İsmet 
(İnönü), and the Ministry of the Interior. In 2009, the petitions were 
part of the refugee (muhacirin) fund (Number 272), and they are cited 
using those numbers.107 These petitions reached the settlement direc-
torate either by telegraph, or, rather rarely, by mail. The directorate 
usually forwarded petitions to its offices in İzmir, which were part of 
the provincial administration (vilayet), asking for further information 
or demanding investigations into the case at hand. This practice made 
it essentially impossible to track cases of corruption on the level of the 
provincial administration. A small official-cum-petitioner complained 
about this in a petition on his own behalf:  
 
107 The fund, whose documents used to be available in digital form, has been 
undergoing a process of “re-organization,” which unfortunately continues to this 
day, at least the petitions cited here at currently not part of the online catalogue. It 
seems that the Republican Archive is creating a separate fund for all documents 
pertaining to the population exchange, and will probably create a new system of 
signatures. I have digital copies of all petitions administrative documents cited 
here and will be happy to show them to anyone interested. 
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The helpless small officials, hoping to protect the law, 
write petitions full of truth, paying for stamps and 
transport out of their own pocket with that day’s bread 
money, and send them to their ministry. The ministry 
sends them back to the provincial governor asking for 
an explanation. The governor blames everything on the 
small official (...). There is no one to protect the law 
against the governor!108 
Since fair copies of the requests were sent to İzmir (or to other minis-
tries), they have only been archived as unsigned drafts, which are 
often exceptionally hard to read. Original petitions were usually for-
warded to the investigating institution, which not always sent them 
back. Many files therefore contain either petitions or requests for 
further information; only a limited number also provides the answer 
letters (occasionally including inspectors’ reports) from İzmir. Clearly, 
an archive of the İzmir province (provided it existed and would be 
made accessible for researchers) would provide a much more vivid 
picture than the documents held in Ankara, which rarely offer clues 
as to their actual effect. A serious flaw of the petitions is the limited 
time span they cover. Those kept in the refugee fund (number 272) 
only start in 1925, suggesting that previous ones sent to the Ministry 
for the Exchange were archived elsewhere. For these early years, how-
ever, I was able to find some petitions in other funds that have helped 
me to at least get an idea of common complaints. It is remarkable that 
not a single petition dates from 1929 or 1930. This is especially prob-
lematic since important changes in property distribution policies only 
came to be implemented after 1928. The obvious explanation for this 
lack of petitions is the change from the familiar Arabic script to the 
Latin one in 1928. A British diplomat observed:  
 
108 “Biçare küçük meʾmūrlar ḥuḳūḳu muḥāfaẓa edeceğim diye çarpınır (...) ḥaḳiḳātlar 
dolu ʿarżuḥāllar yazar yiyeceği o günlük ekmek parasından pul posta parasını verir 
mensūb olduğu maḳāma gönderir maḳām da arżuḥālı tekrār vāliye ḥavāle eder 
iżāḥāt ister derken isnādāt ḳonurlar. Biçare küçük meʾmūruñ yazdığı ḥaḳiḳatlar 
kendine teḥevvül eder (...) Çünkü vāli ile uğraşmaḳ ḥuḳūḳu muḥāfaẓa etmek için 
önünde bir maḥkeme yok.” (...) CA 272...12.48.91.38. 
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(E)ven high officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
still make personal notes in the old script. What then, 
can be said of the Governor and its clerk in Marash or 
Erzerum(...) who have never learned a European lan-
guage? All have, it is true, passed examinations in the 
new script, but many months must elapse before they 
can use it with the facility of the old. In the meantime, 
what will happen with the petitions of the Mehmeds and 
Rizas, which have, after great efforts, been addressed to 
them in the new characters?109 
The lack of petitions written in these years indeed suggests that peti-
tions were not only not read, but hardly ever written in the critical 
interval of 1929–30. This is curious, because the population was cer-
tainly not happy at that point. 1930 was a year of exceptional social 
unrest which produced at least two “incidents” that we know of today: 
a small-scale messianic uprising in late December, which is today 
known as Menemen “incident” (Menemen olayı), and a major riot in 
İzmir.110 The latter took place in September 1930, when Fethi Okyar, 
chairman of the newly founded oppositional Free Republican Party 
(Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası), visited the city.111  
Very few files in the refugee fund include copies of individual deci-
sions of the commissions in charge of the property distribution pro-
cess (tahsis komisyonları/kararları). Nonetheless, these few have 
turned out instructive for a better understanding of the bureaucratic 
procedure employed on the ground. It has, however, been beyond the 
scope and interest of the present study to consider larger numbers of 
these decisions, which are kept in the archives of the directorates for 
village affairs (Köy Hizmetleri Müdürlükleri). A statistical analysis of 
 
109 FO 371/13810/E 916, A.K. Helm, Memorandum on the Present General Position 
of Turkey, February 10, 1929.  
110  For a detailed and insightful discussion of the Menemen incident, see Umut Azak, 
Islam and Secularism in Turkey. Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State. (London: 
I.B. Tauris) 2010, 21–44. 
111  Turgut Hulusi, Atatürk'ün Sırdaşı. Kılıç Ali'nın Anıları, (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Ban-
kası Kültür Yayınları) 2005, 269–75. 
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decisions taken in İzmir has already been provided by Tülay A. 
Baran.112 Exchangees’ applications for property compensation (tasfiye 
talepnameleri), which were originally filed by the Mixed Commission 
in Istanbul, became available at the Republican Archive in 2011. This 
fund (number 130) could only be considered in the form of a very 
limited, yet instructive, sample.  
It is clear from inter-ministerial correspondence in the refugee and 
Prime Ministry funds that the Ministry of Finance (Maliye) played an 
important, possibly the most important, part in the administration of 
abandoned property. Some files contain letters written within that 
ministry, and are used in this study in order to shed light on the rela-
tionship between the Maliye and the settlement directorate. Pending 
the (unlikely) opening of the Maliye’s archive, however, a full discus-
sion of its role will unfortunately remain impossible.  
Minutes of open as well as closed sessions of the Great National As-
sembly of Turkey (TBMM) have recently become available online, as 
scans of the 1975 transcribed version of the original publication in 
Ottoman Turkish.113 My analysis of parliamentary debates provided 
here is completely based on these transcribed minutes and cited ac-
cordingly. Some laws are available online, while others are cited from 
the printed Düstur collection of laws and regulations. 
The chapters of this study focus on different thematic aspects, but are 
organized, where possible, according to the chronology of the events 
they discuss. Chapter One deals with the nexus of private property 
and forced migration and traces the emergence of abandoned proper-
ty as a problem first, of international relations, and then of domestic 
affairs in the Ottoman Empire. It also provides an analysis of the 
numerous laws and regulations issued in the course of the Armenian 
Genocide. Chapter Two provides an analysis of parliamentary debates 
 
112 See Baran, Bir. 
113  These can be browsed online at 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_dergisi_pdfler.meclis_donemleri?v
_meclisdonem=0. I provide the respective sessions’ URLs in the footnotes. A list 
of the URLs is also provided in the list of published sources at the end of this book.  
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in the Turkish national assembly between 1920 and 1922, whereas 
Chapter Three traces those debates that took place in İzmir after 1922. 
Chapter Four discusses the international background of Turkish poli-
cies towards abandoned property during the 1920s, namely, the nego-
tiations about the Greco-Turkish population exchange which took 
place in the course of the Lausanne conference, as well as the follow-
up negotiations between the two governments. Chapter Five provides 
a local case study on the politics of distribution of abandoned property 
among exchangees, local homeless and Balkan War refugees in İzmir 
and the surrounding countryside. The Conclusion sums up the find-
ings with regard to five overarching problems: the emergence of 
abandoned property as a legal concept, the importance of Armenian 
and Greek property for the establishment of new relationships be-
tween state and (Muslim) people, the impact of the population ex-
change on property distribution policies in Turkey, arguments about 
the relationship between nation, state and the people, and the concep-
tualization of land and houses as commodities. 
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1 Forced migration, settlement, and the 
emergence of “abandoned property” in 
Ottoman times 
On first glance, “emval-i metruke” appears to be a rather self-
explaining term: it is usually translated as “abandoned property” and 
“was the official euphemism and established term in Young Turk 
propaganda to characterize the expropriation of Armenians.”1 While 
this is true, there is much more to be said about it: abandoned proper-
ty was a concept whose meanings changed considerably over time and 
which were closely bound up with such violent practices as illegal 
appropriation or state seizure of land, which usually went hand in 
hand with violence against that landʼs owners, workers, and inhabit-
ants.  
This chapter is devoted to a discussion of the legal concept and the 
material practices concerning abandoned property both before and 
after the Armenian Genocide of 1915. The aim of this discussion is to 
trace the emergence of abandoned property as a problem and an ob-
ject of state policies in Ottoman and Turkish history in order to show 
how notions of property were connected to the emergence of inter-
religious conflict, and eventually, forced migration and genocide. If 
abandoned property was a euphemism – and it certainly was – what 
did it hide? How was this category of property conceptualized in the 
Ottoman and Turkish societies? Writing about the Kemalist policies 
towards Christian property in Turkey, one author has argued that 
declaring property “abandoned” amounted to declaring it as being 
state-owned.2 I principally agree on this point, with the reservation 
that the conceptualization of abandoned as state-owned did not repre-
sent the views of the majority of the Turkish population and society, 
 
1 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 6. 
2 Lekka, “Legislative”: 140. 
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but only that of the government. I argue that “abandoned” property, 
both discursively and materially, was at the heart of major conflicts 
throughout the first decades of the 20th century, and its history there-
fore can be instructive for a better understanding of the relationship 
between state and society during that time. This importance did by no 
means end when most non-Muslims were either expelled or killed 
and actually extends far into republican history. Specific connotations 
of “property” and “abandonment” were deeply rooted in two inter-
twined phenomena of (not only Ottoman) modernity: the experience 
of forced mass migration and the establishment of private property 
rights in land. 
1.1 Property and forced migration 
Historically, the establishment of private property rights in land has 
led to involuntary migration all over the world. The enclosures in 
England, which made large numbers of rural people landless and 
thus pushed them to the cities, are but the most prominent example 
among many. Marx has pointed at the considerable violence that was 
extorted in order to enforce this “so-called original accumulation” (die 
sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation), which is better described as 
the “expropriation of the rural population from their land” (Expropria-
tion des Landvolkes von Grund und Boden).3 Once a private property 
regime (and a financial market) is established, landowners can mort-
gage their land – and lose it to a creditor once they fail to pay back the 
loan. In that event, they either become sharecroppers on their former 
land or are forced to move away. There is substantial evidence that 
this mechanism of expropriation was at work all over late 19th century 
Anatolia, where it often unfolded along ethno-religious lines: while 
Armenian peasants in eastern Anatolia lost their land to big Muslim 
(often Kurdish) landowners (either due to indebtedness or to outright 
theft), Muslim ones around İzmir and Adana, respectively, often lost 
 
3 Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie: Der Produktionsprozeß des 
Kapitals, Marx Engels Werke 23 (Berlin: Dietz, 1963), 741–91. 
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theirs to Rum and Armenians.4 Pre-existing religious identities were 
thus increasingly bound up with new economic inequalities. In east-
ern Anatolia, it was arguably not only private property itself, but the 
fact that the state was not able to guarantee this right (as well as those 
to dignity and life) that eventually led to disaster: Armenian peasants, 
unlike their Muslim counterparts, were able to voice their complaints 
about double taxation, violent attacks on their villages, and the illegal 
appropriation of their land to the Great Powers from the late 1870s 
onwards. The “Armenian Question” thus became a problem in the 
international relations of the Ottoman Empire.  
Property relations in the countries of origin were crucial in determin-
ing whether migration became permanent or kept a transnational 
character: We know that those Tatars and Circassians who continued 
to own property in their homelands (and kept their original citizen-
ship) often traveled to and fro between the Ottoman and Tsarist Em-
pires. Those who had sold their land before their departure, however, 
were usually not allowed to return.5 The very times when large-scale 
forced migration started to become an issue were the same in which 
zones of high capitalism (such as İzmir and Adana) developed a high 
demand for labor, which translated into high wages.6 In and around 
İzmir, much of this labor was provided by Greek Orthodox people 
from mainland Greece and the islands, who either migrated perma-
nently or as seasonal workers.7 Those men who worked as dock work-
 
4 Stephan H. Astourian, “The Silence of the Land: Agrarian Relations, Ethnicity, 
and Power,” in A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Otto-
man Empire, ed. Ronald G. Suny, Fatma M. Göçek and Norman M. Naimark, 55–
81 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
5 James H. Meyer, “Immigration, Return, and the Politics of Citizenship: Russian 
Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1914,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies (IJMES) 39, no. 1 (2007). 
6 Isa Blumi, Ottoman Refugees, 1878-1939: Migration in a Post-Imperial World (Lon-
don: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
7 Omri Paz, “The Usual Suspect: Worker Migration and Law Enforcement in Mid-
Nineteenth-Century Anatolia,” Continuity and Change 30, no. 2 (2015); Nicolas 
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ers, boatmen and porters were usually temporary migrants from the 
Black Sea or from eastern Anatolia. Many of them walked through 
much of Anatolia in order to make the money they needed to pay 
their taxes back in the villages.8 The Armenian Genocide and the 
ethnic cleansing of the Greek Orthodox population destroyed the 
Christian part of this workforce, whose lack made itself felt through-
out the 1920s. In and around İzmir, it was exchangee migrants, but 
also impoverished locals from the surrounding countryside who 
quickly replaced these people as agricultural wage laborers, tenants, 
and urban workers. The present study provides some insights into 
this greatly understudied aspect of the population exchange.  
1.1.1 Land rights and property rights  
The Ottoman-Turkish term emval-i metruke is not to be confused with 
arazi-yi metruke, which is used in the Ottoman Land Code (henceforth: 
OLC) of 1858 to refer to commons, i.e. roads and all other stretches of 
land that were used by all members of a given community, such as 
pastures.9 While it is true that these two terms refer to different cate-
gories of land and emerged at different times, the word metruk, which 
can be found in both, points at the fundamental tension between 
notions of the public interest (rights nobody can be excluded from) vs. 
the interests of either private persons or the state (the right to exclude 
                                                                                                                      
Doumanis, Before the Nation: Muslim-Christian Coexistence and its Destruction in 
Late Ottoman Anatolia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
8 Florian Riedler, “Armenian labour migration to Istanbul and the migration crisis 
of the 1890s,” in The City in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the Making of Ur-
ban Modernity, ed. Ulrike Freitag et al., 160–76 (London, New York: Routledge, 
2011). 
9 “Arażi-yi metrūke iki ḳısımdır. Biri ʿumūm-u nās için terk olunmuş olan yerlerdir 
ki ṭāriḳ-i ʿāmm bu ḳabldendır. Bir ḳarye ve ḳaṣaba veya kurā ve ḳaṣabāt-ı 
müteʿaddideniñ umūm ahālisine terk ve taḫṣiṣ olunan yerlerdir ki.” OLC, §5. I 
would like to thank Ahmed Amara (New York University) for providing me with 
the original Ottoman text of the paragraph. An English translation can be found in 
F. Ongley, The Ottoman Land Code. Translated from the Turkish (London: Wil-
liam Clowes and Sons, 1892), 6. 
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all others from the use of a piece of land).10 Depending on the context, 
metruk can mean anything from “estate”, over “ceded by someone for 
someone else,” to “left behind involuntarily.“ Leaving the specifics of 
their use to local customary law, the Ottoman Land Code acknowl-
edged that roads and pastures (arazi-yi metruke) were subject to collec-
tive rights that dated from times immemorial. Arazi-yi metruke could 
therefore not be sold, nor could anyone own it individually.11 In the 
context of the OLC, it was, however, defined as an exception to the 
new rule that most land had to be owned individually. Moreover, the 
paragraph defining the category did not explicitly mention who exact-
ly had “left” the land to the village, and even spoke of places that had 
been “assigned” (tahsis olunan), suggesting that it had been the state, 
not the community, who had done so.12 By contrast, emval-i metruke, a 
term that was not used in the OLC, refers to private property aban-
doned by its owners. “Abandonment” implies two things: first, that 
owners in a given time and place left their property (which brings up 
the question why they did so) and secondly the idea that legal rights 
can stay when property owners move away. Paragraph 111 of the Ot-
toman Land Code, which discussed the handling of property left be-
hind by Ottoman subjects who had taken on citizenship of another 
state, did not yet subscribe to this idea (in this case, it was not neces-
sarily movement in space, but in identity): 
The land of a person who has abandoned the Ottoman 
nationality does not pass by inheritance to his children, 
father or mother who are Ottoman or foreign subjects. It 
becomes vacant by the act, and without seeking the pos-
 
10 This conceptionalization of public vs. private and state use is taken from Mac-
Pherson, Property, 4. 
11 Mundy and Smith, Governing, 46. 
12 Yaşar Karayalçın, “Kanunlarımız, Doktrin ve Uygulama Açısından Mer'a ve 
Yaylaklar, ‘Emval-i Metruke’,” Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 32, 1-4 
(1975): 62. Interestingly, Karayalçın discusses both pastures and abandoned prop-
erty in his article, thus suggesting at least some conceptual proximity between the 
two. 
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sessors of the right to Tapu it is put up to auction and 
given to the candidate.13 
This rule was changed in 1867, when foreign subjects were given the 
right to own land in the Ottoman Empire (which they had done any-
way, but only through proxies, up to that point).14 If it had stayed in 
place, it would have rendered the very idea of abandoned property 
obsolete: Most of the Armenians and Ottoman Greeks (Rum) who left 
Anatolia between 1912 and 1922 acquired the citizenship of another 
country, and thus would have automatically lost their property rights 
in Turkey. Many among the more privileged ones even held dual 
citizenship.  
This, of course, is a contra-factual argument that I make only in order 
to stress that property regimes form a vital part of the social context in 
which forced migrations took place.  
The land discussed in §111 of the OLC belonged to the category of 
miri land. Prior to the 19th century, this meant that full ownership to 
the land belonged to the sovereign, which granted usage rights to 
individuals or groups, often to several at once (for instance, one per-
son or group would be allowed to work the land, while another would 
be allowed to let sheep graze there after the harvest). These rights 
were granted by the issuing of tapu documents, and the act with 
which these limited rights were granted was called tefviz. Individuals 
could not sell land to each other. Over the course of the 18th century, 
tapus came to be seen as documents of full ownership, and it became 
common to sell land – the Land Code of 1858 eventually legalized this 
practice. It did, however, only grant full ownership (mülk) on the con-
dition that land was continuously worked. Owners had to make sure 
that their land was worked, otherwise they lost their titles after a peri-
od of three years. Previously worked land whose title had fallen back 
 
13 Ongley, Ottoman, 59–60. By 1282/1867, it became possible for foreign subjects to 
own and inherit land in the Ottoman Empire.  
14 Attila E. Aytekin, “Agrarian Relations, Property and Law: An Analysis of the Land 
Code of 1858 in the Ottoman Empire,” Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 6 (2009): 939 
(accessed March 11, 2015). 
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to the Treasury was called mahlul. Land that had never been cultivated 
before was called mevad. The Land Code was intended to encourage 
cultivation and therefore granted rights to people who first took mevad 
land under cultivation.15 As a liberal state that respected private prop-
erty rights, the late Ottoman state could freely dispose only of mahlul, 
mevad and emiriye land (private property of the sultan). All other land 
was either miri land to which private property rights had been granted 
or subject to customary and/or collective rights (metruk) or part of 
pious endowments (mevkuf). As we shall see, such existing rights 
were often violated in the course of refugee settlement.  
Historically, the concept of abandoned property is bound up with two 
phenomena of modernity: Forced mass migration and the establish-
ment of private property rights in land, both of which started to affect 
the rural population of the Ottoman Empire almost simultaneously, 
during the second half of the 19th century. This chapter is devoted to 
the peculiar interconnection between mass immigration and conflicts 
in land in Anatolia from the 1860s onwards. The first section discuss-
es the nexus of property and mass migration, paying special attention 
to the question if and how mass migration and notions of property 
may have mutually influenced each other. 
As far as immigration to the Empire is concerned, the sheer (and 
enormous) number of refugees who poured into the empire in gen-
eral and Anatolia in particular do not suffice to explain the scarcity of 
 
15 For the emergence of private ownership in land, see Richard Samirezʼ study in 
Mundy and Smith, Governing. A discussion of the changing meaning of tapu 
rights and documents can be found in Anton Minkov, “Ottoman Tapu Title Deeds 
in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: Origins, Typology and Diplomatics,” 
Islamic Law and Society 7, no. 1 (2000). On early forms of private ownership (mülk) 
in land, see Halil İnalcık, “Land Possession Outside the Miri System,” in An Eco-
nomic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: 1300–1600, ed. Halil İnalcık, 120–
31 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). A general discussion of land 
rights in the Ottoman Empire and beyond can be found in Roger Owen, ed., New 
Perspectives on Land and Property in the Middle East (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2000); Huri İslamoğlu, ed., Constituting Modernity: Pri-
vate Property in the East and West (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004). 
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settlement land, and the emergence of land conflicts between refu-
gees and locals. Rather, the arrival of the refugees coincided with (and 
probably in many places accelerated) the registration of land accord-
ing to the OLC of 1858. Refugee settlement and distribution of land to 
them took place in the context of an all-encompassing negotiation 
between customary, and often overlapping, rights in land and the new 
requirements for clear-cut, taxable ownership. These conflicts were 
increasingly interpreted with reference to concepts of ethnicity, an 
aspect that may be called the ethnification of property conflicts, and, 
as I will argue, forms the ideological prerequisite for later perceptions 
of abandoned property. 
The second part of the chapter deals with state policies and laws for 
abandoned property issued between 1901 and 1918. These policies 
were characterized by the evolution from a rather need-oriented policy 
of distribution to refugees (usually for free) to one that prioritized the 
sale and liquidation of assets in order to fill the coffers of the state. 
The laws for abandoned property also display an intriguing tendency 
to develop distinct policies for property owned by members of certain 
ethno-religious groups. My main argument here is that these laws 
display the very same tendency one can observe in the land conflicts 
of the late 19th century: an increasing disrespect of customary rights 
and practical value, paired with an ethnification of property conflicts. 
Moreover, the development from distribution for free to sale brought 
about a tension within the logic of a “national economy”, bringing up 
the question of the relationship between “the nation” and “the state.” 
1.1.2 The international dimension 
The emergence of abandoned property as a legal and political concept 
(at least in the Ottoman Empire) is a result of modern forced mass 
migration, or, to use an anachronistic term, ethnic cleansing.16 At 
 
16 “Ethnic cleansing” only became prominent as a political term during the Yugoslav 
Wars of the 1990s. I have chosen to use the term here because it has the advantage 
(over “massacre” or simply “forced migration”) to focus on the intention of the 
perpetrators, rather than on their means. For a critical discussion of the term, see 
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first, such forced migration mainly affected Muslims. The very first 
Muslim refugees who came from the Crimea and the Danube Princi-
palities to the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th and early 19th century 
might still have come by their own free will, wishing to live in a Mus-
lim land rather than under Christian rule.17 Most of the later arrivals, 
however, came because they had no other choice. From the Greek 
War of Independence onwards, large-scale seizure or destruction of 
property was a regular feature of the wars these people escaped from, 
and one of the reasons why they could not or didn’t dare to return. 
Even when violence merely worked as a threat and left time for prepa-
rations, it often had the effect that people sold their property at very 
low prices before they fled or migrated to another place. Therefore, 
the stipulations I shall discuss in the following need to be taken with 
more than just a pinch of salt. They certainly were little more than 
products of the European diplomats’ rather idealistic ideas, negotiated 
in the face of conditions that clearly contradicted them. That said, it is 
all the more interesting to note that these ideals nevertheless display 
considerable change over the course of the 19th century. 
Tellingly, the first international document to mention property in 
formerly Ottoman territories is the protocol signed on April 4, 1826, 
by representatives of Great Britain and Russia, which paved the way 
for the subsequent established of the first post-Ottoman nation-state: 
the Kingdom of Greece, four years later. After laying out general prin-
ciples regarding the future government of Greece (as an autonomous, 
but not independent territory), the protocol suggested that 
in order to effect a complete separation between indi-
viduals of the two nations, and to prevent the collisions 
which must be the necessary consequence of a contest 
of such duration, the Greeks should purchase the prop-
                                                                                                                      
Norman M. Naimark, Fires of hatred: Ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
17 See Mehmet Yılmaz, “Policy of Immigrant Settlement of the Ottoman State in the 
19th Century,” in The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation: Economy and Society, vol. 
2, ed. Kemal Çiçek, 594–608: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), 595. 
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erty of Turks, whether situated on the continent of 
Greece or in the islands.18  
Measured against the standards of diplomatic language, the mention-
ing of “collisions” in this declaration of intent must have been a ra-
ther blunt acknowledgment of the ongoing violence in the Morea. 
Interestingly, not only ethno-religious separation, but also purchase of 
property (apparently between individuals) was suggested as a remedy 
to the ongoing war: sales were considered as a kind of guarantee for 
the permanence of emigration. Article 7 of the Treaty of Constantino-
ple of July 12, 1832 signed by France, Great Britain, the Tsarist, and 
the Ottoman Empire (which determined the future boundaries of 
Greece), eventually accorded a period of 18 months for the sale of 
estates to “such individuals as may desire to quit” the future territory 
of Greece. The same article stipulated that a commission of arbitra-
tion was to oversee the process, “causing the sales to be effected at a 
fair price.”19 While the case of Greece is quite poorly documented, it 
is clear that only a minute Muslim population remained after the 
war.20 It has been estimated that almost the complete Muslim popula-
tion of the Morea, which numbered about 20,000, was killed. 21 It 
therefore seems doubtful that anyone was able to make use of this 
regulation by selling their property. 
 
18 Thomas E. Holland, ed., The European Concert in the Eastern Question: A Collection 
of Treaties and Other Public Acts, ed. with Introduction and Notes, 2nd ed. (Aalen: 
Scientia, 1979), 5. 
19 Holland, European, 16. The previous Protocol of London, which had been signed 
by Great Britain, France and Tsarist Russia on February 3, 1830, and accepted by 
the Porte on April 24th, had suggested that almost identical terms (one year) for 
sales would also apply to Greeks who wished to emigrate from the Ottoman Em-
pire to Greece. Ibid., 30. 
20 Fuat Dündar, İttihat ve Terraki’nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913– 1918) 
(Istanbul: İletişim, 2001), 145–46. 
21 Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821-
1922 (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1995), 12. 
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1.1.3 The 1870s 
The next treaty to mention refugees’ property rights was the short-
lived Treaty of San Stefano, which ended the Russo-Turkish war of 
1877–78. It included provisions for eastern Anatolia very similar to 
those negotiated for Greece in 1826: Muslims living in the districts of 
Kars, Ardahan and Batum (which were ceded to the Tsarist Empire) 
and wanted to leave for Ottoman territory were granted three years’ 
time for the sale of their property. Anyone present after that time was 
to be considered a subject of Russia.22 The rules for the Balkans were 
different: The regulations for Serbia (Art. 4) and the new principality 
of Bulgaria (Art. 11) stated that Muslims who held lands within those 
territories could “preserve their real property by having them farmed 
out or administered by others.”23 The Treaty of Berlin made similar 
declarations for Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia.24 Absentee owner-
ship across borders became possible.  
Both models certainly were little more than declarations of good-will 
in the face of wide-spread expulsion, seizure and destruction of prop-
erty. It is, however, interesting to note that they approached the mat-
ter at hand differently: the earlier regulation for Greece, as well as the 
provisions of 1878 for Tsarist Russia, obscured the fait accompli of 
expulsion and loss of property, pretending that people were still pre-
sent and thus able to sell their property, and to emigrate by their own 
free will. Both treaties’ negotiators apparently assumed that anyone 
migrating from a place lost their property rights there by virtue of his 
or her physical absence. Things were very different with respect to the 
Balkans: The Treaty of San Stefano, as well as its successor, the Treaty 
of Berlin, admitted that expulsions had taken place, but insisted on 
the possibility that migration not necessarily have to result in the loss 
of property rights. There might have been practical reasons for this 
 
22 Art. XXI of the Treaty of San Stefano. Holland, European, 345. This last point 
suggests that Tsarist Russia was more interested in gaining territory (and popula-
tion!) than in the ethno-religious composition of this territoryʼs population. 
23 Art IV of the Treaty of San Stefano, ibid., 338. 
24 Art. 12 (Bulgaria) Art 30 (Montenegro), Art. 39 (Serbia). Ibid., 286. 
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shift towards absentee ownership, and even technological ones (such 
as the introduction of the telegraph, which greatly facilitated far-
distance communication). Whatever these reasons may have been, 
they effectively introduced a distinction between the physical move-
ment of people and their legal presence as property owners, even 
across borders. Enjoyment of property rights in the sense of receiving 
revenues was certainly only applicable to large landowners. As the 
Balkans were more economically developed than eastern Anatolia and 
included areas that were very much part of world markets, it might be 
this point (and lobbying activities of big landowners, or possibly their 
creditors) that led to the introduction of the absentia-rule in the trea-
ty.25 Moreover, Tsarist Russia was still a multi-ethnic empire, while 
the new states on the Balkan were nation-states. Even more than oth-
er historical cases of legislation that banned aliens from property-
ownership, the absentia rule can be seen as an elegant solution to the 
perpetual conflict between the twin ideologies of nationalism and 
liberalism:26 It facilitated the physical removal of people by protecting 
their property rights on a given territory. 
This accommodation, however, was mostly theoretical. Throughout 
the early 1880s, questions of property restitution to Muslim citizens 
(who had indeed returned) and absentee landownership became a 
frequent subject of diplomatic correspondence, marring the relations 
between the Ottoman Empire and the new Balkan nation states, and 
 
25 Isa Blumi goes so far as to suggest that European and North American banking 
interests may have played a part in Great Power support for the creation of Balkan 
nation states: Blumi, Ottoman, 20–30. 
26 “On a conceptual level this [legal limits for property ownership by foreign citizens] 
may reflect some kind of an accomodation between nationalism, whose basic atti-
tude towards land as a place – a homeland belonging to the nationals – made its 
thinking often blur the distinction between sovereignty and ownership, and liber-
alism, in which land is perceived as alienable property to be freely traded in the 
market place.” Stanley M. Engermann and Jacob Metzer, “Some Considerations of 
Ethno-Nationality (and Other Distinctions), Property Rights in Land, and Territo-
rial Sovereignty,” in Land Rights, Ethno-Nationality, and Sovereignty in History, ed. 
Stanley M. Engermann and Jacob Metzer, 7–28 (London: Routledge, 2004), 10. 
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discouraging many Muslims from returning to their homes.27 The 
national laws passed often contradicted the high-flying promises 
made on an international level, and in some instances resembled later 
Turkish legislation. A regulation issued in Bulgaria in 1879 allowed 
municipalities to assign abandoned houses for public use and also to 
have them appraised and purchase them to these rather low prices. 
The owners had a month to protest against this procedure. After that 
month, the houses were sold, and the sums obtained were only paid 
to those owners who managed to return within a period of three years. 
20 percent of this sum had to be paid for “road construction.” Proper-
ty not claimed within eight years was to be transferred to the munici-
pality. The regulation was revoked in 1880, and property was given 
back to those returning refugees who could produce title deeds.28 In 
Serbia, it was a law for agrarian reform that made it difficult for ab-
sentee landlords to reclaim their land. As many as 5000 landlords 
jointly commissioned a proxy to act on their behalf, only to find out 
that the sums paid as compensation for expropriated land were disap-
pointingly low.29 
The numbers of refugees, casualties, and returnees during and after 
the Russo-Turkish war to this day remains a highly politicized issue, 
and it goes beyond the scope of the present study to discuss them 
here. However, it is important to note that Turkish scholarly works 
tend to gloss over the relative improvement of the situation after 1880, 
 
27 See Wolfgang Höpken, “Flucht vor dem Kreuz? Muslimische Emigration aus 
Südosteuropa nach dem Ende der osmanischen Herrschaft (19./20. Jahrhundert),” 
Comparativ: Leipziger Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschafts-
forschung 6, no. 1 (1996): 6. 
28 M. Schefer, Agent Diplomatique de France a Sophia, a M. de Freycinet, president 
du conseil des ministres et ministre des affaires etrangeres, 31. Juillet 1880, in: Bi-
lal N. Şimsir, ed., Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri - Belgeler III (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kuru-
mu, 1989), 281. Nedim İpek cites the document extensively, failing to mention 
that the law in question had been revoked. See Nedim İpek, Rumeli’den Anadolu’ya 
Türk Göçleri (1877–1890) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), 144–45. 
29 Şimsir, Rumeli’den, 398.  
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understating the number of those who actually returned.30 A recent 
study of relations between Muslims and Christians in what was to 
become the principality of Bulgaria (i.e. including Eastern Rumelia, 
which was de facto included in 1885) suggests that great numbers of 
Muslims indeed returned. Many landowners among them encoun-
tered serious difficulties in collecting the rent due for their land. Mus-
lim peasants in Eastern Rumelia were confronted with the replace-
ment of the tithe by a fixed property tax which they were often unable 
to pay. According to Anna Mirkova, it was the introduction of this tax 
which eventually forced many rural Muslims to sell their land and 
migrate (again) to the Ottoman Empire. Interestingly, she also men-
tions that many Christians from Eastern Rumelia chose to emigrate 
to the Bulgarian principality for the same reason. 31 A change in rural 
taxation thus forced both Muslims and Christians to leave Ottoman 
Eastern Rumelia, but both groups chose different destinations for 
their migration.  
The idea that property could be liquidated in the name of owners who 
had already emigrated seems to have first come up in the course of 
the Ottoman cession of Crete to the British in 1875. A special com-
mission was set up in order to liquidate the property left behind by 
Cretans who had left for Anatolia.32 At the end of the Second Balkan 
War, the peace treaty concluded between Greece and the Ottoman 
 
30 Nedim İpek speaks of 1,3 million who migrated during the war, calculating the 
numbers of returnees (about 200,000) according to Ottoman figures only. See İpek, 
Rumeli’den, 129. Justin McCarthy speaks of 1,5 Muslims in the pre-war provinces 
of Tuna and Edirne, 500,000 of whom ended up as refugees in the Ottoman em-
pire. He also cites the 1887 Bulgarian census, which recorded 672,215 Muslims in 
Bulgaria. See McCarthy, Death. 
31 See Anna M. Mirkova, “Land Ownership and Modernization in the Transition 
from Imperial Ottoman to National Bulgarian Rule (1879-1908),” (unpublished 
PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 2006). 
32 On the work of the 1897 refugee commission, see Mehmet Yılmaz, “Policy of 
Immigrant Settlement of the Ottoman State in the 19th Century,” in The Great Ot-
toman-Turkish Civilisation: Economy and Society, ed. Kemal Çiçek, 594–608 2 (An-
kara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), 598. 
 55 
Empire (known as the Treaty of Athens) stipulated that the Muslim 
residents of territories ceded to Greece (i.e. Western Thrace) had a 
period of three years to opt for either state’s citizenship. Those who 
chose Ottoman citizenship had to leave the country, but were allowed 
to keep their property rights to land.33 
1.2 Migration and refugee settlement in the 19th century  
During its time of expansion in the Balkans, the Ottoman state regu-
larly settled Muslims in newly conquered territories and along bor-
ders, thus making sparsely populated areas more secure and bringing 
up the ratio of Muslims. In some cases, groups and families were 
exiled in this way.34 Scholarly works on this period do not mention 
any land conflicts with the existing population, and there is no reason 
to believe that emigration from these territories was encouraged. 
Migration within the empire, however, was a serious problem and 
posed a threat to food production. The period of almost incessant 
warfare during the 17th century brought about economic hardships 
for the rural population, causing it to leave their villages and migrate 
to the towns and cities of the empire. Abandonment of land became 
widespread, and state policies aimed (without much success) at bring-
ing people back to their places of origin.35 By the 1770s, the first terri-
torial losses to Russia on the Crimea brought about the as yet unfa-
miliar experience of Muslim immigration. These first Muslim refu-
gees (who were relatively few in numbers) have left no trace in the 
archives, leading scholars to believe that their settlement, usually in 
close proximity to their places of origin, must have proceeded rather 
 
33 Stephan Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (New York: 
MacMillan, 1932), 403. 
34 See Yusuf Halaçoğlu, “Colonisation and Inhabitation,” in The Great Ottoman-
Turkish Civilisation: Economy and Society, vol. 2, ed. Kemal Çiçek, 577–83 (Anka-
ra: Yeni Türkiye, 2000). 
35 Ibid. 
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smoothly and without much state interference.36 (They might just as 
well have starved to death.)  
Up to the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was characterized by a 
relative abundance of land, combined with a relative lack of manpow-
er.37 Immigrants (usually rather small groups such as the Spanish 
Jews), or deserters from Tsarist Russia38 were welcome, while emigra-
tion (which would have aggravated the manpower problem, hampered 
agricultural production and thus diminished tax revenue) did not take 
place in considerable numbers until the 1890s, when the Hamidian 
massacres triggered emigration to the United States (missionary con-
tacts probably facilitated emigration there). Rıfat Bali cites a total 
number of 64,000 Armenians and less than 10.000 Jews who emigrat-
ed from the Ottoman Empire to the United States between 1890 and 
1914.39  
The migration of Muslims from the Morea is equally ill-documented. 
It was only after the Crimean War, in the context of the Russian ad-
vances in the North Caucasus, that large-scale Muslim immigration 
took place. At some point in the late 1850s, the Tsarist and Ottoman 
governments agreed on a limited migration of North Caucasian Mus-
lims, originally expecting only about 40,000 to move. In the face of 
further Russian advances and large-scale expulsions of the Muslim 
population, this number soon became obsolete, and the Ottoman 
 
36 Abdullah Saydam, “The Migrations from Caucasus and Crimea and the Ottoman 
Settlement Policy (1856-1876),” in The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation: Economy 
and Society, vol. 2, ed. Kemal Çiçek, 584–93 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000). 
37 Meltem Toksöz, Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediterranean (Leiden, 
Boston: Brill, 2010), 73. 
38 Will Smiley, “The Burdens of Subjecthood: The Ottoman State, Russian Fugitives, 
and Inter-Imperial Law, 1774-1869,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 
(IJMES) 46, no. 1 (2014). 
39 For Greeks, he gives the number of 78,262 who came to the US between 1900 and 
1923 (plus much higher numbers after that). About 22,000 immigrants arriving in 
the United States between 1900 and 1925, most of them males, identified them-
selves as Turkish. Rıfat Bali, “From Anatolia to the New World: The First Anatoli-
an Immigrants to America,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 12, 1&2 (2006): 
55–59. 
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state set up a special commission for refugee relief and settlement, 
the muhacirin komisyonu, in 1860. Located in Istanbul, it did not have 
branches in the provinces, but officials would travel to settlement 
regions occasionally.40 From the 1860s onwards, more than a million 
North-Caucasian Muslims (known as Çerkes/Circassians in Turkish) 
poured into the Empire.41 According to Kemal Karpat, both govern-
ments negotiated some kind of limited population exchange which 
foresaw the emigration of Christians from Kars in the late 1850s or 
early 1860s. However, few Ottoman subjects were willing to go, while 
some who did emigrate soon decided to return.42 Return migration 
also occurred among Muslims from the Caucasus and the Crimea. 
The Tsarist authorities allowed this on the condition that the return-
ees still owned land that they could return to.43 Chochiev and Koç 
mention that 300 refugee families were settled in houses that had 
been left behind by the Greek population of the district of Kars in 
1860.44 These may have been part of the few families who had agreed 
to leave for the Tsarist Empire (and may also have decided to return 
later on).  
 
40 Mehmet Yılmaz, “Policy of Immigrant Settlement of the Ottoman State in the 
19th Century,” in The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation: Economy and Society, ed. 
Kemal Çiçek, 594–608 2 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), 596. For a detailed study of 
the commission’s work, see David C. Cuthell, “The Muhacirin Komisyonu: An 
Agent in the Transformation of Anatolia, 1860– 1866,” (PhD thesis, Columbia 
University, 2005). 
41 Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, New rev. ed. (London New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 1998), 81. 
42 Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteris-
tics (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 68. 
43 Meyer, “Immigration.” 
44 Georgi Chochiev and Bekir Koç, “Migrants from the North Caucasus in Eastern 
Anatolia: Some Notes on their Settlement and Adaptations,” Journal of Asian His-
tory, no. 40 (2006): 83. 
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1.3 Migrations from the North Caucasus 
1.3.1 Settlement in western Anatolia and the Balkans 
Although eastern Anatolia would have been closer to their homelands, 
most Circassians were settled in the Balkans and western Anatolia, 
where economic conditions were more favorable and the grip of the 
state was tighter. Moreover, the Tsarist government strongly opposed 
settlement of Caucasian refugees in eastern Anatolia. In 1867, the 
Porte agreed not to settle them east of a line extending roughly from 
Samsun in the north through Amasya and Tokat, to Erzincan. 45 
Large-scale refugee settlement in eastern Anatolia was therefore de-
layed for several years. 
Most Circassians came to Anatolia and Rumelia by boat. Upon their 
arrival in the port-cities of the Black and Aegean Sea, many of them 
were half-dead. Their numbers greatly exceeded the capacities of the 
local authorities for relief efforts. The diseases that they brought with 
them – among them the plague – posed serious public health prob-
lems.46 The central government was concerned about the possibility 
of inter-communal strife and therefore explicitly ordered that settle-
ment of Circassians in close proximity to Christian settlements be 
avoided.47 Land conflicts between refugees and locals started as early 
as the 1860s in northwestern Anatolia, and the migrants’ arrival ag-
gravated pre-existing struggles. Much of the land that was first con-
sidered “empty” and therefore earmarked for refugee settlement later 
 
45 Chochiev and Koç, “Migrants”: 86. 
46 Musa Şaşmaz, “Immigration and Settlement of Circassians in the Ottoman Em-
pire in British Documents,” Osmanlı Tarih Araştırmaları Merkezi (1999). 
47 Abdullah Saydam, “The Migrations from Caucasus and Crimea and the Ottoman 
Settlement Policy (1856-1876),” in The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisa-
tion: Economy and Society, vol. 2, ed. Kemal Çiçek, 584–93 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 
2000), 589; Yücel Terzibaşoğlu, “Land Disputes and Ethno-Politics: North-Western 
Anatolia, 1877-1912,” in Land Rights, Ethno-Nationality, and Sovereignty in Histo-
ry, ed. Stanley M. Engermann and Jacob Metzer, 153–80 (London: Routledge, 
2004), 163. 
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turned out to be anything but that: it was either registered in the 
name of absentee landlords or was subject to customary rights of local 
villagers and nomads.48 Therefore, many refugees received too little or 
very infertile land.49 Others seem to have been given land, but not the 
means to work it: in September 1864, the British consul in İzmir 
reported on fears among the local population that refugees who 
lacked permanent housing, seeds and agricultural implements were 
likely to turn to robbery for a living.50 There are reports from north-
western Anatolia about refugees who forcefully seized land from their 
neighbors in the 1860s.51 Even more optimistic authors agree that all 
available land had been distributed by the 1890s.52 It was also around 
this time that the earlier principle to avoid refugee settlement in close 
proximity to Christian villages was abandoned for its exact opposite. 
From then on, and particularly during and after the Balkan Wars, 
refugees were deliberately settled in Christian villages.53 The Balkan 
refugees’ traumatization and their desire for revenge has often been 
identified as the beginning of the end of inter-communal cohabitation 
in western Anatolia. Arnold Toynbee, who traveled in western Anato-
lia during the Greco-Turkish war, wrote: 
The arrival of the Rumelian refugees from the end of 
1912 onwards produced an unexampled tension of feel-
ing in Anatolia and a desire for revenge; and so the Bal-
kan War had two harvests of victims: first, the Rumeli 
 
48 See Terzibaşoğlu, “Land”: 163–69. 
49 Ibid., 163. 
50 Şaşmaz, “Immigration”: 351. 
51 Yücel Terzibaşoğlu, “Land Disputes and Ethno-Politics: North-Western Anatolia, 
1877-1912,” in Land Rights, Ethno-Nationality, and Sovereignty in History, ed. Stan-
ley M. Engermann and Jacob Metzer, 153–80 (London: Routledge, 2004), 166. 
52 Mehmet Yılmaz, “Policy of Immigrant Settlement of the Ottoman State in the 
19th Century,” in The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation: Economy and Society, vol. 
2, ed. Kemal Çiçek, 594–608 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), 602. 
53 Yücel Terzibaşoğlu, “Land Disputes and Ethno-Politics: North-Western Anatolia, 
1877-1912,” in Land Rights, Ethno-Nationality, and Sovereignty in History, ed. Stan-
ley M. Engermann and Jacob Metzer, 153–80 (London: Routledge, 2004), 163. 
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Turks on the one side, and then the Anatolian Greeks 
on the other. 54 
1.3.2 Eastern Anatolia  
The situation in eastern Anatolia was even worse. Whole books have 
been written and continue to be written about the vicious circle of 
events that was (certainly unintentionally) set off in the 1830–40s, 
when Istanbul destroyed the traditional power structures in the area, 
thus creating a dangerous, and ultimately disastrous, power vacuum. 
The occupation of southern and eastern Anatolia by Muhammed Ali 
of Egypt was ended with the help of the Kurdish dynasties that had 
traditionally ruled the area in 1839. The Ottoman state then proceed-
ed to crush the Kurds, but was unable to establish more than a very 
unstable and precarious direct rule in the area. The power vacuum 
left by the great Kurdish dynasties was filled by various smaller war-
lords and religious leaders (sheikhs) whose attacks and illegal taxation 
of the (Muslim and Christian) sedentary population would become 
notorious over the course of the 19th century.55 The OLC of 1858 
made matters worse, as it turned land into a commodity that soon 
became the object of land-grabbing and outright theft. The nomadic 
or semi-nomadic warlords started to appropriate peasant land by vari-
ous, mostly illegal, and often violent means, reducing many to mere 
sharecroppers on the land they had owned.56 It goes beyond the pur-
pose of this study to explain the deadly cocktail of limited state control, 
increasing state demands for taxes and soldiers, peasant demands for 
security, and the commodification of land that were at work there.57 
 
54 Arnold Joseph Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (London: 
Constable, 1923), 139. 
55 See Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Struc-
tures of Kurdistan (London, New York: Zed Books, 1992); David McDowall, A Mod-
ern History of the Kurds, 3rd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004). 
56 See Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 128–52. 
57 For a longue durée study of this topic, see Hans-Lukas Kieser, Der verpasste Friede: 
Mission, Ethnie und Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Türkei 1839-1938 (Zürich: Chro-
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For the purpose of this study, suffice it to say that conflicts over land 
rights were already common when the first refugees arrived there. As 
mentioned above, refugee settlement in eastern Anatolia came to a 
halt after the agreement with Russia in 1867. It was only in the late 
1870s, after the disastrous defeat in the latest Ottoman-Russian war, 
and in the midst of the next major migration waves from the Cauca-
sus and the Balkans, that the Ottoman state made serious attempts at 
settling refugees in eastern Anatolia. This time, it was not only Cir-
cassians from the Caucasus, but also Circassian refugees previously 
settled in Rumelia that had been uprooted a second time during the 
1877–78 war with Russia. The muhacirin komisyonu was dissolved in 
1877, apparently shortly before the war broke out, and was replaced by 
a new “commission for the administration of immigrants” (İdare-i 
Umumiyye-i Muhacirun Komisyonu) which was set up in the same 
year. This time, provincial and district branches were established. 58 
Previous agreements with Russia about the exception of eastern Ana-
tolia from settlement schemes became obsolete with the 1877–78 war, 
and refugees were sent there. Taking place during and after the Berlin 
conference, refugee settlement in the area was highly politicized, 
attracting considerable attention on the part of the Great Powers. 
Settlement of Balkan refugees (many of whom were originally from 
the North Caucasus) was especially unpopular: “(n)o one, Muslim or 
Christian, wanted a Circassian settlement in their district.”59 Armeni-
                                                                                                                      
nos, 2000). The nexus of growing tax demands and limited state control is dis-
cussed in Özbek, “Politics” and Stephan H. Astourian, “The Silence of the Land: 
Agrarian Relations, Ethnicity, and Power,” in A Question of Genocide: Armenians 
and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Ronald G. Suny, Fatma M. Göçek 
and Norman M. Naimark, 55–81 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
58 Mehmet Yılmaz, “Policy of Immigrant Settlement of the Ottoman State in the 
19th Century,” in The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation: Economy and Society, ed. 
Kemal Çiçek, 594–608 2 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), 597. 
59 McCarthy, Death, 47–48. There is no reason to believe that the Muslim population 
was happy about the prospect of refugee settlement among them either. However, 
the Armenians of eastern Anatolia were the first local community who succeeded 
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an protests against refugee settlement were taken up by the Great 
Powers. According to Chochiev and Koç, these objections in turn led 
the Ottoman government to almost completely abandon the idea in 
1879.60 Other studies, however, suggest that settlement in the area 
continued in the following years.  
As in western Anatolia, land turned out to be much less abundant 
than it had first seemed. The settlement agencies might have rea-
soned like a British official who failed to understand the principle of 
extensive agriculture in 1879: reporting about the area around Maraş, 
he complained that existing villages were cultivating “enormous tracts 
of land,” refusing to give any of it up for the refugees, instead prefer-
ring to use “different pieces different years”. The same report men-
tioned that refugees were not given any assistance in establishing new 
villages, and were lacking the most basic means for establishing new 
livelihoods.61 The local sedentary population, however, had good rea-
sons to be hostile towards refugee settlement since the state, itself 
always short of money, demanded them to help out the new arrivals 
while they themselves lived on meager local resources. Although 
officially illegal, seizure of local infrastructure for refugee relief was 
rather common, and took place even during the harvest, thus jeopard-
izing food security.62 A British report about the famine of 1879–80 in 
eastern Anatolia named the “arrival of large bodies of refugees” as 
one of the reasons.63 
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1.3.3 Emigration from the Ottoman Empire prior to 
1900 
Emigration from the Ottoman Empire was rather uncommon for a 
long time, traditionally being perceived as a threat to the economic 
prosperity of the state. First reports of non-Muslim emigration from 
north-western Anatolia date from the late 1860s and were probably 
written in the context of the above-mentioned agreement between the 
Ottoman and Tsarist Empires. At this point the Ottoman Tanzimat 
reforms had resulted in the imposition of new taxes, which many 
peasants and tenants were unable to pay. Tsarist Russia, having ex-
pelled many Muslim inhabitants of the North Caucasus, and eager to 
settle Christians in the vacated lands, started to encourage the Chris-
tian population of northeastern Anatolia to immigrate.64 Nedim İpek, 
who doesnʼt mention an exchange agreement with Russia, cites an 
Ottoman report about the situation in Giresun, where many Christian 
people were eager to emigrate. The report suggested that the state 
distribute empty land to them for free, and, if necessary, expropriate 
land that exceeded the needs of its owners for that purpose.65 In some 
cases, non-Muslims who had emigrated to Russian Caucasia only to 
find that the living conditions there were worse, actually returned to 
their places of origin. İpek cites the case of emigrants from a village in 
Sivas who successfully reclaimed their property (which in the mean-
time had been seized by Caucasian refugees) upon their return.66  
It is hardly possible to distinguish between economic conflicts and 
security issues: Many of the Armenian complaints about Kurdish and 
Circassian violence included reports about illegal land appropria-
 
64 Nedim İpek, İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler (Trabzon: Serander, 2006), 284. 
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66 Ibid., 287. (Sivas Dereköy’e dönenler Kafkas göçmenlereince zapt olunan mesken 
ve emlaklerini geri alabildiler. BOA, AD, Nr. 1141/70-2: Muhacirin Komisyonuna 
tezkere, 30 Ağustos 1869.) The special mention of their success actually suggests 
that other returnees were not as lucky.  
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tion.67 Moreover, refugees were not necessarily perpetrators, but fur-
ther complicated the picture. Chochiev and Koç cite the case of an 
Armenian village by the name of Hamzaşeyh/Lapbudak in the prov-
ince of Muş whose population, intent on migrating towards the Rus-
sian border in 1893, hired the Caucasian refugees from a neighboring 
village as an armed escort for their trek. The refugees not only suc-
cessfully protected the villagers from the raid of a neighboring Kur-
dish tribe, but proceeded to take over the Armenians’ village, thus 
profiting twice from the conflict between the two other groups. The 
case later culminated in a feud between the refugees and the Kurds.68 
It illustrates that conflicts did not only run along the lines of religious 
and ethnic affiliation, but more importantly along the divide between 
sedentary and nomadic communities. In this particular case one 
might even say that the Muslim refugees not only “inherited” their 
neighbors’ village, but also their conflict with the Kurdish nomads. 
According to Justin McCarthy, emigration of Armenians from inse-
cure and poor areas became rather common during the 1890s, despite 
government attempts at discouraging it. 69  He even mentions that 
some Armenian peasants spread rumors of their imminent departure 
in order to keep the government from settling refugees in their villa-
ges.70 Though over-taxation, lack of security, and exploitative working 
conditions affected both Muslim and Christian peasants, the first 
lacked the option of migration to Russia.71 
The period McCarthy refers to coincides with the Hamidian massa-
cres of 1894–96, which certainly need to be taken into account as a 
 
67 Stephan H. Astourian, “The Silence of the Land: Agrarian Relations, Ethnicity, 
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68 Chochiev and Koç, “Migrants”: 94.  
69 At this point, McCarthy fails to mention the Hamidian massacres of the 1890s. 
70 McCarthy, Death, 132, FN 64. 
71 Ibid., 121. 
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push-factor for emigration.72 It is uncontroversial that the killings of 
tens of thousands of Armenians in the six eastern provinces (vilayat-i 
sitte) were to a certain extent instigated and encouraged by the Otto-
man authorities, and possibly Sultan Abdülhamit himself.73 European 
demands for reforms in these provinces had brought up the question 
of Armenian population ratios, and it has been argued that the mas-
sacres need to be studied in the light of these politics of numbers.74 
The Hamidian massacres were accompanied by large-scale confisca-
tions of Armenian land, often by members of the Kurdish Hamidiye 
militias.75 By 1908, the land had not been returned, and all Armenian 
platforms campaigning for the parliamentary elections were united in 
demanding that such restitution be performed. 76  These demands 
yielded some minimal results: A British report written in 1914 about 
the general situation in the northeastern provinces mentions that two 
missions were sent there in 1912 and 1913 “with a view to the restora-
tion of their lands to Armenians dispossessed during the massa-
cres.”77 A total of 20,000 Lira had been earmarked for the compensa-
tion of Armenians in the Erzurum province and sent to the provincial 
administration, where it ended up being used for other ends because 
no Armenians were forthcoming to claim the money. The explanation 
offered for their reluctance to claim the money is particularly interest-
ing: 
All Turkish schemes for tinkering with the land ques-
tion are indeed based on a principle unacceptable to the 
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Armenians, that of monetary compensation. The Arme-
nians wish for the actual land taken from them to be re-
stored to its past owners and nothing less. Their papers 
publish long list (sic) of communal lands and houses 
taken from them and to accept money in lieu would in 
their view be to admit the legality of its transfer.78 
The Armenians, in other words, wanted to return to their land rather 
than take the money and move away. For them, land had qualities 
that far exceeded its monetary value. They also refused to legitimate 
the confiscations by accepting monetary compensation.  
The earliest document to use the term emval-i metruke that my re-
search yielded is a decree on refugee settlement issued in 1901: the 
document includes the interesting distinction between that category 
and “arazi-yi mahlule”, i.e. miri land the title of which had fallen back 
to the treasury of the Ministry of Finance after having officially been 
declared abandoned by its owner.79 Apparently, land of both catego-
ries had been distributed (terk ve tahsis) for free to refugees, who 
turned out to be unable to pay the pre-existing tax arrears due for the 
land. The decree stipulated that these tax arrears of former owners, 
(provided that the land in question was arazi-yi mahlule, not emval-i 
metruke) would be canceled, and the refugees would thus be allowed 
to obtain title (sened-i hakani) to the land.80 The law was possibly part 
of the aftermath of the massacres of 1895–96 (land of people killed in 
those years must have become mahlul from 1898 onwards). The dis-
tinction made here was probably one between land that had fallen 
back to the state (mahlul) and land that continued to be owned by 
those who left it (metruk) – either because it had not been abandoned 
long enough to become mahlul, or because it was urban land (includ-
ing buildings), and thus not subject to the Ottoman Land Code. It is 
 
78 Ibid. 
79 On the category of maḥlūl land, see Mundy and Smith, Governing, 129. 
80 Bilâ bedel muhacirine terk ve tahsis edilip sahibi evvellerinin emvali metrukesi 
olmayan arazii mahlule müterakim vergilerinin terkini kaydi hakkında irade, 9 Ni-
san 1317/1901, Düstur 1. Tertip, Cild 7, 672. 
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also possible that land which had been confiscated illegally, but had 
been used for cultivation ever since was not considered as mahlul, and 
that the term emval-i metruke was minted to express this situation. The 
law suggests that the owners of emval-i metruke mentioned here had 
not been expropriated, and that the state did not attempt to transfer 
the title to this category of land from one owner to another. Precisely 
this was done in the case of the other category, that of mahlul land.  
1.4 The Balkan Wars 
Refugee settlement in the Ottoman Empire during the late 19th cen-
tury was already complicated by pre-existing land conflicts, inter-
communal violence, limited availability of distributable land, and a 
growing ethnification of conflicts concerning land use. All of these 
were closely linked to and aggravated by the introduction of private 
ownership rights in agricultural land. Large-scale immigration took 
place, but emigration was not encouraged by the Ottoman govern-
ment before the 1860s. Agricultural production depended on rural 
manpower, and the settlement authorities tried to avoid inter-
communal conflicts as much as possible, at least before the 1890s. 
The same cannot be said about the Young Turk governments, whose 
policies differed most prominently from those of their “traditional” 
Ottoman predecessors in their encouragement of Muslim immigra-
tion and their conscious effort at using Muslim settlers as a counter-
weight against Christian local populations. In other words, the CUP 
policies of emigration targeted Christians, while those of immigration 
were aimed at Muslims. Both are inextricably linked and part of the 
same, overarching policy of economic, social and linguistic Turkifica-
tion.81 
The first excitement about the Young Turk coup of 1908, which was 
welcomed by the Ottoman population as a step towards freedom and 
justice in the empire, was immediately muffled by the declaration of 
independence of Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary’s full annexation of 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina. Deeply shaken by these events, key members of 
the CUP such as Dr. Nazım started a campaign for the encourage-
ment of Muslim immigration from both countries to Ottoman Mace-
donia. The aim of this program was to prevent any future territorial 
claims to the province by creating a Muslim majority. In the course of 
this program, the campaigners considered to encourage Muslim 
landowners to make room for Muslim settlers by getting rid of Chris-
tian tenants.82 It is interesting to note that one demand in the joint 
ultimatum of Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia at the begin-
ning of the First Balkan War was that the Ottomans promise to stop 
this policy of increased Muslim immigration. Dündar even claims 
that this shared concern about Ottoman settlement policies actually 
helped to bring the Balkan League about.83  
Even prior to the Balkan Wars, which in many respects mark the 
“point of no return” in modern Turkish history, officials became con-
cerned about the ethnic composition of the population, and particular-
ly so about that along the borders.84 Refugee settlement in close prox-
imity to Christian villages and towns was therefore no longer avoided, 
but deliberately encouraged in order to bring up the ratio of Muslim 
inhabitants of districts featuring a Christian majority.85 Not only pop-
ulation ratios, but also the religious affiliation of landowners came to 
be seen as a possible field of state intervention. In 1910, an internal 
memo of the Ministry of the Interior warned that “Muslims are sell-
ing their lands, small or big, everywhere, and the majority of these 
lands are being purchased mostly by Christians who form a minority 
of the general population.”86 The document extensively discussed the 
ongoing policies of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria aimed at the transfer 
of land from Muslim into Christian hands. Pointing out the Bulgarian 
case, in which such measures ranged from cheap government loans 
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for aspiring Christians over quick dispossession of defaulting Muslim 
debtors to intimidation, forced sale and expulsion, it suggested that it 
was necessary to raise awareness of the political implications of in-
creasing Christian landownership and to encourage Muslims to stay 
put.87 The report suggested that cheap credits be offered to Muslims 
in order to enable them to buy, rather than sell, land. 88  As Ter-
zibaşoğlu makes clear, it is impossible to establish if the report ever 
had any direct influence on Young Turk policies. But the document 
proves that the Young Turks studied anti-Muslim policies of their 
neighboring states only years before they started to apply even harsh-
er ones to their own Christian populations. Terzibaşoğlu also notes 
that the report was written at a time when both rural and urban con-
flicts were increasingly staged with reference to ethno-religious cate-
gories. 1909 saw the beginning of a two-year boycott of (mainland) 
Greek businesses and goods in western Anatolia. In one case, a Greek 
landowner was not able to cultivate his olive groves for four years in a 
row and therefore was afraid that his land would be declared aban-
doned (i.e., mahlul) and sold off to someone else.89 
1.4.1 The impact of the Balkan Wars  
According to Wolfgang Höpken, the forced migrations of hundreds of 
thousands of people (both Muslim and Christian) in the course of the 
Balkan Wars were the first instances of full-fledged ethnic cleansing 
in the sense that the expulsions, unlike those of 1877/78, were cen-
 
87 The document seems to be rather unclear about the geographic area in which the 
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trally planned.90 Moreover, the expulsions during this “population war” 
no longer followed the familiar pattern of hostility between religious 
groups, but were implemented along the lines of ethnicity.91 For in-
stance, Bulgarian expulsions targeted not only Muslims, but also 
Jewish and Greek inhabitants of Thrace.92 According to estimates, 
approximately 890,000 people crossed the borders of Serbia, Monte-
negro, Bulgaria, Greece, and the Ottoman Empire in 1912–13.93 Sev-
eral authors mention that the issue of abandoned property first came 
up during the Balkan Wars. The Greek administration in Western 
Thrace set up a commission for abandoned property which was (at 
least officially) in charge of protecting the movable property of people 
who had fled the country.94 On the other side of the border, the CUP 
government established the directorate for the settlement of tribes 
and refugees (İskan-ı Aşiret ve Muhacirin Müdüriyeti, İAMM), the first 
Ottoman refugee settlement agency that actually had the resources to 
effectively manage the migration and settlement of large numbers of 
people, in 1913.95 The principles of the agency’s work were spelled 
out in a regulation for refugee settlement (iskan-i muhacirin ni-
zamnamesi) issued on April 30, 1913.96 According to §25 of the regula-
tion, land “of the kind that can not be distributed for free” would be 
sold to refugees who would be allowed to pay off their debts in in-
stallments. Houses were only mentioned as ones that would be built 
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for the refugees.97 However, as will be seen later on, the İAMM, as 
well as its successor, the general directorate for tribes and refugees 
(Aşair ve Muhacir Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi, AMMU), settled massive 
numbers of refugees in abandoned homes. Though located on differ-
ent sides of the new border between Greece and Turkey, the two key 
elements of abandoned property policies (custodian administration 
and refugee settlement) were introduced almost simultaneously. 
Scholarly works on the Balkan Wars and the settlement policies im-
plemented in its course frequently mention a phenomenon that is 
virtually absent in works on earlier periods. This is the confrontation 
between groups of people who had both already been subject to forced 
migration and were settled in each otherʼs land and houses: All coun-
tries that participated in the Balkan Wars used the lands abandoned 
by local populations for the settlement of refugees from the other side, 
and people were often settled very close to their places of origin. As 
front lines shifted and maps were redrawn, many refugees were up-
rooted not only once, but several times, and one may argue that they 
not only fled the advancing armies of the enemy, but also the wrath of 
those returning refugees whose place and livelihoods they had taken. 
Eastern Thrace is a case in point: First conquered by the Bulgarian 
army in 1912, it was eventually regained by the Ottoman Empire in 
1913, and the Muslim population returned, forcing the Bulgarian 
settlers (and the native Bulgarian population) to leave.98 From this 
course of events, we can conclude that receiving a piece of abandoned 
property in a border region was a risky business whose success direct-
ly and inescapably depended on the ability of a given state to perma-
nently keep the actual owners from returning. Settlers who them-
selves had experienced forced migration and deprivation were aware 
of this possibility and acted accordingly by living as if there were no 
tomorrow. As late as 1918, a British officer reporting from the Edirne 
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province remarked that Muslim settlers had “proved a most unprofit-
able exchange for their predecessors from an economic standpoint. 
Feeling insecure in their tenure of lands allotted to them they have 
cultivated but a small portion, and have confined their energies chief-
ly to deforestation.”99 This sense of insecurity may have been one of 
the factors that contributed to the general economic decline reported 
from all over Anatolia and Thrace during early Republican times.  
Not only did refugees have good reasons to fear for the worst and thus 
not to invest time and energy into their newly acquired land, they 
were also the first to become loyal supporters of the state that had 
settled them. So far, it has usually been argued that those who re-
ceived goods, businesses and land were loyal to the state out of grati-
tude. There is, however, another factor that ought to be taken into 
consideration: fear. People who had received abandoned property had 
to be afraid of the eventual return of former owners, and thus afraid 
for the state, whose fate was directly linked to theirs.100 
1.4.2 Policies of eviction and the first “population ex-
change” 
Even though eastern Thrace had been successfully wrestled back from 
Greece in the Second Balkan War, the overall result of the Balkan 
Wars were disastrous territorial losses for the Ottoman Empire. West-
ern Thrace went to Bulgaria, while Greece gained Macedonia and the 
Aegean islands of Chios, Lesbos, Samos and Limnos. The new bor-
ders in Thrace and in the Aegean were dangerously close to Istanbul 
and western Anatolia respectively, and the CUP government felt that 
it needed to frustrate any further territorial ambitions regarding those 
regions.101  Given that Bulgarian and Greek territorial claims were 
usually justified with reference to the substantial Christian population 
in those areas, a systematic expulsion of these groups appeared as an 
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obvious remedy and could serve the CUP’s program of ethnic ho-
mogenization. In the summer of 1913, directly following the recon-
quest of Edirne, the CUP started a campaign of harassment and in-
timidation against the borderland Bulgarians in eastern Thrace. 
In the wake of these systematic expulsions, the Ottoman and Bulgari-
an governments agreed on a population exchange to be applied along 
the new border between the two states, in an area covering 15 km on 
both sides.102 As with later cases of “exchanges,” most people affected 
by it had already left, and the main purpose of the agreement was “to 
confirm this situation by compelling the remaining inhabitants (…) to 
transfer their residence to the other side of the frontier.”103 When the 
CUP and its secret military organization, the teşkilat-ı mahsusa, pro-
ceeded to harass the Bulgarian population all over eastern Thrace, the 
exchange territories were broadened to include the whole area. In 
March 1914, the Bulgarian population of the southern Marmara coast 
was also forced out. As a result, Bulgaria ended up with a substantial 
Muslim minority, while virtually no Bulgarians continued to live in 
Turkey.104  
With most people already having (been) moved, the main task of a 
soon-established mixed commission was the appraisal and liquidation 
of the affected people’s property. The Bulgarian-Ottoman exchange 
convention stipulated that the exchange would be reciprocal in the full 
sense of the word: the population of one Bulgarian village was to be 
settled in a “partner” village abandoned by its Muslim inhabitants, 
and vice versa.105 Approximately 100,000 people, Bulgarians and Mus-
lims in almost equal numbers, were registered as exchangees. As in 
later exchanges, the appraisal and liquidation of property turned out 
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to be an extremely tricky problem. After “une violente discussion” 
which has unfortunately not been recorded in detail, the commission 
members eventually agreed on keeping communal lands (pastures, 
forests etc.) out of the appraising scheme. 106 One may guess that 
these lands, which, according to Ottoman law, were not tradable, 
could not possibly have been appraised in the first place. As for pri-
vately owned property, the commission members agreed to appraise it 
by reference to the tax registers. This plan was never implemented 
due to the outbreak of World War I.  
1.5 The expulsions of 1913–14 
Having thus dealt with the Bulgarian population of eastern Thrace, 
the CUP started to apply similar techniques towards the region’s Rum 
and Greek inhabitants. Halil (Menteşe), the then chairman of the 
Ottoman parliament, later recalled the campaign in Thrace: 
Now [after the Bulgarians] it was the Thracian Rum’s 
turn. This was a very delicate affair which could have 
brought about a new war. The measure taken was the 
following: Governors and other officials, though only of-
ficially, would appear not to be involved. The society’s 
organization [i.e. the teşkilat-ı mahsusa, the secret mili-
tary arm of the CUP] would take care of the job, and 
without causing much of an incident, intimidate the 
Rum. The mission was started accordingly... Close to 
100,000 Rum left for Greece, without so much as a 
nosebleed having occurred on either side. Later, the 
same pattern was followed in the surroundings of 
İzmir.107 
 
106  Antoniades, Développement, 172–73. 
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Menteşe mentions an important feature of the migrations which to 
this day causes heated discussions among historians of the period: 
The CUP took great care to make sure that government officials did 
not appear to be involved. Ottoman sources on these forced migra-
tions (and even more so those on later events) therefore only provide a 
distorted picture of the events.108 Through them, it is possible to trace 
migrations, but not the events or decisions that triggered them. Given 
the secrecy with which the CUP went about the forced migrations in 
1913–14, it is remarkable that not only one, but several of those men 
who were involved in the expulsions have left accounts which shed 
light on the dark spots left out by official documents. The anti-Rum 
activities of the CUP started in late 1913, and, as Menteşe mentions, 
were later extended to the Aegean littoral. The man in charge of coor-
dinating the “job” for the CUP in İzmir, the later Minister for the 
Population Exchange and Prime Minister Celal (Bayar) 109 , subse-
quently reported that the campaign in İzmir had resulted in the exo-
dus of 130,000 Rum and Greeks to Greece.110 In order to make these 
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correspondence). Efiloğlu does, however, admit that the consular records of for-
eign powers paint a picture very different from the Ottoman ones. Ahmet Efiloğlu, 
“Fuat Dündar’ın, Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kaybolan ‘Modern Türkiye’nin Şifresi’,” 
Belleten 74, no. 270 (2010). Modern Türkiye’nin Şifresi does have several major flaws, 
which are discussed in Ayhan Aktar and Abdülhamit Kırmızı, “‘Bon pour l’Orient’: 
Fuat Dündar’ın Kitabını Deşifre Ederken…,” Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar 8 
(2009). 
109 In 1914, Celal Bayar worked as secretary general of the CUP in İzmir. He later 
became Minister for the Population Exchange (in 1924), served as Prime Minister 
from 1937–38, and as Turkeyʼs third President (1950–60).  
110 Celâl Bayar, Ben de Yazdım: Milli Mücadele’ye Giriş (Istanbul: Maha, 1967), 1568. 
Bayarʼs numbers almost equal those given by Yannis Mourelos (150.000 refugees 
who had arrived in Greece by 1914): Yannis G. Mourelos, “The 1914 Persecutions 
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people move, the CUP resorted to “military, political, administrative 
and economic measures.”111 The case of a landowner from the vicini-
ty of Ayvalık illustrates how the migration was brought about: days 
after the local authorities had guaranteed him that he and his property 
were safe, Turkish militias (çete) attacked the workers of his farm, 
killing a shepherd and wounding several other men. Turkish people 
forcibly took over a garden in Dikili and stole all the horses and thou-
sands of sheep from his farm. After all this, the people living on his 
farm “found life intolerable and decided not to remain.”112 The Greek 
landowner in question appears to have been the same person as that 
mentioned in the introduction. Both the British and the German 
document mention that the man had worked as British vice-consul in 
Dikili prior to 1913, and both archives document his (futile) attempts 
at reclaiming his property.  
Celal Bayar later cited extensively from the (at that point unpublished) 
memoirs of Eşref Kuşçubaşı, the head of the teşkilat-ı mahsusa and 
thus the man in charge of the uglier parts of the campaign. Celal 
Bayar depicted the anti-Christian policies of the time as an act of self-
defense against a Rum civilian population that was armed to the 
teeth.113 But Kuşçubaşı, and Bayar with him, offers another explana-
tion for the necessity for large-scale Rum emigration: İzmir’s reputa-
tion as “’Infidel İzmir’ was not only a metaphor”, but a fact that need-
ed to be changed. According to Kuşçubaşı, Muslims were “far from 
                                                                                                                      
and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey,” 
Balkan Studies 26, no. 2 (1985): 405. 
111 Bayar, Ben, 1574. The citation appears to have been taken from an unpublished 
version of Kuşçubaşıʼs memoir: Eşref Kuşçubaşı, Hayber’de Türk Cengi, ed. Philip 
J. Stoddard (Istanbul: Arba, 1997). I have not been able to obtain a copy of that 
book. 
112  Report of E.J. Elridge to Foreign Office. Smyrna, June 17, 1914. FO 371/11556/E 
4761.  
113 According to Kuşçubaşı, all able-bodied Greek men along the coast regularly went 
to the islands, where they were trained in the Greek army, returning as soldiers of 
the Greek reserve. Bayar, Ben, 1572–74.  
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being its [İzmir’s] owners,” they “were not even night guards of that 
place.”114 
The secret anti-Rum campaign in eastern Thrace and western Anato-
lia coincided with the arrival of large numbers of refugees from the 
Balkans in those areas, and the wrath of the refugees was channeled 
into violent expulsions of local Ottoman Greeks. “Numerous reports” 
from the southern shores of the Marmara Sea mention that arriving 
Balkan refugees evicted local Greeks from their houses and even took 
over whole villages.115 More than 30,000 Ottoman Greeks from the 
southern shores of the Marmara Sea reportedly left their homes and 
emigrated to Greece during and shortly after the Balkan Wars. 116 
According to Fuat Dündar, the settlement of refugees was deliberately 
used as a method to expel local Rum.117 However, conflicts with the 
local population were not limited to non-Muslims. For instance, a 
(Muslim) landowner from the district of Cebel-i Bereket in the Adana 
province complained in 1914 that land which he held title to had been 
used to settle refugees.118 In May 1914, the CUP government pre-
pared a directive for the expropriation of big landowners in order to 
settle refugees on their land, which, however, doesnʼt seem to have 
been turned into a law.119 Moreover, the number of refugees who not 
only temporarily stayed in cities, but ended up living there increased, 
possibly also because of CUP encouragement. In İzmir, newly arrived 
Balkan refugees were encouraged to seek employment at the tobacco 
monopoly’s (Regié’s) factories, in jobs which had never before been 
 
114 “Gâvur İzmir’ sadece kıyasî tabir değildi. Biz orada, değil sahip, bekçi bile değild-
ik.” Ibid., 1574. (Note that “bekçi” does not refer to a military guard, but rather to a 
poor, miserable servant who takes care of a house or shop over night.) 
115 See Gingeras, Sorrowful, 39. 
116 See Gingeras, Sorrowful, 46. 
117 Dündar, Modern, 207. 
118 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri (1912–1913) 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), 94. 
119 BOA, BEO, Şurayı Devlet Mazbataları Gelen-giden Defter No: 638, 6 Cemaziye-
lahir 1332/19 Nisan 1330 (2 Mayıs 1914). Ibid., 108. I have found no other refer-
ence to this project.  
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performed by Muslims.120 Celal Bayar doesn’t mention the workers’ 
gender here, but his readers probably knew that tobacco workers were 
usually women and children. Though indirectly, the incident shows 
that the poverty among urban Muslims now reached levels that forced 
women to work in jobs that had hitherto been considered unaccepta-
ble for them, and that this happened already before World War I. 
1.5.1 Greek abandoned property in 1914  
During the forced Greek migration of 1914, the CUP came up with 
detailed instructions for the handling of abandoned property, which 
were frequently sent to the local authorities along the Marmara and 
Aegean coasts. Like those regulations and law that were later drawn 
up for the administration of Armenian property, these texts are highly 
ambiguous. The letter of these directions, and those of the laws that 
followed them, might be taken as proof of the CUP’s concern about 
protecting abandoned property, and there are some historians who 
have interpreted them in this way.121 However, if we take into account 
the information given by key figures such as Celal (Bayar) and Eşref 
Kuşçubaşı, we have to keep in mind that official communication be-
tween central and local administrations tells us only one part of the 
story as it leaves aside two additional, and unofficial, factors: these are 
the local branches of the CUP and the teşkilat-ı mahsusa, which often 
cooperated with local bands of irregulars (çete). Ignoring this context, 
 
120 According to Celal Bayar, the Regié had hitherto employed Muslims either as 
members of the Regiéʼs notorious private army used against tobacco smugglers 
(kolcu) or administrators (memur). The Regiéʼs director therefore was quite sur-
prised when Bayar asked him to employ Muslims as tobacco workers, too. By relat-
ing this incident, Bayar indirectly admits that the female working class of İzmir 
was overwhelmingly non-Muslim, a fact that does not fit into the standard narra-
tive about the richness of İzmir’s non-Muslim population. It also suggests that the 
CUP abandoned previous policies which had (if often unsuccessfully) tried to 
avoid the settlement of refugees in urban environments. Bayar, Ben, 1554. 
121 Efiloğlu and İvecan, “Rum.” The article, which fails to offer an explanation of the 
“migration” that admittedly took place in 1914, includes numerous references to 
such communication.  
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İvecan and Efiloğlu argue that policies towards abandoned property 
were at first developed on a local level, as a reaction to demands of the 
Rum peasantry in Northwestern Anatolia, which had asked for protec-
tion of their property, and soon started to migrate to Greece. (İvecan 
and Efiloğlu fail to explain how these “migrations” came about in the 
first place.) According to this chronology, demands for property pro-
tection started to come in in May 1914, causing local administrations 
to ask for instructions in June. First directives from Istanbul were 
sent in July. They stipulated that movable property would be stored in 
government depots, livestock would be given to the care of “trustwor-
thy” people, and immovable property would be rented out. The gener-
ated income would be paid to the owners upon their return.122 İvecan 
and Efiloğlu also mention that property was at first sold in order to 
satisfy the demands of debtors, but that this practice was abandoned 
after the agreement about an exchange of populations between the 
Muslims of Greek Macedonia and the Rum of Thrace and İzmir was 
signed.123  
Efiloğlu and İvecan cannot quite explain why the Council of Ministers 
at first – admittedly – decided to have the income generated by Otto-
man Greek property paid to the Treasury (rather than to some kind of 
custodian office).124 (The rule was revoked in July 1914). They also fail 
to discuss how successful local administrations could have been at 
“fighting the bands that were trying to take over property during the 
migrations, and giving the property back to the owners.”125 As many 
other scholars, they never discuss the possible difference between 
policies and their actual application here.  
 
122 Efiloğlu and İvecan, “Rum,” 126. 
123 Ibid., 127. 
124 Meclis-i Vükela’nın 22 Nisan [1]331 (05/05/1915) tarihli kararı, BOA, Meclis-i 
Vükela Belgeleri 197/114; Efiloğlu and İvecan, “Rum,” 127. 
125 “Ayrıca göç esnasında Rumların mallarını ele geçirmeye çalışan çetelerle 
mücadele ediliyor ve ele geçirilen mallar sahiplerine iade ediliyordu.” Ibid., 126. 
Most of the documents they cite are petitions of Greek villages, along with instruc-
tions to the local district administrations (mutasarrıflık).  
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1.5.2 The first Greco-Turkish population exchange  
The Greek and Ottoman governments negotiated an agreement about 
a mutual, but nominally voluntary, population exchange in 1914, 
when large numbers of Rum were leaving the Aegean and Marmara 
coast due to the CUP terror campaign against them. The agreement, 
which was not implemented due to the outbreak of World War I, 
stipulated that Macedonian Muslims would be “exchanged” against 
Rum Greeks from the Ottoman Empire.126  It is unclear who first 
came up with the idea to perform this exchange, and thus to copy 
those already undertaken between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, 
and Greece and Bulgaria, respectively. Celal (Bayar) cites Cemal Paşa, 
who said it was Talât Paşa who first suggested it. Alexander Pallis, 
however, points to Eleftherios Venizelos. According to Celal Bayar, 
who claims to have been present during the relevant conversation 
between Talât Paşa and the British consul in İzmir, Talât promised to 
do what he could “to stop these events and improve the situation.” 
Bayar suggests that this “improvement” was the emigration of the 
Ottoman coastal Greeks, triggered by the ongoing terror campaign 
that he himself was coordinating: “What a strange coincidence: Both 
the endeavors that have become known as “re-settlements” and the 
eventual completion of this task by way of the Lausanne agreement 
were put on my shoulders.”127 (Bayar later became Minister for the 
Population Exchange in Republican times). Unlike most present-day 
Turkish authors, who blame the Greeks and Rum by beginning the 
story of the 1923 population exchange with the Megali Idea and the 
Greek occupation of İzmir in 1919, Bayar thus admits that CUP poli-
cies before the World War form an important part of it as well. The 
1914 agreement, which included the idea of property liquidation on 
both sides, was never put into practice due to the outbreak of World 
War I. 
 
126 Mourelos, “1914”. 
127 Bayar, Ben, 1569. 
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1.5.3 The deportations of the Ottoman Greeks; 1915–16 
The CUP’s policies with regard to the Rum population of the Empire 
changed fundamentally with the Ottoman entry into World War I. 
Though the decision to join the Central Powers was already taken in 
August, the formal declaration of war followed only in November 
1914.128 Greek emigration, which had until then been more or less 
openly pursued, now contradicted Ottoman interests: Greece had not 
yet entered the war, and anything that would have given her a reason 
to join the Entente’s side had to be avoided.129 Moreover, the war 
immediately turned all men of age, including Rum Greeks, into po-
tential soldiers, making it much more desirable to draft them into the 
notorious labor battalions (amele taburları) than to lose them to the 
Greek army. The emigration of Rum was therefore officially outlawed 
on October 22, 1914.130 The terror of irregular armed bands (çete), 
while no longer desired, could only be stopped with a certain delay.131 
However, the overall plan of the CUP to Turkify Anatolia, and particu-
larly those areas with strong Christian population ratios, was still in 
place, and soon morphed into a new policy that could be justified as 
being necessitated by the war: In order to prevent the coastal Rum 
population from spying and otherwise helping the expected Allied 
invasion at the Dardanelles, the Rum Greeks of Thrace were deported 
to inner Anatolia from early 1915 onwards. By July 1915, when the 
campaign at Gallipoli was in full swing, it was ordered that all Greek 
communities located within the radius of an hour’s march from the 
coast would be deported.132 Throughout 1915 and 1916, deportations 
continued first in western Anatolia, then on the Black Sea coast, and 
finally on the southern coast around Antalya. 133  Approximately 
 
128 Zürcher, Turkey, 112–13. 
129 Gingeras, Sorrowful, 45. 
130 Dündar, Modern, 230. 
131 Ibid., 232. 
132 Dündar, Modern, 234. 
133 Ibid., 232–38. 
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100,000 Greeks were deported to inner Anatolia, where they were 
mostly settled in Rum villages.134  
All scholars of the subject agree that the Rum deportations differed 
from those of Armenians (which are discussed below) in some im-
portant respects: Possibly the most notable difference is that not all 
Rum communities were affected. Instead, it was the coastal commu-
nities only, and the deportees were usually settled not in the desert, 
but with co-religionist villages in inner Anatolia. 135  The anti-Rum 
terror campaign and subsequent deportations were, in other words, 
not driven by genocidal intentions. While reliable numbers are hard 
to come by, estimates place the death toll of the Greek deportations at 
several thousand.136 Over the course of the war, Rum deportees be-
came increasingly important for agricultural production in Anato-
lia.137 Their labor must have been a much needed, yet insufficient 
replacement for that lost to military recruitment and the Armenian 
Genocide.  
There are a number of explanations for this difference in policy to-
wards Rum and Armenians. Taner Akçam argues that the deportation 
of Rum Greeks was a kind of rehearsal for the deportation of Armeni-
ans, suggesting that the success of the first radicalized the Unionists’ 
plans for the Armenians. He also mentions that the beginning of the 
war allowed the CUP to ignore all those foreign affairs issues they had 
previously had to consider.138 It is certainly true that the Armenian 
Genocide would not have been possible in times of peace. However, a 
major part of the Greek deportations went on throughout the war 
without taking on a genocidal character. Rather than the difference 
between war and peace, it seems to have been the existence of a Greek 
nation state (for which similar massacres would have been a casus belli) 
 
134 According to Gingeras, some towns (such as Biga in northwestern Anatolia) were 
strangely spared from the deportations: Gingeras, Sorrowful, 45. 
135 Dündar, Modern, 234. 
136 Naimark, Flammender, 60. 
137 Ibid.  
138 Akçam, Shameful, 111. 
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that helped to protect the Ottoman Greeks from sharing the fate of 
the Armenians. 139 Moreover, Greece was a “homeland” that the Rum 
could be (and had already been) expelled to.140 Practical and material 
difficulties taken aside, the Greek government was happy to settle 
Ottoman Rum in order to Hellenize the population. A comparable 
Armenian state did not exist.  
1.6  The Armenian Genocide and abandoned property  
The Armenian Genocide forms a research subject in its own right, 
and important studies dealing with it continue to be published. This 
paragraph merely aims at providing an overview over the general lines 
of the genocide in order to then turn to its economic aspects.141 
The deportations of Armenians started in February 1915 and went on 
throughout 1915 and 1916.142 The first ones were directed to Konya, 
but later sent to the desert district of Der Ez-Zor in present-day Syria, 
which became the final destination of later deportations as well.143 
Survival in this area was unlikely due to the desert climate and the 
 
139 Dündar, Modern, 247; Naimark, Flammender, 59. The Ottoman government was 
nervous about the possibility of Greece entering the War on the side of the En-
tente (Greece eventually did so in 1917).  
140 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 11. 
141 For a good summary of the available studies, complete with research problems 
and questions, see Ronald G. Suny, “Writing Genocide: The Fate of the Ottoman 
Armenians,” in A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ot-
toman Empire, ed. Ronald G. Suny, Fatma M. Göçek and Norman M. Naimark, 
15–41 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
142 Fuat Dündar, “Pouring a People into the Desert: The 'Definitive Solution' of the 
Unionists to the Armenian Question,” in A Question of Genocide: Armenians and 
Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Ronald G. Suny, Fatma M. Göçek and 
Norman M. Naimark, 276–84 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 281. 
143 Akçam, Shameful, 145. Among the earliest deportees were those from Zeytun, 
where a local conflict had spiraled out of control: Aram Arkun, “Zeytun and the 
Commencement of the Armenian Genocide,” in A Question of Geno-
cide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Ronald G. Suny, 
Fatma M. Göçek and Norman M. Naimark, 221–43 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 
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lack of any assistance. Starting in the area around Adana, where the 
Ottoman government feared an Allied invasion of the coast, the de-
portations were extended step by step, eventually covering all of Ana-
tolia. The deportation notices were given days or, at times, only sever-
al hours in advance, forcing many people to sell their livelihoods for 
next to nothing. For Adana it is reported that Armenians were kept 
from selling their property in the first place.144 Having to leave on foot, 
many deportees died of exhaustion, starvation or both. Moreover, the 
deportation treks were frequently and systematically attacked by ir-
regulars and Kurdish militias (both of them under the command of 
the Special Organization), who robbed the deported of money, and if 
that could not (or no longer) be provided, their lives. Children and 
young girls were often pulled out of the treks, surviving as converts 
and wives among the local Muslim population.145 Others survived by 
making it to the more densely populated parts of present-day Syria 
and Lebanon, often ending up in Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut.146  
1.6.1 Laws for abandoned property, 1915-16 
Destruction, theft and forced transfer of property are a common fea-
ture of genocidal violence as well as other forms of collective violence 
in modern times.147 The Armenian Genocide is no exception to this 
rule. This sub-chapter is devoted to a detailed discussion of the laws 
and other legal texts with which the CUP government regulated the 
handling of property left behind by deported Armenians and Greeks. 
These texts mark the construction of a systematic legal and adminis-
 
144 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 113. 
145 See Dündar, Modern; Norman M. Naimark, Flammender Hass: Ethnische Säuberun-
gen im 20. Jahrhundert (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2009), 28–50; 
Zürcher, Turkey, 114–18.  
146 On survivors and their testimonies, see Donald E. Miller and Lorna T. Miller, 
Survivors: An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1993); Keith D. Watenpaugh, “The League of Nations’ Rescue of Ar-
menian Genocide Survivors and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism,” The 
American Historical Review 115, no. 5 (2010). 
147 Naimark, Fires, 193; Astourian, “Silence.”  
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trative framework within which the CUP (and later the Republican 
governments) handled property of non-Muslims in Turkey. As the 
preceding discussion makes clear, the legal concept of abandoned 
property emerged somewhat earlier, and there are reasons to believe 
that state institutions for the handling of this issue were first devel-
oped in Balkan nation states such as Bulgaria and Greece. Moreover, 
Muslim refugees were already settled, or settled themselves, in hous-
es that had been involuntarily left by their owners in 1913–14. In this 
sub-chapter I argue that, at least for Turkey, the laws of 1915 and 1916 
mark the introduction of two most important aspects into the already 
existing concept of “abandoned” property: first, the idea that this cate-
gory ought to be treated as a source of revenue for the state, and sec-
ond, the creation of a conceptional link between owners of a certain 
ethnic affiliation with certain administrative measures towards their 
property. 
These developments can be traced through three legal texts: A regula-
tion for Armenian property issued on June 10, 1915, a temporary law 
for Armenian abandoned property that was issued on September 14, 
1915, and which is known as “liquidation law” (tasfiye kanunu), and 
the much lesser known regulation (talimatname) for Rum abandoned 
property of February 21, 1916. The latter appears not to have been 
published at all, and it might be for this reason that it is rarely dis-
cussed in literature on abandoned property. 148  The temporary law 
dealing with Armenian property, on the other hand, can safely be said 
to be one of the (if not the) most controversial laws in modern Turk-
ish history. It was called “temporary” because it had, like most other 
laws of the period, not been issued by the Ottoman chamber of depu-
ties (Meclis-i Mebusan), which only in theory was required to retroac-
tively sanction it.149 In practice, the law was far from temporary, but 
 
148 Neither Nevzat Onaran nor Mehmet Polatel and Ümit Üngör mention the regula-
tion at all.  
149 This kind of law-making was a regular feature of CUP rule, especially during the 
war: “Over time, temporary laws overtook legislation in the parliament as the 
principal lawmaking mechanism of the state. Many important decisions were con-
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effective until 1986 (apart from a short period between 1920 and 1922), 
even becoming the subject of a verdict of the Turkish constitutional 
court in 1963.150 The tasfiye kanunu is without doubt the central legal 
document for the dispossession of the Ottoman Armenians. 
In light of the vast dimensions of the Armenian Genocide, we still 
know relatively little about the way in which Armenian property was 
transferred into Muslim hands. Research that focuses on (rather than 
just mentions) this material side of the genocide has only just begun, 
and it is probably for this reason that works on the subject devote 
particular attention to legal texts: laws, unlike the tens of thousands of 
documents produced during their implementation, are relatively easy 
to obtain. 
1.6.2 Methodology  
As Hilmar Kaiser has pointed out, many denialist historians tend to 
assume that Ottoman laws were applied exactly in the way prescribed 
in them, and therefore cite them as proof of the good intentions of the 
Ottoman authorities.151 This tendency is by no means limited to Turk-
ish nationalist studies of the “Armenian issue” and can, for instance, 
also be found in works on Republican reform projects. What Gavin D. 
Brockett has criticized in works on Kemalist reforms is equally appli-
cable to abandoned property legislation: Brockett argues that this 
“literal” approach to legal texts “must be recognized for its normative 
idealization.”152 
                                                                                                                      
firmed as temporary laws, without any discussion in the chamber.” Şükrü 
Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2008), 163. 
150 Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke, 375–84. The constitutional court produced not one, but 
three verdicts. 
151 Hilmar Kaiser, “1915-1916 Ermeni Soykırımı Sırasında Ermeni Mülkleri, Osmanlı 
Hukuku ve Milliyet Politikaları,” in İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Türkiye’de Etnik 
Çatışma, ed. Erik J. Zürcher, 123–56 (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), 123–24. A recent 
example for this approach is Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia. 
1914–1923 (Utah: University of Utah Press, 2010). 
152 Brockett, “Collective”: 45. 
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But how to deal with these texts in a more sophisticated way? In many 
cases a given law might actually be the only surviving source, and this 
scarceness of additional evidence might force scholars to use laws a 
lot. In the case of Armenian, and later Greek, property in Turkey, the 
registers which were produced in the process of dispossession are, 
unsurprisingly, indeed not available. Thousands of telegrams sent to 
and fro between Istanbul and the provinces, however, are available 
today and have been studied by scholars working on the subject. A 
limited number of telegrams has even been published by the Turkish 
National Archives. It is therefore possible to trace at least some parts 
of the application of these laws. 
All laws and regulations that will be dealt with here were issued in 
retrospect, i.e., after the actual practices discussed in them had been 
developed. This point is often mentioned in critical literature on the 
subject. For instance, Polatel and Üngör show that the seizure of 
Armenian goods in the spring of 1915 was at first improvised and 
only later codified. Hilmar Kaiser argues that a change in legislation 
of November 1915 was “without doubt reflecting the experiences that 
had been made during the auctions of the past few months.”153 While 
they do not dwell on this point, the implicit methodological assump-
tion is that laws can tell us something about the context they were 
written in. They reflect previous practices while helping to gradually 
develop new ones.154 
It is not only that which is said in legal texts which is instructive to 
historians, but also that which remains unsaid. Calling the laws 
“structural elements of the period of genocide,” Taner Akçam points 
out that the deportation law of April 1915 mentions the possibility of 
land distribution and settlement aid to Armenians. Further regula-
 
153 “Şüphesiz, bu değişiklik geçmiş aylardaki müsadereler sırasında kazanılan den-
eyimleri yansıtıyordu.” Hilmar Kaiser, “1915-1916 Ermeni Soykırımı Sırasında 
Ermeni Mülkleri, Osmanlı Hukuku ve Milliyet Politikaları,” in İmparatorluktan 
Cumhuriyete Türkiye’de Etnik Çatışma, ed. Erik J. Zürcher, 123–56 (Istan-
bul: İletişim, 2005). 
154 This point is based on Huri Islamoğluʼs work on the Ottoman Land Code. See 
İslamoğlu, “Property”. 
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tions that would spell out the details of such measures, however, are 
nowhere to be found. While mentioned in the law itself, it appears 
that no instructions for these measures were ever prepared.155 On the 
other hand, there is an abundance of laws and regulations dealing 
with the treatment of the abandoned property of the deported Arme-
nians, and the procedure by which refugees were to be settled in them. 
Akçam concludes that regulations for land distribution to Armenians 
were never written because such distribution did not take place. The 
administrators of the genocide were much more interested in the 
distribution of Armenian property than in providing for the Armeni-
ans. Akçam’s argument can even be taken further: it is not enough to 
analyze laws as proof of their implementation, but an abundance of 
certain ideas and their reiteration in legal texts points towards an 
importance of these ideas in the minds of the law-makers. Moreover, 
changes in legislation and terminology may be seen as traces of 
changing practices and the evolution of certain legal concepts. The 
following sub-chapter is devoted to such a close reading of the laws 
and regulations issued in 1915–16 that dealt with Armenian as well as 
Greek abandoned property in Anatolia and Thrace. 
1.6.3 The regulation for Armenian property (June 10, 
1915) 
Even though deportations started in February 1915, the first law regu-
lating them was issued on May 19, 1915.156 It did not contain rules for 
the property of the deported. According to Akçam and Kurt, first in-
structions for the sale of Armenian property were sent to the provinc-
es several days before that date, probably as early as May 17, and then 
again on May 23.157 Immediately following the deportation of their 
 
155 “Ana iddiam odur ki, gerek Osmanlı gerek Cumhuriyet döneminde çıkartılan bu 
kanun ve kararnamelerde Ermeni soykırımının izini sürmek mümkündür. Bu 
kanunlar esas olarak soykırım sürecinin bir parçası, onun yapısal bir unsuru 
olarak yaratılmış ve uygulamaya konmuşlardır.” Akçam, “Kanunların”: 2. 
156 The original Ottoman text, along with a transliteration and a translation into 
modern Turkish, is provided in Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 17–20. 
157 Akçam and Kurt, Spirit, 20. 
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inhabitants, Armenian villages and towns were settled by Muslim 
immigrants. This migration was centrally planned and sometimes 
even involved the resettlement of refugees who had already been set-
tled elsewhere in the Empire.158 Almost a month after the deportation 
law, the CUP government issued the first comprehensive “Directive 
for the Administration of Property and Land Owned by Armenians 
who Have Been Sent to Other Places Due to the War and the Special 
Political Situation”. 159  It is remarkable that the directive’s title so 
openly refers to Armenians as the ones who were deported (the de-
portation law had not done so). One explanation may be that there 
was no need to be vague about this point because the directive, unlike 
full-grown laws, was never published. Some historians even claim 
that it was secret.160 I would rather say that it was a document intend-
ed for internal use by the officials working in the abandoned property 
commissions. 
According to the directive, all houses of the deported Armenians were 
to be sealed and their movable property to be drawn up in registers by 
abandoned property commissions which would be set up for this 
purpose (Art. 2, 3). Accuracy and completeness appear to have mat-
tered a lot to the law-makers: Article 7 reiterates that all goods, their 
character, number and value had to be listed in registers for every 
village and town. Perishable goods, livestock, and harvested crops 
would be auctioned and the obtained sums of money would be kept in 
accounts in the respective owners’ names. If an owner was unknown, 
the money would be kept in the name of his or her village or town 
(Article 5). Religious objects and books found in churches would also 
be registered, stored, and later sent to the respective communities’ 
 
158 Dündar, Modern, 289. Dündar cites the case of Turkish refugees who were moved 
on from Syria to Zeytun.  
159 Selahattin Kardeş does not mention this directive at all. I have worked with the 
modern Turkish translation in “Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri 1914-1915: 
Cilt I (1914-1915),” (Genelkurmay Başkanlığı): 
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BzTG7ZKYLQglSnRfQkMwZDM0ZTg/edit?pref
=2&pli=1, 139–42. An English translation is provided there on pages 143–46.  
160 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 44. 
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place of exile (Art. 6). Articles 1 to 10 of the talimatname, by often 
mentioning the owners and speaking of custodian care for their prop-
erty, convey the impression to be concerned with the protection of 
these owners’ rights. There are, however, suspicious points. For in-
stance, Article 8 stipulates that crops would be auctioned unless no 
buyer could be found, in which case the produce could be sold for less 
than the estimated price. Certainly, no crop would have been hard to 
sell in the middle of the Great War. (The only exception to this may 
have been cash-crops which may not have been tradable due to the 
war). 
Article 11 states that “refugees will be settled in the emptied villages.” 
(Note that the text does not formulate a possibility but anticipates a 
fact). The following eight articles contain detailed stipulations pertain-
ing to the settlement of these refugees, as well as to nomadic tribes, in 
Armenian houses. Here again, the text prescribes that the settlement 
and allocation process be documented in great detail: registers had to 
include information on the refugees’ names, origin, the date and 
place of their settlement, as well as the characteristics (and value) of 
all the fields, houses etc. they were assigned. Refugees would be given 
one copy of a document that contained all this information.161 Their 
settlement was at no point called temporary. Contrary to Article. 4, 
according to which immovable property would be sealed and kept 
under protection, Art. 20 mentions that “those houses and fields that 
no one wants to buy can be rented out for a period no longer than two 
years.”162 It appears that the limit of two years’ tenancy was not in-
tended to keep houses available for their owners, but to make sure 
that all houses were sold rather than rented out. The implication that 
property would indeed not be protected but sold is made explicit in 
Art. 21 and 22, which mention that the “sums obtained through sale 
or renting out will be kept in custodian accounts and, according to 
 
161 “Arşiv,” 140. 
162 Ibid. 
 91 
information which will be given later, paid to the owners.”163 Arts. 24 
to 34 deal with the abandoned property commissions, their structure, 
the appointment of officials, questions of responsibility, salaries, and 
the administrative framework they were to be established in. Each 
commission was to be comprised of three members: one specially 
appointed chairman would work together with one financial and one 
civil official (Art. 30). The salaries (1.5 Lira per day for the chairman, 
one each for the other members) were to be paid “out of what the 
refugees will pay” (Art. 33). The commissions would receive their 
orders and be responsible to the Ministry of the Interior only. 
Most scholars of the subject agree that the talimatname (as well as 
later, similar regulations) said one thing and meant another.164 That 
said, it is instructive to ask why the CUP government issued the di-
rective, including paragraphs about protective care and custodian 
accounts, in the first place. One convincing answer is that it was im-
possible to admit that property taken by the state would never be giv-
en back. This would have amounted to theft, a “crime that the state 
can’t possibly be accused of.”165 The second, equally plausible expla-
nation points to the comforting effect of detailed instructions on those 
in charge of the dispossession: 
the many orders camouflaged the plunder and lent it a 
juridical quasi-legitimacy. They possibly also played an 
important role for the officials and institutions charged 
with carrying them out. It structured their daily work 
and provided an impersonal, administrative-
bureaucratic mask to hide behind. (...) It gave shape to a 
 
163 This “information to be given later” concerned the new places of residence of the 
deported Armenians.  
164 See Lekka, “Legislative”; Akçam, “Kanunların”. 
165 “Ermenilerin tüm mal varlıklarına el koyarken, açıktan ‘bu mallar veya değerleri 
sahiplerine geri verilmeyecektir’ denmedi, denemedi. Çünkü bu devleti, doğrudan 
hırsız konumuna düşürürdü. Oysa, hırsız değildir, ve vatandaşının malına 
karşılıksız el koymakla, yani hırsızlıkla suçlanamaz.” Akçam, “Kanunların”: 2. 
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“just world fallacy”: if there were government laws about 
the dispossession, then surely they were legitimate.166 
In other words, the talimatname was neither fake nor drawn up to be 
shelved. By providing a blueprint for the handling of abandoned 
property, it shaped the way bureaucrats as well as ordinary people 
came to think about proper or improper ways of dealing with it: from 
1915 on, abandoned property was supposed to be administered by the 
state, and more than that, by specialized commissions in charge of 
registering, selling, and renting out the property. These commissions 
really performed their task (as we shall see later on, often in ways that 
made people judge their work as corruption). This process was im-
mediately followed by the settlement of Muslim refugees in Armeni-
an houses and villages. Officials involved in the implementation of 
the regulation did not need to read between the lines because the 
administrative tasks of sealing, registering, and renting out, (with the 
possible exception of sale), and even the settlement of refugees could 
really have served the purpose of protection. Indeed, the protection of 
houses from decay was useful as it could facilitate the settlement of 
refugees (and the other way around). 167  Likewise, information on 
more or less valuable goods, and their sale through officials could 
provide cash – if not for the refugees, then for the coffers of the state 
– or for the officials themselves. The difference between honest pro-
tection and dispossession made itself felt in details which the talimat-
name did not discuss, i.e., the “information to be given later” for pay-
ment of sums to the original owners of property. In order to use the 
text against rather than for the interests of the deported Armenians, it 
was possible to simply follow the instructions given in the regulation. 
The available information on the implementation of the talimatname, 
and of the dispossession of Armenians as a whole, is still scarce and 
scattered. This is due not to a scarceness of available sources, but 
rather to the fact that scholars have only recently begun to study the 
 
166 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 58. 
167 Dündar, Modern, 294. 
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economic aspects of the genocide in greater detail. However, the gen-
eral picture is clear: abandoned property commissions were set up in 
every province and every district affected by the genocide (i.e., with 
the exception of Istanbul, İzmir and Edirne). This is not to say that 
pillage only started after June 10. In Diyarbakır, for instance, rioting 
in and large-scale plunder of Armenian shops took place as early as 
August 1914, being tolerated by the police.168 
Moreover, it is commonly known that people who had received their 
deportation orders rushed to sell their belongings for whatever price 
they could obtain. An employee of the German Red Cross who wit-
nessed the deportations in Erzincan observed: 
The Armenian women everywhere were sitting in front 
of the houses and offered all their household effects for 
sale. All went away for a song. (…) On 10 June the pic-
ture changed. The city was empty.169 
Many reports mention that crowds of local Muslim people, especially 
women and children, looted Armenian houses, carrying away whatev-
er they could. Üngör and Polatel see the participation of women as an 
instance of their taking part in the national cause of Turkification and 
“bridg(ing) the gender gap.”170 Technically, this might be true. On the 
other hand, it is hardly possible to retrospectively determine the ideo-
logical background of theft. In many cases, especially those in which 
greatly impoverished people looted Armenian property, they might 
simply have been trying to survive. During wartime, when most work-
ing men from towns and cities were serving in the army, their wives, 
widows and children formed a majority among the poorest of the 
poor.171  
 
168 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 136. 
169 PA AA, Botschaft Konstantinopel 96, B1.66–68, report by a Red Cross doctor in 
Erzincan, 29 June 1915. Cited in ibid., 70. 
170 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 88. 
171 This problem of female poverty (and not only the shortage of manpower) was 
certainly one of the factors that lead to first campaigns for employment of urban 
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The prices paid for movable as well as immovable goods did not go up 
when the commissions took over. A witness to the sale of Armenian 
goods in Diyarbakır later recalled: 
You might see a carpet, worth thirty pounds, sold for 
five, a man’s costume, worth four pounds, sold for two 
medjidies, and so on with the rest of the articles, this be-
ing especially the case with musical instruments, such 
as pianos, etc., which had no value at all.172  
The auctions certainly offered an opportunity for local Muslims to 
enrich themselves, and low prices might well have been an expression 
of disrespect and even humiliation aimed at the deported Armenians. 
However, one can easily imagine that “real” demand also played a 
part: people might not have had any use for objects that had been 
valuable to the deported Armenians (as in the case of musical instru-
ments they did not play). Moreover, the simultaneous offering of all 
Armenian goods must have eased competition among potential buy-
ers. Polatel and Üngör argue that goods were sold to the lowest, rather 
than the highest bidder in order to allow the local Muslim population 
to benefit.173 I am not convinced in this point. What is uncontrover-
sial is that the central government was quite unhappy about the mea-
ger results of the auctions, which were good for the local population, 
but bad for the treasury. On July 29, 1915, Talât Paşa himself urged 
the commissions to bring in more money, ostensibly to secure fair 
prices for the owners: 
It has been brought to our attention that the movable 
property of Armenians has been given away or sold for 
nothing as a result of the endeavors of usurers who took 
advantage of their monopoly. As a result, the owners as 
                                                                                                                      
Muslim women. See Zafer Toprak, “Osmanlı Kadınları Çalıştırma Cemiyeti. 
Kadın Askerler ve Milli Aile,” Tarih ve Toplum 9, no. 51 (1988). 
172 Fa'iz el-Ghusein, Martyred Armenia (London: Pearson, 1917), 30. Cited in Polatel 
and Üngör, Confiscation, 113. 
173 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 67. 
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a whole have suffered great losses. (...) Don’t tolerate 
these practices, and if there is anyone who has bought 
property so cheaply, annul the purchase and make sure 
that the difference to the real price is paid.174 
Particularly valuable property such as big landed estates and compa-
nies were turned into new, “national” companies, and “there was 
usually one-to-one correspondence between the roster of the Commit-
tee of Union and Progress local organization and the shareholders of 
new companies.”175 For instance, in Adana, land and resources were 
channeled to a specially set-up CUP-backed cotton company (Anadolu 
Pamuk Şirketi) before the abandoned property commissions started 
their work.176 Agriculture in Adana and its surroundings (the Çuku-
rova plain), was, unlike most other areas of Anatolia,177 characterized 
by large estates and large-scale cultivation of cash crops, especially 
cotton.178 This mode of production required large amounts of capital, 
which were usually obtained through loans from foreign companies. 
Landowners secured these loans with their land. Many of these land-
owners were Armenians, and their dispossession and deportation 
 
174 “Nakledilen Ermenilerin emvâl-ı menkulelerinin pek ucuz elden çıkarıldığı ve 
şuradan buradan toplanan erbâb-ı ihtikârın seyyi'e-i inhisârı olarak, yok behâsına 
satılarak ashâbının külliyen mütezarrır olduğu, istihbâr olunuyor, (...) Bunlardan 
ucuz mâl almışlar varsa fesh-i bey' gibi tedâbîrlere müracaʿâtla kıymet-i asliyeler-
ine ircâ'ına gayret olunarak sūret-i katʿiyyede menâfi'-i gayr-i meşrūʿaya meydan 
verilmemesi” BOA DH. ŞFR 54/381, cited in T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri 
Genel Müdürlüğü, ed., Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler (1915-1920) (Ankara, 1994), 
76. 
175 Keyder, State, 63. 
176 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 113. 
177 The other exception was İzmir, whose Armenian population was not deported. See 
Kontente, Smyrne, 688. I have not come across any protests of creditors against the 
forced migrations of Greeks in 1914–15.  
178 Cotton production in Adana had gained prominence during and shortly after the 
American Civil War, which had effectively cut off the supply of cotton from the 
southern states of the US. For an overview of Adanaʼs development and the inter-
connection between migration and capitalist agriculture in that area, see Toksöz, 
Nomads. 
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posed a direct threat to the financial interests of foreign companies. 
While British and French banks must have been equally affected, only 
German and Austrian ones could voice their demands during the 
war.179 The German ambassador Wolf-Metternich later reported that 
his office had “schon im Interesse der deutschen Gläubiger der 
Ausgesiedelten,” directed complaints against the deportations to the 
Sublime Porte. When these turned out to be to no avail, 
sahen wir uns genötigt, zur Wahrung der in Mitleiden-
schaft gezogenen deutschen Interessen der Pforte zu 
erklären, dass wir sie für den Schaden verantwortlich 
machten, den die deutschen Gläubiger der Ausgesiedel-
ten als unmittelbare Folge des rechtswidrigen Verhal-
tens der türkischen Regierungsorgane erlitten hätten.180  
Talât Paşa reacted by temporarily postponing the deportation of Ar-
menians who were in debt to German companies.181 Later, on Sep-
tember 14, 1915, the CUP government issued the Temporary Law for 
the Abandoned Property, Debts, and Receivables of Persons Deported 
to Other Places, better known as the liquidation law (tasfiye 
kanunu).182 
1.6.4 The liquidation law (tasfiye kanunu)  
When the liquidation law was issued in September 1915, the deporta-
tions and dispossession of Armenians had been largely completed. 
Like most other war-time laws of the CUP government, the tasfiye 
 
179 Losses of people and companies associated with the Entente Powers were later 
regulated in the Lausanne treaty. After 1924, special arbitrary commissions were 
set up to decide about claims for compensation against the Turkish government.  
180 PA-AA/Bo/Kon/99, 10/12 (nicht abgeschickt), cited in Wolfgang Gust, ed., Der 
Völkermord an den Armeniern 1915/16: Dokumente aus dem Politischen Archiv des 
deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes (zu Klampen, 2005), 437. 
181 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 46. 
182 Ahar Mahallere Nakledilen Eşhasın Emval ve Düyūn ve Matlūbat-ı Metrūkesi 
Hakkında Kanun-u Muvakkat. I cite from the transliteration published in Kardeş, 
“Tehcir”, 27–31. 
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kanunu was simply passed by the cabinet, without previous (or subse-
quent) deliberation in the chamber of deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan). It 
was, however, briefly discussed in the Senate (Meclis-i Ayan) on No-
vember 30, 1915. The minutes of this session reveal that the senators 
were well aware of the deportations but managed to drown any doubts 
about its legitimacy in questions of legal procedure. Ahmet Rıza, the 
chairman of the Senate, harshly criticized the law as unconstitutional 
and demanded emergency relief for those Armenians who were still 
alive. The other senators, however, denied responsibility, claiming 
that the second chamber (the Meclis-i Mebusan) had to deal with the 
law first.183  
Most works on the subject stress that the law was issued as a result of 
protests of German and Austrian companies which had been pressing 
for re-payment of their loans.184 I would rather say that it was pub-
lished for this reason, once again providing a codification for already 
existing practices. Moreover, the CUP government was determined to 
keep Armenian property out of foreign hands: as early as July 1915, 
the settlement directorate had instructed the provincial administra-
tion of Trabzon to gather information on outstanding debts of Arme-
nians, urging it“ not to allow that Armenian property passes into the 
hands of foreigners etc.”185 Foreigners were therefore not allowed to 
bid in the auctions. This pattern appears to have continued after the 
 
183 For very brief discussions of Ahmet Rızaʼs speech (but not his colleaguesʼ 
reaction), see Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide. Ethnic 
Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Oxford: Berghahn, 1995), 222–
24; Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 6. The (transliterated) minutes are available 
online at 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/MECLISIAYAN/mad03ic02c001
/mad03ic02c001ink010.pdf (accessed April 7, 2016).  
184 Hilmar Kaiser, “1915-1916 Ermeni Soykırımı Sırasında Ermeni Mülkleri, Osmanlı 
Hukuku ve Milliyet Politikaları,” in İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Türkiye’de Etnik 
Çatışma, ed. Erik J. Zürcher, 123–56 (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), 127–38. Both Ona-
ran and Polatel/Üngör cite Kaiser.  
185 “Ermenilerin uhdesinde emvâlin ecânib ve sâʿire yedine geçmesine müsâʿade 
edilmemesi” BOA. DH.ŞFR 45/393, published in T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşi-
vleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı, 64. 
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liquidation law had been passed, and its implementation turned out 
to be far from satisfactory for foreign creditors. 186  Forwarding a 
French translation of the law to the German embassy in Istanbul, the 
director of the Deutsch-Levantinische Baumwollgesellschaft (a major 
creditor of Armenian cotton producers) commented sarcastically on 
the law’s actual objective:  
Es hätte sich wohl viel einfacher und klarer in zwei Arti-
keln ausdrücken lassen, nämlich: Art. 1) Tous le biens 
des Arméniens sont confisqués. Art. 2) Le Gouverne-
ment encaissera les créances des exilés et il remboursera 
(ou ne remboursera pas) leurs dettes.187  
Commonly known as tasfiye kanunu (liquidation law), the law of Sep-
tember 14, 1915 comprised 11 articles. Article 1 stipulates that “all 
properties, receivables and debts left behind by real or legal persons 
who have been transported to other localities according to the law of 
May 14, 1331 [1915]” shall be “recorded one by one by specially set up 
commissions” and, “on grounds of these records, liquidated by the 
courts.”188  According to Article 2, income-generating property that 
was part of pious endowments (evkaf) would be recorded in the names 
of either the Ministry of Finance or the Treasury of Religious Founda-
tions. The properties would be paid for by the treasuries and the sums 
 
186 According to Polatel/Üngör, this rule applied not only to foreigners, but to non-
Muslims in general. Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 113. 
187 PA-AA/R 14088, A 29127, pr. 8.19.1915 Privatschreiben Abdruck: DuA Dok. 222. 
Cited in Gust, Völkermord, 329. 
188 “14 Mayıs 1331 tarihli kanûn-ı muvakkat hükmünce âher mahallere nakledilen 
eşhâsı hakikîyye ve hükmiyyenin terk etmiş oldukları Emvâl ve matlûbât ve düyûn 
bu husûs için müteşekkil komisyonların her şâhıs için ayrı ayrı tanzim edecekleri 
mazbatalar üzerine mahkemelerce tasfiye edilir.” Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke, 319; 
Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 27. Kardeşʼs otherwise problematic publication provides a 
faksimile of the original text of the law in Ottoman Turkish as published in the of-
ficial gazette, along with a transcription in the Latin script and a translation into 
modern Turkish.  
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remaining after liquidation would be “given to their owners.”189 All 
purchases or other transfers of ownership which had been effected 
during the 15 days preceding the deportations, and were found to 
have been realized at heavily overcharged prices, were declared invalid 
in Article 2. 190 191 Moreover, anyone bringing up a legal dispute con-
cerning the properties would have the state’s registrar’s office (defter-i 
hakani) as adversary (Art. 2). According to Article 3, all moveable 
property, cash and receivables would be registered by the commission 
chairmen, auctioned, and those sums that were not subject to claims 
would be kept in the owner’s name.192 Article 4 regulates the applica-
tion procedure for those who held claims against the deportees: they 
had to register their claims with the commissions and prove residency 
in the place where the commission worked. (This rule must have 
excluded most foreign subjects and companies.) Parties resident on 
Ottoman territory were given two, those resident outside of the em-
pire four months to register their claims. (This rule appears to con-
tradict the former one.) After that period, it was to be possible to sue 
the state, but even anyone who won a case would no longer be able to 
get the property back. Article 5 contains the details of the procedure 
with which local plaintiffs and courts were supposed to establish the 
claims of creditors, who were, unlike their debtors, given the oppor-
tunity to file objections. Following the courts’ establishment of the 
 
189 “(M)ezkûr Hazîneler tarafından verilecek bedellerinden baʾdet-tasfiye kalacak 
miktarı ashabına ita olunur.” Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 27. 
190 This may have been a reference to purchases made by friends of deportees which 
had been made in order to protect Armenian property. 
191 “Eşhas-ı mebhusenin tarih-i nakillerinden on beş gün evvelki müddet zarfında 
icra ettikleri muamelâtı ferağiyede muvazaa veya gabn-i fahişin vücudu, bilmu-
hakeme sabit olduğu takdirde, ukûd-u vakı'a fesh ve iptal olunur.” Kardeş, 
“Tehcir”, 28. 
192 “Zikrolunan şahısların nukût ve emval-i menkule-i metrûkesiyle mevduat ve 
matlûbatı, birinci maddede zikredilen komisyon reisi veya vekili tarafından cem’  
ve istirdat ve tahsil ve dava ve emval-i metrûkeden münaza’ ün-fih olmayanlar, 
bilmüzayede füruht ile hâsıl olan mebaliğ, sahipleri namına emaneten mal 
sandıklarına tevdi olunur.” Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 28. 
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creditors’ claims, the commissions would proceed to liquidate the 
abandoned property. Any objection filed later than that was declared 
invalid. Article 6 prescribes how the sums obtained in the course of 
the liquidation would be distributed among creditors, especially if the 
sums turned out to be insufficient for the satisfaction of all claims. 
Article 7 declares all previous legal regulations, decisions and acts of 
official institutions pertaining to abandoned property invalid and 
announces that anyone who attempted to seize property according to 
these regulations would be subject to the tasfiye kanunu.193 (This point 
must have been a reference to the previous regulation, which had 
prioritized refugee settlement in abandoned property.) Anyone still 
having outstanding lawsuits in court against the deported Armenians 
was directed to turn to the liquidation commissions. Article 8 an-
nounces that the details of the commissions’ composition and work 
would be regulated in a separate regulation. According to Article 9, all  
immovable property mentioned in the law, including income-
generating vakf-property, could be distributed for free among refugees, 
in the framework of the refugee regulation (muhacirin nizamnamesi) 
issued in 1913. Articles 10 and 11 name the ministries in charge of 
the application of the law (the Ministry for Religious Endowments, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Interior, and that of Legal 
Affairs) and stipulates that the law would come into force upon its 
publication. 
1.6.5 Comparison of talimatname and tasfiye kanunu 
Compared against the regulation (talimatname) for abandoned prop-
erty issued three months earlier, the tasfiye kanunu contained some 
significant changes. Unlike its predecessor, the tasfiye kanunu men-
tioned debts and even receivables, describing an administrative and 
judicial procedure not only for the sale, but for the liquidation of Ar-
 
193 “Nakil olunan eşhasın emval-i metrûkesine işbu Kanunun neşrinden mukaddem 
mehakim ve devair-i resmiye tarafından vaz‘ edilmiş olan ihtiyatî veya icraî 
hacizler keen-lem-yekün olup haczi vazedenler işbu Kanunun ahkâmına tâbi 
olacaklardır.” Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 30. 
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menian property. In that sense, the law made it even clearer that a 
return of the deported Armenians was not intended at all. The catego-
ry of value was stressed much more than in the talimatname, while 
refugee settlement, which had been regulated in much detail in June 
1915, was only addressed once, and much less decidedly (“vakf-land 
may be distributed for free among refugees“). It is remarkable that 
free distribution (“meccanen tefviz ve tevzii“) is mentioned explicitly 
only in the liquidation law – the distribution discussed in the talimat-
name had in all likeliness been for free, too, but at that time nobody 
seems to have felt that this point needed to be mentioned at all. 
Moreover, Article 7 declares the regulations of the talimatname (and 
all other previous regulations on the matter) void. Those who “oc-
cup[ied] a house according to previous regulations” must, in most 
cases, have been refugees, and “being subject to the regulations of the 
law” must have meant that those houses, too, would be auctioned. 
The state did, in other words, suddenly consider people it had settled 
only months ago as trespassers. Selahaddin Kardeş (who never men-
tions the talimatname and might in fact have been unaware of it) has 
covered this point up with a mistranslation from Ottoman to modern 
Turkish: “those who occupy houses, counting previous regulations as 
null and void.”194 
1.6.6 Further amendments to and application of the law 
In September 1916, almost exactly a year after the original tasfiye 
kanunu, when great numbers of the deported Armenians could be 
assumed to be dead, the CUP government issued yet another tempo-
rary law, amending Article 2, point 1 of the tasfiye kanunu. This text 
mentioned the possibility that land that had fallen back to the treasury 
(mahlulat) and sultanic land and houses located in the places where 
Armenians had been deported to “can be distributed for free among 
them, in order to be used as temporary shelters, houses, and for their 
 
194 Kardeş translates: “konulmuş olan ihtiyatî veya icraî hacizler yokmuş gibi adde-
dilip haczi koyanlar.” Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 30. 
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subsistence.”195 As Onaran points out, it is significant that the law 
merely mentioned a possibility, not an obligation, thus implying that 
it was equally possible not to provide anything for the subsistence of 
the Armenians.196 Moreover, I doubt that any mahlulat and emiriye 
(sultanic) land existed in the area around Der Ez-Zor, which, being 
desert land, was unlikely to have been cultivated or registered before. 
If anything, it would have been subject to nomadic land rights or 
would have been counted as previously uncultivated mevad land.  
As for the application of the tasfiye kanunu, it is safe to say that the 
administrative structures foreseen in it, namely the liquidation com-
missions, were indeed set up. We know that a total number of either 
32 or 33 liquidation commissions were formed in the provinces and 
districts of Anatolia and Thrace.197 A regulation (nizamname) issued 
on October 28, 1915 provided detailed instructions for the work of 
these commissions.198 According to this document, the commissions 
were charged with the gargantuan task of drawing up all movable and 
immovable property of the Armenians in two copies. These books 
were to be compiled with the help of local tapu and financial officials. 
One of the books was supposed to be handed over to the local admin-
istrative councils, while the other one would be sent to the tapu offices 
for later consultation. If these registers were indeed drawn up (and 
there is no reason to believe that they were not), they must have pro-
 
195 “Şu kadar ki mahal-i ahara naklolunan eşhas-ı merkumeye mahali mürettep-
lerinde beytutet ve ikametleriyle maişetlerini temin edebilecek derecede emlâk ve 
arazi-i mahlûle ve emiriyeden meccanen mesken ve arazi verilmek suretiyle de 
muavenet olunabilir.” Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 37. 
196 “(Y)ardım yapılabilir demekle yapılmayabileceği de ifâde edilmiş olunuyor.” Ona-
ran, Emvâl-i Metrûke, 58. 
197 The list of the places can be found in Hilmar Kaiser, “1915-1916 Ermeni Soykırımı 
Sırasında Ermeni Mülkleri, Osmanlı Hukuku ve Milliyet Politikaları,” in İmpara-
torluktan Cumhuriyete Türkiye’de Etnik Çatışma, ed. Erik J. Zürcher, 123–56 (Istan-
bul: İletişim, 2005), 143. 
198 Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 53–56. Along with a transcription and a modern Turkish transla-
tion, Kardeş provides a faksimile of the original Ottoman text, which also included 
the exemplary tabular forms.  
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vided a depth of information that had never before been available to 
administrators. (The nizamname mentioned that local knowledge 
would be consulted.) The document was sent out with a model regis-
ter (defter), demonstrating the correct way to draw up all relevant in-
formation, attached to it.199 The (at least) 66 registers (defter) that must 
have been produced in the process seem to have disappeared, or ra-
ther, are not available to researchers.200 The collection of all relevant 
information on debts, receivables, mortgages, bank accounts, money 
deposited with other people, and their collection by the commission, 
if performed in the way prescribed in Articles 13–19, must have (or 
rather, would have) created red tape of truly byzantine dimensions. 
According to Fuat Dündar, who has studied the settlement policies of 
the CUP government in great detail, the settlement agency (İAMM) 
indeed produced records that would have allowed tracing exactly 
whose property had been given to whom, and to give it back accord-
ingly.201 
Several provisions of the regulation suggest that the lawmakers, pos-
sibly as a result of the experiences of the past few months, anticipated 
both local resistance to the registration process and corruption of 
officials: “sufficient numbers” of policemen and gendarmes were to 
be called in where necessary, (Article 21), all registers were to be con-
stantly checked, and all members of the commission were to be held 
materially responsible for any losses suffered due to the non-
performance of their duties (Art. 23). The bulk of the commissions’ 
work (that is, the non-monetary aspects of it) appears to have been 
finished by May 1916, when responsibility for them was transferred 
from the Ministry of the Interior (and the settlement agency) to the 
Treasury.202 In March 1917, the Senate decided that Armenian prop-
 
199 This model is part of the version published in the official gazette (takvim-i vekâyi).  
200 “Bu halde yüzlerce defter olması gerekiyor. (...) Peki, bu defterler nerede?” Onaran, 
Emvâl-i Metrûke, 74. 
201 Dündar, İttihad, 88. 
202 BOA.HU Kr 109/3, published in T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel 
Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı, 146. 
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erty mortgaged to the Agricultural Bank would be auctioned in order 
to secure repayment of the debt. The decision explicitly mentioned 
that Greeks and Bulgarians who had left the country would not be 
affected. 203 In the same year, it was also decided that tax arrears 
would be secured in this same way.204 
1.7 The regulation for Greek property 
Although the expulsion, and later deportations, of Ottoman Greeks 
(Rum) preceded those of Armenians, the first legal text that explicitly 
regulated the administrative treatment of their property was issued 
after those for the Armenians. We can assume that the experiences 
made in the handling of Rum property informed the first measures 
taken for Armenian ones and the regulation for Armenian property of 
June 1915. This regulation was also applied to Rum property until 
February 1916.205 
There is a tendency in the scholarly literature on abandoned property 
to see the issue of Rum abandoned property as one limited to the 
issue of the 1923 population exchange. It is probably for this reason 
that Nevzat Onaran does not consider exchangee property as part of 
the greater problematic (in his first book). Polatel and Üngör, while 
acknowledging that there were separate rules for different classes of 
non-Muslim property, claim that they were nevertheless treated the 
same.206 On the other hand, they mislead the reader by depicting the 
population exchange of 1923–24 as the only factor relevant for the 
handling of Rum property: According to them, property of non-
Armenian minorities such as Greeks, Jews and Syriacs was 
 
203 “Maliye Nezâreti’nin tezkiresinde muharrer olduğu üzere Bulgar ve Rumlara âʿid 
emlâk ve arâzinin Hâzine-i celîleye taʿallûku olmayıp ancak Ermenilerden metrûk 
emvâl-ı merhûnenin (...) bi’l-müzâyede satdırılarak” BOA. Meclis-i Vükelâ Maz-
bataları 207/3, published in T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 
Osmanlı, 146. 
204 Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke, 55. 
205 Dündar, Modern, 240; Ahmet Efiloğlu and Raif İvecan, “Rum Emvâl-i Metrûkesin-
in İdaresi,” History Studies 2, no. 3 (2010): 130. 
206 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 43. 
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defined by different categories and applied according to 
different laws. For instance, the laws about Greek mi-
grants (mübadil) who migrated according to the 1923 
population exchange between Greece and Turkey were 
referred to as “property transfer laws” (temlik kanun-
lari).207  
Akçam and Kurt stress that the CUP created different categories for 
different property in accordance with the owners’ treatment by the 
state – for example, there were different rules for deported Rum and 
those who were forced into exile – and go on to state that each catego-
ry corresponded to a different set of administrative practices.208 While 
their stress on administrative rules (rather than ethno-religious identi-
ty or citizenship) is important and instructive, I think that they overes-
timate the power of the legal text, overlooking the development in 
which practices in the provinces informed the law. It is true (and one 
of the central arguments of this study) that the distinction between 
Rum, Greek and Armenian property was of great importance. Yet, it 
was never clear-cut and always hotly contested. The idea of a distinc-
tion between Armenian and non-Armenian property certainly goes 
back to 1915, yet it is instructive to look into the process in which this 
distinction was turned into a self-evident, widely accepted administra-
tive practice. 
As mentioned above, Ottoman Greeks (Rum), including many who 
held Greek citizenship, had been subject to forced migrations even 
before the Ottoman Empire entered World War I, and local admin-
istrations had been settling refugees in their place as early as 1913. 
According to Fuat Dündar, “the settlement of refugees was one of the 
most important means by which Greeks were driven out” at this 
 
207 Ibid. 
208 See Taner Akçam, “Uğur Ümit Üngör ve Mehmet Polatel: El Koyma ve Yıkım, 
Genç Türklerin Ermeni Mallarını Gasp Etmesi kitabı üzerine,” Tarih ve Toplum 
Yeni Yaklaşımlar 14 (2012): 100–102. 
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point. 209  Even before the Ottoman Empire entered the war, Rum 
property was was sold in auctions or rented out.210 Interestingly, the 
issue of outstanding debts (not to foreign companies, but to the Agri-
cultural Bank) seems to have come up in July 1914 as well, and 
Greek/Rum debts to that bank were secured through the sale of the 
debtors’ property.211 The chronology of these measures strongly sug-
gests that the measures that were later applied to Armenian property 
were first developed in local authorities’ dealings with Rum aban-
doned property. The first nation-wide regulation on this issue, howev-
er, seems to have been that of June 10, 1915, which explicitly referred 
to Armenians, thus bringing up the question what to do with Rum 
and Greek-owned property (up until 1923, the latter appears to have 
been treated the same as property of Ottoman subjects). On July 4, 
1915, the settlement agency instructed local authorities in western 
Anatolia to apply the regulation for Armenian property to that owned 
by Rum as well.212 It was only with the proclamation of the liquidation 
law of September 1915 (which, ironically, did not mention the ethno-
religious identity of the deported), that the official policies towards 
Rum and Armenian property seem to have been fine-tuned. Only days 
after the law’s proclamation, on September 29, the settlement agency 
instructed the abandoned property commission in Hüdavendigar 
(Bursa) to treat Rum property differently from that owned by Armeni-
ans.213 Later telegrams to the district government (mutasarrıflık) in 
Canik/Samsun explicitly stated that Rum property should not be liq-
uidated.214 According to Efiloğlu and İvecan, the CUP government 
feared that the Greek government would reciprocate any seizure of 
 
209 “Muhacir iskânı, Rumların kovulması sırasında başvurulan en önemli yöntem-
lerden biridir.” Dündar, Modern, 207. 
210 Dahiliye Nezareti İdare-i Umumiye‟ den Kala-i Sultaniye Mutasarrıflığına 
gönderilen tahrirat, 13 Temmuz [1]330 (26/07/1914), BOA. DH.H, 73/16, Lef. 1/1. 
Cited in Efiloğlu and İvecan, “Rum,” 126. 
211 Ibid., 127. 
212 Ibid., 130. 
213 Efiloğlu and İvecan, “Rum,” 130. 
214 Efiloğlu and İvecan, “Rum,” 131. 
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Rum property in the Ottoman Empire by applying similar measures 
to the Muslim population in Greece. In order to protect the Muslims 
in Greece, it therefore issued a separate set of instructions.215 The 
argument makes sense, but leaves one critical point unconsidered: If 
the decision was aimed at keeping the Greek government happy, why 
was it not published? I think that internal reasons, namely an ongo-
ing disagreement between the Ministry of the Interior and the Treas-
ury, also played a part in bringing about separate policies for Rum and 
Armenian property: Throughout the summer of 1915, the Treasury 
had been pressing hard for a full liquidation of Rum abandoned prop-
erty, while the Ministry of the Interior had rejected the idea.216 Apart 
from and on top of foreign affairs concerns, I think that this disa-
greement was rooted in the different objectives of the two ministries: 
Those of income generation on the one hand and refugee settlement 
on the other. The regulation for Rum property marked a compromise 
between these two mutually contradictory objectives which effectively 
separated the spheres of influence of the two ministries. This explana-
tion is supported by a cabinet decision (taken as late as November 
1917), which placed Rum abandoned property under the supervision 
of the Ministry of the Interior (i.e., the settlement directorate), while 
responsibility for Armenian property was given to the Treasury.217 
The regulation (talimatname) for Rum abandoned property was com-
prised of thirteen articles, most of which regulated the use of Rum 
property for the benefit of refugees.218 Articles 1 and 2 explicitly state 
that property of those Rum who had left the country “for good” would 
be dealt with separately, and that the following regulations were to 
affect only those left behind by “people who have been temporarily 
settled in other places for military reasons.” (This effectively marked a 
 
215 Ibid., 128.  
216 Ibid., 129. 
217  Meclis-i Vükela’nın 11 Teşrin-i Sani [1]333 (11 Kasım 1917) tarihli kararı; BOA. 
MV, 210/25; Sadaret’ten Dahiliye ve Maliye Nezaretlerine gönderilen tahrirat, 15 
Teşrin-i Sani [1]333 (Kasım 1917), BOA. BEO, 336787. Cited in Efiloğlu and İvecan, 
“Rum,” 130. 
218 I cite the transliterated text of the regulation published in ibid., 136.  
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distinction between those forced into emigration prior to the Ottoman 
entry into World War I and those deported to the interior during the 
war.) Tools and household items would be distributed among refu-
gees, preferably widows and young girls, who were without family 
support (Art. 3). Movable property that could be of military use could, 
against receipt, be requisitioned by the army. Other movable property 
would be sold in auctions (if the owners were subject to the [1914] 
population exchange with Greece), and the revenues would be kept in 
custodian accounts (again either in the owner’s or the village’s name). 
Movable property of deported people would be kept in churches and 
depots (Art. 4). Immovable property would be distributed according to 
an already existing regulation for refugee settlement of Teşrinisani 
1330/ January/February 1914. (Art. 5).219 Buildings that were unsuit-
able for refugee settlement, but income-generating (such as mills, 
shops etc.) would be rented out for short periods (Art. 6). The specific 
needs and skills of refugees would be considered in the settlement 
decisions (Art. 7). All information on the distributed property would 
be recorded in special defters (Art. 8). Vineyards, orchards and olive 
groves would be assigned to refugees who had the necessary skills for 
working them (Art. 9). Article 10 stipulated that immovable property 
owned by deported people would not be distributed. An exception 
would be made in the case of empty villages along the coast which, in 
order not to become a security threat, would be settled with refu-
gees.220 Property of people who returned and decided to stay in the 
Ottoman Empire would be treated like that of deported people (Art. 
11). The tasks outlined in the rest of the text would be performed by 
the existing liquidation commissions wherever these were available. If 
no liquidation commission existed, refugee settlement commissions 
would be in charge (Art. 12). The government would not be responsi-
 
219 I have not come across any other reference to such a regulation, and it seems 
possible that this actually was a reference to the muhacirin nizamnamesi of 1913.  
220 The Greek deportations did qua definitionem only affect coastal populations. The 
article therefore provided carte blanche for refugee settlement in all those places 
that were supposedly excluded from this measure.  
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ble for any damage of property suffered either during the emigration 
or during the deportation of owners (Art. 13). 
1.8 Custodian accounts  
The liquidation/abandoned property commissions were set up all over 
Turkey and swiftly took up their task of renting and selling out Ar-
menian and Rum property. There is no doubt among the scholars 
specialized in this field that the special accounts mentioned in the 
regulations were indeed set up (yet without much of a custodian pur-
pose.) The whereabouts of the (at least) 66 registers drawn up by the 
33 commissions, which must have been comprised of hundreds of 
separate books, however, remain unknown. 221  In some cases, the 
accounts and their balances are mentioned in other sources. The 
records of the Council of Ministers, for instance, state that by Decem-
ber 1917, a total sum of 4,699,199 kuruş (4,699 Lira) had been ob-
tained by the sale of Rum property in the Edirne province.222 The 
(much bigger) Aydın province reported a sum of 1,453,987 kuruş, 
(1453 Lira), 227,469 out of which had been spent for various purpos-
es.223 The remaining sum was apparently included in the 1915 pro-
vincial budget, but later used for the construction of schools in-
stead.224 Considering that the prices paid for a house in the interior 
ranged from between 50 and 1000 Lira after the war, and that the 
province of Aydın alone had more than a million inhabitants prior to 
the war, the mentioned sums are ridiculously low.225  
 
221 “33 Tasfiye Komisyonu’nun 14 hesap türüne göre yazdığı defterlerin kaydı şu 
kadar ve defterlerde şunlar var şeklinde bilgilenmek bugün itibariyle mümkün 
olmamıştır. Bu halde yüzlerce defter olması gerekiyor. Hadi yüzlerce değilse bile, 
en azından 33 komisyon bölgesinde Nizam-name (sic) gereği bir esâs ve bir de cari 
olmak üzere kaydedilen 66 defterin bulunması lâzımdır. Peki, bu defterler nerede?” 
Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke, 74. 
222 BOA. MV, 210/68, cited in Efiloğlu and İvecan, “Rum”: 130. 
223 Efiloğlu and İvecan, “Rum,” 127. 
224 BOA. MV, 201/63, cited in ibid., 131. 
225 The price-range of houses after the war has been taken from: Report Ltd. Hole, 
August 1919, FO 371/4158/12444. 
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Much higher sums are mentioned with regard to confiscated Armeni-
an bank accounts. From early on in the deportation process, the CUP 
had been trying to keep Armenians from sending their money abroad 
or leaving it in the care of friends.226 In June 1915, the province of 
Trabzon was instructed “not to allow for any transfer of goods which 
are currently in the hands of the Armenians to foreigners etc.”227 
While there is clear evidence that the accounts of the deported were 
seized (the nizamname admits to this point), the total sum of the con-
fiscated money and its whereabouts remain obscure. Polatel and Ün-
gör claim that the CUP government deposited five million Turkish 
Lira at the Deutsche Reichsbank in 1916, claiming that this was the 
total sum of the confiscated bank accounts plus the money sent from 
provincial liquidation commissions. 228  After the war, the Entente 
powers, keen on obtaining their reparations from Germany, launched 
investigations on the war-time financial transactions that had taken 
place between the German Reich and the Ottoman Empire, eventually 
coming to the conclusion that a gold deposit made in 1915 had not 
originally belonged to Armenians. Hrayr Karageuzian argues that 
these reports either overlooked or obscured a second deposit, which, 
unlike the first, indeed had its source in Armenian bank accounts. He 
claims that the post-war Allied governments were not interested in 
unveiling the actual sources of the money, preferring to establish 
good relations with the Turkish Republic and seize the money as part 
of the German reparation payments.229 It seems doubtful whether the 
complicated details of the war-time finances, and the post-war inves-
tigations, can be disentangled as easily as he claims. 
 
226 Hilmar Kaiser, “1915-1916 Ermeni Soykırımı Sırasında Ermeni Mülkleri, Osmanlı 
Hukuku ve Milliyet Politikaları,” in İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Türkiye’de Etnik 
Çatışma, ed. Erik J. Zürcher, 123–56 (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), 152. 
227 “Ermenilerin uhdesindeki emvâlin ecânib ve sâʿire yedine geçmesine müsâʿade 
edilmemesi,” İAMM to Trabzon vilayeti, 28 Haziran 1331, BOA.DH. ŞFR. nr. 
54/393, published in T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı, 
64.  
228 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 66.  
229 Karagueuzian, Perfect, 99–104. 
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The only clear proof for the existence of a nation-wide “custodian 
account” dates from 1928, i.e., the time after the population exchange, 
at which point even more people had been dispossessed. A law (no. 
1349 issued in May 1928 transferred the money kept in the aban-
doned property current accounts (emval-i metruke hesab-ı carileri) to 
the “various purposes” section of that year’s national budget. Up to 
300,000 Lira out of that (non-specified) sum were directly “added” to 
the 1928 budget of the Treasury.230 It is remarkable how openly this 
major act of theft was performed. The money’s origin seems not to 
have aroused any anxiety among the deputies anymore, possibly be-
cause the administrative routine involved in confiscation, recording 
and storing had sufficiently “laundered” it. The law itself does not 
mention the origins of the accounts’ contents, but Selahaddin Kardeş, 
a high-ranking financial official, states that it included the money of 
all those people whose property had passed into the hands of the 
Treasury because they had been deported or fled, and who had not 
claimed the money by 1928.231 The sum of 300,000 Lira clearly was 
mentioned as merely a part of the total sum, and it remains unknown 
exactly how much money was kept in the accounts.232  
1.8.1 Corruption  
If the total profit from auctioning off all the abandoned property lo-
cated in a whole province did not exceed the postwar price of two 
mansions, this suggests two things: first that the prices paid were far 
below those paid in peacetime, and second that corruption was rife. 
Both points were frequently mentioned in post-war debates and are 
discussed in Chapter Two. Documents produced in the course of the 
 
230 Emval-i Metrûke Hesab-ı Carilerinin Bütçeye İrat Kaydına Dair Kanun No 1349, 
May 28, 1928. The law is also discussed in chapter 5.7. Its full text can be found in 
Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 113. On the law, also see Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 56. 
231 “(N)akledilen, kaybolan, yabancı ülke ve işgal altındaki yerlere giden kimselerin 
Hazineye geçen taşınmaz mallarıyla ilgili olarak emanet hesaplarında bulunan ve 
henüz alınmamış paralar, 1928 yılı bütçesine irat kaydedilmiştir.” Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 
10.  
232 Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke, 264–66. 
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dispossession process frequently discuss cases of corruption, and in 
some cases even mention consequences. In Samsun, where the mov-
able property of Rum Greeks had not been put into depots, the district 
governor (kaymakam) and the army commander were dismissed.233 In 
Bandırma, almost the whole local administration (including the dis-
trict governor, mayor, chief of the district police, the tax official and 
the chief of the local police station) had to go after they had been 
found to have sold Rum property too cheaply.234 In Adana, too, some 
minor officials were sacked. The overall situation, however, seems to 
have been one in which the corruption of minor officials could not 
even remotely match that of high-level ones.235 The governor (vali) of 
Diyarbakır, Dr. Reşit Bey, personally enriched himself so much that 
Talât Paşa urged him to “return the cash, jewelry and other property 
to the Armenians who were attacked during their deportation.”236 
1.9 The deportees’ return: 1918–20 
After the armistice of October 1918, what was to become Turkey was 
described as a “mixture of misery and disorder”, an impoverished 
country full of displaced people, deserters, disbanded soldiers, all of 
them trying to make their way back home. The acting British High 
Commissioner spoke of “a migration of peoples which reminds one 
of the migrations of the Middle Ages.”237 Those Armenians and Rum 
who made their way back home often found their houses either unin-
habitable or occupied by Muslim refugees who refused to vacate 
them.238 The end of the war thus brought along a wave of renewed 
inter-ethnic strife, which once again crystallized around the question 
 
233 Efiloğlu and İvecan, “Rum”: 135. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 117. 
236 BOA, DH ŞFR 56/315, Talaat to Reshid, 6 October 1915. Cited in ibid., 147. 
237 High Commissioner Richardleart to Foreign Office, December 22, 1918. FO 
371/4157/521. 
238 Ryan Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Otto-
man Empire, 1912–1923 (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 52–
54; Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 97–100. 
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of property rights.239 Though a result of the war-time policies of the 
CUP (which had effectively removed the victims of deportations and 
dispossession from local Muslims’ eyes), the reflux of refugees might 
well have appeared to be the actual cause of post-war tension. Refugee 
settlement and the economic gains made through property theft had 
effectively turned much of the population into accomplices of geno-
cide and expulsion. Reporting on the situation in Adapazarı, an Amer-
ican missionary wrote: 
The Turks are not pleased. Their consciences are too 
unpleasantly active for them to enjoy seeing the people 
they have robbed... They had lived rather happily on the 
whole with their Armenian neighbors formerly but after 
the deportations, which were ordered from above, the 
return of the people they have so grossly wronged is a 
constant irritation.240 
Following the armistice of Moudros/Mondros on October 30, 1918, 
officers of the Allied High Commissions made their way to the pro-
vincial towns of Turkey in order to oversee the demobilization of the 
Ottoman army. Their reports (which cover only easily accessible plac-
es along the railways and the coastline) frequently describe the aban-
doned property question as a most serious threat to public security. A 
circular that was sent to the provinces on December 18, 1918 recog-
nized this and stated that property would be given back to their right-
ful owners (but not to proxies). A detailed cabinet decision (kararname, 
no. 2747 which revoked the tasfiye kanunu of September 1915 fol-
lowed on January 12, 1920.241  
In theory, people who had been dispossessed during the war were 
eligible for full restitution of their property and compensation for 
 
239 Ellinor Morack, “The Ottoman Greeks and the Great War: 1912-1922,” in The 
World During the First World War, ed. Helmut Bley and Anorthe Kremer, 213–28 
(Essen: Klartext, 2014). 
240 ABCFM 16.9.4, vol. 6: “Easter in Adabazar”, cited in Gingeras, Sorrowful, 54. 
241 Akçam and Kurt, Kanunların, 55–57. For the original text as published in the 
official gazette (which is dated 8 January 1920), see Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 69 – 91.  
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their losses from December 1918 onwards. Indeed, several Allied 
officers reported that they had instituted local mixed commissions 
which had started to give Christian property back to the original own-
ers. These commissions were each composed of one Armenian, 
Greek and Muslim member and chaired by the local governor (kay-
makam). The effectiveness of these commissions differed greatly from 
place to place.242 While some reports speak of hundreds of houses 
that were given back, others complain about the reluctance, if not 
passive resistance of governors against actually pursuing this task.243 
In his report about his visits to such commissions in Ankara, Akşehir 
and Afyonkarahısar (which he found to be working quite effectively), 
a British officer remarked that “the enthusiasm of a Turkish official is 
liable to evaporate at the departure of a relief officer, and should be 
sustained by periodical visits.”244 Reports about unsuccessful or inef-
fective commission work came remarkably often from towns along 
the coast, i.e., from those places where deportations of Rum had taken 
place.245 Indeed, officers often remarked that difficulties in the resti-
tution process arose especially in those places that had been affected 
by Rum deportations.246 
 
242 On the mixed reports from northwestern Anatolian towns, see Gingeras, Sorrow-
ful, 53. For western Anatolia and the Black Sea coast, see Ellinor Morack, “The Ot-
toman Greeks and the Great War: 1912-1922,” in The World During the First 
World War, ed. Helmut Bley and Anorthe Kremer, 213–28 (Essen: Klartext, 2014). 
243 A report sent from the Black Sea ports of Giresun, Inebolu and “Unieh”(Ünye) 
was especially gloomy. The reporting officer demanded that the governor of Inebo-
lu be replaced. FO 371/4159/135243, Ltd. Slade to British High Commission in 
Constantinople, September 30, 1919.  
244 Hole to High Commissioner, August 15, 1919. FO 371/4158/12444. 
245 This pattern is traceable in the reports from the Black Sea coast and western 
Anatolia that I have seen. Gingeras speaks of “abysmal” results in Bandırma, Bur-
sa and Mudanya in constrast to successful restitutions in Bilecik, Karacabey, Kir-
masti and İzmit. Gingeras, Sorrowful, 53. 
246 The reason for the prominence of reports about conflicts between returning Rum 
(rather than Armenian) deportees and refugees seems to be that deported Rum 
were much more likely to have survived than Armenians. Moreover, the Armenian 
population in western Anatolia was relatively small (compared to eastern Anatolia). 
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Since Christian property had systematically been used to settle Mus-
lim refugees, it comes as no surprise that these refugees, who hardly 
had other places to go, often refused to leave. Those who eventually 
had to vacate the houses petitioned the government in Istanbul with 
frantic requests for help.247 The government, in turn, wrote to the 
provincial administrations, asking for information on available places 
to settle the refugees in. 248  A government order (kararname) with 
detailed provisions for the restitution of property and compensation 
of deportees was only issued in January 1920, two months prior to the 
full Allied military occupation of Istanbul.249 By that time, major parts 
of western Anatolia were under Greek occupation. In April, the na-
tionalists around Mustafa Kemal established their government in 
Ankara, soon bringing important parts of central and eastern Anatolia 
under their control. Whether or not the law for property restitution 
was applied in nationalist territory is discussed in Chapter Two.  
Throughout the war, Ottoman propaganda and censorship, in tandem 
with poor roads and communications and the remoteness of the 
fronts to the Anatolian homeland, had effectively kept ordinary people 
in the countryside from becoming aware of the actual gravity of the 
military situation.250 British officers regularly complained about local 
Muslims’ reluctance to realize that the war had been lost: 
I think that in the Capital and its neighborhood, the 
Turks are under no misconception as to their having 
                                                                                                                      
Gingeras comes up with a survival rate of roughly 10 percent among Armenians 
from the south Marmara region. Ibid., 52–53.  
247 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 97. Polatel and Üngör cite the case of a petition 
sent by Balkan War refugees who had ended up homeless in Bursa in October 
1919.  
248 Ibid. 
249 Akçam and Kurt, Kanunların, 57. 
250 The only war theater that was geographically close to western Anatolia was 
Gallipoli, where the Ottoman army fought one of its two successful battles of the 
Great War. People in western Anatolia would have had much greater difficulty at 
learning about the military disasters on the eastern Anatolian, Mesopotamian and 
Palestinian fronts. 
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been beaten, but this fact does not penetrate through the 
ignorance and indifference of the Turkish population in 
the Interior.251 
An officer reporting from the province (vilayet) of Edirne had “no 
doubt that the Turkish population on a whole” was “far from consid-
ering themselves a beaten nation.”252 The same report depicts the 
continued occupation of Armenian and Greek houses by Muslim 
refugees and their refusal to leave as a sign of stubbornness and in-
appropriate Siegermentalität. (In assessing these reports, one certainly 
needs to keep in mind that the failure of Turkish officials to cooperate 
probably frustrated the Siegermentalität of the British officers them-
selves.) Moreover, one may assume that, as these reports were written, 
people were already starting to understand the situation better. The 
arrival of returning deportees and Allied officers together marked the 
point at which the far-away defeat started to make itself felt in ordi-
nary people’s lives. According to Gingeras, it was the return of the 
non-Muslims and their demanding their property back that actually 
made people realize that the CUP government had failed.253 The sud-
den appearance of foreign officers and the fact that they were giving 
orders to Ottoman officers and civil officials was probably outrageous 
– the eviction from a house one had called home for three years or 
more (and even the mere possibility of it) was certainly distressing. 
Dündar is probably right in arguing that the return of the Rum and 
Greek population from exile and deportation was “one of the two 
main reasons (the other being the foreign occupation by the victori-
ous powers) that brought about the Kemalist movement.”254 
 
251 British High Commission to Foreign Office, December 18, 1918, FO 
371/4157/521. 
252 Ibid. Report Slate to British High Commission.  
253 Gingeras, Sorrowful, 54. 
254 “(...) Rum dönüşünün Kemalist hareketi doğuran en önemli iki nedenden biri 
olduğunu (diğeri de galip devletlerin işgalidir) belirtmek isterim.” Dündar makes 
this argument in his discussion of the Greek return, but it might well be made for 
Armenian returnees as well. Dündar, Modern, 175. 
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In some cases, the return of the deportees led to bloody conflicts be-
tween them and the refugees who had been settled in their places. 
This was especially true for French-occupied Cilicia and the Greek-
occupied area around İzmir.255 In Dörtyol, returning Armenians vio-
lently evicted Muslim refugees from their houses, killing some of 
them. The local Muslims in turn were quick in organizing militias 
who would punish anyone who attempted to help returning Armeni-
ans.256 Even prior to the Greek landing at İzmir (in May 1919), British 
reports from the area frequently mentioned violent conflicts between 
Rum who had returned from their exile in mainland Greece and local 
Muslims. In Urla, a local Greek militia, which was reportedly com-
prised mostly of recent returnees from Greece, engaged in a petty war 
against the local gendarmerie in the winter of 1918–19.257 Another 
report describes daily occurrences of robbery and murder (in 
April/May 1919): 
(B)efore the war these districts were largely used by the 
Turks as a dumping ground for immigrants from Crete, 
Epirus, Macedonia and other Mahommedan districts 
outside Anatolia. There are therefore considerable num-
bers of Cretans, Albanians, Circassians and Bosniaks in 
the sandjaks of Smyrna and Aidin, men who are in 
many cases embittered against the Greeks owing to 
what they suffered and lost as the result of Greek expan-
sion, who are naturally inclined to lawlessness, who 
have received little or no help from the Turkish authori-
ties, and therefore readily turn to brigandage and rob-
bery.258  
 
255 A discussion of Greek violence against Muslims in western Anatolia during that 
time can be found in Toynbee, Western. For the pro-Turkish perspective on events 
in Adana, see Güçlü, Armenians. 
256 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 124. 
257 Report of Sgd. S. Baker to Dixon, Smyrna January 23, 1919. FO 371/4157/31308. 
258 Lieut.-Colonel Ian M. Smith to British High Commission, Constantinople, May 
1919, FO 371/4157/72532. 
118 
By the spring of 1919, the western coastline of Anatolia had what 
Thrace had already had six years before: a population comprised of 
people who had, in one way or another, recently made the experience 
of forced migration, who were embittered against each other and 
tragically bound up in conflicts about the very same houses and the 
very same land. All British reports of the period point out that the 
population tensely awaited the decisions to be made at the peace con-
ference in Paris. Time and again, the officers warned that the handing 
over of İzmir and its surroundings to Greece would result in even 
more bloodshed – their calls went unheard. 
1.10  Conclusion: From empty land to “national” 
property 
Refugees coming to Anatolia were occasionally settled (or settled 
themselves) in property abandoned by its former owners as early as 
the 1860s. It was also at this point that a limited mutual “exchange” of 
populations was negotiated with with the Tsarist Empire. At this point, 
however, the Ottoman state neither pursued a policy of enforced emi-
gration nor systematically administered the property that stayed be-
hind. Moreover, migration still was mainly immigration, not emigra-
tion, and it therefore doesn’t come as a surprise that the various peace 
treaties of the 19th century usually mentioned only one category of 
property: that of Muslim landowners in Ottoman territories ceded to 
the new nation-states of the Balkans. The first of these treaties, the 
London Protocol of 1830, still conceptualized property rights as tightly 
bound to the physical presence of property owners. Fifty years later, 
the Treaty of Berlin included clauses that allowed absentee landown-
ership across borders (significantly, only for the new Balkan states, 
but not for the areas ceded to Tsarist Russia). On the one hand, this 
development was certainly rooted in the establishment of modern 
property rights and the existence of large-scale agricultural estates in 
the Balkans. But it was more than that. The idea that ownership rights 
could be enjoyed from afar was a precondition for the emergence of 
abandoned property policies: people who migrated from one place to 
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another prior to the emergence of this concept (such as those Mus-
lims who left the Morea in the 1820s) simply lost their land. In the 
case of those Muslims who were forced to leave Bulgaria in the 1870s, 
however, the legal separation between physical presence and property 
rights made it possible for the provisional Russian authorities to take 
over their rights by representing them (more or less faithfully so). 
Historically, forced mass migration in the presence of modern prop-
erty rights was accompanied by the emergence of state practices that 
made the rather abstract legal conceptualization of modern property 
rights in land (which had been codified in the mid-1850s) and their 
inalienability very much concrete: these laws actually denied people 
the rights that they ostensibly protected. But the real litmus test on 
the character of abandoned property administration came when peo-
ple returned (as happened in Bulgaria in the late 1870s, and Anatolia 
after 1918).  
The Ottoman state became acquainted with state registration, admin-
istration and the messy politics of restitution in the course of forced 
mass migration of Muslims from the new Balkan states, which coin-
cided with and was exploited for the forced emigration of the Chris-
tian population along the western borders. The policies of state ad-
ministration and “protection” were probably inspired by those prac-
ticed in Bulgaria in the 1870s and 1880s.  
The available research on immigration to and refugee settlement in 
the Ottoman Empire also suggests a strong interdependence between 
modern property rights and mass migration. First of all, it seems to 
have been existing property rights rather than physical scarcity of land 
that dried up the reserves of land available for refugee settlement. It is 
remarkable that expropriation and land reform, while occasionally 
mentioned in reports, seems to have never actually been pursued as a 
possible remedy to this problem. The settlement of refugees aggravat-
ed existing conflicts over property rights in the countryside, and, on a 
local level, amplified their conceptualization in terms of ethnicity. 
Moreover, illegal appropriation of agricultural land in eastern Anato-
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lia, especially during the Hamidian massacres of the 1890s, was a 
push factor for Armenian emigration to the United States.  
Conflicts between refugees and local people (not only non-Muslim) 
were common throughout the latter half of the 19th century. But it is 
only from the 1890s on, and particularly during the Armenian massa-
cres of 1894–96, that reports mention active state involvement and 
encouragement of violent attacks on Ottoman non-Muslims. The 
latter were also accompanied by large-scale seizures of Armenian 
property by the hands of Kurdish militias, which, however, left signif-
icant numbers of Armenians in place. When the CUP government 
started to deal with these appropriations, the scheme it came up with 
(yet which does not seem to have been implemented) was one of 
monetary compensation rather than restitution. While legal in terms 
of a liberal conceptualization of property, compensation would have 
implied that those who received compensation (and who had been 
forced to leave long ago) effectively lost their right to return to their 
land. It is important to note that this conception was rejected by Ar-
menian groups, who instead rallied for full, physical restitution of the 
land. 
Abandoned property in the full sense of the word only emerged in the 
aftermath of the Balkan Wars. At this point, the Ottoman state (which 
was now run by a government almost completely comprised of men 
who themselves had a refugee background)259 started to actively or-
ganize the eviction of Ottoman Greeks. The term emval-i metruke 
came to signify this particular combination of (already) abandoned 
houses and land plus active (or prescribed) state administration of 
them. It was here that local Ottoman authorities came to develop 
administrative techniques to deal with the problem of abandoned 
property. The Ottoman term emval-i metruke probably described this 
combination of a fact (empty houses and fields) combined with tech-
niques of state administration of that property. Comprehensive legal 
regulations for this issue were only drawn up in 1915, that is, almost 
 
259 Dündar, Modern, 187. 
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two years after the first evictions of Greeks and Bulgarians, and rested 
on the practices that had been developed in the meantime.  
All regulations and laws discussed here contain the two mutually 
contradictory objectives of refugee settlement on the one hand and 
revenue generation on the other, yet with different emphasis on each 
point. Judging from the development of these texts over time, refugee 
settlement in Armenian houses and land distribution to them was 
deemed rather important in June 1915, but became highly unwel-
come in September 1915, when the liquidation law (tasfiye kanunu) 
was drawn up. The regulation for Greek property, which was issued 
five months later, again stressed refugee settlement rather than the 
sale of abandoned property. It seems that the internal conflict be-
tween both objectives (and the respective ministries embodying them) 
had been accommodated by a distinction between Greek and Armeni-
an property, as well as one between deported Greeks and those who 
had been forced into emigration. This distinction between property 
according to the identity of former owners and their treatment by the 
state would persist, if under somewhat different circumstances, 
throughout the early Republican period.  
Why this difference? Foreign policy reasons such as the existence of a 
Greek nation state, and the non-existence of an Armenian one are an 
important, but not a sufficient explanation. Rather, the distinction 
between different classes of property was a very specific administra-
tive attempt at answering the much more fundamental question 
whether the stolen wealth of non-Muslims was supposed to serve the 
public good – or the state. This question is indeed discussed in plenty 
of sources about the fate of abandoned property, usually with regard 
to practices subsumed under the term “corruption”.  
Refugee settlement was an even more complicated matter. Through-
out World War I, it was pursued not only as a measure of relief for the 
refugees, but of social engineering, performed in order to increase the 
number of Muslims living in Anatolia. Moreover, it was a declared 
objective of the CUP to transfer non-Muslim wealth to the hands of 
Muslims, and most abandoned property commissions acted accord-
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ingly. This meant that Armenian and possibly Greek property was 
auctioned at prices far below their peace-time value, a matter that 
created tensions between the central government and local authorities. 
In a nutshell, the question at hand was if “the nation” (which was 
supposed to benefit from non-Muslim property) was simply identical 
with “the people” – or rather represented by “the state.” 
Authors such as Polatel and Üngör are certainly right in pointing out 
the importance of Young Turk economic thought, and, more particu-
larly, that of the idea of economic Turkification, in bringing about the 
dispossession of the Ottoman Armenians. However, I think that their 
analysis, in providing a history first of the ideological background and 
then of the actual practices, fails to shed light on the mutual influ-
ences between the two. It is possible to trace this influence of practic-
es on discourse and vice versa in the debates about the proper use of 
abandoned property, not only between members of the elite, but be-
tween parliamentarians, individual refugees, and local people. These 
debates not only addressed the problem of the proper use of property, 
but the vital question who the nation was, whether or not it could be 
represented, and if yes, by whom. The following chapters are devoted 
to an analysis of these questions in the debates during and after the 
War of Independence. 
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2 Making sense of ethnic cleansing and 
genocide: Parliamentary debates concerning 
“abandoned property”, 1921–22 
This chapter traces debates concerning abandoned property 
legislation and its application from April 1921, when a draft for a new 
“abandoned property” law was first discussed, up to November 1922, 
to three sessions that dealt with this lawʼs application. 
Methodologically, it provides a discourse analysis that traces the 
emergence of certain ideas as a result of multiple, and often 
contradictory, speeches made by many different deputies. The 
approach to the debate is further informed by Erik J. Zürcher, who 
has argued that the ideology we know today as Turkish nationalism 
was developed not so much by intellectuals, but by practitioners who 
worked with the conditions they found in place: 
It is quite conceivable, indeed probable, that the politi-
cians formed their policies under the impetus of fast-
changing political realities of the day and used the ideo-
logical toolkit available to them in an essentially prag-
matic manner. (...) If we are to understand the history of 
the period (and its legacy), therefore, it is essential that 
we understand what made these Young Turk politicians 
tick, but we have to take their actions as our point of de-
parture, rather than try to place them in the Ottoman-
ism-Islamism-Turkism paradigm.1  
The chapter jumps back and forth between the discussion of events 
and a close analysis of parliamentary debates, thus providing the his-
torical background against which the latter took place. The aim of this 
chapter is to show that discussions about abandoned property helped 
 
1 Erik J. Zürcher, “Young,” in The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening, 
217–18. 
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to make sense of the ongoing expulsion of non-Muslims from the 
areas under nationalist control, and thus to permanently exclude non-
Muslims from the emerging nation-state of Turkey. More specifically, 
it shows how shifting notions of state, nation, and the relationship 
between the two informed perceptions of “legitimate” use of the 
property that non-Muslims were forced to leave behind.  
2.1 Historical background: The War of Independence  
Soon after the conclusion of the Armistice of Moudros (October 30, 
1918), officers of the Ottoman army and civilian members of the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) formed a secret organiza-
tion called Black Arm (Karakol). By smuggling arms out of the depots 
in Istanbul, the organization undermined article 20 of the armistice, 
which stipulated that the Ottoman army would be demobilized and 
authorized the Allies to take over all Ottoman arms and military 
equipment. Appealing to the idea of national self-determination and 
sovereignty over the “Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire” 
which US President Wilson had mentioned in number 12 of his 14 
points, civilian “Societies for the Defense of Rights” (Müdafaa-yi 
Hukuk Cemiyetleri) were established all over Anatolia and Thrace in 
the winter and spring of 1918/19. Though nominally headed by local 
religious dignitaries, these societies were mostly staffed by civilian 
members of the CUP.2  
At this point, the idea of an Allied (preferably British) mandate over 
Anatolia was widely discussed, not only among the Allies, but also 
among liberal nationalists in Istanbul, who felt that foreign involve-
ment was necessary to develop the country.3 Military occupation prior 
to the conclusion of a peace treaty, however, was considered unac-
ceptable among the Ottoman elites, who could justify this rejection 
with According to article 24, an occupation was only possible in east-
ern Anatolia in case of threats to public security, and in all other parts 
of the country only if the security of Allied troops was under threat 
 
2 See Zürcher, Turkey, 148; Andrew Mango, Atatürk (London: Murray, 2000), 210. 
3 See Mango, Atatürk, 246. 
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(article 7).4 Despite these stipulations, the Allied delegates at Paris 
started to discuss exactly such an occupation of western Anatolia in 
early 1919.5 Based on allegations of a Greek majority in the area, 
Greek Prime Minister Venizelos claimed most of the Aydın province 
in western Anatolia, including İzmir/Smyrna.6 In March, the Greek 
Orthodox community, represented by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 
Istanbul, officially severed its ties to the Ottoman state.7 In the same 
month, Italian troops, who also had aspirations for the area around 
İzmir, landed at Antalya. A Greek occupation of the Aydın province 
was unacceptable to the Ottoman elite and probably also to many 
Muslims in Anatolia, who rejected the idea that “a subject and minor-
ity element, fundamentally considered second-class subjects of the 
Sultan, should rule him or part of his land.”8 The İzmir “Society for 
the Defense of Ottoman Law” held a congress with several similar 
nationalist organizations in the area, protesting the idea of a Greek 
occupation In March 1919.9 In April, a imperial delegation led by 
prince Abdürrahim and comprised of representatives of the Muslim, 
Greek and Armenian communities, visited İzmir and other western 
Anatolian cities in order to reaffirm Ottoman sovereignty over the 
area.10 However, the idea of a Greek military occupation continued to 
 
4 See Zürcher, Turkey, 133. 
5 The most comprehensive account of the discussions pertaining to western 
Anatolia can be found in Michael Llewellyn Smith, Ionian vision: Greece in Asia 
Minor, 1919-1922 (London: Allen Lane, 1973), 62–65. 
6 Population statistics from the period are notoriously unreliable and highly politi-
cized, forming a research topic in its own right. That said, it is uncontroversial that 
a Greek majority existed only in İzmir proper and along the coastal districts, but 
not in the hinterland. See, for instance, Kontente, Smyrne, 711–13; Smith, Ionian, 
72–73. 
7 See Mango, Atatürk, 210. 
8 See Roderic H. Davison, “Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne,” in The 
Diplomats, 1919–1939, ed. Gordon Craig and F. Gilbert, 172–209 (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1953, 1994), 175. 
9 For a detailed account of the societyʼs history (which is mostly based on the report 
of a prominent member, Nail Moralı), see Çapa, “İzmir.”  
10 For a good account of the trip, see Kontente, Smyrne, 706–10. 
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be discussed in Paris. British control officers in the İzmir area repeat-
edly warned their superiors that a Greek mandate there was likely to 
produce disastrous results by further aggravating the already tense 
relations between local Christians and Muslims.11 Especially in the 
countryside, gang violence was ubiquitous. A report on the situation 
around Söke stated that violence was mostly a result of a lack of gov-
ernment control and poverty:  
The racial part appears only in the fact that when Turks 
are held up by a Moslem band, they escape with the loss 
of their property, when by a Greek band, they lose their 
lives as well, and vice versa.12 
The Paris Peace Conference  decided in favor of a Greek occupation 
in May 1919. When the news reached İzmir, a freshly formed “Anti-
Annexation Committee” (which had been formed out of the above-
mentioned “Society for the Defense of Ottoman Law”) organized a 
public demonstration, which took place on May 14, one night prior to 
the Greek landing, in the Jewish neighborhood of Maşatlık (i.e., in 
close proximity to the Muslim quarter).13 The invitation to the meet-
ing is interesting for its peculiar way of calling ordinary Muslims to 
form gather and submit to the leadership of the committee:  
Miserable Turk! Your rights are violated under the cover 
of Wilsonian principles. It has been claimed that the 
 
11 See various reports written between February and May 1919 in FO 371/4157.  
12 Report Control officer Smyrna, April 20, 1919, FO 371/4157/75876. 
13 Engin Berber explains that Maşatlık was a perfect location for such a gathering: It 
lay on a hill and was easily visible from all over the city. Engin Berber, “Mütareke 
Döneminde İzmir Sancağında Yunanistan Karşıtı Çalışmalarda Bulunan 
Toplumsal Örgütler (30 Ekim 1918–15 Mayıs 1919),” in Bir İzmir Kâbusu. 
Mütareke ve İşgal Üzerine Yazılar, 40–75, Kent kitaplığı dizisi 25 (İzmir: İzmir 
Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2002), 67. However, it is remarkable that 
the committee chose not to hold the meeting on the quay in downtown İzmir, 
which was in close proximity to the Christian neighborhoods. This decision was 
probably in line with the established division of public spaces in the city along 
ethno-religious lines.  
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Rum form a majority here and that the Turks will happi-
ly join with the Greek. As a result, this beautiful country 
has been handed over to the Greek. Now we ask you: are 
the Rum greater in numbers than you? Do you support 
the idea of Greek sovereignty [over İzmir]? It is time to 
show yourself. All your brothers are at Maşatlık. Show 
the world that we are an overwhelming majority. Prove 
it. Among us, there is no rich or poor, no educated or 
ignorant. There is only an overwhelming mass of people 
that reject Greek sovereignty. This is your biggest duty. 
Don’t stay behind. (...) Come to Maşatlık in the tens and 
hundreds of thousands and submit to the order of the 
National Committee!14 
Several thousand people followed the call, which was spread by town 
criers. Later that night, the crowd proceeded to freeing prisoners from 
the city prison and obtaining large numbers of firearms.15 
Landing in İzmir on May 15, 1919, the Greek forces were met on the 
quay by a cheering crowd of local Greeks and Armenians. According 
to the official Turkish narrative, it was Hasan Tahsin a.k.a. Osman 
Nevres, a journalist and member of the İzmir Society of Rights, who 
 
14 “Ey bedbaḫt Türk!.. Wilson prensipleri ʿünvān-ı insāniyet ātisi altında seniñ 
ḥaḳḳıñ gaṣb ve nāmūsuñ hetkediliyor. Buralarda Rumuñ çoḳ olduğu ve Türkleriñ 
Yunān ilhāḳıñı memnūniyetle ḳabūl edeceği söylendi ve buñu neticesi olaraḳ 
güzel memleket Yunāna verildi. Şimdi sana ṣoruyoruz. Rum senden daha mı 
çoḳtur? Yunān ḥākimiyetini ḳabūle ṭarafdar mısıñ? Artıḳ kendini göster. Tekmīl 
kardeşleriñ Maşaṭlıḳdadır. Oraya yüzbiñlerle ṭoplan. Ve ḳahir ekseriyetini orada 
bütün dünyāya göster. İʿlān ve isbāt et. Burada zengin, faḳīr, ʿālim, cāhil yoḳ. Faḳaṭ 
Yunān ḥākimiyetini istemeyen bir ḳitle-yi ḳāhire vardır. Bu sana düşen eñ büyük 
vaẓīfedir. Geri ḳalma! (...) Biñlerle, yüzbiñlerle Maşaṭlığa ḳoş! Ve Heʾyet-i 
Milliyeniñ ʾemrine iṭāʿat et. İlḥāḳ-ı redd heʾyet-i millīyesi”. Cited in Ottoman 
Turkish in Berber, Bir, 66. 
15 In Turkish historiography, these events are usually depicted as spontaneous 
activities of the crowd: See, for instance, ibid., 67. Leon Kontente, however, has ar-
gued that the liberation of prisoners, the distribution of arms among the Muslim 
population, and the opening of the governmental treasury were in line with orders 
from Istanbul. See Kontente, Smyrne, 720. 
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fired the first shot at the embarking Greek soldiers, who answered 
with fierce gunfire on the quay.16 Chaos broke out. Many Muslim 
businesses and houses were looted, their inhabitants humiliated, 
raped, or killed. At the end of the day, Hasan Tahsin and several hun-
dred other Turks were dead.17 An inter-Allied commission of inquiry 
later found that about three to four hundred Turks had been killed or 
wounded. On the Greek side, two soldiers and forty civilians were 
killed, and sixty wounded.18  
The İzmir landing and its deathly toll among local Muslims has been 
described as “ein Faustschlag ins Gesicht” 19  of Anatolia’s Muslim 
population and as the most important event in bringing about a na-
tional resistance movement against the Allied occupations in Anatolia. 
When he visited İzmir in 1924, Mustafa Kemal stated that “if the 
enemy had not stupidly come here, the whole country might have 
slept on heedlessly.”20 The second important factor was that many 
Muslims, especially along the Aegean coast, in Thrace and eastern 
Anatolia, were living in houses the the Armenian and Greek owners 
had been forced to leave behind when they were deported or fled the 
country. The Muslim inhabitants (many of whom were refugees) did 
not wish to give these houses back to their returning owners. Days 
prior to the Greek landing, a British officer reported on the existence 
of a “powerful organization” that was distributing arms among the 
 
16 See, for instance, Eczacıbaşı, Kent, 162. More recently, it has been claimed that 
Hasan Tahsin had strongly criticized the massacres of Armenians during World 
War I in his newspaper Hukuk-u Beşer, and might have been shot for this reason. 
See Talat Ulusoy, “Hasan Tahsin meğer kurşunu 'resmi tarih'e atmış,” Agos April 
22, 2013, http://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/4858/hasan-tahsin-meger-kursunu-
resmi-tarihe-atmis (accessed October 14, 2015). 
17 Detailed accounts in Kontente, Smyrne, 720–24; Mansel, Levant, 204–5. 
18 Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry, “Documents of the Inter-Allied Commission 
of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Adjoining Territories,”, 
http://www.ataa.org/reference/iacom.pdf (accessed February 3, 2016).  
19 Gotthard Jäschke, “Der Freiheitskampf des türkischen Volkes. Ein Beitrag zur 
politischen Geschichte der Nachkriegszeit,” Die Welt des Islams, no. 14 (1932): 14. 
20 Atatürk Söz ve Demeçleri, Bd. 2, 237, cited in Mango, Atatürk, 217. 
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Muslim population along the coast: “It is backed by the most powerful 
of motives, the desire to keep wealth stolen from the very people who 
want to return, wealth which the Turk has now learnt to appreciate 
and enjoy.”21 The same report mentions that Greek propaganda was 
“met rather coolly by the Ottoman Greek refugees, whose experience 
of their mother-country during the last few years has not inspired 
them with any longing to be permanently under Hellenic rule.”22 This 
was a reference to the expulsions of 1913–14, which had forced many 
Ottoman Greeks to temporarily move to mainland Greece.  
The Greek landing at İzmir/Smyrna facilitated the work of the 
nascent Muslim-nationalist movement in Anatolia. 23  The İzmir 
society was re-organized as the “National Committee for the Rejection 
of Annexation” (Redd-i İlhak Heyet-i Milliyesi). 24  Days later, public 
protests were held in Bursa, Havza, Erzurum and Istanbul. 25 
Members of the Societies for the Defense of Rights held a number of 
congresses all over the country. The congress of the eastern Anatolian 
societies at Erzurum (July 23 to August 7) issued the first version of a 
document that was to become known as the “National Pact” (Misak-ı 
Milli). This document refers to the Wilsonian principle of national 
self-government that all those territories within or outside of the 
armistice line that were inhabited by a “majorité musulmano-
ottomane” formed a unit “qui ne souffre, sous quelque pretexte que 
se soit, aucune dissociation ni de fait ni de droit.”26 
 
21 Report Hole, Smyrna, May 7, 1919, FO 371/4157/82979. 
22 Ibid., “Political feeling in district.” Again, one needs to keep in mind that the 
writer was advocating a British mandate.  
23 I refer to this movement and their government as “nationalists” as opposed to the 
imperial government in Istanbul. Their program was directed against non-
Muslims in Anatolia and was supported by many Muslim, but non-Turkish indi-
viduals and groups. For the anti-Christian character of early Turkish nationalism, 
see Erik J. Zürcher, “Young,” in The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening. 
24 Eczacıbaşı, Kent, 158. 
25 Mango, Atatürk, 222–23. 
26 This definition implied a Turkish claim to the province of Mosul, which lay within 
the armistice line and featured a Kurdish majority. The document also stated that 
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According the official Turkish narrative, the Turkish War of Indepen-
dence did not begin with such events as the distribution of arms in 
the vicinity of İzmir, but with Mustafa Kemal’s departure for Samsun 
on May 19, where he was supposed to supervise the disarmament of 
the Ottoman army. Instead, he and other nationalists started to coor-
dinate armed resistance against the Greek, French and Armenian 
armies in Anatolia.27 At this point, the only intact Ottoman units were 
those stationed at Erzurum. In western Anatolia, the nationalists 
depended on pre-existing local bands of deser-ters and common crim-
inals (çete). The relationship between these (Muslim) bands and the 
local population was highly ambiguous: while provi-ding protection 
against Greek bands, they often extorted food and other assistance 
from the villagers at gunpoint. Arnold Toynbee speaks of Turkish 
villages which “actually called in the Greeks in order to be rescued 
from their national ‘protectors’.” 28  It was also not uncommon for 
Muslim bands to fight on the Greek side, or to change sides in the 
course of the conflict.29 Although the newly formed National Forces 
(Kuvva-yı Milliye) claimed not to admit criminals into their lines, they 
often did, and the ill fame of these gangs posed a serious threat to the 
Muslim population’s perception of the nationalists’ legitimacy. 30 
Çerkes Ethem, one of the most notorious gang leaders in the Aegean 
region, later justified his activities as follows:  
                                                                                                                      
plebiscites ought to be held in Western Thrace, Kars, Ardahan and Batum. Cited 
in Toynbee, Western, 208. 
27 On the Turkish War of Independence, see Mango, Atatürk; Zürcher, Turkey, 133–
66. 
28 Toynbee, Western, 377. 
29 The most famous çete leader to change sides was Çerkes Edhem, who at first 
fought for the Turkish side, but was later not ready to submit to orders of the regu-
lar nationalist army. For an in-depth study of the gang-war in northwestern Anato-
lia, see Gingeras, Sorrowful. 
30 Gingeras, Sorrowful, 83–84; Ryan Gingeras, “Gangsters, Kidnappers, Killers and 
Other Patriots: The Writing of a New Social History of the Turkish War of Inde-
pendence,” in Towards a Social History of Modern Turkey, ed. Gavin D. Brockett, 
39–58 (Istanbul: Libra, 2011). 
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I used to procure food for my mobile forces through my 
own methods. Prior to the occupation of İzmir by the 
Greeks, I fed my men with the help of the Defense of 
Rights [Societies], after the occupation with that of the 
Rejection of the Occupation [Society], and eventually 
with that of the National Defense Societies.31  
Ethem made a twofold claim here: On the one hand, he declared nev-
er to have forcibly requisitioned food from the local peasantry. On the 
other hand, he stressed that he had been supported by those organiza-
tions that the official Turkish narrative later considered as the legiti-
mate representatives of the Turkish nation in those days. When the 
war was in full swing, however, the nationalists’ legitimacy was far 
from being well-established. The Greek forces installed a Turkish 
governor and made efforts to win over the Turkish population (in 
preparation for a referendum, which was to decide the question of an 
annexation by Greece after five years). 32  Ordinary urban Muslims 
were certainly not happy about being ruled by non-Muslims and suf-
fered from everyday petty discrimination. Those dwelling in the coun-
tryside were subject to large-scale violence, especially towards the end 
of the occupation.33 That said, it is clear that organized resistance was 
an elite affair. Members of the Society of Rights, and later of the Re-
 
31 “Seyyar haldeki kuvvetlerimin iaşelerini kendi yöntemlerimle temin ederdim. Bir 
yerde kaldığımız zamanlarda da İzmir’in Yunanlılar tarafından işgalinden önce 
Müdafaa-i Hukuk, ve işgalden sonra da Redd-i İlhak ve daha sonraları Müdafaa-i 
Milliye cemiyetleri vasıtasıyla askerlerimi besletirdim. Maaşlarımı da bu cemi-
yetler vasıtasıyla verirdim.” Çerkes Ethem, Anılarım (Berfin, 1962, 1993), 8. 
32 See Kontente, Smyrne, 732–35. 
33 Though written in retrospect and under the impression of the subsequent victory, 
a series of readersʼ letters that were published by local newspaper Ahenk in 1926 
provide some insights into the experiences of (relatively) ordinary Muslims during 
the occupation. See Ellinor Morack, “Fear and Loathing in 'Gavur' Izmir: Emo-
tions in early Republican Memories of the Greek occupation (1919-1922),” Interna-
tional Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES) 49 (2017), 71– 89. 
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jection of Annexation Committee, were mayors, bureaucrats, lawyers 
and journalists, many of whom left the city during the occupation.34  
The Greek forces at İzmir soon occupied much more territory than 
just the Aydın province, reaching Eskişehir and Afyonkarahısar, 
whereas the Muslim nationalists more or less controlled central and 
eastern Anatolia. The French and the British, unhappy about the na-
tionalist movement, but unwilling to dispatch their own troops (which 
were busy elsewhere),35 instead used the Greek army “to do their 
fighting for them.” 36  In March 1920, British, French and Italian 
troops occupied Istanbul in order to stop nationalist activities there. 
The last Ottoman Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan) (which 
had been elected among Muslims only in 1919) was dissolved and 
leading nationalists were arrested and exiled to Malta. This step, how-
ever, backfired, causing those who had not (yet) been arrested to es-
cape to Anatolia. Eighty-eight deputies of the last Ottoman parliament 
helped to establish an alternative legislative, the Grand National As-
sembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, henceforth: TBMM), 
which, following new elections in nationalist-controlled territory, first 
assembled in Ankara on April 23, 1920. Relying on the TBMM’s legit-
imacy as an elected body with roots in the Ottoman system, the na-
tionalists established a government in Ankara, claiming to represent 
the nation now that the imperial government in Istanbul was con-
 
34 Two particularly active journalists of the post-war period, Mehmet Şevki of Ahenk 
and Haydar Rüştü, the owner and editor of Anadolu, were members of the society. 
The same is true for Mustafa Necati, the future first Minister for the Population 
Exchange, who also published the nationalist newspaper İzmir’e Doğru during the 
War of Independence. See Eczacıbaşı, Kent, 157; Kontente, Smyrne, 733.  
35 The French had occupied Düsseldorf and Duisburg in March 1920, had 18.000 
troops in Cilicia, and were struggling with a serious uprising in Syria. Likewise, 
the British army had their hands full in India, Egypt, Mesopotamia and Ireland. 
Domestically, yet another war would have been hard to legitimate in the eyes of 
the exhausted, war-weary electorate in Great Britain and France. See Zara Steiner, 
The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 112. 
36 Ibid., 111. 
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trolled by the Allies. The Allies reacted by giving permission to the 
Greek army to advance on Ankara and occupy Thrace in June 1920.  
The Treaty of Sèvres, signed by a powerless Istanbul government in 
August 1920, has been called a “stillborn” treaty.37 This is true in the 
sense that the territorial division of Anatolia projected in this treaty 
was never implemented, and seriously contested even before it was 
drawn up: The Allied representatives in Paris were distributing terri-
tory they were not controlling in the first place. According to the treaty, 
Ottoman Turkey would have been reduced to a rump state in North-
western and Central Anatolia, including Istanbul, with an interna-
tionalized zone around the straits. Greece would have received Thrace 
and the area around İzmir, Italy the occupation zone around Antalya, 
France Cilicia and South-Eastern Turkey. These three zones were 
more or less identical with the areas occupied by the respective armies 
in 1919. Most of those areas earmarked as Kurdish and Armenian 
territories in northeastern and eastern Anatolia, however, were con-
trolled by the Turkish nationalist army. Armenia was projected as a 
US-American mandate (an idea that the US-American Senate had 
already rejected in June 1920), and the Kurdish area (the territory of 
which was not even outlined in detail) as a British one.38 Today we 
know that the most important effect of the treaty was what has been 
called the “Sèvres Syndrome”: A conviction among Turkish national-
ists that an imperialist division of Anatolia was (and in the minds of 
some, continues to be) imminent.39 Today, such fears might indeed 
seem oddly misplaced and even paranoiac – in 1920 and the subse-
quent years, however, they were quite realistic.  
The nationalist movement was able to achieve important military 
advances in 1920 and 1921. Regular troops in eastern Anatolia defea-
 
37 A.E Montgomery, “The Making of the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920,” The 
Historical Journal 15, no. 4 (1972): 775. 
38 For a discussion of the territorial stipulations of the treaty, see Steiner, Lights; 
Margaret Macmillan, Peacemakers. The Paris Conference and its Attempt to End War 
(New York, 2001). 
39 For a discussion of this concept, see Fatma M. Göçek, ed., Social Constructions of 
Nationalism in the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002). 
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ted the small and poorly equipped army of the short-lived Armenian 
Republic in September 1920. In December, the nationalists signed 
their first international treaty at Gümrü/Alexandropol.The Bolsheviks, 
who at that point were “as friendless as Atatürk,”40 agreed to return 
the districts of Kars and Ardahan and started to supply the national-
ists with the two things they needed most: Arms and interest-free 
loans which enabled Ankara to gradually replace the paramilitary çetes 
with regular troops. 
When Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos lost the elections in 
Greece in October 1920, the French and Italians withdrew their sup-
port to the Greek adventure in Anatolia.41 The nationalists managed 
to stop the Greek advance in January 1921 at the village of İnönü.42 
Following this success, the Allies invited them to London, where they 
offered a modification of the Treaty of Sèvres. The Ankara govern-
ment declined the offer.43 A second battle at İnönü (March 1921) 
ended with a Turkish victory, causing the Allies to withdraw their 
support for Greece and declare their neutrality. The nationalist troops 
narrowly managed to fight off a Greek offensive which came as close 
as the Sakarya river (50 km north of Ankara) in September 1921. In 
the summer, they had somewhat improved their critical financial 
situation by seizing all abandoned property and labeling unauthorized 
 
40 Macmillan, Peacemakers, 455. 
41 Ibid., 461. 
42 In memory and recognition of his achievements, the commanding officer İsmet 
and later prime minister and president of Turkey received “İnönü” as an honorary 
last name in 1934.  
43 The Allies had invited both the Istanbul and the Ankara governments, only to find 
out that Ankara’s representative spoke for both. See Roderic H. Davison, “Turkish 
Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne,” in The Diplomats, 1919–1939, ed. Gordon 
Craig and F. Gilbert, 172–209 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, 1994), 
188. 
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occupation of it as high treason. Taxes were raised to 40 percent, and 
20 percent of all carts were seized.44  
The French, who had already agreed to evacuate their troops from 
Cilicia in March, now started to supply arms to the nationalists in 
October 1921 (in exchange for economic concessions and the recogni-
tion of the border to mandate Syria).45 Italian troops, too, started to 
evacuate Anatolia in June 1921. The evacuation of French troops in 
Cilicia was accompanied by the expulsion of the Armenian population 
that had returned since 1918. It was mostly their property that now 
became available, and whose fate was discussed in the subsequent 
parliamentary debate. 
Devoid of Allied financial and military support, the Greek army never 
recovered from the Sakarya debacle, and the campaign became in-
creasingly unpopular at home. Desperate for money to merely main-
tain the troops in Anatolia, the Greek government raised a loan by 
having all paper currency cut in half, treating half of the snippets as 
government bonds.46 The front line remained unaltered for almost a 
year. In late August 1922, Turkish forces launched an offensive which 
managed to divide the Greek lines. It took them only thirteen days to 
regain the territory that had been under Greek occupation for almost 
three years. The motto of a nationalist newspaper (“Towards İzmir” – 
İzmir’e Doğru) became true. Turkish nationalist troops entered the 
city on September 9, 1922. 
The gradual military and diplomatic achievements of these years 
would have been impossible without the advent of the October Revo-
lution, which temporarily transformed the formerly hostile great 
power Russia into a weak state whose government was eager to make 
new friends. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the na-
tionalist movement’s claim to power was seriously challenged at 
 
44 See Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke, 125–26. As will be discussed later on in this chapter, 
this was a military order. The TBMM initially refused to pass a bill that would have 
transformed the stipulations of the order into a law, only passing it in April 1922.  
45 The TBMM never ratified these concessions. See Davison, “Diplomacy,”, 193. 
46 Smith, Ionian, 266–67. 
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home throughout these years. Between 1919 and 1921, up to twenty-
four uprisings shook central and eastern Anatolia. The nationalists 
fought them with brute military force and the establishment of the 
notorious “Independence Tribunals” (İstiklal Mahkemeleri). The in-
surgents’ motives varied from place to place, yet even nationalist au-
thors admit to two prominent factors: Loyalty to the imperial govern-
ment in Istanbul and resistance to the crushing requisitions and tax 
demands of the nationalists.47 Avni (Doğan), a member of the nation-
al resistance movement, who witnessed one of the bigger insurgen-
cies in Yozgat (in June 1920), later recalled how little impression the 
nationalist struggle made on the elders of the town. Having been 
asked to vote for the new parliament in Ankara, they refused by point-
ing out that the Ottoman constitution reserved the right to calling an 
election to the sultan himself. Later, when an uprising against the 
nationalists was imminent, Avni was summoned in front of the elders 
and asked to explain what the national movement was all about. One 
of the insurgents’ reaction to this speech indicates how incomprehen-
sible the nationalist objectives must have been to most people: 
Brother, this young man is talking gibberish... Despite 
this request of a bunch of miserable people (bazı 
bedbahtların arzusu), I will plant the standard of the 
 
47 Çelik lists the reasons as follows: “a) hopelessness, poverty and exhaustion that the 
long years of war and the defeat had left among the population, b) as a result of 
this, an increase in the number of deserters, c) the economic hardship brought 
about by the national struggle on a population that was already impoverished, 
tired and hopeless, and the desire to avoid this burden, d) reactionary currents that 
built on the traditional and religious ties to the sultan and caliph (...) l) the 
requisitions of food, clothing and money that the national forces, also known as 
bands, made among the population, and sometimes made by use of force (...)” 
Kemal Çelik, “Millî Mücadele’de İç İsyanlar, Vatana İhanet Kanunu ve İstiklâl 
Mahkemeleri,” Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu 
Dergisi, no. 40 (2007): 585. 
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Prophet into the soil of Ankara. Tell this lad to leave us 
alone.48  
An announcement of Kılıç (“Sword”) Ali, a notorious gang leader and 
later bodyguard of Mustafa Kemal, is instructive for the seriousness of 
the problem with requisitions (and hence, the legitimacy) of the na-
tionalist bands. In a call to the population around Maraş, Kılıç Ali 
admonished them not to abandon their villages in flight of the “na-
tional forces”:  
It has come to my attention that villagers, believing in 
the words of men who neither know themselves nor 
what they are talking about, have left their villages and 
gone elsewhere. I have to say that the term “band” is in-
appropriate here. It expresses something evil. There are 
no bands here, only National Forces (…). I ask villagers 
who have suffered from the National Forces to come to 
me and explain their grievance.49  
From 1921 onwards, the military efforts of the nationalists took on a 
more orderly character, and the unruly çetes were gradually replaced 
by conscripted soldiers, many of whom, however, had to be forced 
into service. In the discussion of a bill against desertion in the TBMM 
that took place in July 1920, a deputy lamented that an average group 
of three hundred fresh recruits usually lost two hundred men to de-
sertion within three days, while still on their way to the front. These 
men could not return to their villages and therefore joined bands in 
 
48 “Birader Bey, bu delikanlı saçmalıyor... Bazı bedbahtların arzusuna rağmen 
Alem’i Peygamberi’yi Ankara’ya dikeceğim. Bu delikanlıya söyle, bizi rahat 
bıraksın.”Avni Doğan, Kurtuluş, Kuruluş ve Sonrası (Istanbul: Dünya, 1964), 55–60. 
49 “Kendilerini ve sözünü bilmeyen bazı adamların iğfallerine kapılan köy ahalisinin 
köylerini bırakarak başka yerlere gittiklerini işitiyorum. Evvela şunu anlatayım ki, 
çete tabiri doğru değildir. Bu söz fena bir manayı anlatır. Burada çete yoktur. 
Ancak millet kuvveti vardır. Bu Kuvayyı Milliye’den zerre zarar gören köylüler 
derhal yanıma gelerek hallarini anlatsınlar.” Hulusi Turgut, Atatürk’ün Sırdaşı. 
Kılıç Ali’nın Anıları (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2005), 680. 
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the mountains. 50  Such high levels of desertion had already been 
common in late Ottoman times.51 However, it is interesting to note 
that the new situation of actual occupation by a foreign power did not 
boost the readiness of young Muslims to die for the state.  
The military victory of September 1922 was crushing, yet it was only a 
prerequisite for the establishment of political control over the popula-
tion. Much, if not all of the territory that the nationalist forces con-
quered in that year had been the scene of a bloody guerrilla war for 
three years. Especially during the Greek retreat, towns and villages 
along the front-line had become the scene of atrocities committed 
both by (Greek and Turkish) regular soldiers and paramilitary 
bands.52 Çağlar Keyder has convincingly argued that it was this expe-
rience of ethnicized warfare that ripped apart the social fabric of the 
Ottoman countryside and brought about a hegemony of nationalist 
ideas.53 However, this violence was still largely framed in terms of 
religious antagonism, not ethnicity.54 Lofty ideas such as secularism 
and republicanism were largely unknown at this point, and ordinary 
people had certainly not fought for them. It comes as no surprise that 
the first army declaration following the conquest of İzmir was framed 
largely in religious terms:  
 
50 “Üçyüz kişilik bir asker kafilesi üç gün sonra yüz kişiye iniyor (...) Asker firarileri 
firar edince (...) köylere iltica edemiyor (...) Eşkiya çetelerini buluyorlar.” GCZ, 5 
Temmuz 1920. Cited in Çelik, “Milli”: 598. Also see 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/GZC/d01/CILT01/gcz01001028.
pdf, 87. 
51 In fact, Erik J. Zürcher has argued that the nationalist army indirectly profited 
from the high levels of desertion among Ottoman soldiers during World War I: 
Many men survived thanks to desertion and could therefore be drafted into the na-
tionalist army after 1919. See Erik J. Zürcher, “The Ottoman Soldier in World War 
I,” in The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening: From the Ottoman Empire 
to Atatürk’s Turkey, 167–87 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010). 
52 The British historian Arnold Toynbee visited several Turkish towns only hours 
after their devastation by the hands of Greek troops. His reports can be found in 
Toynbee, Western, 259–78. 
53 See Çağlar Keyder, “Consequences ,” 41. 
54 See Gingeras, Sorrowful, 5. 
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To the venerable people of the Vilayet of Smyrna. The 
unjustifiable attack of our enemy, the Greeks, who are 
unjust, cowardly but peerlessly unique in cruelty in the 
history of humanity, on our sacred land, their entry into 
it, their destruction of the Mohammedan population 
and their enjoyment of the protection of their Allies and 
persuaders, who are as unjust and unconscious as 
themselves, has at last touched the zeal of God. (…) As a 
result, with the help of God the Almighty and the spir-
itual assistance of the Prophet, the enemy has been 
driven from the major parts of the country. Anatolia be-
came the grave of the Greek army (…)55 
The fact that western Anatolia had been subject to a Greek occupation 
on the one hand meant that the forces of resistance had been united 
under a common cause – on the other hand, they had been far re-
moved from Ankara’s direct control. In this sense, the experience of 
common Muslims in western Anatolia must have been distinctly 
different from those in central and East Anatolia. Their exposition to a 
nationalist government only started in September 1922, and the estab-
lishment and legitimacy of that government hinged on its distribution 
of abandoned property to the population. As the following discussion 
shows, this was also true for the relationship between the Ankara 
government and its parliament, the Great National Assembly of Tur-
key.  
2.2  Abandoned property in parliament 
Between 1920 and 1930, Turkish nationalism was transformed from 
an elite idea into an ideology that affected the lives (and brains) of 
millions of Anatolian Muslims. Parliamentary minutes of the Great 
National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, henceforth: 
TBMM) are a rich and interesting source through which we can study 
this process. This is especially true for the first assembly, which con-
 
55 Cited from an English translation of the original Ottoman document in FO 
371/10177/E11677. 
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vened between 1920 and 1923, and whose members were much more 
diverse in terms of their backgrounds than those of later ones. 
Lengthy and controversial discussions were rather common in this 
first national parliament, which (very much unlike its successors) was 
“quite a heterogeneous and unruly body.”56 The deputies were elected 
in 1919–20 from among the members of the “Societies for the De-
fense of Rights” all over Anatolia and Thrace. They were all Muslims, 
often locally powerful or influential people, who opposed the territori-
al ambitions of Armenia, Greece, France and Italy, and, eventually, 
the Treaty of Sèvres, which sanctioned these plans. Apart from their 
opposition to foreign occupation, however, they had little in common. 
Their ideological differences emerged over the course of these first 
years and are usually analyzed along the lines of the two parliamen-
tary factions that emerged in 1921, and thus along the lines of well-
established binaries such as secular/religious and authoritari-
an/liberal. The “First Group” (Birinci Grup), is considered to be the 
precedent of the authoritarian Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Fırkası, later: Partisi, henceforth: CHP) and the more liberal 
“Second Group” (İkinci Grup) (roughly) that of the short-lived opposi-
tional Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, 
TCF), which existed from 1924 to 1925.57 The debate that shall be 
analyzed here runs counter to these binaries, and it is probably for 
this reason that it has received very little, and only superficial, scholar-
ly attention.58 
In September 1920, five months after its establishment, the Turkish 
nationalist government in Ankara drew up a bill dealing with “proper-
ty that has become ownerless due to its ownersʼ flight or disappear-
ance.” The bill, and the law that was eventually issued by the TBMM 
nineteen months later, in April 1922, was clearly a continuation of the 
temporary “liquidation law” (tasfiye kanunu) that the CUP government 
 
56 Zürcher, Turkey, 159. 
57 See İhsan Güneş, Birinci TBMM’nin Düşünce Yapısı (1920-1923) (Istanbul: Türki-
ye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009). 
58 For these, see Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke. 
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had drawn up during the Armenian Genocide of 1915–16 in order to 
legitimate the ongoing seizure, sale, liquidation, and distribution of 
the property owned by “deported” Armenians. Unlike its predecessor, 
however, the abandoned property law issued in 1922 foresaw (at least 
on paper) that this property would be protected by the state.  
In 1915, the tasfiye kanunu was only discussed in the Senate, but not 
in the Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan).59 In November 1918, 
the Meclis-i Mebusan, which still included many non-Muslims, debat-
ed the war-time massacres and the dispossession that had accompa-
nied them. Several non-Muslim deputies pressed for a prosecution of 
the culprits, while their Muslims colleagues tended to depict the vio-
lence as a legitimate act of self-defense.60 Several years later, a similar 
argument would frequently be made in the TBMM as well.  
Like the tasfiye kanunu of 1915, the bill of 1920 was drawn up in the 
midst of war, at a time when the Turkish-Muslim movement against 
the Armenian, Greek and French partition of Anatolia was starting to 
gain momentum. Yet, the very legitimacy of the Ankara government 
(which, at that point, was strongly contested) rested on its newly es-
tablished parliament. The bill had to be discussed in parliament, and 
indeed became the subject of extensive deliberations, which lasted 
until April 1922. The minutes of these deliberations offer important 
insights into the process in which the deputies at Ankara made sense 
first of the Armenian Genocide, then the expulsion of survivors who 
had returned in 1918–19, and finally, the expulsion of the Ottoman 
Greek (Rum) population of western Anatolia. The debates of the An-
kara parliament are special in two most important respects: Unlike 
those of the last Ottoman parliament, they did not take place in the 
shadow of defeat, but at a time of increasingly successful military 
action in Anatolia. More importantly, they were internal debates of 
the Muslim resistance movement whose delegates formed the TBMM 
 
59 See chapter 1.6.4. 
60 Ayhan Aktarʼs article about that debate has been an important source of inspira-
tion for this chapter: Ayhan Aktar, “Debating the Armenian Massacres in the Last 
Ottoman Parliament,” History Workshop Journal 64 (2007). 
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in Ankara. As this chapter shows, this movement was far from united 
in all respects, and debates such as that of the abandoned property bill 
were crucial for working out how the relationship between state and 
nation, Muslims and non-Muslims would be organized in the future. 
Recent scholarship has pointed at the importance of economic factors 
for widespread Muslim support for, participation in, and eventual 
denial of the Armenian Genocide.61 The desire to keep stolen proper-
ty (rather than give it back to surviving owners or their heirs) was an 
important motivating factor for Muslim support for the nationalist 
struggle of 1919-22.62 The abandoned property bill of 1920 served 
exactly this purpose of keeping what had been stolen, and it is proba-
bly this point that has led Polatel and Üngör to claim that it was is-
sued unanimously.63  This, however, is not true. The bill was dis-
cussed quite extensively and there was strong and prolonged re-
sistance to it, despite the fact that all deputies agreed that stolen Ar-
menian wealth ought to stay in (needy) Muslim hands. It took seven 
sessions held over the course of nineteen months to finally issue the 
law. Why did it take so long? 
In order to answer this question, it is important to keep in mind that 
the Armenian Genocide was a particularly quick case of genocide. In 
Nazi Germany and later all over occupied Europe, Jews were stripped 
of their rights in a piecemeal fashion. They were forced to give up 
their professions and sell their businesses years before the actual 
deportations started.64 The Anatolian Armenians, on the other hand, 
 
61 See Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation; Y. D. Çetinkaya, “Soykırımın Toplumsal 
Karakteri,” Mesele, April 2015. 
62 See Dündar, Modern, 245. 
63 See Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 50. 
64 For the history of so-called “Aryanization”, see Avraham Barkai, Vom Boykott zur 
"Entjudung" Der wirtschaftliche Existenzkampf der Juden im Dritten Reich 1933-1943 
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1988); Irmtrud Wojak and Peter Hayes, eds., "Arisie-
rung" im Nationalsozialismus. Raub, Volksgemeinschaft und Gedächtnis (Frankfurt 
am Main: Campus, 2000); Katharina Stengel, ed., Vor der Vernichtung. Die staatli-
che Enteignung der Juden im Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 
2007). On the process of restitution, see Constantin Goschler and Philipp Ther, 
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were given orders to prepare their departure and sell their possessions 
within days, and in some cases within hours. Most ended up selling 
their entire households for next to nothing. Their dispossession con-
tinued on the deportation treks, where they were robbed of their last 
possessions: Murder and dispossession coincided. The forced migra-
tion of Anatolia’s Greek Orthodox communities also took place within 
a very short time. Following the breakdown of the Greek front in late 
August 1922, it was a matter of days until the Turkish nationalist 
army arrived in İzmir. The civilian Greek population had no time to 
sell anything, and most fled towards İzmir and other coastal towns 
with hardly more than the clothes on their backs. Their property 
stayed behind, and was, in accordance with the abandoned property 
law, which had been issued in April 1922, supposed to be adminis-
tered by official abandoned property commissions. In practice, how-
ever, most of it was quickly taken over by the Muslim population, 
often by local notables and members of the CUP. Perpetrators and 
profiteers ended up with vast numbers of houses, fields, gardens, 
agricultural yields, furniture and other movable property within a very 
short period of time. At least for locals (who often, but not necessarily, 
were perpetrators) this stolen property must have been a material 
reminder of its ownersʼ fate. It probably raised not only the question if 
and how one could keep it, but also how their own possession of it, as 
well as the ownersʼ violent death or expulsion, could be legitimated. 
This, at least, is what we must assume given that the Ottoman Empire 
had had a liberal property regime for land since at least the 1850s (and 
much longer for urban areas). The concept of private ownership was 
well-known and enshrined in the constitution. As in any other society, 
murder and theft were illegal. To assume that the Muslims living in 
Ottoman Anatolia were simply indifferent to violence would mean to 
regard their religion, culture and society as inherently barbarous.  
Taking the stolen property over was one thing that could be accom-
plished relatively quickly. Its appropriation, that is, the permanent 
                                                                                                                      
eds., Raub und Restitution. "Arisierung" und Rückerstattung des jüdischen Eigentums 
in Europa (Frankfurt am Main, 2003). 
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transfer into secure ownership rights, was another matter that was 
intimately linked to the issue of legitimacy: As early as 1913–14, dur-
ing the campaign of threat and intimidation along the southern 
Marmara and the Aegean coast which forced many Greeks to leave 
the country, their houses and agricultural land were given to Muslim 
immigrants and refugees. In some places, desperate refugees evicted 
local Christians from their homes.65 During the Armenian Genocide, 
large numbers of refugees were settled in Armenian houses.66 The 
post-war imperial government in Istanbul revoked not only the depor-
tation orders, but also the notorious liquidation law (tasfiye kanunu) in 
January 1920.67 Returning Greeks and surviving Armenians now were 
legally entitled to get their property back. At least in those towns in 
close proximity to railways, Allied officers established mixed commis-
sions that were charged with the restitution of stolen property. 68 
These commissions produced mixed results, but the few restitutions 
that did take place certainly made an impression upon those who had 
profited economically: Stolen property could be, and sometimes was, 
claimed back.  
It was probably this experience of the early armistice period that 
pushed the question of legitimacy to the forefront of nationalist rea-
soning. And, since the stories of dispossession and murder were so 
closely linked, it was hardly possible to legitimate only the economic 
side of genocide.  
The parliamentary debate analyzed here is testimony to this quest for 
legitimacy and for the deputies’ desire to find a justification for the 
violence they had all, more or less directly, witnessed, and were again 
witnessing at the very time they were discussing the bill: Between 
1920 and 1922, the nationalist military campaign in Anatolia succeed-
 
65 See Gingeras, Sorrowful, 38. 
66 See Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 81. 
67 See page 116. 
68 See Gingeras, Sorrowful, 52–54; Ellinor Morack, “The Ottoman Greeks and the 
Great War: 1912-1922,” in The World During the First World War, ed. Helmut Bley 
and Anorthe Kremer, 213–28 (Essen: Klartext, 2014). 
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ed first at crushing the short-lived Republic of Armenia in the area 
around Kars (in October and November 1920), then at driving out the 
French from Cilicia, Antep and Maraş (in the spring of 1921), and 
finally in August and September 1922, the Greeks from western Ana-
tolia. These areas came to be known as “liberated territories,” and the 
arrival of nationalist troops was usually accompanied by the forced 
emigration of the non-Muslim population. The remarkably peaceful 
Italian occupation of south-western Anatolia ended in July 1921, but, 
judging from the parliamentary minutes, the area was not perceived 
as “liberated territory.”69 
2.3 The legal background 
As one of its first legislative acts, in April 1920, the TBMM declared 
all laws and regulations issued by the Ottoman government in Istan-
bul after the Allied military occupation in March 1920 void.70 War-
time laws for Armenian and Greek property, however, had been re-
voked prior to the occupation, in January 1920:71 the Ankara govern-
ment had effectively declared those regulations and schemes for the 
restitution of property to be valid – if it wanted to act differently, it had 
to come up with a new law. Between September 1920, when it was 
first put on the agenda, and April 1922, when it was finally issued, the 
bill was repeatedly sent back and forth to three different parliamen-
tary commissions. Onaran cites extensively from the debate, but 
doesnʼt offer an actual interpretation of it.72 Polatel and Üngör, who 
dedicate roughly a page to the debate, argue that the discussions 
 
69 The relative tranquility of the Italian occupation there was probably due to the fact 
that the Greek Orthodox population had remained in place during World War I. 
70 The text of the respective law (issued by the Istanbul government) can be found in 
Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke, 334.  
71 The first post-war cabinet in Istanbul had issued several decrees for the relocation 
of surviving Armenians and restitution of their property. Polatel and Üngör, Con-
fiscation, 97–98. The full-fledged revocation of the deportation law followed on 
January 8/12, 1920, two months prior to Istanbulʼs full military occupation by the 
Allies. See page 113. 
72 Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke, 125–36. 
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about the law “provide clues as to the perceptions of the deputies 
regarding the properties,” but fail to explain what these insights are.73  
Deliberations on the abandoned property bill roughly coincided with 
the year during which nationalist rule in Anatolia was first consoli-
dated and then extended. This process is echoed in the changes that 
the bill underwent over time. The first bill of early September 1920 
was written for the “places rescued from the enemy’s occupation” 
(düşman istilasından kurtulan mahaller), which were also known as 
“liberated territories” (memaliki müstahlasa). 74  At that point, these 
were not much more than central and eastern Anatolia. By March 
1921, after its first revision by the parliamentary commission for fi-
nancial affairs (Maliye Encümeni), the term “liberated territories” had 
become dynamic: The lawʼs area of validity was extended to all places 
that would be “liberated” in the future. This means that the bill, 
which had been drawn up for largely Armenian abandoned property, 
became applicable to property owned by Rum, as well as mainland 
Greeks, and thus for people who had not been subject to a genocide: it 
was much more likely for them to return.  
Though it was only issued in 1922, the practices described in the law 
(state seizure and sale of abandoned property) were quite obviously 
performed throughout the time of its deliberation in parliament. This 
is clear from the deliberations. The bill can thus, just like the tasfiye 
kanunu of 1915, be described as a legal text that merely codified pre-
existing practices. As early as August 1921, when the war with Greece 
 
73 Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 50. Polatel and Üngör merely mention that one 
deputy criticized the law, cite another one who legitimized the bill with reference 
to a bloodthirsty hadith, and go on to claim that the law was passed unanimously. 
This last point is simply not true: As Onaran has already pointed out, there were 
37 no votes in the final poll. 115 deputies voted yes, 26 abstained. The results of 
the final poll can be found at 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c019/tbmm0101903
1.pdf, 335–36 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
74 For the minutes of this first debate (which include the first draft of the bill), see 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c009/tbmm0100900
7.pdf, 221–26 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
 147 
on the Western front reached a critical point, the Turkish army issued 
a set of ten infamous orders that were used to mobilize all available 
resources for its cause. The sixth of these orders stipulates that all 
abandoned property, both movable and immovable, would be seized 
for the needs of the army; any attempt at privately using them was 
considered high treason.75  
2.4  The first draft: Who were “the disappeared”? 
The first draft of September 1920 stated that movable property and 
crops that had “become ownerless due to their ownersʼ flight and 
disappearance” would be treated as follows: The local administrations 
would auction movable and perishable goods, and administer im-
movable property and seeded fields. The money thus obtained would 
be kept by the local financial administrations. When owners returned, 
their immovable property would be returned and the money would be 
paid back to them (apart from those amounts spent for administrative 
purposes). The illegal occupation of abandoned property was to be 
persecuted.76 The bill was brought in along with an explanatory decla-
ration of the Ankara government, which stated that the law was nec-
essary because the property of those who had left the “liberated areas” 
was currently used or rented out by various people, or used for the 
provision of the army. In order to stop these practices, which “obvi-
ously cause corruption and the destruction of personal wealth,”77 it 
was necessary for the government to administer these properties, and, 
since it was “quite natural for returning owners to take possession of 
their property again,” to make sure that it would be returned to 
 
75 TBMM March 14, 1921, 125–27. 
76 http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c009/tbmm01009007.p
df (accessed September 2, 2016). 
77 “Bu sureti muamelenin menafii hususiyeye hâdim ve suiistimalâtı müeddi olduğu 
derkar olup” Ibid., 121. Throughout this chapter, I cite the minutes as they were 
published in 1971, following the non-academic transliteration that was used there.  
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them.78 As Onaran has pointed out, the bill marks a shift from one 
euphemism to the other: The war-time phrase “people who have been 
moved to other places” (aher mahallere nakledilen eşhas) was replaced 
with “those who have fled or disappeared” (firar ve gaybubet eden).79  
On September 9, 1920, the bill was merely mentioned in parliament 
and directly sent off to the parliamentary committee for financial 
affairs, which made several changes and brought in a revised version 
on March 14, 1921, at which point the bill was discussed for the first 
time. The first controversy concerned the actual meaning of the new 
terms “fugitive” (firari) and “disappeared” (mütegayyip). Vehbi Efendi, 
a scholar (alim) from Konya, stated:80 
Gentlemen! I don’t understand the objective of this law. 
(…) Those who have left the liberated territories for 
somewhere else have all died, so does the treasury now 
sell their property? Or is it selling the property of people 
who are actually alive? A is selling B’s property? This is 
not proper, neither according to the şeriat, nor to posi-
tive law. (…) This is unacceptable.81  
Throughout the discussion, Mehmet Vehbi Efendi was the only one 
to openly admit that “having fled or disappeared” was in fact a eu-
phemism for “having died.” The text of the bill, however, suggested 
 
78 “Bu gibi emval eshabından me'valarına avdet edenlerin emval ve eşyasına tesahüp 
etmesi pek tabiî olduğundan (...) kendilerine iadesi tensip olunmuştur.” TBMM 14 
March 1922, 122.  
79 See Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke, 120–21. 
80 This was probably Mehmet Vehbi Efendi (Çelik) (1864-1949), and not Ömer Vehbi 
Efendi, who also spoke during this debate. The minutes here only give the second 
name. Mehmet Vehbi Efendi became Minister for Religious Affairs and Pious En-
dowments in 1922, and eventually issued the legal opinion (fetva) that legitimized 
the nationalistsʼ abolition of the sultanate in 1922. See TBMM Basın ve Halkla 
İlişkiler Müdürlüğü, TBMM Albümü 1920-2010: 1. Cilt 1920-1950,  44. 
81 “Fakat istilâ edilen memleketlerden diğer memleketlere hicret eden adamlar hep 
ölmüş de beytülmal bunların malını mı satıyor? Yoksa orada sahibi olduğu halde 
mi satıyor? Zeydin malını Amrin satması? Bu şeran ve kanunen caiz değildir.” 
TBMM 14 March 1922, 122–23.  
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otherwise by drawing up rules for an eventual restitution of the prop-
erty in question, raising the specter of the ownersʼ return. Vehbi 
Efendi further criticized that the sale of private property owned by one 
(living) person by another was illegal. This is curious, because the bill 
didn’t mention such a procedure. His argument was probably based 
on his familiarity with the sale of Armenian property during World 
War I, and the assumption that the bill was intended to serve the 
same purpose. Vehbi Efendi’s criticism caused his fellow deputies to 
provide their own understandings of the new terminology: What had 
happened to the Armenians? Would they return? Nusret Efendi 82 
(Erzurum) regarded the owners as alive, but thought that they had lost 
all their rights:  
Those who have fled or disappeared from the liberated 
territories, that is, the Armenians (…) Under which cir-
cumstances have they fled? They have rebelled against 
us. How can a rebel own fields and real estate? They 
have rebelled, and then left. Houses, shops, in short: 
Whatever they may have left belongs to the public treas-
ury.83  
Nusret Efendi argued that the Armenians, by rebelling against their 
Muslim rulers, had lost their property rights. Therefore, their proper-
ty ought not to be merely administered, but completely taken over by 
the state. He further suggested that the state not sell it, but give it to 
those who sought shelter in Muslim territories. Nusret Efendi de-
manded that the first paragraph be changed accordingly. Likewise, he 
refused the possibility of the ownersʼ return mentioned in the second 
 
82 Mehmet Nusret Efendi (Sun) (1879-1930) had served as army imam during the 
Balkan Wars and World War I. He was not elected to the TBMM again. See 
TBMM Albümü, 29. 
83 “Memaliki müstahlasadan firar ve gaybubet eden, yani ermeniler... (...) Bunlar ne 
suretle firar ettiler? Bunlar bize isyan ettiler, âsi olan bir adamin arazisi ve emlâki 
olabilir mi? İsyan etti, çekildi gitti. Bırakmış oldukları haneler, dükkanlar velhasıl 
her ne kalmış ise beytülmale aittir.” TBMM 14 March 1922, 124. 
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paragraph: “No, they cannot return. They have gone to Armenia.”84 
But if someone had gone to another country, he or she could surely 
return? Yahya Galip, deputy for Kırşehir, reminded his colleagues that 
the Armenians had returned and reclaimed their property once be-
fore.85 Referring to the years 1915–20, he stated:  
But how can we know what will happen tomorrow? 
These people’s movable and immovable property was 
administered by the government [1915–18]. Then came 
a villain government [in Istanbul], which totally rejected 
that law. After taking the treasury’s property, the Arme-
nians proceeded to take over whatever Muslims owned 
with the help of two witnesses. We saw this pain with 
our own eyes. In the light of this, it is necessary for the 
assembly to find the best solution as quickly as possible, 
to make sure that it works.86  
Yahya Galip’s speech put in a nutshell what many deputies (and ordi-
nary Muslims) must have felt: They had already made the experience 
that survivors did return, taking back the property they had come to 
regard as their own, and even more than that. Galip Bey felt that it 
was necessary to come up with a law that provided a guarantee 
against such restitutions. The present situation, however, was not 
 
84 TBMM 14 March 1922, 124. 
85 Yahya Galip Bey (Kargı) (1874-1942) served as an accountant in the imperial 
accounting office in Istanbul and later in the financial administrations 
(defterdarlığı) of Bitlis, the Hicaz, Kastamonu and Ankara. As such he was probably 
involved in the dispossession of the Armenians during World War I and witnessed 
the partial restitutions during the armistice period. He also served as deputy 
governor and (shortly) as governor of Ankara. He was not elected to the TBMM 
again. See TBMM Albümü, 43.  
86 “Fakat; yarın nasıl olacağını nasıl kestirebiliriz? Bunların emvali menkule ve 
gayrimenkulesi Hükümet namına idare edilmişti, sonra bir erzel Hükümet geldi, 
o kanunu hiç de tanımadı. Ermeniler Hazinenin malını aldıktan sonra, İslâmların 
ne kadar mallar varsa iki şahit ile onu da aldı. (...) Şu hale nazaran hangi ciheti 
daha muvafık ise onu kestirip bir anda işi sağlam kazığa başlamak Meclisinize ait 
bir keyfiyettir.” Ibid., 125.  
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stable enough to provide such a guarantee, and any law that would 
really transfer all abandoned property to the treasury was bound to 
produce “disastrous results”.87 Yahya Galip Bey probably inferred that 
the CUP government’s war-time sales of Armenian property were 
responsible for subsequent conflicts between local Muslims and re-
turning Armenians. He was not opposed to the dispossession of Ar-
menians, but felt that it had been performed prematurely.  
In such a situation of longing for legal security, the words of trained 
lawyers and scholars of religious law counted more than those of 
laypeople. Hüseyin Avni Bey88 (Erzurum), a lawyer and deputy for 
Erzurum, pointed out that, according to (positive) Ottoman law, a 
property owner either exercised his property rights himself or through 
a proxy, and in the event of his death, the rights passed on to his heirs. 
If neither the owner him- or herself, nor a proxy, nor an heir existed, 
the rights passed on to the public treasury. Avni Bey therefore argued 
that there was no need for a bill in the first place.89 Hüseyin Avni’s 
speech on the one hand admitted indirectly that most Armenians had 
indeed died without leaving any heirs. His mentioning of proxies, 
however, suggested that not the state, but legal representatives of the 
actual owners should and could administer the property in question. 
He then suggested that the bill be passed on to the parliamentary 
commissions for Islamic law (şeriyye encümeni) and justice (adliye 
 
87 “Çünkü henüz gayemize tamamiyle vâsıl alamamışızdır ve bu bizim fiiliyat 
itibariyle aleyhimize fena neticeler tevlit edebilir.” TBMM 14 March 1922, 125. 
88 Hüseyin Avni (Ulaş) (1887-1948) took part in the Erzurum and Sivas congresses 
and was elected to the last Ottoman parliament before joining the TBMM in An-
kara. He was among the founders of the oppositional “second group” in parlia-
ment. In the aftermath of the 1926 attempted attack on Mustafa Kemal, he was 
found guilty by the Independence Tribunal, but later acquitted. Güneş, Birinci, 166. 
89 “Ya kendisi yapar veyhut (sic) vekili vardır, ölmüşse vârisi vardır ve bunları tama-
men kavanini umumiyemiz mütekeffildir, kendisi berhayat ise idare eder veyahut 
vekili eder. (...) Bunların haricinde ise beytülmal vardır, bunlara lüzum yoktur. O 
zaman beytülmal vaziyed eder. Böyle bir kanuna lüzum yoktur.” TBMM March 14, 
1921, 123.  
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encümeni). The deputies agreed, and the bill was passed on to the 
committees.  
Three weeks later, on April 7, 1921, the government brought in an-
other bill concerning the administration of the “abandoned property 
houses that have been given to the population of the liberated territo-
ries whose houses have been destroyed.”90 The text made it clear that 
people had already been settled in those houses and stipulated that no 
rent would be asked from them. Houses would be distributed with a 
view to the number of household members and the social status of 
the family. After establishing each family’s needs, the local adminis-
trative councils would commit houses to their charge (içlerinde mukim 
olan ahaliye teffiz olunacaktır No fees would be charged for this admin-
istrative act.91 The ruins of these families’ houses would be registered 
in the name of the government.  
This second bill quite obviously concerned exactly those buildings 
mentioned in the abandoned property bill that was already under 
consideration. The first draft concerned “destroyed houses in the 
liberated territories,” but the Committee for Financial Affairs (maliye 
encümeni) broadened the circle of beneficiaries to people whose hous-
es had been “destroyed during the Great War” and were located in the 
provinces of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Mamüretülaziz, Diyarbakır, Sivas, 
and the districts Maraş and Antep. These six provinces were exactly 
the “six provinces” (vilayat-ı sitte) that had been famous for their high 
ratio of Armenians prior to the genocide, and had been earmarked as 
Armenian territory in the Treaty of Sèvres.92 The bill thus made it 
 
90 Haneleri tahrip olunan vilâyatı müstahlâsa ahalisine emvali metrûkeden verilmiş 
olan haneler hakkında kanun layihası, TBMM April 7, 1921, 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c009/tbmm0100901
7.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
91 The act of tefvīż was not a full transfer of property rights, but an easily revocable 
committing to the charge of someone. For the history, meaning and legal implica-
tions of the term, see page 242. Henceforth I shall use the term without diacritical 
characters in the regular text and with them in the transcription of documents.  
92 The term was first coined in the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, in which the Ottoman 
Empire agreed to perform reforms in those provinces in order to improve public 
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clear that its objective was to safeguard those Muslims that were al-
ready living in Armenian houses (most of them presumably since the 
genocide of 1915) and free them of the obligation to pay rent. If ap-
plied, it would have effectively brought the rent income of abandoned 
property houses (which, according to the first bill, was supposed to be 
collected and kept in the ownersʼ names) down to zero.  
There was a limited discusssion about the question if areas outside of 
the war zone had actually suffered damage or not. One deputy ques-
tioned the “possibility that places where the enemy never set foot were 
damaged,” and some colleagues agreed with cries of “there is no such 
possibility”.93 This remark can be read as an indirect question about 
the reasons behind the bill – a question that could neither be ad-
dressed, nor answered, but nevertheless informed the discussion: 
Where were all the Armenian owners? The deputies were trying to 
make sense of this bill but at the same time avoiding to mention why 
so many houses in these areas – most of which had indeed been far 
away from the war-zones – had become available. The law provided an 
explanation only for the need to settle refugees (war-time destruction) 
but not for their settlement in the six provinces. The emptiness of 
these houses, however, could not be explained with the war, but only 
with the murder and deportation of their Armenian owners and in-
habitants, an elephant in the room that the deputies carefully avoided 
to mention.  
Apart from this limited discussion, the deputies overwhelmingly sup-
ported the bill. It was handed back to the financial committee, but, as 
we shall see, its stipulations, which amounted to a free distribution of 
abandoned property among its current Muslim inhabitants, contin-
                                                                                                                      
security. The term was also used in the Armistice of Moudros. See Roderic H. Da-
vison, “Diplomacy.” 
93 Müfit Ef. (Kırşehir): “(...) [D]üşmanın girmediği yerlerde tahrip edilmek imkanı ve 
ihtimalı var mıdır? Rica ederim.” (Yoktur sesleri). TBMM April 7, 394. Müfit 
Efendi (Kurutluoğlu) (1879-1958) was a medrese-trained religious scholar from 
Kırşehir who also worked as a lawyer. After 1923, he did not serve in the TBMM 
again. TBMM Albümü, 43. 
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ued to inform the deputies’ criticism of the abandoned property bill 
later on.  
2.5  The question of proxies  
The abandoned property bill came back from the Commission for 
Justice (adliye encümeni) on September 15, 1921, and was discussed 
two days later. Like the first draft, it maintained that movable property 
and crops would be sold, while houses and fields would be adminis-
tered by the government. The money obtained from sales, as well as 
rent imcomes, would be kept in the local financial administrations, 
which would pay the administrative costs out of that money. Return-
ing owners would get their immovable property back and would be 
given the money obtained through sales and administration. Article 
Two now included a new stipulation regarding proxies: the govern-
ment was made universal custodian for all “abandoned property”, 
unless there was a proxy in place who had been named prior to the 
lawʼs proclamation.94  
As Hüseyin Avni had pointed out, the naming of proxies was a regu-
lar procedure in Ottoman legal practice, and we can assume that the 
deputies were familiar with it. In the context of this debate, however, 
the idea was provocative because it suggested that even an absent 
person could continue to enjoy, and exercise, their property rights – a 
powerful threat to the desire to permanently appropriate these assets. 
The debate now shifted from the question whether owners were dead 
to the legitimacy of their proxies. The deputies also started to more 
openly discuss the ongoing de facto treatment of abandoned property. 
Vehbi Efendi, the religious scholar from Konya, observed that he was 
“not sure if any money will be left over after the expenses have been 
 
94 The text of the revised bill, as well as the debate I shall discuss presently, can be 
found at 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c013/tbmm0101309
5.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
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paid.”95 This caused some commotion among his colleagues, to which 
he replied: “It happens, it is still going on.”96 He then went on to de-
mand that abandoned fields and houses be allocated (tevzi) to the 
local population (ahaliye) – his wording was exactly that of the second 
bill for refugee housing. Minister of Finance Hasan Bey97 replied that 
the government was already doing exactly that.98 He explained that 
the government was not selling crops, but giving the fields in ques-
tion to neighbors, who were, after payment of the tithe, allowed to 
keep half of the produce as their own.99 A full and free distribution to 
landless people, however, was not possible because the land was “not 
ownerless.” Upon Vehbi Efendi’s insistence, Hasan Bey explained: 
“As a matter of fact, it has become ownerless. However, it is regis-
 
95 Again, the minutes only name him as “Vehbi Efendi”, so it might have been either 
Mehmet Vehbi Efendi or Ömer Vehbi Efendi.  
96 “Emvali menkulenin bilmüzayede füruhtu ile masarifi çıkarıldıktan sonra 
parasının sandığa teslimi deniliyor. Bendeniz masarif çıktıktan sonra para kalıp 
kalmayacağını bilmem, oraya karışmam. Onun için söz söylemiyeceğim. (Şimdi 
ona meydan verilmez sesleri) Hepsi oluyor, hâlâ devam ediyor.” TBMM 17 Sep-
tember 1921, 227. 
97 Hasan Hüsnü (Saka) (1885–1960) was educated at the Ottoman highschool for 
public servants (Mülkiye) and trained as a diplomat in Paris. He was part of the 
Turkish delegation at the Lausanne conference and continuously served as deputy 
for his home province Trabzon up to the 1950s. Following his resignation from 
the post of Minister of Finance, he became Minister of the Economy in May 1922. 
He served as Minister of Finance and the Economy in the second and third gov-
ernments of Prime Minister İsmet Paşa (1925–26) and later became professor of 
Economics in Ankara. He also briefly served as Prime Minister between 1947 and 
1949. See TBMM Albümü, 60. 
98 “Mezruat hakkında yaptığımız şekli idare şudur; O civarda bulunan erbabı 
mesaiye diyoruz ki; bu mezruat kemale geldikten sonra hasat edersiniz, üşrü 
çıktıktan sonra hasılatı bakıyenın nısfını emeğinize mukabil size bırakacağız, nısfı 
diğeri Hazine için kabzediliyor. Mezruatı sattığımız yoktur.” TBMM September 17, 
227.  
99 Hasan Bey implied here that the other 45 percent of the produce went to the state. 
This would have been a very unattractive, and probably ruinous, arrangement for 
subsistence farmers, but might have made some sense for people who planted 
cash crops.  
156 
tered in someone’s name in the tapu registers.”100 The owners were 
absent or dead – but their records were not, and the government, he 
claimed, could not simply ignore this presence.  
Minister Hasan’s mentioning of the legal presence of owners met 
with incredulity on the part of several deputies. Esat Efendi, deputy 
for Aydın, summed up:101 
I cannot bring myself to understand this paragraph. The 
property of citizens who have used arms against us and 
have gone over to the enemy will be sold and adminis-
tered, and later they are supposed to get that money 
back? I request that this provision be rejected altogether, 
and that the property be distributed among the needy 
instead.102  
Hasan Basri Bey103 (deputy for Karesi) seconded him, reminding the 
audience of the second bill on property distribution to refugees, and 
pointing out that the two laws clearly contradicted each other. He 
went on to criticize current government practice and to advocate the 
free distribution of houses to refugees as a much better idea than 
government “protection”:  
 
100 “VEHBİ Ef. (Konya) – Deminden sahipsiz buyurdunuz. Maliye Vekili HASAN B. 
(Trabzon) – Bilfiil sahipsiz kalmış. Fakat birinin namına mukayyettir, tapu 
kaydına göre.” TBMM 17 September 1921, 227.  
101 Born in Gümülcine/Komotini (Western Thrace), Esat Efendi (İleri) (1882–1957) 
served as district chairman of the CUP in his hometown, and later as deputy for 
his province in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies. He migrated to Istanbul at the 
end of the first Balkan War. See Ayten C. Tunalı, “Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Esat Efendi 
(İleri),” Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi 41 (2007). 
102 “Benim bu maddei kanuniyeye hiç aklım ermedi. Düşman tarafına firar etmiş, 
bize karşı silâh kullanmış vatandaşların hükümet emvali menkulelerini satacak 
idare edecek, sonra da bunlara mükâfaten parayı iade edecek, bunun kemali 
teesürle reddini talebederek muhtacine tevziini istirham ediyorum.” TBMM Sep-
tember 17, 1921, 227–28.  
103 Hasan Basri (Çantay) (1887-1964), worked as a journalist and lower-level bureau-
crat in his native town Karesi/Balıkesir (part of the Greek occupation zone). Prior 
to the war he had been publisher of the local CUP newspaper Yıldırım. He did not 
serve in the TBMM again. See TBMM Albümü, 40. 
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We have seen how the buildings, land and the like, 
which are in the hands of the government, can be bene-
ficial or harmful to the nation. If we actually want to 
administer the immovable property in the liberated ter-
ritories, if we want it to be profitable, and if we no long-
er want to enlarge individual fortunes with it (some-
thing the Treasury has been doing for a long time), then 
let us give them to those among our poor brothers in re-
ligion who have lost their own homes. (…) If the gov-
ernment wants to seize real estate, let us resist it with all 
our might, let’s not give it.104  
Hasan Basri Bey went on to demand that the other bill (for property 
distribution among refugees), which was at the time “asleep in the 
commission”, be put on the agenda and discussed together with the 
current one.105 Following this proposition, the deputies’ criticism of 
“government administration” grew harsher: Musa Kâzım Efendi106 
(Konya) pointed out that the law was prone to invite corruption on the 
part of local officials, and that the profits to be gained would “due to 
various shortcomings of the administrations, end up in the hands of a 
small number of people.” The real victim of this situation would be 
 
104 “Şimdiye kadar Hükümetin elinde bulunan emlâk, arazi ve sairenin millete ne 
kadar müfit veya muzır olduğunu gördük. Eğer düşman istilâsından kurtulan ma-
hallerdeki emvali gayrimenkuleyi işletmek, müfit bir hale getirmek istiyorsak eğer 
maliyenin öteden beri yaptığı gibi sabit sermayeleri, gayrimüfit sermayeleri 
çoğaltmak istemiyorsak, bunları emlâki mahvedilen birtakım zavallı 
dindaşlarımıza verelim.(...) Eğer emvali gayrimenkuleyi Hükümet istiyorsa buna 
bütün mevcudiyetimizle isyan edelim, vermiyelim.” TBMM September 17, 1921, 
228–29.  
105 “Encümende uyuyan o kanunun tam zamanı gelmiştir, biran evvel meclisimize 
tevdi edilsin.” Ibid.  
106 Musa Kâzım (Onar) (1881-1930) had already been deputy for his hometown Konya 
in the last Ottoman Chamber of Deputies. He followed Mehmet Vehbi Efendi as 
Minister for Religious Affairs and Pious Endowments (1922–23). TBMM Albümü, 
44. 
158 
“the poor nation, which cannot benefit at all.”107 Durak Efendi,108 a 
deputy for Erzurum, went even further, making it clear that the bill 
would not so much take away property of the (already absent) Chris-
tian owners, but from those Muslims who currently inhabited it. Re-
minding the audience that most of the country lay in ruins, he stated 
that abandoned property (“three, five houses“) was actually the only 
thing of any worth in the hands of a penniless nation. He argued that 
the transfer of this little wealth to the hands of the government would 
leave the people in a state of total wretchedness.109 The deputies’ ar-
gument was twofold: They felt that Armenians had (collectively) lost 
their property rights by rising up against Ottoman rule. Furthermore, 
they argued that these Armenians’ houses ought to be distributed 
among (Muslim) home- and landless people. They opposed both the 
idea of restitution to Armenians and that of government administra-
tion of the property, which they knew from experience since 1915, 
would only help to enrich a few powerful people.  
Minister of Finance Hasan Bey dismissed the first demand (free dis-
tribution to refugees) by pointing out that the legal concept of aban-
doned property implied that legal ownership continued. Abandoned 
property was not emiriye, i.e. not privately owned by the sultan (or, in 
this case, the state). Only people guilty of high treason could be 
stripped of their rights. He reminded the deputies that anyone who 
was found guilty of having committed high treason would, as a rule, 
be tried in court, and, as a result of his conviction, lose all rights to his 
property. His land would thus no longer be treated as abandoned 
 
107 “Şu veya bu idaresizlikler sebebiyle bu gibi emvalin menafii maalesef bâzı eşhasın 
elinde kaldığı halde zararını millet çeker, bundan hiç istifade etmiyen zavallı mil-
let mutazarrır olabilir.” TBMM September 17, 1921, 228. 
108 Mustafa Durak (Sakarya), (1876-1942), was a police officer from Erzurum. He did 
not serve as deputy again. TBMM Albümü, 28. 
109 “Gerek Şark vilayetlerinde ve gerek Garp vilâyetlerinde emniyet kâmilen mah-
voldu, haraboldu. (...) Bugün paramız yok, elimizde emvali metrukeden az çok her 
tarafta üç beş hane bulunuyor. Bunu da kaldırır böyle bir kanunu yapar ve 
idaresini Hükümete tevdi edersek halkın hali ne olur? Halk perişan olur.” TBMM 
September 17, 1921, 229. 
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(emval-i metruke)) but instead as sultanic property (emiriye) – a catego-
ry of land that could indeed be distributed to refugees for free – which, 
however, ought to be regulated by a separate law.110 Hasan Bey thus 
admitted that the property in question was owned by people who had 
not committed high treason – and that his government was keen to 
seize it anyway. At this point, he introduced a new argument, namely 
that not the owners themselves, but their proxies were criminals. He 
claimed that it was not the government that had channeled aban-
doned property into the hands of certain individuals, but proxy state-
ments, which the government, at least so far, had been forced to ac-
cept. Abandoned property was actually not in the hands of the home-
less poor, but in those of fortune-makers who acted as proxies. In 
order to fight these individuals, he insisted that the paragraph on 
proxy statements be added to the bill.111 Hasan Bey thus masterfully 
turned the narrative of poor homeless people vs. the government 
upside down, presenting the government as the innocent party. 
Given the (pretended) universality of its wording, the bill could poten-
tially also be used against Muslims. Hüseyin Avni Bey later put this in 
a nutshell when he warned his colleagues that only courts, not admin-
istrations, should be able to decide whether someone had “disap-
peared,” otherwise “we will all end up as ‘disappeared ones,’ and our 
 
110 “Eğer firar eden eşhasın esnayı firarında onların maznuniyetini mucib ahval varsa 
alelûsul, mahkemede sâbit olur, (...) cezalarını zaten görürler ve bunların malı 
zaten muhakemece müsadere olunur. (...) artık orada emvali metrûke hükmü cari 
olmaz. Doğrudan doğruya emvali emiriye meyanına girer. Emvali emiriyenin; 
memleketin (...) mutazarrır olmuş olan ahalimize tevzii meselesini [halletmek] (...) 
için ayrıca bir kanun yapmak lâzımgelir.” TBMM September 17, 1921, 229.  
111 “Adliye Encümeninde müzakeresi icra edilirken esnayi müzakeresinde hazır 
bulunan ve lâzımgelen, lüzumlu gördüğüm tadilâtı da söylemiştim, netice itibari-
yle bu şekli almıştı (...) Ahalinin elinde değildir, Durak Beyefendi. Emvali 
metrûkeyi bugün karıştırırsak birkaç mütegallibenin elinde çıkar (...) her hangi 
sınıf eşhasın hakikaten kandi menfaatı iktizasından olarak mukavelât maharriri 
marifetiyle yapılan bir vekâlet ile bu işe siper olması muhtemeldir.” Ibid. 229–30.  
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property will go to waste.”112 Süleyman Sırrı Bey113 (deputy for Yozgat) 
feared the same: 
As is well-known, the words “movable property” and 
“abandoned property” are used specifically to refer to 
[property owned by] Christians. Does the [new term] 
“ownerless due to the flight and disappearance of its 
owners” refer to that [property] owned by Muslims or by 
Christians?114 
The minutes inform us that cries of “there is no discrimination” (te-
frik yoktur) could be heard at this point: The deputies were aware of 
the danger that the government might apply the same laws to the 
Muslim population as well, and indeed, at least one such case was 
later reported.115 The bill under consideration violated the Ottoman 
property regime. Musa Kâzım Efendi insisted:  
How else is someone who cannot come here, or who is 
not allowed to come, supposed to take care of his prop-
erty, if not by the help of a legal representative? Isn’t this 
a plain necessity? In a regime that respects people’s en-
joyment of property rights, this is indeed just a logical 
 
112 “Mahkeme tahtı karara almalıdır. Yoksa İdareten olursa hepimiz gayiboluruz. 
Hepimizin malı heder olur.” 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c014/tbmm0101410
8.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
113 Süleyman Sırrı Bey (1878-1963) had served as district governor (kaymakam) in 
several towns before joining the first TBMM. He joined the war in August 1921 
and was not part of later assemblies. TBMM Albümü, 63. 
114 “Malumualiniz öteden beri emvali menkule ve emvali metruke kelimeleri 
hıristiyanlara muhtas bir tabir gibi telakki ediliyor. Burada ashabının firar ve 
gaybubetiyle sahipsiz kalan emlak, hıristiyanlara mi aidolanı, yoksa İslamlara 
aidolanı mi?” TBMM 17 September 1921, 229. 
115 On September 11, 1922, deputy for Aydın Mazhar Bey claimed that his own olive 
grove had been treated as abandoned property and had been sold by the nationalist 
government. See 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c022/tbmm0102210
0.pdf, 617. 
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principle, be it for property owners or others. Proxy 
statements and similar documents drawn up in accord-
ance with the şeriat have a significance in positive law, in 
human reason and conscience. Therefore, they cannot 
be annulled. (…) Only courts can annul them.116 
The question of legality now came to the forefront of the discussion. 
It did so with regard to two issues: The first was the status of non-
Muslims and their property rights, the second that of current Muslim 
inhabitants of abandoned property. Both were quite obviously inter-
connected, yet they had been discussed with respect to separate bills 
so far, a point that had seriously hampered the deputiesʼ attempts at 
legalizing the status of people who were already living in abandoned 
property houses. A majority voted for the joint consideration of both 
bills, and the abandoned property bill was sent back to the Commis-
sion for Financial Affairs. It eventually reappeared on April 16, 1922, 
after a joint meeting of the three commissions for justice, financial 
affairs, and şeriat law.  
2.6 The question of legality 
Musa Kâzım Efendi argued that proxy statements were documents 
that were drawn up in accordance with the holy şeriat, and therefore 
had to be protected both by positive law and by the courts. Upon first 
glance, this was a powerful argument, as it implied that private prop-
erty rights – whether those of Muslims or non-Muslims – were pro-
tected by god-given law and could therefore not be violated by men. 
On the other hand, his reference to the şeriat appears to have inspired 
 
116 “Kanun böyle müdafaa edilmez. Kendisi buraya geldiği halde gelemiyen ve belki 
kabul edilmiyen zevat emvalini vekâletle idareden başka çare bulabilir mi rica 
ederim? Buna bir zaruret yok mudur? Ve herkesin malındaki tasarrufu kabul 
edince bu imkânı aklî mevcut değil midir? Mal sahipleri için olsun, kim olursa 
olsun. Binaenaleyh vekâletnamelerin ve bu gibi hücceti şerʿiyenin mânayı kanuni-
si, mânayı aklîsi mevcuttur. Mânayı vicdanisi mevcuttur. Her şey mevcuttur. 
Binaenaleyh vekâletlere ait hükümler hiçbir zaman iptal edilemez. (...) Bunu iptal 
için mahkeme hükmü lazımgelir. Başka çare yoktur.” TBMM September 17, 1921, 
230.  
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some of his colleagues to frame their arguments in terms of the şeriat 
as well – though with a different objective, namely to argue that it was 
no longer applicable to the non-Muslims in question.  
The abandoned property bill came back from the joint meeting of the 
three commissions on April 16, 1922. The three commissions had 
changed the lawʼs applicability to all places where people had “fled or 
disappeared due to political reasons or under conditions of war.” They 
had, however, not inserted a paragraph regulating the rights of cur-
rent inhabitants. The commissions had decided that state administra-
tion of abandoned property was justified by “general regulations” and 
that the bill at hand was therefore not necessary. Hasan Bey disagreed:  
There are people among them [the owners of abandoned 
property] who have fled abroad after engaging in all 
kinds of treason against our country. These people then 
simply draw up a warrant for someone and name him 
their representative. These guys [the proxies] have full 
powers to sell that property in their [the ownersʼ] name. 
They turn to the courts, and the courts have to follow the 
existing laws and recognize those warrants. (...) The 
courts tell us: “Under these circumstances, we do not 
recognize you as general custodian.” They ask us: “Who 
are you to occupy this house?”117 
When Hasan Bey made this statement, his government had just is-
sued a cabinet decision (kararname no. 1483) concerning proxy 
statements that Greeks who had fled to Istanbul and foreign countries 
 
117 “Sonra memleketin hayatı aleyhinde fesad tertibatından sonra fürceyabı firar 
olmuş, memaliki ecnebiyeye gitmiş adamlar vardır. Bunlar bulundukları mahal-
lerdeki şehbenderlikten o memalik kâtibi adilliğinden musaddak bir vekâletname 
ile her hangi bir adamı tevkil ediyorlar. Emval ve emlâkinin füruhtuna salâhiyet ve 
vekâlet ediyorlar. (...) mahkemeye müracaat ediyorlar, mevzuatı kanuniyemiz mu-
cibince mahkemeler bu vekâleti kanuniyeyi kabul etmek mecburiyetinde kalıyor. 
(…) [B]ize mahkemeler 'nasıl gasıp ve füzuli oturuyorsun, sen necisin?' Diyorlar.” 
TBMM 16 April 1922. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c019/tbmm0101902
8.pdf, 221. (accessed September 2, 2016). 
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were sending from there. The cabinet decision stated that these doc-
uments would no longer be accepted in court. The Ankara govern-
ment had issued the document on March 12, 1922.118 But this appar-
ently was not enough, and the courts might indeed have demanded a 
full-grown law to legalize this practice.  
In his speech, the Minister of Finance no longer tried to pretend that 
his government was merely protecting the rights of absent owners 
against their illicit proxies. He depicted the owners themselves as 
traitors, and no longer talked of trying them in court in order to legal-
ly seize their property. The roles are reversed here: It is the courts that 
protect the ownersʼ rights against a government that seizes property 
illegally. Hasan Bey, in other words, admitted to his governmentʼs 
illegally seizing property, asking his parliament to legalize this prac-
tice.  
The information Hasan Bey gave here is not completely unconvincing: 
The Ottoman government under Mehmet VI (Vahdettin) had indeed 
revoked the temporary law of 1915 that had regulated the sale and 
liquidation of Armenian property in January 1920 with a cabinet deci-
sion (no. 2747).119 It seems perfectly possible that local courts in terri-
tories controlled by the Ankara government accepted this change, and 
accordingly protected the rights of absent non-Muslims – at least as 
long as Ankara had not come up with a full-grown law that replaced 
the cabinet decision issued in Istanbul.  
As a response to Minister Hasan Beyʼs explanation, Lütfi Efendi,120 
deputy for Malatya, asked:  
 
118 For the text of the kararname, see Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 125–26.  
119 To be exact, on Kanunisani/January 8, 1336/1920 (see page 113). Kardeş gives the 
correct date according to the Rumi calendar, but incorrectly states that this 
corresponded to January 1921. See Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 91. 
120 Lütfi Efendi (Evliyaoğlu) (1863–1923), a lawyer, was among the few TBMM 
members who had both a higher religious (medrese) and a state education from the 
school for public administration (Mülkiye). He is sometimes called “Bey” and 
sometimes “Efendi” in the parliamentary minutes See TBMM Albümü, 48.  
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How has the movable and immovable property of these 
people been treated so far? And by which authorization? 
If there is a legal foundation for this, why is there a need 
for such a law in the first place? If there is no legal 
foundation, how has [the government] justified [these 
practices]?121  
Answering this question, a chancellor of the treasury explained that 
the government was already acting as universal custodian of aban-
doned property, but was encountering difficulties whenever owners 
went to court. Lütfi Bey then insisted to know “who exactly” had be-
stowed this function on the government, to which the chancellor re-
plied that it was “a provision of the şeriat”.122 If the bill was, as the 
chancellor claimed, supported by the şeriat, it could surely be inter-
preted with the help of legal terms borrowed from Islamic jurispru-
dence (ahkamı şerriye), and most speeches now turned to this problem, 
trying to find ways to legitimate not only government custodianship, 
but the full seizure of abandoned property. 
According to a deputy’s account of the joint commission meeting, the 
şeriyye commission had argued that the people which the bill referred 
to as firari and mütegayyıp (fled/disappeared), could in fact be treated 
under şeriat law as “gaib” (absent) and “mefkud” (lost/disappeared) 
respectively.123 Several religious scholars among the deputies disa-
greed and explained the actual meanings of these terms in Islamic 
law: Hamit Bey (deputy for Biga) pointed out that they could only be 
applied when someone was either known to be dead or once an ab-
sent person could safely be assumed to be dead because he or she was 
over ninety years old. Only after that point could the government fully 
 
121 “Hükümetten sual ediyorum. Şimdiye kadar bunların emvali metruke ve 
menkuleleri hakkında ne muamele yapmıştır? Ve bunu hangi salahiyetine 
istinadettirmiş? Eğer salâhiyeti kanuniyeye istinadetmişse o halde bu kanuna ne 
lüzum vardır? Yok eğer bir salâhiyeti kanuniyeye istinad etmemişse neye 
istinadetmiş?” TBMM April 16, 1922, 226. 
122 Lütfi B. Malatya: “Efendim bir sual soracağım. Bu velâyeti ammeyi size tevdi eden 
kimdir?” Müsteşar Zekai B.: “Ahkâmi şeriyedir.” Ibid.  
123 Şükrü Bey (Gülez), (Bolu), TBMM 16 April 1922, 218.  
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seize such a personʼs property.124 Unlike the şeriat commission, he 
apparently was of the opinion that most “fugitive” and “disappeared” 
people were alive. 
Osman Fevzi Efendi 125  (Erzincan) explained that mefkud and gaib 
implied that the state had to take care of the property of people thus 
categorized and that these categories were therefore not suitable for 
application in the case at hand. (He thus implied that “custodianship” 
was a mere euphemism for full-fledged government seizure of prop-
erty). Instead, he suggested that the Armenians had consciously left 
zimmet, the protected, but inferior status of Christians and Jews in 
countries under Muslim rule. He argued that their giving up this 
status meant that the Treasury was allowed to sell their property.126 
Many deputies agreed that the Armenians had “opted out of the status 
of protection”127 and that their property had therefore fallen to the 
state. Mustafa Taki Efendi128 (Sivas) elaborated on this point: 
 
124 Hamid Bey (Biga): “Malumualiniz gaip ve mefkudun hükmü, vefatına veyahut 
doksan yaşını ikmal edeceği zamana kadar hukuku müktesebesinin devamından 
ibarettir.” Ibid., 225. This rule of Islamic law was taken over into paragraphs 530 
and 639 of the Civil Code issued in 1926, which made it possible to transfer full 
ownership of property either to the Treasury or to those who already controlled it. 
(Many thanks go to Afşin Umar, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul for pointing me 
towards these paragraphs). Note that this legal change happened almost exactly 
ten years after the Armenian Genocide. The repercussions of these two 
paragraphs for abandoned property legislation are discussed in chapter 5.7. 
125 Osman Fevzi (Topçu) (1862–1939) served as müftü of Erzincan after 1884. He was 
deputy for his hometown in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies elected in 1908. 
After 1918, he again served as müftü in Erzincan. As such, he became chairman of 
the Society for the Protection of Rights in the eastern provinces and took part in 
the Erzurum Congress in 1919. See TBMM Albümü, 27. 
126 “Ermeniler ve saire bu gibiler 'firar ve gaybubet' tabirinin umumi şekliyle ifade 
olunamaz. Bunun hususi tâbiri şerʿan (hurucu alelimam), (hurucu anıttaa) dır. 
Bunların ise malları Beytülmale raptolunabilir ve Beytülmal bunu füruht edebilir.” 
TBMM April 16, 1922, 219.  
127 “(B)unlar zimmetten huruç etmişler” Nusret Efendi, Ibid., 217. 
128  Mustafa Taki Efendi (1873–1925) served as a judge and Arabic teacher in his 
hometown Sivas. See TBMM Albümü, 57. 
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The Greeks and Armenians living in Turkey have decid-
ed no longer to accept our rule, and while it is true that 
our book, our jurist’s law knows such a term as ‘protect-
ed status’ (ahkamı zimmi), this term can no longer be 
applied to them. This is because they can only enjoy the 
rights that Islam grants them if they obey to all laws of 
the şeriat. These people, however, have opted out, decid-
ing to live in independence. They have gone to Europe. 
They have worked for their separation from the Turks, 
they have even gone so far as to establish an Armenian 
state.129  
Mustafa Taki Efendi was one of the first to point out that those who 
were framed as “disappeared” and “fugitive” were not only Armeni-
ans, but also Greeks. He thus acknowledged that the term “liberated 
territories” had started to signify not only areas in eastern Anatolia, 
but also, potentially, some in the west, which were still under Greek 
occupation. It is not quite clear which group he referred to when he 
then pointed out that many people would eventually return once hos-
tilities were over.  
There is, however, one point we need to consider: how 
will they be treated when they live among us [again]? 
Will they be treated as foreigners? This will have to be 
discussed when we get an international peace [agree-
ment], under the heading of ‘minority law.’ They [the Al-
lied Powers] will confront us with that, and make us ac-
cept as much as they can. Until then, we need to protect 
 
129 “Türkiye’de ikamet eden Rum, Ermeni ahali bunlar Türkiye’nin itaatınden huruç 
etmişler, gerçi bizim kitabımizda, fıkıhımızda 'ahkamı zimmi' namiyle bir ahkâm 
var ise de fakat bu ahkâm bunlar hakkında şimdi icra olunamaz bir hale gelmiştir. 
Çünkü onlar bütün kavanini şeriyeye itaatı taahhütle memaliki İslâmiyede 
otururlarsa şerʿi İslâmın onlara verdiği hukuktan istaifadeye hakları vardır. Fakat 
bunlar itaatten huruç etmişlerdir, bilistiklâl yaşamak istemişlerdir. Avrupa’ya 
gitmişlerdir. Türklerden ayrılmak için siyasi teşebbüslerde bulunmuşlardır, hattâ 
Ermenistan bile teşkil etmişlerdir.” TBMM April 16, 1922, 220.  
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that property, that is, we cannot fully transfer it to the 
hands of the treasury.130 
Mustafa Takiʼs speech already radiates confidence regarding an even-
tual victory over the Greek forces in Anatolia. However, he (correctly) 
anticipated that the Allied Powers, just as they had done before, would 
insist on a system of minority protection (which indeed was created 
with the Treaty of Lausanne). Though he doesnʼt explicitly mention it 
here, his concern was probably rooted in the fact that the Greeks were 
much more likely to return in large numbers than the Armenians 
because they had not been subject to genocidal violence. He could not 
be sure of his governmentʼs ability to hinder them from doing so after 
the end of the war.  
Nusret Efendi (Erzurum) joined the discussion of possible future 
scenarios by pointing to the Treaty of Kars, which had been signed 
between the Ankara government, the Socialist Soviet Republics of 
Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and Georgia in October 1921. He claimed that 
Armenians from the “liberated territories” had lost everything 
through that treaty, and that their land had effectively become state 
property.131 Based on this argument, he rejected the idea of state ad-
ministration, instead promoting free property distribution to Muslim 
 
130 “(Y)alnız bir mahzur vardır ki Rumlar, Ermeniler bizim içimizde oturdukları 
halde haklarında ne muamele olacaktır? Ecnebi muamelesi mi olacak? Bu ileride 
beynelmilel bir sulh olursa 'Ekalliyetler hukuku' namiyle ortaya çıkar. İşte o 
zaman bu taayün edecektir. O vakte kadar bunların emvali muhafaza edilmelidir. 
Yani bütün bütün Hazineye maledilemez.” TBMM April 16, 1922, 220. 
131 The Treaty of Kars did not contain such a stipulation, but euphemistically stated 
that the population was free to decide whether to leave or not, and to sell their 
property prior to their emigration. §13 states: “All inhabitants of territory that was 
part of Russia before 1918, and over which the sovereignty of Turkey is affirmed, 
shall have the opportunity, if they desire to relinquish their Turkish nationality, to 
leave Turkey freely, taking with them their possessions and goods, or the proceeds 
of their sale.” Treaty of Kars, Last accessed July 18, 2016: 
http://groong.usc.edu/treaties/kars.html. Nusret Efendi here hinted at the de facto 
effects of the treaty. 
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refugees.132 This argument implied that the whole Armenian popula-
tion had left the area in question, and that the Greek population of 
western Anatolia would eventually be forced to do the same. 
For the time being, however, western Anatolia continued to be under 
Greek occupation, a fact that raised the possibility to frame the sei-
zure of property by the Ankara government as an act of vengeance. 
Several deputies had already done so in 1921, sometimes going back 
as far as the war of 1877-78, to (correctly) point out that Bulgaria, 
Greece and Serbia had started to seize Muslim property first.133 They 
also referred to the idea of reciprocity (mukabele bilmisl). Reciprocity is 
today considered a principle that governments apply to foreigners 
from a specific other state residing on their territory: they treat them 
the same as that state treats their own citizens living over there.134 
Nusret Efendi (Erzurum) argued that the Armenians were indeed 
foreigners: by taking up arms against Muslim rule, they had not only 
lost their status as zimmi, but also their Ottoman citizenship. There-
fore, they had lost all rights to their property and could, as a reaction 
to the misdeeds of the Balkan states, be treated as foreigners, accord-
ing to the principle of reciprocity (mukabele bilmisl) in international 
law. 135  Despite these arguments, several deputies still had doubts 
 
132 TBMM April 16, 1922, 217.  
133 Operatör Emin Bey (Bursa): “Rumeli’de Yunanlılar, Sırplar, Bulgarlar, takip etti-
kleri usul ile; hicret edenlerin malını, mülkünü ve her şeyini gasbetmişlerdir. (...) 
Yunanlıların yapmadıkları zulüm kalmamıştır.” TBMM March 14, 1921, 124.  
134 Today, the rule is often applied to visa regulations. See Robert O. Keohane, “Reci-
procity in International Relations,” International Organization 40, no. 1 (1986). 
Turkey, however, has treated its own minorities, most notably the remaining 
Greeks of Istanbul, along these lines throughout the 20th century. See Baskın Oran, 
“The Story of Those Who Stayed: Lessons from Articles 1 and 2 of the 1923 Con-
vention,” in Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population 
Exchange between Greece and Turkey, ed. Renée Hirschon, 97–116 (New York, Ox-
ford: Berghahn, 2003). 
135 “(B)izim zimmetimizden çıktılar. Bunlar bizim tabaamız değildir. Binaenaleyh 
hukuku esasiye, hukuku beynel düvel kaidesine tevfikan bunlar arazilerinden, 
emval ve akaarlarından sarfınazar edilmiş addedilirler. (...) Balkan hükümetleri 
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about the billʼs legitimacy and a majority voted to once again send it 
back to the şeriyye commission. At this point, however, the text had 
been moved to the voting of individual paragraphs, and therefore only 
the first, relatively uncontroversial paragraph was sent.  
2.7  “Fugitive”, “Disappeared” or “Deported”?  
Loss of citizenship rights and the protected status of zimmi potentially 
concerned not only property rights, but the life and safety of a non-
Muslim. This aspect was discussed much more openly in the next 
session, in which the law was finally passed, on April 20, 1922.136 
Since the discussion had already been moved on to individual para-
graphs, it was no longer possible for deputies to talk about their gen-
eral views on the bill in this last session. They could only express 
standpoints related directly to specific paragraphs, which would then 
quickly be moved on to a vote. This time, the law was passed. The first 
paragraph, which discussed the administration and sale of property 
“that has become ownerless due to the flight and disappearance of its 
owners” had meanwhile been declared compatible with the holy şeriat 
by the şeriyye commission. Yet, there was still a great deal of contro-
versy regarding the actual meaning of these terms, and hence the 
legitimacy of the paragraph. Ömer Vehbi Efendi137 insisted that the 
law ought to distinguish between people who had “disappeared” and 
                                                                                                                      
bize aynen bu muameleyi tatbik etmişlerdir. Biz de mukabele bilmisil olmak 
üzere yapacağız ve yapmaya mecburuz.” TBMM April 16, 1922, 217.  
136 Accessed November 26, 2012: 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c014/tbmm0101410
8.pdf. 
137 Ömer Vehbi Efendi (Isparta 1870 – Konya 1922) was chairman of the şeriyye com-
mission when he made this statement. He had already served as deputy for Konya 
in the Ottoman parliament after 1912. During the war years, he taught Islamic law 
and Ottoman positive civil law (mecelle) in Konyaʼs law school. He was among the 
leaders of the cityʼs society for the protection of rights and was elected to the last 
Ottoman parliament before joining the TBMM in 1920. He left the National As-
sembly in June 1922 to work as müftü in Konya until his death in 1928. See 
TBMM Albümü, 44. 
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those who had consciously and on their own accord left the country as 
“fugitives” (for which he named several reasons).138 This implied that 
only some people could be regarded as traitors. Musa Kâzım Efendi 
went one step further:  
If the owner of a piece of land has been deported, or if 
he has fled, or if he disappeared, can we treat him as fu-
gitive? And if we do it, is it right? (...) What if he has 
heirs? Will we nevertheless consider the land ownerless? 
(...) Is this right, gentlemen? (...) This law is unaccepta-
ble.139  
No other speaker dared to answer these questions, yet the protocol 
records cries of: “It is not right at all”. Musa Kâzım had reminded his 
colleagues that most Armenians had not “fled” or “disappeared” vol-
untarily, but had been deported. Though this term was another eu-
phemism, it nevertheless addressed the question of agency and cul-
pability: could one punish someone (or his/her heirs) for a crime that 
had been committed against him? Speaking of heirs, moreover, im-
plied that “deported” people were actually dead.  
Osman Fevzi Efendi140, müftü and deputy for Erzincan, explained the 
different forms known in Islamic law with which a non-Muslim could 
leave the protected status of zimmet: He could refuse obedience to 
state rule, engage in espionage, attack or lay siege on a Muslim village 
or castle, and permanently migrate to another country. Taking the 
 
138 “Mütaaddit esbaba firar olur (...) Şu halde burada gaybubet ya firar suretiyle veya 
gayrı bir suretle olan demektir.” TBMM April 20, 1922, 304.  
139 “(İ)dareten, siyaseten başka mahallere nakledilenlere kanun şâmil midir? Sonra 
arazinin sahibi başka mahalle nakletmiş veya firar etmiş veya gaybubet etmiş olur-
sa buna firar muamelesi yapabilir miyiz? Ve yaparsak doğru olur mu? (...) Veresesi 
mevcut ise yine bu malı sahipsiz mi addedeceğiz? (...) Bu doğru mu efendiler? 
(Hiç doğru değil sesleri) (...) Bu kanun kabul edilemez.” TBMM April 20, 1922, 
307.  
140 Fevzi Efendi (Topçu) (1861-1939) was preacher and müftü at the Great Mosque of 
Erzincan, chairman of the Society for the Protection of Rights in the eastern Ana-
tolian provinces and one of the oldest members of the first TBMM. See TBMM 
Albümü, 27. 
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Rum militias on the Black Sea coast as an example, Fevzi Efendi ar-
gued that these groups had indeed opted out of their protected status. 
Up to this point, his explanations had fit in well with other depictions 
of non-Muslims as a collective of insurgents and traitors who had no 
right whatsoever to return. This, he argued, was not true in terms of 
Islamic law:  
If they have heirs that continue to be loyal [to us], then 
the profits from before the insurrection go to them. If 
there are no heirs, or if the heirs are insurgents as well, 
their property passes on to the Treasury. (...) But if these 
people ever return, expressing their [renewed] subordi-
nation [to Muslim rule] and remorse, then their peni-
tence is accepted, and they are given back [their proper-
ty].141  
Fevzi Efendi went on to mention that the property of insurgents who 
did not return would indeed pass to the Treasury. This may or may 
not have been a subtle hint at the possibility to hinder non-Muslims 
from returning – an option that the nationalist government put into 
practice only five months later, when the Greek Orthodox were forced 
out of the country and never allowed to return. 
For Şeref Bey,142 deputy for Edirne and returnee from Malta, there 
was no reason to ponder about the meanings of “fugitive” and “disap-
peared”: 
 
141 “Hali itaatte bulunan veresesi varsa kablelisyan olan kazançları onlara verilir. 
Haliitaatte verese yoksa veyahut veresesi dahi hali isyanda ise bunların menkul ve 
gayrimenkul emvali fiʼdir. Emini beytülmal olan kimse bunları Hazine namına 
zabıt ve tasarruf eder. (...) Bunlar ne vakit avdet ve itaat ederse o vakit tövbeleri ka-
bul olunur ve o zaman kendilerine iade olunur.” TBMM April 20,1922, 305.  
142 Mehmet Şeref (Aykut), (1874-1939). Trained as a lawyer, Şeref worked as a jour-
nalist and publisher of various newspapers. He was among those members of the 
CUP who were deported to Malta in 1920. See Hacer Özmakas and Yavuz Özma-
kas, “Mehmet Şeref Aykut ve Dil Sorunu,” Anadili, no. 32 (2006), 
www.baskaizmiryok.com/makaleler/mehmet_seref_aykut.pdf (accessed July 28, 
2012). 
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Some guy has fled from here, leaving a representative 
behind. Where has he gone, gentlemen? He has joined 
the Greeks to fire bullets at the Turks’, the Muslims’ 
bosom. When he left, he left a proxy statement in order 
to protect his property here. (...) Someone takes the 
proxy statement and comes here, while the man sits in 
some street in Paris, working for the Pontus organiza-
tion, against our national government. While that man 
is busy working against me, the proxy statement he is-
sued is valid here, and therefore I am compelled to give 
back his property and his money. With that money, he 
will go and buy bullets, and shoot them at some Turk’s 
heart (...).143 
Chairman Hasan Fehmi Bey144, a hardliner who would soon become 
Minister of Finance and build a reputation for channeling non-
 
143 “Bir adam bir vekil bırakarak kendisi buradan firar etmiş. Nereye efendiler? Tü-
rkün, İslamın sinesine kurşun atmak için Yunana iltihak etmiş. Gittiği vakit bura-
da mevcudolan malını muhafaza etmek için bir de vekaletname uydurmuş. Bizim 
yakın tairhimizde bu vakayi o kadar çoktur ki, biz Rumeli halkı bunu fevkalade iyi 
biliriz.(...) Birisi vekaleti aldı geldi, herifte Pontüs teşkilatından dolayı bugün 
Pariste filân sokakta Hükümeti Milliye aleyhinde teşkilat yapıyor ve onun da bura-
da şu kadar emlâki vardır. Bu herif orada benim aleyhime teşkilat yaparken, şu 
kanunla onun yaptığı vekâletin hükmü burada caridir, binaenaleyh ben bunun 
malını teslim edeceğim; paralarını ona teslim edeceğim; o paralarını alacak, gide-
cek ve o para ile kurşun alacak, Türkün sinesine atacak... Efendiler, böyle bir jka-
nun mevcut ise ben o kanuna bu memlekette paydos derim. Binaenaleyh bu 
yapılan kanun şeriata da muvafıktır, akla da muvafıktır, maslahata da muvafıktır. 
Bu kanunun kabulünden başka yolumuz yoktur.” TBMM April 20, 1922, 308. 
144 Hasan Fehmi (Ataç) (1879-1961) served as deputy in the 1914 and 1919 Ottoman 
parliaments before he was elected as deputy for Gümüşhane to the TBMM, where 
he chaired the commission for financial affairs. He became Minister of Finance 
two days after the abandoned property law had been issued and stayed on that post 
throughout the last year of the War of Independence. As such, he is remembered 
in Turkey as the man who made the final Turkish offensive against the Greeks in 
western Anatolia financially possible. See TBMM Albümü, 31. He seems to have 
later worked as director of the directorate for “national property” (milli emlak 
müdürü) at the Ministry of Finance. See Baran, Bir, 110. 
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Muslim wealth into the financing of the nationalist war effort, chose 
this moment to suggest that the assembly start voting on the para-
graph. Two movements by Ömer Vehbi Efendi and Musa Kâzım 
Efendi, who demanded that the paragraph be voted down, were not 
approved, and the paragraph was passed. 
2.8  The state as universal custodian?  
The second paragraph with its stipulation concerning the state as 
universal custodian of abandoned property had already been contro-
versial in previous sessions. Now that the vote was approaching rapid-
ly, discussions concerning its compatibility with religious law came to 
a head. The first speaker to take the floor was again Ömer Vehbi 
Efendi from Konya, who stubbornly rejected the paragraph, arguing 
that it went both against the şeriat and against common reason. 
Moreover, he stated that the stipulations of paragraph one and two 
essentially contradicted each other: the second paragraph violated the 
very rights that the first ostensibly protected. Ömer Vehbi stressed the 
importance of proxy statements as an essential part of the Ottoman 
property regime, underlining that a law that did not accept those doc-
uments could in no way be accepted in the light of the holy şeriat. He 
then ventured to explain the possible consequences of the assembly 
passing such a law:  
I request from your high assembly that any law passed 
here ought to be in harmony with the şeriat. The holy 
Kurʾan, too, is quite explicit about this point. A govern-
ment that passes laws which contradict the şeriat is an 
unworthy one. (...) The common people will never come 
to like it, and it [the government] will be unable to make 
any progress. (...) Therefore I suggest that paragraph 
one and two be turned down. If this suggestion is not 
accepted, that’s fine – my objective is to keep myself 
clear of sin.145  
 
145 TBMM April 20, 1922, 309. 
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We can safely assume that many deputies regarded themselves as 
good Muslims, and were not eager to do something that a respected 
religious scholar called a sin. Ömer Vehbi Efendi’s challenge needed 
to be countered, and on the very battleground he had opened. The 
person to take up that challenge was Hacı Mustafa Sabri Efendi (Siirt), 
another man of religion (though certainly of lesser distinction than 
the scholars from Konya), who had previously served as judge at a 
religious court (kadı) in Siverek/Urfa.146 Mustafa Sabri Efendi coun-
tered Ömer Vehbi Efendisʼs arguments by citing a saying of the 
Prophet Muhammed (hadis): 
The blood of a man who has turned arms towards his 
brothers can be shed unrevenged, and his property is 
sugar [fair game]. [He repeated the text in Arabic]. (...) 
The overwhelming majority of the people (millet) sup-
port this principle. Whatever believers consider right is 
right (hasen). It is not forbidden (haram).147 
Ömer Vehbi Efendi countered that “legitimizing the forbidden” was 
“blasphemy” (haramı istihsan etmek küfürdür). The minutes do not 
record any reaction from the audience at this point, so the deputies 
may have listened attentively.  
By citing this hadis, Mustafa Sabri Efendi openly admitted to what one 
may call the spirit of the law at hand: what the assembly was discuss-
ing was not a matter of government administration, cancellation or 
recognition of proxy statements – it was actually trying to legalize 
mass murder and the illegal appropriation of the victims’ property. By 
citing the hadis, Mustafa Sabri Efendi implied that the Armenians had 
risen in arms, therefore they had been killed, and their property could 
now be distributed without any concerns about legitimacy.  
In one last attempt at resistance, Ömer Vehbi Efendi brought in a 
movement in which he asked for the paragraph to be dismissed (on 
 
146 Hacı Mustafa Sabri (Baysan) (1887- 1960) is not to be confused with the second-
last şeyhülislam of the Ottoman Empire of the same name. Mustafa Sabrı was ed-
ucated as a kadı and served as such in Siverek (Urfa). See TBMM Albümü, 55.  
147 TBMM April 20, 1922, 309.  
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the grounds that it “did not suit an Islamic government”). The 
movement was turned down, the paragraph voted on, and passed. The 
protocol records cries of “no majority!” at this point, indicating that 
the majority might not have been as overwhelming as chairman Ha-
san Fehmi Bey claimed.148  
As the other, silently dropped bill on refugee housing had made clear, 
countless houses and fields of Armenians (and increasingly also 
Greeks) were already inhabited or worked by Muslims, who were 
either local homeless people or refugees. The refugee bill had project-
ed that homeless people would not be asked to pay rent for the houses 
they lived in, and support for the bill had been strong. The third para-
graph of the bill on abandoned property, however, had a very different 
objective. It framed the problem not as one of housing for homeless 
refugees but as one of illegal occupation and appropriation which had 
to be fought. It stipulated that people who illegally occupied aban-
doned property would be hindered from doing so, and would be sub-
ject to prosecution. The actual owners were not mentioned at all.  
Several deputies used the debate about paragraph three as an oppor-
tunity to clarify who these “occupants” were. Ömer Vehbi Efendi 
suggested that they were people who protected houses for the actual 
owners:  
Judging from the two previous paragraphs, I understand 
that, for example, someone who disappeared has placed 
another man in his house and told him: “live here and 
protect the place.” In the language of şeriat law, such 
people are called custodians. He has placed this person 
as custodian and left, or maybe rented [the house] out. 
Now, the government will ask this person, who is a cus-
todian: “with what right have you lived here?”. And if he 
canʼt produce a document, he will be evicted as an ille-
gal occupant. This is what the paragraph suggests. But 
the government is impartial. Its goal is to defend the 
rights of the oppressed against their oppressors. As long 
 
148 TBMM April 20, 1922, 310. 
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as [the owner] doesnʼt go to court, the government has 
no authority to go and ask someone “why do you live 
here”? 149  
Deputy for Maraş Hasip Bey150 made a similar point when he pro-
posed an additional paragraph which stated that all rental contracts 
for abandoned property would stay in force.151 The assembly didnʼt 
accept his proposition.  
Both arguments were somewhat ambiguous: Vehbi Efendi and Hasip 
Bey may have defended the absent ownersʼ rights in order to protect 
the current (usually Muslim) inhabitants of abandoned houses from 
eviction. While we cannot be sure about their intentions, it is interest-
ing to note that their colleagues rejected these arguments even though 
they could have helped the cause of the current inhabitants. Only 
Mehmet Ragıp Bey (deputy for his hometown Amasya) really took 
sides with non-Muslims: he suggested that the families of absent 
owners should be allowed to dwell in abandoned property houses or 
supported with the income generated through that property. The 
chairman simply ignored this suggestion, and it was not voted upon.  
Most deputies supported the third paragraph, which was approved 
with a great majority of votes (119 yes, 38 no, 26 abstentions). The 
abandoned property bill was passed, coming into effect the same 
day.152 It was (at least theoretically) the legal basis for the work of the 
 
149 “Anladığıma göre maddeteyni evveleyn karinesiyle mesela gaybubet eden eşhas 
evine bir adamı oturtmuş, sen burada otur, muhafaza et demiş. Lisanı şeride buna 
(müveddea) derler. Vedia olarak koymuş, gitmiş veyahut icara vermiş. Şimdi 
hükümet bu müveddea olan şahsa sen burada nasıl oturdun? Diye soracak. Şayet 
bir vesika ibraz edemiyecek olursa fuzuli tasarruf ediyorsun diye çıkaracak. 
Bundan bu anlaşılıyor. Halbuki hükümet bitaraftır. Hükümetin maksadı 
teşekkülü mazlumun hakkını zalimden almaktır. Böyle dava eden olmadan kendi 
kendine hükümetin varıp da sen burada ne suretle oturursun? Diye suale 
salahiyeti yoktur.” (...) TBMM April 20, 1922, 312. 
150 Hasip (Aksüyek) worked as a scribe in the court of first instance in Maraş. He was 
not elected to the TBMM again. See ibid., 48. 
151 TBMM April 20, 1922, 316.  
152 The final text can be found at www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.224.pdf. 
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abandoned property commissions that were formed all over western 
Anatolia at the end of the Greco-Turkish war.  
2.9  Conclusion  
It is possible to trace a radicalization of ideas throughout the debates 
analyzed here. The very first draft of the abandoned property bill still 
mentioned that owners might return. Hasan (Saka), the Minister of 
Finance in April 1921, still argued that not all Armenians were trai-
tors, and that it was indeed the job of court martials to convict those 
who were (and directly transfer their property rights to the treasury). 
This view was strongly opposed by many deputies, and in subsequent 
sessions, such a statement became utterly impossible. Armenians 
(and, increasingly, Greeks) came to be collectively seen as traitors. 
This was partly accomplished through narratives of warfare and be-
trayal (such as that of Greeks who would use rent incomes in order to 
buy bullets and kill Turkish soldiers), and partly through the depiction 
of legal proxies as criminals. Interestingly, this narrative also served to 
depict the treasury (which, admittedly, controlled large parts of the 
abandoned property) as utterly helpless in its own courts. 
This radicalization, however, was accompanied by a strong desire for 
legitimization. As one deputy put it, it was necessary to administrate 
abandoned property “in a lawful way that suits our current political 
situation.”153 Most deputies were not so much opposed to the law as 
they were uneasy about its legal validity, and therefore looking for a 
sound justification for the fact that most Armenian houses, fields and 
movable goods had already been taken over, both by individuals and 
by state institutions. This uneasiness was the reason why the bill was 
sent off to parliamentary commissions so often. Since both the consti-
tution and the şeriat-based civil code (mecelle) of the Ottoman Empire 
explicitly protected private property rights, it was out of the question 
to cite them as a possible source of justification for the bill. The 
makeshift constitution (teşkilat-ı esasiye kanunu) of January 1921 
 
153 “(B)unları meşru ve siyaseti hazırımıza yakışır bir surette idare etmeliyiz” Emir 
Paşa (Sivas), TBMM April 16, 1922, 218. 
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didnʼt help much either: The document explicitly stated that those 
provisions of the Ottoman constitution that did not violate the princi-
ples of national self-determination remained valid. It is therefore not 
surprising that the deputies made no reference to this document at all. 
Instead, some of them claimed that the şeriat (or rather, its interpreta-
tion by religious scholars) allowed for the dispossession of unruly 
non-Muslims. This idea testifies to the deeply religious nature of the 
national resistance movement in Anatolia, and to the persistence of 
pre-Tanzimat notions of an essentially unequal relationship between 
(ruling) Muslims and obeying non-Muslims. The narrative that de-
picted all non-Muslims as a collective of traitors who could never 
return clearly was rooted in this religious conception. “Rooted”, how-
ever, does not mean “in harmony” here: as several religious scholars 
pointed out in the debate, the radicals’ idea of a complete and irre-
versible end to cohabitation with non-Muslims was at odds with the 
concept of protected status (zimmet) for Christians and Jews, a status 
that the protected could return to if they decided to do so. The idea of 
a permanent end of cohabitation went, in other words, against the 
principles of Islamic law. It is remarkable that so many deputies even-
tually voted for a law that prestigious scholars such as Ömer Vehbi 
Efendi deemed unjust, and, indeed, un-Islamic. Their readiness to 
(eventually, after much back and forth) do so testifies to the enormous 
economic merits that were to be gained. Importantly, the last argu-
ment in favor of the law (which likely turned the tide for approval of 
the bill) used a hadis that referenced the will of the people as a source 
of legitimization. (“Whatever the people think is right is right”). This 
implied that the people (and hence, the deputies) could ignore legal 
opinions, as well as positive law, and work out their own idea of jus-
tice. By doing so, however, they took a conscious step away from the 
Ottoman legal and administrative framework, and towards a nation-
state based not only on national self-determination, but on the denial 
of all rights of its non-Muslim citizens.  
The abandoned property bill did not mention the dispossession of 
non-Muslims, but stipulated that the government would protect their 
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property. This regulation was certainly not intended to protect, but to 
channel wealth into Muslim hands. (It might, however, have helped 
to create a sense of legality among the deputies.) It is remarkable how 
openly they discussed the real objective behind the law, i.e., the full 
appropriation of non-Muslim property. The debate consistently dealt 
with both layers of the law: at times it was the actual text (custodian-
ship), at others its subtext of full dispossession. Many deputies openly 
admitted to this subtext, and it is this openness that makes the debate 
especially noteworthy.  
Especially during the earlier sections, when the bill for refugee hous-
ing was still on the agenda, deputies strongly opposed the govern-
ment’s efforts at monopolizing control over abandoned property. This 
opposition was informed by a deep distrust of public administrations, 
especially on a local level. It also was a response to the subtext of the 
law: the issue at hand was full appropriation - but by whom? The 
property rights of actual owners no longer mattered, but property 
could either be used for the public good (for refugee housing) or 
would go to waste (through corruption by state officials). Such state-
ments openly challenged the legitimacy of the Ankara government.  
The refugee housing bill eventually disappeared from the agenda, and 
attempts at bringing parts of it back into the abandoned property bill 
failed almost completely. Occupation of houses, which, as the refugee 
housing bill had made clear, was a widespread phenomenon (many 
people had rented abandoned houses from the government), came to 
be discussed as illegal occupation in the abandoned property law. In 
the final debate, no deputy made any serious attempt at questioning 
the illegality of such practices, and resistance was limited to a consid-
erable watering-down of the possible punishments for squatters. This 
gradual disappearance of the refugee issue might have been due to 
the relative increase in government power vis-à-vis the TBMM. How-
ever, the inherent conflict between state and nation was far from be-
ing solved at this point, and eventually re-appeared on the agenda 
when the looting of İzmir was discussed in November 1922. 
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3 Self-help, corruption, or theft? Debating 
practices of property appropriation in İzmir 
and western Anatolia, 1922–24 
3.1  İzmir, September 1922: destruction, death and exile  
During the last weeks and days of the Greco-Turkish war, when the 
remnants of the Greek army first retreated, and then fled towards the 
coast in western Anatolia, the local Greek Orthodox population fled 
with them, leaving behind almost everything they owned.1 The events 
of these last days of the war and the re-capture of İzmir became the 
subject of an extended debate in the TBMM in November 1922. Dis-
cussions focused especially on the whereabouts of movable property 
that the inhabitants had been forced to leave behind. 
According to the new Minister of Finance, Hasan Fehmi Bey, the 
advancing Turkish army was accompanied by three commission(s) for 
war spoils (ganaimi harbiye komisyonu) in charge of seizing these as-
sets. At first, however, “there was so much that the commission had 
to contend themselves with merely recording the booty.”2 Many vil-
lages and towns in the area were either burned to the ground or se-
verely damaged during the last weeks and days of the war. The towns 
of Manisa, Salihli and Kasaba were destroyed almost completely.3 The 
 
1 See Naimark, Flammender, 63–68.  
2 “Malumu âliniz ordu Uşak’tan Alaşehire doğru ilerlerken biz, üç tane ganaimi 
harbiye komisyonu gönderdik. Bunlar, üç kol üzerinden ganaimi tahrire başladılar. 
Fakat ganaim ilk hatta o kadar çoktu ki, bu yalnız tahrir ve tespit ile kaldı.” Hasan 
Fehmi Beyʼs declaration in the TBMM on November 29, 1922. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/GZC/d01/CILT03/gcz01003147.
pdf, 1137 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
3 These three towns appear frequently in various sources. The first mention that I 
have come across is in the declaration of Hasan Fehmi in the TBMM on Novem-
ber 27, 1922. 
182 
retreating Greek army forced both Rum and Muslim inhabitants to 
leave their houses and burned them down.4 According to a British 
report,  
Two British railway employees were caught with the 
rearguard of the troops occupying the Meander Valley, 
and accompanied them during their work of systematic 
devastation. Every village within sight of the railway line 
was burnt, and such inhabitants as failed to escape were 
slaughtered.5 
Other places were destroyed by Turkish troops as acts of revenge.6 
When the Turkish army entered İzmir, the city was packed with (not 
only Rum) refugees from the surrounding countryside. The military 
authorities seem to have been able to establish law and order relative-
ly easily. On September 13, a fire broke out in the Armenian quarter, 
spreading quickly to the Greek and “Frankish” (i.e., foreigners’) 
neighborhoods. During the three-day blaze, 75 percent of the city that 
had hitherto been known as “Infidel” İzmir (Gavur İzmir) were re-
duced to ashes. Only the Muslim and Jewish quarters and the north-
ern tip of the Christian area (the “Point”/Punta and Bella Vista neigh-
borhoods, which are today known as Alsancak) remained intact. 7 
                                                                                                                      
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c025/tbmm0102514
6.pdf, 97 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
4 “Sie erzählten alle dieselbe Geschichte und fluchten sogar auf die hellenischen 
Griechen. Jede Gruppe erzählte, sie hätten auf Anordnung des Metropoliten ihres 
Dorfes oder griechischen Befehlshabers ihre Häuser verlassen müssen. Sobald sie 
die Dörfer verlassen hatten, wurden sie niedergebrannt.” Kriegstagebuch der US-
Marineeinheit, Bericht von Aufklärungsoffizier Lt. A.S. Merill, 6. September 1922, 
AGUSA , Mikrofiche 337, cited in Naimark, Flammender, 63–64.  
5 Memorandum by Mr. Hole on Events in Smyrna, September 18, 1922, FO 371/ 
7949/ E 9883. 
6 See Arı, “Yunan”: 4. 
7 For an account of the fire, see Mansel, Levant, 211–33. On the fire and the politics 
of memory surrounding it to this day, see Biray Kolluoğlu-Kırlı, “The Play of 
Memory, Counter-Memory: Building İzmir on Smyrna’s Ashes,” New Perspectives 
on Turkey 26 (2002). 
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According to estimates, between 20,000 and 25,000 buildings (out of 
some 40,000) were destroyed. Estimates on the number of casualties 
of the fire (including people who were killed during the fire) range 
from 25,000 to 100,000.8  
To this day, the identity and objectives of the arsonists remain a sub-
ject of debate. Greek and Armenian authors have generally blamed 
the Turkish side, which in turn points to Armenian revolutionaries.9 
Those who blame the Turkish side generally point out that it was on 
this day that the wind started to blow away from the Muslim and Jew-
ish quarters, allowing Turkish arsonists to safely burn the Armenian, 
Greek and “Frankish” ones.10 The eye-witness reports archived by the 
British Foreign Office unanimously blame the Turkish side – howev-
er, they were classified due to concerns over the already tense rela-
tions with Turkey.11 Several reports claim that large numbers of the 
city’s Armenians were hunted down and killed both prior to and dur-
ing the fire. A British diplomat described the scene on the day before 
the fire:  
I visited the Armenian quarter on the morning of Tues-
day, 12th September. We found soldiers actively engaged 
in expelling occupants from houses, in removing loot by 
cart loads, and in the streets, and large number of bod-
ies already smelling very badly.12  
 
8 A British eyewitness estimated that 25,000 people had been killed during the fire: 
Report Hatkinson, September 20, 1922, FO 371/7898/E10382. Biray Kolluoğlu-
Kırlı, “Forgetting the Smyrna Fire,” History Workshop Journal 60 (2005): 31–32. 
9 Most prominently Marjorie Housepian, the author of a 1966 monograph on the 
fire: Marjorie Housepian, Smyrna 1922. The Destruction of a City (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1972). 
10 See Mansel, Levant, 215–20; Kontente, Smyrne, 773. 
11 In 1924, when British subjects sued their insurance companies for compensation 
of their losses in the fire, the FO would not allow access to these reports. Internal 
memos pointed out that, if published, they would jeopardize the good relations 
with the Turkish government,and would make it necessary to pull most qualified 
staff out of Turkey. See FO 371/10177. 
12 Memorandum Urquhart, Smyrna, November 29, FO 371/9108/E 620. 
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Few people saw actual arson, but many described what happened in 
the burning city:  
As an eyewitness, and as one of the last persons who got 
away, I am in a position to testify that the town was de-
liberately and systematically set on fire by the Turks – 
military and civilians – and not by the Armenians as the 
former now pretend. Incendiary bombs were freely used, 
and the soldiers, regulars and irregulars, as well as the 
Moslem population, which had been previously armed, 
drove the Christians who tried to escape from the burn-
ing houses, back into the flames. Machine guns, rifles 
and knives also played a prominent part, and the num-
ber of victims can be counted in the tens of thousands. 
Words fail me to depict the horrible scene.13 
One witness speculated that the Turkish authorities had ordered the 
arson in order to cover up the destruction and pillage that had taken 
place during the first few days.14 American and German reports, on 
the other hand, blame Armenian desperados or explain the fire as 
part of the torched earth policy of the retreating Greeks. However, 
these are second-hand reports, often based on hearsay and rumors: 
No tangible evidence establishing the identity of those 
who fired the city has as yet been unearthed by the 
Turks, but it seems to be the general belief in the for-
eign colony of the city that Smyrna was fired by the Ar-
menians and the Greeks, the Armenians being the more 
responsible of the two. Threats to burn the city were 
commonly made by both Armenians and Greeks before 
the evacuation of the Greek troops had been completet 
(sic) and there is little doubt that the Armenian revolu-
tionary committee did sponsor, and propably (sic) car-
ried into execution, a plan to destroy Smyrna in the 
event atrocities were committed upon them, thus nec-
 
13 Report P. Hadkinson, FO 371/7898/E 10382.  
14 Dr. Chambers, “The Tragedy of Smyrna,” FO 371/9108/E 3838. 
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cessitating that they flee from the country and abandon 
their property. Such atrocities were committed although 
not without provocation.15  
The fire left the surviving Armenians and Greeks of Smyrna, along 
with refugees from the surrounding countryside, with nowhere to 
go.16 For several days, they camped on the quays of the city, waiting 
for Allied ships to evacuate them to Greece. The Turkish nationalist 
government had made it clear that it would not allow them to return 
to their villages or to the city.17 The Muslim population was face to 
face with their misery for several days. Ahmet Emin Yalman later 
recalled:  
When we arrived at İzmir, we found the city up in 
flames and smoke. The retreating enemy had, as a final 
atrocity, put the city to fire. As a result, hundreds of 
thousands of traitors to the fatherland were now 
crammed together on the quays, living under the most 
deplorable conditions. These people had risen up 
against the country that had allowed them to live in 
peace and security for centuries. They had collaborated 
with the occupation forces. Now they had been ordered 
to leave the country as soon as possible. They had flood-
ed to the quays by the thousands. Now they were living 
in misery, waiting for the ships to take them away.18  
On September 24, the military commander of the Turkish army, 
Nureddin Paşa, issued a declaration in which he clarified that all 
Greeks and Armenians, including those nationalized by a foreign 
 
15 Report on the Smyrna fire, November 4, 1922: NARA, İzmir Consulate, box 0012, 
Smyrna fire.  
16 İzmir’s governor Rahmi Bey (as well as the presence of numerous foreign 
consulates and institutions) had protected most local Armenians from deportation 
in 1915. See Ahmet Mehmetefendioğlu, “Rahmi Bey’in İzmir Valiliği,” Çağdaş Tü-
rkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi 1, no. 3 (1993): 360.  
17 Naimark, Fires, 48–49. 
18 Ahmet Emin Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim (Istanbul: Yenilik, 
1970), 7–8. 
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country, would be treated as Ottoman subjects, and therefore had to 
leave until September 30. House searches would be made in order to 
find Greek soldiers and other armed men. 19 All merchandise and 
movable abandoned property in the city was seized for the needs of 
the Turkish army. The Turkish military treated all Greek men be-
tween the ages of 17 and 45 as prisoners of war.20 Anyone found in 
illegal possession of movable or immovable abandoned property (the-
oretically) faced ten years of hard labor and fines of up to five thou-
sand Lira.21  
Parliamentary minutes and Turkish newspapers of the relevant weeks 
contain only scattered and passing remarks about the fire.22 The ques-
tion of arson, no matter by whom, was not discussed, and the depu-
ties, who would usually blame the government for almost anything, 
never mentioned that the fire could have been fought. One deputy 
actually suggested on September 18 (when most of downtown was 
still smoldering) that the city be officially renamed “Beautiful İzmir” 
(Güzel İzmir). Neither this motion nor the chairman reading it out 
mentioned the fire.23 In the parliamentary minutes, the blast appears 
as a natural disaster. The newspaper Seda-yı Hakk depicted the fire in 
a similar way. On May 15, 1924, the fifth anniversary of the city’s 
occupation by Greek forces (which the paper dubbed “the greatest 
catastrophe”), it printed a picture of the burning city (photographed 
 
19 Declaration No. 5, in: Ahenk, September 18, 1922.  
20 The newspaper collection of the Milli Kütüphane in İzmir (now accessible at 
APİKAM) only contains a few of the issues of these very first days, and I therefore 
found only a few declarations. The British consulate sent translations of 
declarations no. 1, 5 and 6 to London: FO 371/10177/E 11677. 
21 An English translation of this document can be found in FO 371/7949, E 
9977/9024/44 confiscation of abandoned property in Smyrna, September 26, 1922. 
22 “İzmir’in kurtarıldığı günde yangından bahsedilmediği gibi, sonrasında da 
yangına genel olarak değinilir, geçilir.” Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke, 152. 
23 Edirne Mebusu Şeref Beyin İzmirin (Güzel İzmir) tesmiye hakkında teklif, 
September 18, 1922. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c023/tbmm0102310
4.pdf, 101 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
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from the safe distance of an Allied war ship in the harbor) on its front 
page. The text below the picture read “one of the results of the great 
catastrophe [the Greek occupation]: Beautiful İzmir on fire.”24 Curi-
ously, these photographs continue to be the only ones available. Pic-
tures showing what was happening inside the city and what ordinary 
residents must have witnessed are curiously unavailable. Subsequent 
reports on the anniversary of September 9 never even mentioned the 
fire. While the destruction caused by it was occasionally mentioned, 
contemporaries were, as a rule, eager to declare their indifference 
about the cityʼs lost glory, and to stress that the city would soon be 
much more beautiful than before. Remembering his return from 
Istanbul to İzmir, a young man declared in 1926:  
A while later, having been occupied so viciously, beauti-
ful İzmir was united with the homeland once again. 
And I returned to my homeland with tears of joy in my 
eyes. But – alas! The once flourishing [city] had turned 
into a bare skeleton. But what does it matter. The soil 
has stayed in place, hasnʼt it? This is all we need. If we 
work hard, – and hard working is going on indeed – we 
can make İzmir even more prosperous than it used to be. 
As Napoleon said: Nothing is impossible in the world.25 
My sources support Biray Kolluoğlu-Kırlı’s contention that the fire 
was essentially forgotten, or rather, that memories of it were sup-
 
24 Seda-yı Hakk, May 15, 1924. This is the only picture of the burning city I have 
come across in all local newspapers published in the 1920s. The only other picture 
(also taken off-shore) was published in a contemporary monograph on İzmir’s his-
tory, which also depicts the fire as a result of the Greek occupation: Raʾif Nezîh, 
İzmir Târiḫi (İzmir, ca. 1928). 
25 “Bir zaman sonra, alçakçasına gasp edilen güzel İzmir, tekrar özvatana ilhak edildi. 
Ve ben de sevinç gözyaşlarıyla vatana avdet ettim. Fakat heyhat! Zavallı mamur 
kadid bir iskelete dönmüşdü. Fakat ne ehemmiyeti var. Toprağı yerinde ya... bize 
de lazım olan o... Çalıştığımız takdirde, ki – mütemadiyyen çalışılıyor – İzmir’i 
eskisinden, daha mamur bir hale getirebiliriz. Napoleon’un dediği gibi: dünyada, 
olmaz, olmaz.” Kokaryalı H. Celal, “Azametli Madam” in: Ahenk, Aldığımız 
Cevaplar, January 21, 1926. 
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pressed. Moreover, it seems that contemporaries preferred to ignore 
the fire rather than blame anyone (including the Greek or Armenian 
population) for it. While foreign consular reports mention that the 
Turkish authorities blamed Armenians, there is a curious lack of such 
accusations in sources written for a Turkish-speaking audience. Ac-
counts such as that in Ahmet Emin (Yalman)’s autobiography (which, 
if briefly, mentions the fire) were written years and decades later. 
Forty years later, Yalman was able to find a justification for the misery 
of the non-Muslim Smyrniots. He was, however, unable to completely 
ignore their fate, which continued to make itself felt even to those 
living in the village-suburb Kokaryalı (present-day Güzelbahçe). Re-
membering the days and weeks following the İzmir fire, he wrote:  
At that time, nobody wanted to bathe in the sea because 
it was full of human bodies. Likewise, nobody so much 
as thought of eating the fish, which after all fed on hu-
man flesh. We shied away from fishing, even though we 
could see that the sea was so full of fish that one could 
have caught them with bare hands.26 
3.2  The fate of “abandoned property” in Smyrna/İzmir  
When Ahmet Emin (Yalman) came to İzmir in September 1922, most 
hotels were on fire. Despite this fact, finding a place to stay was very 
easy for him: 
General Mürsel Paşa, a friend of mine since my time in 
Malta,27 had been among the first to enter the city with 
his unit and was now central commander of the city. I 
went to see him and told him that I would stay in İzmir 
for a couple of weeks, asking for a place to stay. He saw 
 
26 “O sıralarda denizleri dolduran sayısız cesaretlerden dolayı denize girmek hatıra 
gelmediği gibi, insan etiyle beslenen balıkları yemeği de kimse istemiyordu. 
Denizde elle tutulacak kadar çok balık biriktiğini gördük, fakat bunları tutmaktan 
tiksiniyorduk.” Yalman, Yakın, 9–10. 
27 Yalman was among those Turkish nationalists who were deported to Malta by the 
British in 1920, but were exchanged against British POWs in 1921.  
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to it that I was given a villa in Kokaryalı (today known as 
Güzel Yalı). The house had been abandoned by fugitive 
Rum.28  
Forty years later, Ahmet Emin Yalman still marveled at the delicacies 
he found in the summer house assigned to him: 
The summer house had a huge basement, which con-
tained everything: great amounts of rice, flour, sugar, 
beans, bulgur, all kinds of pickles, jams, lots of beer, 
wine, sausages, meat, pastrami, eggs, pots full of white 
cheese, dried nuts and fruit. Since all shops were closed, 
all these were a great blessing for us.29 
If such amounts of food, especially expensive items such as meat, 
were a “blessing” for a middle-class city dweller like Yalman, they 
must have been treasure for the impoverished, hungry rural popula-
tion that now flowed into İzmir. Like any other movable property, 
food was supposed to be handled by the abandoned property commis-
sions. But unlike most other kinds, it had a real value for everybody. 
The other thing that was useful for almost everybody were houses.  
The military authorities divided the city into nine districts, each of 
which had a commission for abandoned property in charge of regis-
tering, gathering and storing anything movable: merchandise, furni-
ture, valuables and cash. From late October 1922 on, Muslim credi-
tors turned to the local courts in order to re-claim debts from those 
who had been killed or expelled. Local papers frequently published 
official declarations pertaining to such cases. For instance, on No-
vember 22, 1922, the office of the land registrar (defter-i hakani) an-
nounced that Kalliope, wife of Andon Sofiopolou, had been found to 
have “disappeared” (gaybubet ettiği), her current place of residence 
 
28 Yalman, Yakın, 9–10. 
29 “Evin alt katı baştan başa kilerdi. Burada bol miktarda pirinç, un, şeker, fasulya, 
bulgur, her türlü turşu, her türlü reçel, bir hayli bira, şarağ, sucuk, kavurma, 
pastırma, yumurta, tenekelerle beyaz peynir, kuru yemiş gibi herşey vardı. 
İzmir’de bütün dükkanlar kapalı olduğu için böyle çeşitli erzağa sahip olmak bir 
nimetti.” Ibid., 10. 
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being unknown. Rahime, daughter of Aydınzade Hacı Şaban Efendi, 
claimed to have lent her 2700 Liras, repayable within a year, in Sep-
tember 1334/1918. The declaration stated that Kalliope’s house would 
be sold in order to repay her debt unless the money was paid within a 
month.30 Numerous similar announcements were also published by 
the courts of commerce (ticaret hakimliği). It is impossible to establish 
to what extent the claims thus brought forward were legitimate. The 
central government certainly regarded them with suspicion. The Min-
ister of Finance Hasan Fehmi speculated that many of those docu-
ments presented as proof of outstanding debts were forged: 
Muslim merchants show us checks, claiming that so 
and so has disappeared, and that the checks have been 
written by these people to be cashed by the banks, or 
merchandise has been signed over to their [the Muslim 
merchants’] names. Well, are these fake or real? 31 
Local newspapers started to print announcements for auctions in 
November 1922. The administration of abandoned property in the 
Basmane district announced on November 15 that auctions would 
start in the following days, asking people to make their bid at its of-
fice.32 From 1923 on, announcements were made in the form of lists 
(frequently filling half a page), often for several houses located in the 
same street. These announcements, published either by the aban-
doned property administration of the respective district or by a city-
wide liquidation commission (tasfiye komisyonu), included the charac-
teristics of the house (dwelling, shop, storage room), its address or 
location, the estimated price, and the number of the district it was 
 
30 Ahenk, November 11, 1922.  
31 “İkincisi; islâm tüccarları bâzı çekler ibraz ediyorlar. Falan, falan tagayyübetmiş. 
Bu çekler, eşhas tarafından bankalar üzerine verilmiş veyahut birtakım çekler ve 
senedatı ticariye onların namına yazılmıştır. Ey bunlar, muvazaa mıdır, yoksa 
hakikat mıdır?” TBMM November 27, 1922. 
32 Ahenk, November 15, 1922, 3.  
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located in.33 These announcements were an important source of in-
come for local newspapers.34  
By late December 1922, the more prestigious houses had already been 
auctioned off, and prices were sky-rocketing: 
The anxiety of certain commercial and financial organi-
zations to install themselves in buildings commensurate 
with the dignity of the concern combined with the great 
scarcity of desirable locations, has caused some of the 
bids to assume exorbitant proportions.35 
Consular records show that the commissions went quickly about their 
business, evicting tenants of Greek- and Armenian-owned houses, 
often compelling them to leave most of their belongings behind to be 
looted. While looting and squatting were widespread, there are good 
reasons to believe that the authorities managed to get control of sub-
stantial numbers of houses, at least during the very first weeks. In a 
petition to the governor of İzmir dated October 3, 1922, (that is, less 
than a month after the city’s re-conquest) a certain Antoine Is-
saverdains explained his situation: he lived for rent in a flat in 
Cordelio/Karşıyaka (a suburb of İzmir across the bay that was spared 
from the fire), the owner of which was a Greek citizen. According to 
Issaverdainʼs account, a local administration of abandoned property 
had ordered him to evacuate the place. In his petition he asks the 
governor to allow him to stay and, instead of having to leave, pay rent 
to the administration.36 The attached Ottoman document indicates 
that the local authorities had asked him to evacuate the house so they 
would be able to auction it.37 It is very likely that many people wrote 
 
33 For instance, the announcements published in Türk Sesi, September 2, 1923.  
34 See Zeki Arıkan ed., Haydar Rüştü Öktem, Mütareke ve İşgal Anıları (Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu, 1991), 45. 
35 NARA, Izmir Consulate General, Box 0070, Confidential reports 1922-1924, A. 
Wallace Treat, December 28, 1922.  
36 PA AA İzmir 93/50, Grundbesitz Allgemeines, Petition Antoine Issaverdins to 
Vali Hussein Aziz Bey.  
37 Ibid.  
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similar requests to the governor. Unfortunately, only those letters that 
were forwarded to other parties (such as consulates, as in this case, or 
the Ministry of the Interior) are accessible for research. 
According to a British report, the eviction of tenants from houses 
whose owners had fled especially affected poor Jews, who were “ex-
ceedingly apprehensive of further trouble.”38 Such reports on the fate 
of poor Jews are rare, and it seems that the hatred once directed 
against Greeks and Armenians was quickly turned towards the last 
substantial non-Muslim minority. Both British and Turkish sources 
of the time exculpate the actual looters, instead blaming Jewish mer-
chants who supposedly bought most of the booty.39 The British vice-
Consul reported in October: 
The Jews remain so far unmolested, though at one time 
there were indications that they might be regarded as a 
convenient source of revenue. They themselves are 
nervous, and, in view of the stringent regulations 
against the possession of looted goods by anybody but 
the State, they feel insecure, especially with regard to 
their most recently acquired property. Their enterprise 
has been especially remarkable during the month of 
September. (…) they have succeeded in concentrating in 
their hands at small cost most of the remaining wealth 
in Smyrna.40 
The mass participation of Muslims in the plunder, just as the poverty 
of most Jews, was conveniently ignored.41 By December 1922, the 
 
38 FO 371/7951/ E 14145/9024/44 November 13, 1922. Smyrna diary of events at 
Smyrna, November 8–13. Commanding officer HMS Carysfort Sgd. A. Carpenter 
(Captain).  
39 “Yahudi almış, Mehmet almış, Ahmet almış yahudiye satmış.” TBMM November 
29 1922, 1140.  
40 FO 371/7949, E 11492/9024/44. 
41 Commenting on the Anti-Jewish utterances in this TBMM debate, Murat Koral-
türk has remarked that this tendency to blame others was rather typical for nation-
alists of the time. “The identity of culprits was usually not mentioned.” ((F)aillerin 
kimliği üzerine pek durulmaz) Koraltürk, Erken, 86. 
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Anti-Jewish agitation began to take effect. Several demonstrations of 
soldiers directed against Jews had taken place, causing those who 
could afford it to liquidate their property and leave for South America 
and Egypt.42 A British consular report written in 1924 estimated that 
only 15,000 out of 25,000 Smyrniote Jews remained.43 
Sales of abandoned property confiscated by the state took place under 
the aegis of the local authorities.44 The city had been re-taken at har-
vest-time, when great values were stored in the warehouses and cus-
toms depots of the city. Though major companies were hit by the fire 
(the carpet depot of the rug company OCM and the warehouse of the 
tobacco monopoly went up in smoke) the authorities were still able to 
seize huge amounts of merchandise.45 Minister of Finance Hasan 
Fehmi estimated that the tobacco seized in provincial warehouses of 
the tobacco monopoly alone amounted to four million kilograms.46 
The seizure of merchandise also affected foreign companies, who 
only by great efforts managed to get their property back.47 On October 
22, the British Vice-Consul Urquhart reported that there was “little 
security for property in the presence of owners, in their absence, 
none.”48 The sales of movable property continued in the next year. 
Ernst Glock, a German merchant resident in İzmir wrote to Germany 
in February 1923: 
 
42 Ibid. E 14491, Situation at Smyrna, December 6, 1922.  
43 FO 371/10195/E 8116. 
44 TBMM GCZ, November 29, 1922. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/GZC/d01/CILT03/gcz01003147.
pdf, 1133 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
45 Mansel, Levant, 216. 
46 Information provided by Hasan Fehmi in parliament, TBMM GCZ, November 29, 
1922, 1136. 
47 This, for instance, was the case with the British company C. Whittal, whose 
merchandise of a value of 300,000 T£ had been seized by the Turkish authorities. 
FO 371/7949, E9977/9024/44, Vice-Consul Urquhart to Sir Horace Rumbold, 
September 26, 1922.  
48 Ibid., report Urquhart, October 22, 1922.  
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[G]anz nach dem Beispiele unserer Feinde haben die 
Tuerken das ganze bewegliche und unbewegliche Ver-
moegen der Griechen und Armenier mit Beschlag be-
legt. Es finden taeglich im Bazare Auktionen statt, in 
denen die Warenbestaende der Angehoerigen dieser Na-
tionen in Aufstreiche verkauft werden.49 
A member of an old Levantine family actually managed to repurchase 
the Whitall and Lafontaine familiesʼ silver, which had been looted, in 
the bazaar – for “next to nothing.”50 Most of the assets that were loot-
ed or burnt in September 1922 must have been quite worthless for 
locals: İzmir was famous for its export-oriented trade in dried fruit, 
carpets, and tobacco, but also rarer things like liquorice root. The 
amounts stored in the warehouses must have greatly exceeded local 
demand. They were also cheap at home, and only expensive if export-
ed. With the exception of tobacco, which was sold by a monopoly, 
these goods were traded by numerous private companies, whose 
Greek and Armenian owners were lost for good along with their trad-
ing contacts abroad: the looters wouldnʼt have known who to sell 
these export goods to. Judging from dozens of letters that German 
importers of dried fruit wrote to the German consulate in İzmir in 
1922–23, it took some time to establish new contacts.51  
It may well be that one of the motifs behind the arson in September 
1922 (the fire was started in several locations all over İzmir) was dis-
appointment over such richness in things utterly useless to the looters. 
There were only three things among the abandoned property that 
were of real use for everybody, regardless of class and ethno-religious 
background: real estate, food, and money. It is the whereabouts and 
control over these three that were most fiercely debated in the after-
math of the fire.  
The subject of money was discussed extensively in the non-public 
session of the TBMM on November 29 which is analyzed in more 
 
49 Ernst Glock an Stadtpfarrer Stahl, Reutlingen, 25. Februar 1923, EZA [5]/[1965]. 
50 Ibid., 231. 
51 Akten Generalkonsulat Izmir, PA/AA Berlin.  
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detail below. The Turkish authorities had seized bank accounts and 
the contents of hard-boxes kept in İzmirʼs banks, and the deputies 
demanded to know what had happened to them. According to Hasan 
Fehmi Bey’s declaration, the Turkish authorities had not yet managed 
to open the safes, and the question how to open them was extensively 
discussed in the session. Among the seized bank accounts were many 
containing the money of Greek and foreign citizens. These accounts 
and safe-deposit boxes became the subject of prolonged diplomatic 
negotiations throughout the 1920s.52 Eventually, the contents of bank 
accounts owned by exchangeable people were the only kind of proper-
ty that the Turkish government agreed to restore with the Ankara 
Agreement of 1930.53  
3.3 İzmir’s looted wealth in parliament  
İzmirʼs conquest in September 1922 marks the definite victory of the 
Turkish nationalist army over the Greek one. One of its first effects in 
the realm of legislation was the TBMMʼs formal revocation of the 
cabinet decision (kararname) issued by the Istanbul government in 
January 1920, which had stipulated that the property of those deport-
ed in 1915 be given back to the rightful owners (or their surviving 
heirs). This happened on September 14, while İzmir was still burning. 
(The official reinstatement of the notorious liquidation law (tasfiye 
kanunu) followed only on April 15, 1923.) With peace negotiations on 
the horizon, the Ankara government was eager to do away with this 
regulation in order to make sure that surviving Armenians would not 
return and try to reclaim their property.54 Hasan (Saka Bey (deputy 
for Trabzon and Hasan Fehmiʼs predecessor as Minister of Finance) 
put this objective in a nutshell when he said: “Peace is around the 
corner. We need to clean up these kinds of things before we start to 
 
52 A detailed account of these can be found in Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 122. 
53 For a discussion of the Ankara Agreement, see chapter 4.2. 
54 See Akçam and Kurt, Spirit. 
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deal with the issue of peace.”55 As Minister of Finance Hasan Fehmi 
explained, the kararname “completely contradicts our laws and legal 
principles by granting a bunch of new rights to the deportees” and 
therefore needed to be refuted as soon as possible.56 Significantly, he 
presented the cabinet decision not as one that reinstated rights that 
had been taken away, but as one that granted new ones. He thus pre-
sented the deportation as an act that had permanently and irrevocably 
excluded the Armenians from the Ottoman legal and political sphere. 
The property owned by the Ottoman Greeks who had fled the advan-
cing Turkish army was, at least in theory, subject to the abandoned 
property law of 1922, and thus to state protection. The large-scale 
looting and sale of movable property that took place in September and 
October 1922 clearly contradicted the letter of this law, but, as the 
following analysis shows, not its spirit.  
The TBMM discussed the looting of İzmir extensively in late Novem-
ber 1922, in three consecutive sessions on November 25, 27, and 29, 
which offered the deputies an opportunity to reflect on the lawʼs ap-
plication in western Anatolia. Discussions concerning the cityʼs re-
conquest started much earlier, on September 11, when more than 70 
deputies suggested that, since the government machinery was not 
working yet, the TBMM send a commission to western Anatolia in 
order to restore law and order, punish those guilty of high treason, 
alleviate the populationʼs misery, settle legal disputes, settle refugees, 
rebuild destroyed buildings, and make sure that abandoned property 
be properly administered. 57  As several other deputies (such as 
Hüseyin Avni Bey and Vehbi Efendi, both of them lawyers who had 
 
55 “Sulh yakındır. Sulh mesailine başlamazdan evvel bu gibi şeyleri temizlemek 
lâzımdır.” TBMM September 14, 1922. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c023/tbmm0102310
2.pdf, 773 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
56 “Çünkü bu, bütün kavanin ve ahkamı esasiyemizi çiğneyerek, tehcir edilen eşhasa 
yeni bir takım hukuk bahşediyor.” TBMM September 14, 1922, 768. 
57 TBMM September 11, 1922: 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c022/ 
tbmm01022100.pdf, 209–10 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
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opposed the abandoned property law) were quick to point out, all 
these tasks were identical with those of the government, and a com-
mission performing them would effectively trespass into the govern-
mentʼs realm.58 This was true, yet most deputies felt that such a chal-
lenge was necessary because the government was not working yet, 
and simply not able to perform its duty. The declaration was, in other 
words, one of open mistrust. (On another note, the undersigning 
deputies might also have been trying to find an official reason for 
joining the unfolding gold-rush in İzmir.) As mentioned above, the 
İzmir fire was not discussed in parliament and largely ignored. The 
debate of November 25-29 was the first one dealing with its result: the 
vast destruction of wealth, and the question who exactly had looted 
the city.  
On November 25, Ragıp Bey (deputy for Kütahya) read out a letter 
which lamented that “all the assets that the government has seized 
and sealed are being wasted.” 59  The (unnamed) letter-writer gave 
several examples for systematic corruption that was taking place in 
western Anatolia, claiming that the members of abandoned property 
commissions helped themselves and others to wealth that had been 
seized in the name of the government:  
The looters collaborate with the chairmen and members 
of abandoned property commissions, paying a couple of 
hundred Liras, and taking out [from the depots] whatev-
er they please. People who know nothing of business 
give a couple of thousand to the commissions, open the 
depots and freely sell their contents, which are worth 
forty, fifty thousand. When this is reported and people 
 
58 “(B)u takrirde tadadolunan [sic, probably a misspelling of teʿdid) vazaifin cümlesi 
Hükümetin vazaifindendir. Binaenaleyh Hükümetin birçok vazaifi arasında bir de 
bu gibi şeylerde Hükümetin vazifesini işgal etmenin bir manası yoktur.” Vehbi 
Efendi (Konya), Ibid., 611. 
59 “Hükümetin tahtı temhire aldığı (...) mallar külliyen heder olmaktadır.” Letter 
read by Ragıp Bey, TBMM November 25, 1922, 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c025/tbmm0102514
5.pdf, 66 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
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start to complain, the government seals the depots again, 
which, now that their contents have been brought else-
where, only contain broken, worthless items. It seems 
that [the government] wants to deceive the people (...) 60 
The only way to stop this rampant corruption, the letter argued, was 
to send an Independence Tribunal (İstiklal Mahkemesi) to western 
Anatolia. This view was shared by a telegram jointly sent by six depu-
ties representing İzmir, Saruhan and Denizli, who described the theft 
of abandoned property as a “moral plague” (vebayi ahlakiye), and 
argued that only an Independence Tribunal would help to re-establish 
a strong government in the area. As quickly became clear, the majori-
ty of deputies were not willing to do so, but nevertheless wanted to 
discuss the cityʼs looting.  
Neither these calls for an Independence Tribunal nor the subsequent 
debate mention the actual owners of abandoned property – whose 
expulsion from İzmir had just been completed – anymore. Instead, 
they frame the ongoing plunder as a threat to the wealth of the Turk-
ish state and nation. The call for an Independence Tribunal implied 
that the theft and corruption surrounding the “administration” of 
abandoned property were a threat to governmental power that at least 
equaled such grave crimes as high treason and desertion, and there-
fore had to be fought with the same drastic means: “Independence 
Tribunals” were the court martials that the TBMM government used 
since 1920 in order to crush internal opposition in Anatolia. These 
 
60 “Yağma edilen mallar için yağmacılar üçer, beşer yüz lira vererek Emvali Metruke 
Komisyonu Reis ve heyetleriyle uzlaşıp yedlerindeki malları serbest olarak 
çıkarmaktadır. İçinde kırk beş, elli bin liralık mal olan bir mağazayı komisyona üç 
dört bin lira veren ve hiç sanattan anlamızan kimseler açıp içindeki malları serbest 
bir surette satmakta iken şiddetle ihbara vukubulması üzerine bu defa malları 
mağazadan aşırttıktan sonra içerisinde kalan çürük, çarık birkaç parça üzerine 
Hükümet tekrar mühür basıyor. Sanki bununla halkı aldatmak istiyor. (...)” 
TBMM November 25, 1922, 66.  
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courts were notorious for their arbitrariness, the absence of defenders, 
and their frequent use of the death penalty.61  
The TBMM did not send an Independence Tribunal to İzmir in 1922. 
Moreover, very much unlike a tribunal, parliamentarians almost uni-
versally abstained from naming culprits. As Murat Koraltürk has 
pointed out, the debate is characterized by a remarkable reluctance on 
the part of the deputies to mention names, and a tendency to blame 
the Jews as a group.62 Having said that, it is still worth dwelling more 
on the question what the deputies were actually discussing in this 
debate, and how the Antisemitism informing the debate fits into the 
larger picture, namely, the ongoing conflict between competing no-
tions of nation and state. In order to do so, this sub-chapter analyzes 
the different groups and people that were blamed, showing how such 
accusations helped to advocate certain notions of state, government 
and nation, and studying the relationship between those concepts. 
On November 27, Minister of Finance Hasan Fehmi Bey stated that 
the fire in İzmir had almost exclusively destroyed houses of non-
Muslims. This information, which was not questioned by the deputies, 
might explain why they didn’t criticize the authorities’ obvious failure 
at fighting the blaze itself. 63  The minister estimated the financial 
losses due to the fire at three hundred million gold Lira.64 (By contrast, 
 
61 Independence Tribunals were first mentioned in an annex to the “Law concerning 
deserters” (firariler hakkında kanun) issued on September 11, 1920. They were of-
ficially established with the “Law for Independence Tribunals” (Mehakimi İstiklal 
Kanunu) issued on July 31. 1922. While the first tribunals mostly tried deserters, 
those established in 1922 dealt with people accused of collaboration with the 
Greek occupation. See Çelik, “Milli”: 597–98. 
62 Koraltürk, Erken, 86. 
63 It is indeed curious that the fire was hardly ever mentioned in the parliamentary 
minutes of September and October 1922. The fire was either only mentioned in 
passing or completely ignored. Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke, 152. See TBMM Novem-
ber 27, 1922, 97. 
64 Cihan Duru, Kemal Turan and Abdurrahman Öngeoğlu, Atatürk Dönemi Maliye 
Politikası. Mondros’tan Cumhuriyet’e Mali ve Ekonomik Sorunlar (Ankara: TİSA, 
1982), 317. 
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the Ankara government’s official budget for 1922 amounted to 71 
million). Given this fantastic number, it is not surprising that the 
deputies were rather fascinated with İzmirʼs wealth, and very eager to 
know where the remains of that wealth had ended up. As for those 
houses that had escaped the fire, the minister reported that aban-
doned property commissions had taken up their work, placing refu-
gees in them, or renting them out by auction. Only small items had 
been taken to storehouses, while furniture was only registered and 
then left in the houses. Hasan Fehmi Bey stressed that the sale of 
houses had not even started yet. He also emphasized that the gov-
ernment machinery was still not functioning properly, and that his 
ministry was facing great difficulty finding capable staff: “We didn’t 
have enough staff, and we accepted whoever applied to us. The situa-
tion is so serious that we would pluck them from the trees – if only 
they grew on them.”65  
The subsequent debate took place against the background of a num-
ber of major successes in the international realm: the Greek army had 
not only been forced out of western Anatolia, but also of Thrace, and 
the Allies had officially invited the Ankara government to the upcom-
ing peace conference in Lausanne. The Istanbul government, which 
had also received an invitation to the conference, had effectively been 
deprived of power by the TBMM’s official abolishment of the sultan-
ate on November 1, 1922.66 This string of achievements on the inter-
national level made the Ankara government virtually immune against 
criticism in this realm. However, the debate that is analyzed here 
shows that awareness for domestic issues, and especially for those 
that questioned the government’s claim to unlimited sovereignty 
within the country, was increasing. The (ostensible) failure of the 
authorities to get hold of abandoned property in İzmir could be de-
 
65 “Memur yoktu. Her müracaat edeni aldık. Ağaçtan adamı ararcasına memur 
efendilere ihtiyaç vardır.” TBMM November 27, 1922, 98.  
66 For a detailed chronology of the events leading up to the abolishment of the sul-
tanate, see Faruk Alpkaya, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Kuruluşu (1923-1924) (Istanbul: 
İletişim, 1998), 22–40. 
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picted as such a sign of weakness, and used as a case in point to dis-
cuss changing perceptions about the relationship between nation and 
state, parliament and government. 
3.4  Who took part in the looting?  
The first two sessions on November 25 and 27, 1922 were open to the 
public and left many deputies unsatisfied. Expecting the really scan-
dalous information to come to light, they called for a non-public ses-
sion, which started on November 29. (As we shall see, this expectation 
was not fulfilled). The session started with a declaration by Minister 
of Finance Hasan Fehmi Bey who stated that “all classes of people” 
had taken part in the looting, and that it was impossible to detect the 
culprits. He depicted the looting as a natural result of three years of 
oppression and the precarious state of governmental authority in the 
city.67 He thus indirectly interpreted it as a legitimate act of revenge 
which the government was unable to control. When Ragıp Bey (who 
had started the debate by scandalizing the corruption of abandoned 
property commissions) mentioned that ordinary soldiers 
(Mehmetcikler) took part in the looting, and that much wealth had 
passed into their hands, his colleagues interrupted him with cries of: 
“Helal olsun!” (Good for them!”), and he agreed.68 Rather than elabo-
rate on the role of Muslim soldiers, he then blamed the Jews of İzmir. 
Ragıp Bey claimed that whatever had survived the fire had been “fin-
ished off within the first five days by a caravan of looters” whose par-
 
67 “(Ü)ç sene tazyik altında kalmış insanların üzerinden o tazyik kalkınca Hükümet 
makinası teessüs edinceye kadar bazı gayri tabii hareketlerin olmasını zaruri 
görüyorum. (...) İzmir’e girildiği vakitte İzmir’de eşyayı hafifeyi veyahut şu 
mağazadan bu mağazadan yangın esnasında veyahut yangından sonra eşya 
yağmasına iştirak edenlerin, birer birer adedini tespit etmek lâzım gelse bunun 
imkânı yoktur. Yalnız yağmaya iştirak eden her sunuf vardır. Bunu arz ettim. Her 
türlü halk vardır.” TBMM November 29, 1922, 1132, 1134. 
68 “Bu beş altı gün zarfında vuku-bulan yağmadan mehmetciklerin eline geçen 
miktarı ne olursa olsun (Helâl olsun sadaları.) Benden tarafı yerden göğe kadar 
helâl olsun.” TBMM November 29, 1922, 1137.  
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ticipants had “ranged from İzmir’s rabbis up to its richest Jews.”69 
Later on, he made a distinction between official war booty seized by 
the state (ganaimi harbiye) and looted goods (yağma edilen kısım). It 
seems that the first category was considered perfectly legitimate: the 
official government budget for 1922 lists harp ganimetleri (7000 Lira) 
as a regular part of state revenue.70 Ragıp Bey claimed that the war 
booty had initally been much bigger than that looted by civilians, but 
that it, too, had “ended up in the hands of the Jews.”71 He probably 
referred to the widespread belief that those willing to sell their booty 
had often only found Jews (supposedly the only group with enough 
cash at their disposal) as buyers. Shortly later, Minister of Finance 
Hasan Fehmi pointed out that “the Jew took, Mehmet took, Ahmet 
took and sold to the Jew.”72 Unlike Ragıp Bey, he thus admitted that 
many Muslims had participated in the looting. Şükrü Bey (deputy for 
Bolu) promptly admonished him “not to mention Mehmet and Ah-
met.”73  
 
69 Ibid. The transliterated text reads: “İzmir hamamlarından başlayarak en zengin 
Yahudilere varıncaya kadar” (“starting from the Turkish baths of İzmir and up to 
the richest Jews”). This makes no sense at all. “Hamam” is probably a misreading 
of ḫāḫām: rabbi.  
70  For the budget, see Ahmet Tekin, “Millî Mücadele Bütçeleri, Vergi Politikası ve 
Dış Yardımlar (1919-1923),” https://www.tarihtarih.com/?Syf=26&Syz=353941 
(accessed November 18, 2015). 
71  “Ganaimin çok büyük bir kısmı yahudilerin eline geçmiştir. Bu yağma edilen 
kısımdan çok büyük bir kısmı yahudilerin eline geçmiştir.” TBMM November 29, 
1922, 1137. 
72 “Yahudi almış, Mehmet almış, Ahmet almış yahudiye satmış.” Ibid. 1140. Note 
that “the” Jew is not given a cliché first name here – unlike “Mehmet” and “Ah-
met,” but also “Kevork” or “Yorgi” who usually embody Armenians and Greeks in 
nationalist narratives of the time. Critical theories of Antisemitism have argued 
that such depersonalization is a typical feature of modern Antisemitism, which 
tends to regard Jews as the universal, completely antagonistic or “third” Other. See 
Klaus Holz, “Der Jude. Dritter der Nationen,” in Die Figur des Dritten, ed. Eva Ess-
linger et al., 292–303 (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010). 
73 “Ahmeti, Mehmeti mevzubahis etmeyiniz.” TBMM GCZ, November 29, 1922, 
1140. 
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There was a great deal of controversy over the meaning of abandoned 
property – and in connection to this, the proper use of it. The Minister 
of Finance himself made rather contradictory statements in this re-
spect. On the one hand he openly admitted that the incomes generat-
ed from the booty would be used to pay for the costs of the war. On 
the other hand, he repeatedly reminded the deputies that his ministry 
merely administered abandoned property in place of the actual own-
ers, and could therefore not distribute it among the population. Some 
deputies challenged this idea by speaking of “state property” (emvali 
devlet) which was being “wasted” in İzmir. This led to an interesting 
dialogue:  
Hasan Fehmi Bey: “Yahya Galip Bey has asked: how will 
the state property be administered? It is not state proper-
ty, it is abandoned property.” – Yahya Galip Bey: “It is 
not abandoned property, they have all fled, it is state 
property.” – Hasan Fehmi Bey: “I beg your pardon. This 
is the law. The abandoned property law. It stipulates that 
it is to be administered in the name and for the benefit 
of the disappeared, and that the [income] is to be depos-
ited in the current accounts.” – Yahya Galip Bey: “It is 
not like that, it is not.”74 (Emphasis mine) 
As an active participant in the debate of the respective bill, Yahya 
Galip Bey was familiar with the abandoned property law. He knew the 
legal term, but provided his interpretation of its actual meaning by 
speaking of “state property”. His irritation and his insistence that it 
was “not like this” was probably a result of his familiarity with the 
practices of the abandoned property commissions, which were indeed 
selling non-Muslim assets in order to generate revenue for the state. 
 
74 “Yahya Galip Bey buyurdular ki, emvali metruke nasıl idare edilecek? Emvali 
Devlet değildir, Emvali Metrukedir. Yahya Galip Bey: Emvali metruke değildir, on-
lar hep kaçmıştır, emvali Devlettir. Hasan Fehmi Bey: Müsaade buyurunuz. Emva-
li metruke için elimizdeki kanun budur. Emvali metruke kanunu. Tegayyüp eden 
eşhas nam ve hesabına idare olunup açılacak hesabı carisine irat kaydetmekten 
ibarettir.” (Emphasis mine) ibid., 1139. 
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Yahya Galip Bey knew that there was a discrepancy between the word-
ing of the law and its subtext, and he was irritated by the ministers’ 
reluctance to openly admit this. Shortly later, he challenged the minis-
ter even further by speaking of “national property ” (emvali millettir), 
adding that “the property of those who have committed treason can-
not be abandoned property.”75  
In his first statement, Yahya Galip (Kargı) argued that non-Muslim 
property had de facto become state property (“they have all fled, it is 
state property”). The term “national property,” however, implied that 
not the state, but the nation was the rightful owner, and that there 
was a difference between the two. This statement posed a challenge to 
the state itself – a challenge that at that very time also translated into 
popular practices of squatting and appropriation. Yahya Galip Beyʼs 
use of the term “national property” (emvali millet) indicates that he 
considered it the right of the (Muslim) people, rather than the gov-
ernment, to seize and use non-Muslim property. Unlike “abandoned 
property”, which (at least on paper) implied the idea of legal represen-
tation of actual owners, this term was based on direct, full ownership 
– not by the state, but the (Muslim-Turkish) nation.  
3.5  The identity of squatters 
Corruption by the hands of officials and army officers was frequently 
mentioned in the course of the debate. A deputy for Mardin, İbrahim 
Bey76 asked the Minister of Finance whether it was true that “quite a 
number of fellow deputies” had “moved into houses [in İzmir] with all 
their furniture” and were still occupying them.77 Avoiding a direct 
 
75 Hasan Fehmi Bey: “Efendim bu bir isimdir. Bu mal emvali metrukedendir, mali 
mağsup mali mesruk olarak... Yahya Galip Bey: Emvali metruke değil emvali mil-
lettir. Mademki ihanet etmiş mülkü emvali metruke olamaz.” TBMM November 
29, 1140.  
76 İbrahim Bey (Turhan)ʼs professional background was in the financial administra-
tion. See TBMM Albümü, 50. 
77 “Sonra birçok mebus arkadaşlarımız mobilyesiyle beraber evlere girmiş ve şimdiye 
kadar o evlere tasarruf ediyorlar, bu da doğru mudur? Bunları soruyorum.” TBMM 
November 29, 1134. 
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answer to the question, Hasan Fehmi Bey replied that five thousand 
houses (i.e. about a fourth of the remaining buildings in İzmir proper) 
had been occupied illegally.78 Neither he nor other speakers men-
tioned any squattersʼ names, and indeed carefully avoided to do so. 
After continued demands of fellow deputies to actually name the 
culprits, Ragıp Bey finally exclaimed: 
Gentlemen, you want to hear names? It is ten thousand 
people. Their names do not enter the assembly. Go and find 
out for yourselves, it is ten thousand people. Their names 
do not enter the assembly-room. What use would there be in 
mentioning names? It is all out in the open, go and find 
out. Who? What do you mean, who is it? (...) Gentlemen, 
it is the İzmir governor, the head of the financial admin-
istration, the chairmen of the [abandoned property] 
commissions, their members, all of them.79 (Emphasis 
mine) 
Ragıp Bey’s reluctance to mention names and his statement that the 
names would “not enter the assembly-room” indicate that he was 
pointing to an unspoken rule that organized the ongoing debate. He 
might have been protecting friends (or powerful adversaries) among 
the deputies who themselves had profited from the looting and had 
seized houses (he might also himself have been one of them). As long 
as no names were mentioned, the looting of İzmir could be used to 
(quite literally) read the riot act to the government, and strengthen the 
assembly’s position towards it. The deputies did not intend to take 
any real action against looters and squatters. The only squatter that 
was named was a certain Şerefeddin, the aide-de-camp of Kâzım Paşa 
 
78 TBMM November 29, 1922, 1134. 
79 “Efendiler isim mi istiyorsunuz? On bin kişidir. İsimleri Meclisin içine sığmaz. 
Siz tespit ediniz on bin kişidir. Giden siz tespit edin. İsimleri Meclisinizin salo-
nuna sığmaz. İsimler demek ne demektir? Mesele meydandadır, gidin tespit edin. 
Kimlerdir? Ne demek kimlerdir? (…) Efendim, İzmir Valisi, İzmir Defterdarı, Mü-
fettiş, komisyon azaları, komisyon kâtipleri, hepsi, bütün bunlar...”. Ibid., 1138. 
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(Özalp), then Minister of National Defence. Reşat Bey80 (deputy for 
Saruhan and chairman of the parliamentary budget commission) 
asked Kâzım Paşa (Özalp) whether it was true that the officer had 
illegally occupied a house on the first Kordon in İzmir which had been 
assigned to the Ministry of Finance. Kâzım Paşa answered in great 
detail, admitting that the officer in question, having been on leave at 
the time, had indeed placed his mother in the building, but complete-
ly of his own accord. Kâzım Paşa himself claimed to have placed two 
guards in front of the house, thus forcing his officer to return it. (He 
did, however, not mention any disciplinary action against his aide-de-
camp). By asking about this story, Reşat not only indicated that there 
had been a conflict between army and government, but one within the 
government itself. Kâzım Paşa tried to counter this view on the inci-
dent, emphasizing that his actions had been in harmony with those of 
the civil authorities, and that similar cases of disorder within the army 
would be fought with the same vigor. However, he made one small 
remark that got his fellow minister in trouble: unlike Reşat Bey, who 
had spoken of “a house assigned to the Ministry of Finance,” Kâzım 
Paşa said that the “Minister of Finance had occupied the house.”81 
 
80 Reşat Bey (Kayalıoğlu), 1881-1926, worked at the Agricultural Bank and at the 
Ministry of Finance in Ottoman times. He was chairman of the society for the de-
fense of rights in Saruhan and participated in the War of Independence. Between 
1922 and 1923, he served as Minister of Public Works. See TBMM Albümü, 55. 
81 “Efendim, Muhterem arkadaşımız Reşat Beyin beyanatı arasında benim yaverimin 
de İzmir’de bir ev işgal ettiğini beyan buyurdular. Ben bu meseleye muttali oldum. 
O vakit yaverim mezunen İzmir’de bulunuyordu. Maliye Vekili Beyefendinin 
mukaddema Kordonda işgal ettikleri binaya hakikaten, validesini koymuş ve 
demiş ki; bu evi ben işgal edeceğim. Bundan haberdar olan kolordu kumandanı – 
kî ben orada iken katî emirler vermiştim, böyle hotbehot ve işgal etmek muvafık 
değildir demiştim -Kolordu kumandanı bundan haberdar oluyor ve kapıya iki 
nöbetçi koymuş, benim yaverim gelip eve girmek istediği zaman kendisini içeriye 
girmekten nöbetçiler menetmişlerdir. O da içeriden validesini almağa mecbur 
olmuştur. Yani kendisi kimsenin haberi olmaksızın orayı işgal etmiş, fakat yine 
Hükümet ve oranın kumandanı benden aldığı emir üzerine benim yaverimi içeri-
ye sokmamıştır. Bu böyle olduğu gibi diğerlerine de böyle muamele yapılacağın-
dan emin olabilirsiniz. Yani ciheti askeriye ordunun asayiş ve inzibatını ihlâl ede-
 207 
This little detail later compelled Hasan Fehmi Bey to explain at length 
that he had only stay house for two days, and that, far from being 
occupied by himself or his Ministry, it had indeed served as a gov-
ernment guest house.82 
Hasan Fehmi Bey mentioned early on during the non-public session 
that he had suggested that the assembly send a court martial (İstiklal 
Mahkemesi) to İzmir before – and that the deputies had renounced the 
idea. The deputies showed no reaction at all. Ragıp Bey again sug-
gested this measure later on: 
Those who have collaborated with the Greeks during 
their time [the occupation] neither put a thought to the 
government nor do they fear anyone. [Cries of: “Like 
what?”] Gentlemen, the situation is out of control. These 
people have gotten used to the lack of any capable gov-
ernment, and they don’t think that one will ever be es-
tablished. Therefore, they do not fear anybody. There is 
no fear. [Cries of: “Praise to God”]. It is always done like 
this. None of our governments has ever succeeded at es-
tablishing order, gaining power, or building institutions 
that work properly. There is only one cure to this, and 
this will be the first and last time for me to suggest it: 
sending an Independence Tribunal there. You can be 
sure that even the announcement of such a court will do 
the job even before the court members take off [for 
İzmir].83 
                                                                                                                      
cek her türlü intizamsızlığı ref edecek şiddetli tedbirler ittihaz etmektedir.” 
TBMM November 29, 1922, 1142. 
82 “Maliye vekaletine tahsis edilmiş ev yoktur. Bendeniz bir iki gün otelde kaldım, 
sonra o eve naklettim. (...) Yani bir misafirhanedir, o da Hükümetin tahtı 
emrindedir.” Ibid. 1143. 
83 “Yunanlılar zamanında Yunan’lılarla düşüp kalkan insanlar ne hükümet 
düşünüyor ve ne bir korkusu var. (Ne gibi sesleri). İdaresizlik var efendim, yani 
kafalarına koy muşlardır ki, şedidülicraat bir hükümet yoktur ve olamıyacaktır, 
diye hiç kimseden korkuları yoktur. Korku yoktur. (Elhamdülillah sesleri). Her 
muamele böyledir. Hiç bir idaremiz, intizam, şiddet, katiyen teessüs edememiştir. 
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By suggesting that the assembly send such a tribunal to İzmir, Ragıp 
Bey openly admitted to the role of violence and terror in the estab-
lishment of the present regime in Turkey. The comments of his fel-
low deputies (“praise to God”) indicate that they actually welcomed 
the lack of governmental control in the area, openly rejecting the idea 
to establish law and order by means of brutal force. They certainly did 
so because they were aware that not only “collaborators” and “traitors”, 
but many from their own ranks had had (and possibly were continu-
ing to have) their share in the booty. Ragıp Bey’s suggestion was ig-
nored. 
3.6  Conclusion 
The debate about İzmir’s looting in November 1922 can be read as a 
commentary to the application of the abandoned property law, which 
at this point was no longer criticized as such. Especially the non-
public part of the debate was remarkably different from those discus-
sions that had taken place prior to the Turkish victory: Non-Muslims 
were no longer considered in the debate, and the deputies were confi-
dent that they would not return again. The only speaker to mention 
rights of non-Muslim property owners was the Minister of Finance, 
who tried to uphold the fiction of custodian care – though not to actu-
ally protect the ownersʼ rights, but rather to fend off the deputiesʼ 
claims that the property was indeed owned by “the nation.” This con-
flict between popular claims and that of the government was much 
more pronounced than in the previous debate, and one deputy even 
went so far as to speak of “national property.” 
The debate was informed by an implicit distinction between legiti-
mate and illegitimate forms of looting. The former was performed 
either by the army or by poor, unpaid soldiers, with whom the depu-
ties clearly sympathized (“helal olsun”). The latter was looting per-
formed by Jews or rich people, two categories that were conflated here 
                                                                                                                      
Bunun yegâne çaresi – evvel ve ahir arz ettik – oralara bir istiklâl mahkemesi 
gönderilmesi. Emin olunuz bir istiklâl mahkemesi daha yola çıkmaksızın, bir bey-
anname ile tekmil bunların önünü alacaktır.” TBMM November 29, 1922, 1142. 
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– Jews were regarded as rich by definition, while rich Muslims were 
never mentioned. The distinction between these forms of appropria-
tion depended not on the identity of actual owners, but on that of the 
appropriating party. The second illegitimate form of appropriation 
was “corruption” (suiistimal). By using this term, the speakers implied 
that ownership of the property in question had already passed to the 
state. In this perspective, it was fine to take from non-Muslims, but 
not from the state.  
As frequently mentioned in the course of the debate, governmental 
authority in İzmir (as well as in western Anatolia in general) was still 
weak, and corruption, as well as squatting, ubiquitous. Some deputies 
openly welcomed this state of affairs, and the TBMM, despite repeat-
ed requests to this effect, did not send an Independence Tribunal to 
İzmir. It thus, in effect, refused to regard the theft and appropriation 
of non-Muslim property as high treason, even if that property was 
stolen from state coffers. 
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4  International agreements, national legislation, 
and the implemention in Turkey, 1923–45 
4.1  Negotiations in Lausanne  
Throughout the War of Independence, the Ankara government and 
its army were able to treat abandoned property without interference 
from abroad. The main challenge first to the passing and then to the 
implementation of the abandoned property law of April 1922 was the 
unruly TBMM, whose members openly sympathized with popular 
practices of squatting all over the country. Abandoned property, in 
other words, was treated as a domestic policy issue until late in 1922. 
The advent of the new peace conference in Lausanne changed the 
picture in important ways: Negotiations about a possible population 
exchange with Greece quite obviously concerned not only the people 
who had been killed or expelled, but also their property in Turkey, and 
the abandoned property question now gained an international dimen-
sion that the Ankara government had to consider. In order to under-
stand the politics of property compensation in Turkey from 1923 
onwards, it is therefore necessary to discuss the international legal 
framework, i.e., the negotiations at the peace conference in Lausanne, 
the stipulations of the exchange convention between Greece and Tur-
key, and the follow-up agreements signed by the Greek and Turkish 
governments in 1925, 1926, and 1930. As we shall see, these interna-
tional agreements were not necessarily implemented in Turkey. That 
said, they are nevertheless important for an understanding of the 
context in which domestic abandoned property policies took place. 
The governments of Greece, the Great National Assembly of Turkey1 
and the Allies had, at least in principle, already agreed on a Greek and 
 
1 Present-day Turkey had two governments in January 1923: The Turkish delegation 
at Lausanne represented the nationalist government in Ankara (officially known as 
the “Government of the Great National Assembly of Turkey”), which had been 
functioning since April 1920. The Republic was only proclaimed in October 1923, 
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Turkish population exchange before the Lausanne conference started 
in November 1921.2 The Turkish delegation came to Lausanne with a 
laundry list of fourteen principles for the negotiations, number nine 
of which simply stated: “Minorities: to be exchanged.”3 This clearly 
included the Ottoman Armenians (whether dead or alive), and was 
possibly aimed at a legalization of their dispossession similar to that 
later achieved for Rum property through the exchange convention.4 
The Ankara government at first insisted that İsmet (İnönü), the head 
of the Turkish delegation, negotiate an Armenian exchange, only 
abandoning the idea when İsmet Paşa pointed out that there was 
nobody at the conference to discuss the matter with.5 
As early as March 1922, when the fortunes of war in the Greco-
Turkish conflict were turning towards the Turkish side, the Ankara 
governmentʼs Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Kemal Bey, dis-
cussed the idea of a population exchange with his French and British 
colleagues in London. Upon his return to Ankara, he reported that 
“[f]or the Rum minority, I have proposed an exchange, and told them: 
we want a lasting peace, and in order to accomplish this, it is neces-
                                                                                                                      
at which point the Ottoman Empire formally ceased to exist. The imperial gov-
ernment in Istanbul, which had also been invited to the Lausanne conference, had 
accepted to be represented by the Ankara government at the Lausanne conference.  
2 Ladas, Exchange, 337; Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 81–82. 
3 “Ekalliyetler: Esas mübadeledir.” Cited in Ayhan Aktar, “Türk-Yunan Nüfus 
Mübadelesi’nin İlk Yılı: Eylül 1922– Eylül 1923,” in Yeniden Kurulan Yaşamlar. 
1923 Türk-Yunan Zorunlu Nüfus Mübadelesi, ed. Müfide Pekin, 41–84 (Istan-
bul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005), 48. The full list (in modern Turkish) can be 
found in Bilal N. Şimşir, Lozan Telgrafları: Türk Diplomatik Belgelerinde Lozan 
Barış Konferansı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990), ixv. 
4 This aspect of a population exchange, and the lack thereof in the Armenian case, 
has been pointed out by Polatel and Üngör: Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 11. 
5 “Yerli Ermenilerin Ermenistandaki Türklerle mübadelesini kimle görüşeyim?” 
Telegram No. 86, in: Şimşir, Lozan, 172. 
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sary to protect them from us and us from them.”6 Yusuf Kemal Bey 
explicitly mentioned the previous Ottoman-Greek and Ottoman-
Bulgarian agreements of 1913–14 and 1919, respectively.7 Both previ-
ous treaties, however, had paid lip service to the principle of voluntary 
migration. The idea to name a de facto compulsory exchange as such 
seems to have only come up in the course of the forced migration of 
the Ottoman Greeks in September and October 1922, and possibly as 
a result of the Turkish governmentʼs determination not to let them 
return.8  
Fridjof Nansen, the High Commissioner for Refugees of the freshly 
established League of Nations, gave an introductory presentation to 
the Lausanne conference on December 1, 1922. He acknowledged 
that “the displacement of populations of more than 1,000,000 people” 
and the subsequent task of “registering, valuing and liquidating their 
individual property which they abandon, and in securing to them the 
payment of their just claims to the value of this property” was one of 
“immense” difficulty.9 However, he argued that these difficulties were 
now smaller than they would have been before, and that “the reasons 
which make an exchange desirable” were “of greater force.”10 As a 
possible model for the task at hand, Nansen pointed towards the ex-
change of populations between Greece and Bulgaria that had been 
 
6 “Rum ekalliyetleri için mübadele esasini teklif ettim ve dedim ki: Biz, devamlı bir 
sulh istiyoruz ve bunun için bu suretle bizi onlardan, onları bizden emin kılmak-
tır.” cited in Aktar, “Türk-Yunan”, 43. 
7 Aktar, “Türk-Yunan”, 43. 
8 Ladas cites two letters to Nansen, the first by Venizelos dated October 13, in which 
Venizelos reportedly saw very clearly that the Turkish government would not allow 
the Rum refugees to return. The second letter was written by the TBMM repre-
sentative in Istanbul, Hamid Bey (Hasancan), and dated October 31. Hamid Bey 
informed Nansen that his instructions only allowed him to negotiate on the basis 
of a “total and enforced exchange of populations.” Ladas, Exchange, 336. 
9 H.M.S.O., Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923. Records of Pro-
ceedings and Draft Terms of Peace: Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majes-
ty (London: H.M.S.O., 1923), 114. 
10 Ibid., 115. 
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regulated in the peace treaty of Neuilly in 1919. He reported to have 
spoken to two neutral members of the commission in task of that 
exchange, who had both assured him that the technical aspects of 
such an endeavor were manageable. Moreover, he suggested that the 
details be left to be sorted out by a Mixed Commission, as had been 
done in the Greco-Bulgarian exchange.11 
Nansen pressed for a very quick implementation of the exchange, 
arguing that this would allow settlers to simply take over the fields 
that others had already left behind.12 In this view, which glossed over 
the existence of a native population only too eager to take what they 
considered their just share, he was not alone: apart from the Turkish 
delegates, who repeatedly pointed at the considerable war-related 
damage in Turkey, other delegates assumed that Greek abandoned 
property in Turkey was both easily available and patiently waiting to 
be settled by Muslims from Greece. It therefore comes as no surprise 
that the issue of property was, if ever, only mentioned as a question 
secondary to that of people: for instance, Lord Curzon stated that “it 
would be easier to secure payment for the property which people were 
obliged to leave behind them” if the exchange was compulsory. 13 
When the matter was first discussed, İsmet Paşa insisted that the 
Greeks of both Istanbul and İzmir be included in the exchange. 
Elefterios Venizelos strongly opposed the inclusion of the Istanbulites 
(who were largely in place), but not that of the Smyrniots (who had 
already been expelled), thus accepting the latterʼs fate.14 
The matter of the exchange of populations (along with those of civil 
hostages and prisoners of war) was referred to a sub-commission, 
whose president Montagna (the chief Italian delegate) submitted a 
report on January 10, 1923.15 According to this report, the members 
of the sub-commission had agreed on the quick release of prisoners 
 
11 H.M.S.O., Lausanne, 116. 
12 Ibid., 116. 
13 Ibid., 121. 
14 Ibid., 122–23. 
15 For the report, see H.M.S.O., Lausanne, 328–37. 
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of war, on the compulsory character of the exchange and the exemp-
tion of the Istanbulite Greeks and the Western Thracian Muslims. 
With respect to the property involved, they had decided that mixed 
commissions would be set up and “entrusted with the task of valuat-
ing property left behind on either side with a view to compensa-
tion.”16 The Greek and Bulgarian exchange convention is not men-
tioned in the report, and it is hardly possible to find out if it was taken 
as a model (as suggested by Nansen). What is clear, however, is that 
the sub-commission had agreed on a scheme quite different from that 
projected in the Greco-Bulgarian exchange convention, namely, on 
compensation with real estate rather than money or substitutes such 
as bonds: the report states that the commissions “shall be entrusted 
with the distribution of property and of all sums of money paid over 
to them among the persons entitled thereto.”17 The Greco-Bulgarian 
convention had clearly favored compensation with money: Article 10 
stipulates valuations to be performed by the mixed sub-commissions, 
and in presence of the owners or their representatives. Ownership of 
the real estate in question would pass to the respective government.18 
The government would then provide the mixed commission with the 
sums established, and the mixed commission would proceed to pay 
them to the exchangees.19 One may say that not the real estate itself, 
but only the values thereof were subject to the exchange between 
Bulgaria and Greece. The Greco-Turkish idea of compensation with 
property, however, involved a much more complicated procedure. 
From the perspective of the Turkish and Greek governments (both of 
 
16 Report Montagna, ibid., 332. 
17 Ibid., 332. 
18 “Le Gouvernement du pays ou la liquidation aura eu lieu, devra verser à la Com-
mission mixte, dans les conditions à fixer par celle-ci et pur être remis aux ayants 
droit, le montant de la valeur des biens immobiliers liquidés, qui resteront la pro-
priété dudit Gouvernement.” (Art. 10), cited in Ladas, Exchange, 741. 
19 Eventually, 90 percent of the compensations in Greece and Bulgaria were paid in 
bonds bearing an interest of 6 percent. In 1927, the bonds were sold at 50 to 75 
percent of their nominal value. See ibid., 323–24. 
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whom were in serious financial straits) this scheme probably looked 
attractive. They might have thought that compensation with land and 
houses would spare them the problem of having to find cash they did 
not have. Moreover, property compensation was clearly not deemed 
important enough to be discussed at length. Indeed, it seems that 
questions of property were hardly discussed at all, while those involv-
ing people were highly controversial. 20 When Montagna wrote his 
report, negotiations had come to a deadlock over the question of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul: the Turkish delegation demand-
ed that the patriarchate leave the city. This question continued to 
occupy the sub-commission throughout January 1923. It was finally 
settled with the Turkish delegation accepting that the patriarchate 
would stay in place.21 This decision made earlier attempts at establish-
ing a Turkish-Orthodox patriarchate for the Turkish-speaking inner 
Anatolian Karamanlides (a project that the Ankara government had 
pursued in order to keep them) redundant, and the Karamanlides 
were made part of the exchange.22  
The convention on a mutual and compulsory exchange of populations 
between Greece and Turkey was signed in Lausanne on January 30, 
1923. As part of the Lausanne treaty (signed six months later, on July 
24, 1923) which replaced the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, (and thus offi-
cially ended World War I for Turkey), the convention only came into 
force by August 6, 1924, following the Lausanne treaty’s ratification 
 
20 See Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 26. 
21 As a supranational institution, the patriarchate embodied the complete opposite of 
the Turkish nationalistsʼ claim to full Muslim sovereignty over Turkey. Moreover, 
the patriarchate had officially severed its ties with the Ottoman state in March 
1919 as a reaction to anti-Greek policies and to the Ottoman defeat in World War I. 
See Mango, Atatürk, 210. 
22 As early as 1921, the Ankara government made attempts at separating the Kara-
manlides from the patriarchate in Constantinople by establishing a “Turkish Or-
thodox” faith with its own patriarch. See Ramazan Tosun, Türk-Rum Nüfus 
Mübadelesi ve Kayseri’deki Rumlar (Niğde, 1998); Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 48. 
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by a sufficient number of signatory powers.23 Article 1 of the conven-
tion defines the groups subject to the exchange as “Turkish nationals 
of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of 
Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territo-
ry.”24 Apart from these, all “Greeks and Moslems” who had already 
left the respective territories since October 18, 1912 (i.e., the begin-
ning of the First Balkan War) were made part of the exchange (Art. 3). 
In Greece, this second group was actually bigger than the first: a 
Greek census counted 847,000 Asia Minor refugees in April 1923, 
months before the official movement of people started.25 It is much 
harder to come up with numbers for this group of early arrivals in 
Turkey: Scholars of Muslim forced migration have estimated that 
between 413,922 and 640,000 people migrated from Greek Macedonia 
and Thrace to Turkey between 1912 and 1914.26 However, it would be 
misleading to simply add this number to that of “official” exchangees: 
The number includes eastern Thrace, which was re-taken by Ottoman 
troops in 1913 and later became a part of modern Turkey, as well as 
western Thrace, whose population was exempted from the population 
exchange. Many of those who were counted as immigrants between 
1912 and 1914 are likely to have returned at some point, with those 
from Macedonia eventually migrating a second time in the course of 
the population exchange. Official statistics published in 1932 counted 
499,000 people as exchangees, i.e., 140,000 more than those who im-
migrated to Turkey after the Lausanne convention was signed.27 This 
 
23 After Turkey, Greece, Italy and Japan, Great Britain had ratified the contract on 
July 16, 1924. Ladas, Exchange, 501. 
24 “Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations,” in 
Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange be-
tween Greece and Turkey, ed. Renée Hirschon, 281–7 (New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 
2003), 281. 
25 Ladas, Exchange, 633. 
26 McCarthy, Death, 164, cited in Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 89. 
27 İskân tarihçesi (Istanbul: Hamit, 1932), 137. 
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means that about one in five exchangees had already arrived during 
the Balkan Wars.  
With respect to the exchangeesʼ property, the convention stipulates 
that “immovable property, whether rural or urban, belonging to emi-
grants (…) shall be liquidated” by a mixed commission to be set up 
(Art. 11 and 12).28 The agreement further states that “the emigrant 
shall in principle be entitled to receive in the country to which he 
emigrates, as representing the sums due to him, property of a value 
equal to and of the same nature as that which he has left behind.”29 
This rule marks a remarkable difference to the Greco-Bulgarian ex-
change agreement of 1919, which stipulates that the owners of im-
mobile property would be indemnified with money.30 According to 
Article 13 of the Greco-Turkish convention, sub-commissions were to 
be set up and given the task of appraising and liquidating the property, 
providing the emigrants with documents stating the value of their 
property in gold currency. The property would then remain at the 
disposal of the respective government (Art. 14). Property that had 
already been left behind was to be appraised as well (Art. 10). At the 
end of the process, one government was supposed to pay the differ-
ence thus calculated to the other in cash (unless the values turned out 
to be equal) (Art. 14). This last stipulation was possibly the most prob-
lematic of all because it created a strong incentive for both govern-
ments to delay, and possibly sabotage, the appraisal of exchangeable 
property: the convention clearly stated that full appraisal was a pre-
condition for the eventual calculation of all values involved.  
What may have sounded simple to the ears of the Lausanne delegates 
was in fact nothing short of a complete, individual appraisal of the 
property of two million people, about half of whom had already been 
forced to leave. The work projected in these few sentences was not 
 
28 “Convention”, 284. 
29 Ibid., 285. 
30 I have worked with the text of the 1919 convention published in Ladas, Exchange, 
739–43. 
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only one of Herculean dimensions, it was also outlined in a rather 
general way, leaving more questions than answers: According to 
which rules would property be appraised? How would pre-war values 
be compared to post-war ones? How would the compensation process 
work? These questions were left to the hands of the Mixed Commis-
sion, which was, in Article 11, given “full power to take the measures 
necessitated by the execution of the present Convention and to decide 
all questions to which this Convention may give rise.” The same arti-
cle states explicitly that the Commission “shall settle the methods to 
be followed as regards the emigration and liquidation mentioned 
above.”31 Along with the convention, a declaration (known as Declara-
tion No. IX) was signed, concerning the property of people who were 
not subject to the exchange, either because they already held the citi-
zenship of the respective other country (Greek citizens residing in 
Turkey, Ottoman citizens residing in Greece) or because they had 
emigrated prior to the beginning of the first Balkan War. This last 
rule was especially relevant for Muslim absentee landowners who had 
left Macedonia in 1911, when the province had been ceded to Greece, 
and whose property had been confiscated in 1922 (for refugee settle-
ment). According to declaration No. IX, both groups could (even in 
absentia) either reclaim their property or have it included in the ex-
change.32 The follow-up negotiations in the Mixed Commission over-
whelmingly dealt with the appraisal of this class of property, which 
concerned much fewer people than those included in the exchange 
proper. In Turkey, this group came to be known as “non-exchangees” 
(gayrimübadil). 
4.2  The Mixed Commission and follow-up negotiations  
In accordance with Article 11 of the convention, the Mixed Commis-
sion was staffed with four members each from Turkey and Greece, 
 
31 “Convention”, 284–85. 
32 Ladas, Exchange, 467. 
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plus three members from neutral countries. 33 It officially took up 
work on September 17, 1923, holding a first meeting in Athens on 
October 8.34 Upon insistence of the Turkish side, its headquarters 
were moved to Istanbul in June 1924, where they remained until the 
commissionʼs dissolution in 1934.35  
The work of the Mixed Commission with respect to the appraisal and 
liquidation of exchangeable property has been judged as an almost 
complete failure. What happened in both countries had very little if 
nothing to do with what the convention had prescribed.36 There is, 
however, some evidence that the commission initially, and by the 
judgment of some scholars, naïvely, tried to fulfill its obligations in 
that field. Article 13, which stipulated that exchangee property would 
be appraised and liquidated by local sub-commissions, was partly 
fulfilled: The Mixed Commission (henceforth: MC) set up sub-
commissions in the cities and towns of Thessaly and Macedonia, 
which proceeded to draw up inventories of exchangeable assets prior 
to their owner’s departure. Copies of these documents were given to 
the exchangees, who were supposed to bring them to Turkey in order 
to be indemnified there. These documents were known in Turkey as 
“application for property liquidation” (tasfiye talepname) or simply as 
“declaration/statement” (beyanname). According to a first generation 
exchangee, they were often filled in by the emigrants themselves.37 
Tevfik Rüştü Bey, the chairman of the Turkish delegation at the MC, 
 
33 The original members included Jean Papas, Alexander Pallis, Antonio Cal-
vocoressi, P. Canaginis for Greece, Tevfik Rüşdü, Hamid Bey [a typo: Hamdi Bey], 
Ihsan Bey, and Senieddin Bey. The neutral members were Erik Einar Ekstrand, of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Don Manuel Manrique de Lara, a Span-
ish general, and Karl Marius Widding, a Danish diplomat. Ibid., 354. 
34 Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 158. 
35 Ibid., 164. 
36 Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 176; Ladas, Exchange, 460. 
37 Tesal, “Azınlıkların”: 50. The article published in 1988 by his son was an abridged 
version of a memorandum Tesal had written in 1924. It contains a picture of 
Tesalʼs own liquidation document (tasfiye talepnamesi), which was drawn up by the 
sub-commission in Salonica.  
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made a similar declaration.38 An internal memo of the settlement 
office, however, does not repeat this accusation. It simply states that 
those beyannames issued in the province of Salonica would be subject 
to special scrutiny because they had been issued by the Greek gov-
ernment.39 The document does not give a reason for this distrust of 
Greek institutions, (there may have been practical or ideological rea-
sons). What is clear, however, is that documents issued by Ottoman 
authorities (often dating back as far as the 1860s) were regularly ac-
cepted.  
In 1923, a special section of the MC was set up in order to study pos-
sible appraisal schemes.40 One major problem was the comparison 
and calculation of pre-war against post-war values. According to the 
report of a first-generation exchangee (mübadil), this bureau suggest-
ed that present values of property should be estimated as 3.5–4 times 
those recorded in pre-war documents.41 In the summer of 1924, sev-
eral sub-commissions were sent to cities in Greece and Turkey in 
order to study the possibilities for an appraisal of exchangeable prop-
erty.42 It was probably in the course of these investigations that a sub-
commission declared its intention to start working in the land regis-
trar’s office in Istanbul, which reportedly held the Ottoman land rec-
ords for Anatolia and Macedonia. 43  In 1925, an agreement was 
reached on some general principles for property appraisal and a re-
spective report, which also recorded the diverging views of the Greek 
and Turkish delegations, was submitted to the central MC. This re-
port argued against individual appraisal, instead suggesting lump 
appraisals by district. The Greek and Turkish delegations all but ig-
 
38 Seda-yi Hakk, February 6, 1924. Cited in Arı, Büyük, 74. 
39 CA 272...13.79.03.06. 8 July 1926. 
40 Ladas, Exchange, 366; Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 160. 
41 Tesal, “Azınlıkların”: 50. 
42 Ladas, Exchange, 461. 
43 İleri, July 27, 1340 (1924), cited in Ercan Çelebi, “Mübadillerin Yunanistandaki 
Mal Kayıtları ve Muhtelit Mübadele Komisyonu Tasfiye Talepnameleri,” Çağdaş 
Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi 12 (2006): 43. 
222 
nored the report.44 This information supports Onur Yıldırım’s state-
ment that neither side was interested in an individual appraisal 
scheme: According to him, the Greek government did not wish to be 
disturbed in its ongoing land reform and refugee settlement in Mace-
donia, while the Turkish side simply insisted that the total value of 
Muslim property in Greece had been higher than that of Greek prop-
erty in Turkey. Yıldırım seems to insinuate that the Turkish govern-
ment did not wish to risk an appraisal that might have proved this 
contention wrong – and thus would have forced Turkey to pay.45  
Anxiety over possible payments aside – on a much more basic and 
practical level, the idea to appraise property after it had been taken 
over by new owners (be they governments or individual owners) 
would probably only have worked in times of peace. A contemporary 
observer noted that “the scheme would only work at a time when it is 
improbable that anyone would think of putting it into practice.”46 It is 
likely that the mutual disinterest of both governments in a detailed 
appraisal is related to their domestic concerns about possible com-
pensation claims and on an inherent contradiction between their 
national and international interests in this respect: on the interna-
tional level, a high, but general value of the property in the respective 
other country was desirable, as it would potentially force the other 
side to pay. On the national level, i.e., when it came to domestic com-
pensation policies, reliable data on individual values for abandoned 
property would have translated into hardly dismissible financial 
claims of refugees, and was hence not desirable for the respective 
government.  
 
44 Ladas, Exchange, 462. 
45 Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 163. 
46 C.B Eddy, Greece and the Greek Refugees (London: Allen and Unwin, 1931), 228, 
cited in Michael Barutcitski, “Lausanne Revisited: Population Exchanges in Inter-
national Law and Policy,” in Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compul-
sory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey, ed. Renée Hirschon, 23–38 
(New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2003), 33. 
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The most serious attempt at a comprehensive property appraisal was 
made after the Agreement of Athens in 1926. This document solely 
dealt with non-exchangeable property, which included many big es-
tates in Macedonia and Epirus. Their owners were absentee landlords, 
“most of them pashas of the Hamidian regime or their heirs” who 
had left Greece prior to the Balkan Wars.47 In 1927–28, a total of 
twelve appraisal committees was set up by the MC. Until June 1928, 
only some of these actually worked, and those who did were proceed-
ing painfully slowly. Out of the 14,000 Greek and 1500 Turkish claims 
that had been filed, only 1000 cases were processed. Progress was 
especially slow in Turkey, where a greater number of small estates 
had to be appraised.48 The Greek and Turkish experts on the appraisal 
committees often disagreed.49  
The Ankara Agreement of 1930 officially ended the exchange of popu-
lations (at least on the international level) and settled all pending 
questions between the two states. Possibly as a result of the largely 
unsuccessful experience with non-exchangeable property, the idea of 
appraisal was given up altogether, and the property rights of exchang-
ees were transferred to the government in which their assets were 
located. (According to the exchange convention, they would only have 
been transferred after the completion of the appraisal). Greece agreed 
to pay half a million pound sterling to Turkey (which had, however, 
already been paid in connection to the 1926 agreement, and were 
supposed to be used for the indemnification of non-exchangeable 
people).50  
 
47 R.C. Lindsay to Chamberlain, June 22, 1926, FO 371/11548/E 3931. 
48 Ladas, Exchange, 462. 
49 In Turkey, properties with a total value of 751,439£ (sterling) were recorded as 
undisputed appraisals, while 72,439 £ were recorded as disputed. In Greece, the 
experts disagreed in almost half the cases: 421,636£ of undisputed and 
398,160£ of disputed value were recorded. Ibid., 526. 
50 See League of Nations Treaty Series, “Greece and Turkey–Convention regarding 
the Final Settlement of the Questions resulting from the Application of the Treaty 
of Lausanne and of the Agreement of Athens relating to the Exchange of Popula-
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If the property rights of exchangees were only transferred to the gov-
ernments of Greece and Turkey in 1930, they must have remained with 
the actual owners up to that point. We do, however, know that both 
governments started to distribute abandoned property as early as 1924. 
Surprisingly, this point seems not to have occurred to any scholar of 
the exchange so far, and the development of the relevant laws issued 
between 1924 and 1930 has been ignored. Given the fact that aban-
doned property in Turkey was already seized, auctioned and sold by 
abandoned property commissions during World War I and the War of 
Independence, the question of legal ownership to abandoned property 
admittedly was a rather theoretical one already before the population 
exchange was negotiated. As mentioned in Chapter Two, Turkish 
legislation made it possible to liquidate the property of the deported in 
1915 and introduced the fiction of “custodian” care for abandoned 
property after 1921, thus igoring the ownership rights of actual own-
ers.  
For those people who received property before 1930, however, the 
question of continued ownership to abandoned property must have 
been a highly relevant one. If Turkey did not own the property in 
question, how could it possibly start to distribute it? (For the years 
1923–30, the question would be equally relevant for Greece). What 
was the legal status of people who received property that continued to 
be legally owned by someone else? As we shall see, Turkish legislators 
did indeed not grant full property rights to the exchangees and only 
gradually introduced full ownership rights to exchangeable Rum 
property.  
4.3  Preparations in Turkey, 1923-1924 
According to article 18 of the Lausanne convention, both govern-
ments were supposed to change their national laws “with a view to 
                                                                                                                      
tions. Signed at Ankara, June 10, 1930 [1930] LNTSer 277; 108 LNTS 233,” 
http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/1930/277.html (accessed January 12, 
2013). 
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ensuring the execution” of the exchange. Ankara was not only re-
markably slow in doing so, but at first ignored this rule. In April 1923, 
two months after the convention had been signed in Lausanne, the 
National Assembly (TBMM) passed a law (No. 333) that made the 
property of those (mostly Greek) people who had in the meantime 
“disappeared,” “fled”, migrated to Istanbul, to occupied areas or to 
foreign countries subject to the liquidation law of 1915, which had 
been issued during the Armenian Genocide.51 At this point the Lau-
sanne peace treaty had not been signed and the exchange convention 
had therefore not yet come into force.52 According to the exchange 
convention, these people’s property rights were supposed to be liqui-
dated under supervision of the Mixed Commission (which did not yet 
exist in April 1923). Instead, according to law number 333, they were 
to be liquidated by the Turkish abandoned property commissions and 
the sums obtained were to be put in custodian accounts (Art. 2). Arti-
cle 9 of the original law of 1915, which had stated that some classes of 
abandoned property may be used for distribution among refugees, 
was annulled (Art. 5). The exchange was hardly ever mentioned dur-
ing the debate on the bill, and those deputies who did mention it were 
quickly silenced. The importance of abandoned property for the set-
tlement of hundreds of thousands of refugees had either not sunk in 
yet or was regarded as unimportant.53  
This only changed towards the summer. In August 1923, the Istan-
bul-based newspaper İleri reported in detail on the stipulations of the 
 
51 The liquidation law of 1915 is discussed in chapter 1.6.4. 
52 Ahar Mahallere Nakledilen Eşhasın Emval ve Düyûn ve Matlûbat-ı Metrûkesi 
Hakkındaki 17 Zilkade 1333 ve 13 Eylül 1331 Tarihli Kanunu Muvakkatin Bazı 
Mevaddi ile 20 Nisan 1338 Tarihli Emval-i Metrûke Kanununu Muaddil Kanun, 
No. 333, 15.04.1339/1923. For the full text of the law, see Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 101–4, 
also http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.333.pdf (accessed July 21, 
2016). 
53 TBMM April 15, 1923: 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c029/ 
tbmm01029025.pdf, 173 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
226 
Lausanne convention and the efforts of the Greek government at 
setting up local commissions in major cities.54 It presented the up-
coming exchange as a matter of exceptional importance and urgency 
for which Turkey seemed ill-prepared. İleri pictured the exchangees as 
yet another group of hungry, desperate refugees who would have to 
be kept alive.55 An İzmir-based paper, on the other hand, warned that 
exchangees, unlike previous immigrants, would “not ask for charity, 
but claim their rights, and do so with force, leaving us no way to re-
fuse.”56 It thus depicted them as a threat to the economic interests of 
the existing population.  
On July 17, 1923, the Turkish council of ministers issued a regulation 
(talimatname) with first instructions for the implementation of the 
exchange – which, however, were limited to questions of linguistic 
and cultural assimilation. The settlement authorities were to see to it 
that no more than 20 percent of the people settled in a town or village 
spoke a “foreign language, practice[d] strange customs or belong[ed] 
to another race.”57 In an annex to the regulation, exchangees were 
 
54 Cited in Cahide Z. Aghatabay, Mübadelenin Mazlum Misafirleri. Mübadele ve 
Kamuoyu 1923-1930 (Istanbul: Bengi, 2007), 85. 
55 “Yunanistan kendi muhacirleri için oradaki Türklerin mallarını ve mülklerini 
müsadere etti, komisyonlarını, memurlarını tayin etti ve işe başladı. Cemiyet-i 
Akvam vasıtasıyla büyük bir borç anlaşması yaptı. Biz ise henüz yeni gözlerimizi 
açtık. Ciddi ve acil bir surette harekete geçip kaybolan vakti kazanalım. Çünkü 
artık idaresizlikten, sefaletten ve kırtasiyecilik yüzünden feda edecek nüfusumuz 
yoktur. Bir nüfus, bir insan, bir Türk ve İslam en kıymetli sermayemizdir, 
kuvvetimizdir, ümidimizdir. Bunun için herşeyden evvel gelecek muhacirlerimizi 
yaşatmağa, mesut etmeğe bakmalıyız.” Subhi Nuri, “Mübadelenin Tatbikinde Bazı 
Meseleler” in: İleri, August 8, 1923. Cited in: Aghatabay, Mübadelenin, 89. 
56 “Onlar merhamet-i umumiye, muavenet, lütuftan ziyade bir 'hak'ka istinat ede-
cekler ve bizden isteyeceklerini bu gayri kabil-i inkâr kuvvetle isteyecekler.” 
Dramalızade C.T. in Türk Sesi, August 1, 1339 (1923), cited in: Zeki Arıkan, İzmir 
Basınından Seçmeler (1923-1938): II. Cilt - II. Kitap, Kent kitaplığı dizisi 58 (İzmir: 
İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2008), 83. 
57 “Bir Türk kasaba veya köyünde lisan ve adeti başka diğer bir ırka mensup mu-
hacirinin miktarı yüzde yirmiyi asla tecavüz etmeyecektir.” Ahali Mübadelesi 
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loosely categorized as ‘tobacconists’ (tütüncü), grape/olive-growers 
(bağcı/zeytinci) and ‘agriculturalists’ (çiftçi, i.e. people growing food-
stuffs, especially grain) and assigned to settlement regions with 
matching climates. For İzmir, Manisa, Menteşe and Denizli, the 
scheme anticipated the settlement of 4,000 “tobacconists”, 20,000 
“agriculturists”, and 40,000 “grape/olive-growers.” 58  Occupational 
differences such as those between (absentee) landowners, sharecrop-
pers, subsistence farmers, but also people engaged in the production, 
manufacture and sale of these crops were ignored, as were those be-
tween rural and urban populations.59 The lack of precision in this 
plan met with severe criticism, especially in İzmir, where a “society 
for settlement and assistance” (iskan ve teavün cemiyeti) published a 
detailed alternative settlement scheme that contained a distinction 
between urban and rural populations, as well as broad occupational 
groups such as producers and traders.60 Abandoned property, howev-
er, was still not perceived as a problem connected to the exchange.  
The first law that linked both issues was the law establishing a special 
Ministry for the [population] Exchange, Reconstruction and Settle-
ment (mübadele, imar ve iskan vekaleti), which was issued in October 
1923.61 The ministry was put in charge of settling not only the ex-
changees coming from Greece, but all refugees who had arrived since 
1912, everybody who would be recognized as such in the future, as 
well as those who had lost their homes during the war. However, only 
exchangee (mübadil) refugees were declared eligible for temporary 
shelter and food supply upon their arrival in Turkey. According to §8 
of the relevant law, the ministry was empowered to demand, “in case 
of need, all abandoned property” in order to assign and hand it over 
                                                                                                                      
Hakkında Talimatname, 17 Temmuz/July 1339 (1923), cited in: Yıldırım, Diplo-
macy, 268. 
58 This iskan cetveli can be found in İskan Tarihçesi, 18. It is also cited in Yıldırım, 
Diplomacy, 141. 
59 Ibid., 140. 
60 Ibid., 142–43. 
61 For a detailed discussion of the ministry’s establishment, see Arı, Büyük, 22–24. 
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(tahsis ve tefviz) to external and internal refugees and people who were 
in need. The ministry was allowed to clear out abandoned property 
that was currently rented out or occupied by third parties.62 This was a 
major shift in priorities, which, at least in theory, marked the settling 
of new refugees as a priority over the housing needs of the existing 
population. The law further stated that if rents should not be paid as a 
result of evictions, the Ministry of Finance was to appraise the loss 
and balance it out of the custodian accounts.63 This provision shows 
that legislators anticipated conflicts between financial and settlement 
authorities over the use of abandoned property, and, in order to ap-
pease them, chose to make the absent owners pay rents for their own 
property, out of the custodian accounts that were supposedly kept in 
their name. The stipulation also suggests that rents had not been paid 
to the custodian accounts, but to the Ministry of Finance.  
As we shall see, it did indeed not take long for such arguments be-
tween financal and settlement authorities to arise. The post of Ex-
change Minister was offered to three candidates, all of whom declined 
the enormously difficult job.64 Eventually, Mustafa Necati (Uğural), a 
deputy for İzmir who had served on the Independence Tribunals of 
Sivas and Kastamonu in 1921 and 1922, could be persuaded to accept. 
Four and a half months later, the post was taken over by the later 
prime minister and president Celal Bayar (March to July 1924), who 
was followed by Refet (Canıtez) (July 1924 to November 1925). The 
overall performance of the ministry was a popular target of criticism 
in the Turkish press throughout this period.65 In October 1924, it 
became the subject of a general debate that took almost two weeks.66 
 
62 Mübadele, İmar ve İskan Kanunu No. 368, 8 Teşrinisani/November 1339/1923, 
Düstur, 3. Tertip: Cild 5 (Istanbul, 1931), 407–8. 
63 “İşbu tahliyeden feshi icar suretiyle mutazarrır olanlar bulunduğu surette Maliye 
vekâleti takdir olunacak zararı vâkıı mahakime müracaata hacet kalmaksızın em-
vali mezkûrenin hesabı carisinden tesviye edecektir.” Ibid. 
64 Henderson to Curzon, October 23, 1923, FO 371/9132/E 10557. 
65 For examples of such reports, see Aghatabay, Mübadelenin; Arı, Büyük. 
66 For a good overview of the debate, see Aktar, “Homogenising”. 
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A foreign observer later commented that Prime Minister İsmet Paşa 
had “diverted the opposition from a series of attacks piecemeal 
against certain of the more unpopular ministries.”67 As a result of this 
criticism, the ministry was abolished and its work taken over by the 
re-established directorate for settlement affairs (iskan müdürlüğü) at 
the Ministry of the Interior in late 1925. Most of the administrative 
documents that are discussed in Chapter Five were handled by or 
written at this directorate.  
The establishment of the Exchange Ministry and its endowment with 
far-reaching competences marked a major shift in priorities. The law 
regulating its functions did not yet contain specific regulations for the 
compensation of refugees, but such rules, and the significance of the 
exchange convention, now started to be discussed. During the debate 
on the exchange law (which outlined the tasks of his ministry), Ex-
change Minister Mustafa Necati Bey welcomed the idea of compensa-
tion for exchangees, expressing his hope that they would be better off 
than previous refugees, who “depended on government support for 
all eternity.”68 This idea of a new, privileged class of immigrants was 
strongly opposed in parliament. 18 deputies from the eastern Anatoli-
an provinces proposed an additional paragraph to the law. According 
to their draft, people whose property had been destroyed by the ene-
my, by the hands of rebels or in the course of government measures 
would be compensated out of what was left after the distribution to 
exchangees was completed. They demanded that these people be 
compensated in the same way as exchangees.69 The Minister of Fi-
 
67 Maxwell H. H. Macartney, “The New Opposition in Turkey,” The Fortnightly 
Review, no. 117 (1925): 786, cited in Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 173. 
68 “Memleketimizde böyle ilelebet iaşe olunur bir muhacirin sınıfı ihdas olun-
muştur.” TBMM November 1, 1923, 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d02/c003/tbmm0200304
6.pdf, 172.  
69 TBMM November 8, 1923, 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d02/c003/tbmm0200305
0.pdf, 304 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
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nance, Hasan Fehmi Bey70, dismissed this suggestion with reference 
to the exchange convention and the eventual balancing of accounts 
between Greece and Turkey: 
You seem to assume that the government will get this 
abandoned property for free? The government will be 
charged for it, and the total sum will be calculated. The 
government ending up with more will be in debt to the 
other. So, the Treasury doesn’t get [the property] for free 
at all, but [you demand] it to give it away for free.71 
It is not clear whether this statement was merely intended to silence 
the deputies’ demand, or an expression of serious concern over the 
possibility that Turkey might eventually have to pay. The minutes, 
however, show that the deputies indeed refrained from demanding 
Rum property, and from this point on, only demanded Armenian 
abandoned property, which, they argued, was not subject to the popu-
lation exchange (and mainly located in eastern Anatolia). The Minis-
ter of Finance first tried to reject this demand, claiming that there was 
“no such abandoned property”. The draft article was sent to the par-
liamentary commission for financial affairs, from where it re-
appeared as a separate bill for the compensation of local populations 
in April 1924.  
The debate of the exchange law in November 1923 marks the renewed 
distinction between Armenian and Greek property (which had already 
been made during World War I, but not during the War of Independ-
ence). Property distribution was now no longer discussed as a means 
 
70 Hasan Fehmi Bey had chaired the last and most important sessions in which the 
abandoned property law of 1922 was debated and eventually passed. See chapters 
2.7. and 2.8. He became Minister of Finance days after that debate and reported on 
the state of abandoned property in İzmir later; see chapter 3.3. 
71 “Zannolunur ki, bu bakaya emvali metruke Hükümete bedava kalacaktır? 
Hükümet bunlar için borçlanacaktır ve yekûn itibariyle mahsup muamelesi 
yapılacak. Hangi tarafta fazlalık kalırsa Hükümetler yekdiğerine karşı borçlanmış 
bulunacaklardır. Binaenaleyh Hazine bunu bedava almıyacak ki, bedava versin.” 
TBMM November 8, 1923, 304. 
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of relief, but of compensation. Many deputies clearly understood that 
the economic interests of exchangees would be at odds with those of 
the existing Muslim population and eagerly sought to secure the same 
privileges for the existing population. Such concerns appear to have 
been particularly strong in İzmir and the surrounding area: A petition 
submitted by three deputies (who declared to be voicing numerous 
complaints from their electoral districts in western Anatolia) in April 
1924 went so far as to suggest that İzmir be exempt from exchangee 
settlement altogether. They pointed out that “if the houses in which 
everybody lives today” were “cleared in order to settle refugees, a sec-
ond caravan of refugees numbering just as many people” would “be 
the result.” They argued that, rather than be evicted, the current in-
habitants should be allowed to stay. 72  Moreover, the deputies ex-
plained that the population of İzmir, which had already been suffer-
ing from a housing crisis, soaring rents and falling wages since the 
Balkan Wars, was now at a point where it could not take any more 
and started to be impatient with the government, which was doing 
nothing for them. Reminding the government of its duty to help the 
population and make laws accordingly, they indirectly suggested the 
possibility of open protest.73  
4.4  Squatting and resistance to exchangee settlement 
Illegal occupation of abandoned houses and fields was widespread 
long before the exchangeesʼ arrival in İzmir. Prior to 1924, however, it 
was perceived as a somewhat different problem than later, because it 
challenged financial interests of the state rather than refugee settle-
ment. Local abandoned property commissions had to locate and regis-
 
72 “İzmir’de herkesiñ elyevm iḳāmet ettikleri ḫāneleriñ taḥliyesi cihetine gidildiği 
taḳdirde İzmir’e gelecek muḥācir ḳadar ikinci bir ḳāfile-yi muḥācirīn peydā olması 
aşkāriye ṣūrette görülmektedir.” CA 130.10...06.37.19 (March 24, 1924). 
73 “İzmir’de kirânıñ arttığı ve maʿâşiyetiñ daraldığı ve temla? -i işârıñ ... şiddetiyle 
ḥüküm sürmesinden kimsede ḳudret-i taḥammülüye ḳalmadığı ve ḥükümeti 
cumhûriyetiñ bu ḥalḳa (...) siyânetini uzatmadıḳça (...)” Ibid. 
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ter houses, land and movable property before they could go about 
their task to auction them off, and their work was viewed with suspi-
cion by the local population. İzmirʼs newspapers vividly discussed 
“unnecessary occupation” (fuzuli işgal) in 1922 and 1923, often criti-
cizing (but never naming) people who had seized houses in order to 
enrich themselves.74 Taking sides with more destitute occupants of 
abandoned property, these texts also challenged the work of the aban-
doned property commissions. The local paper Ahenk reported in No-
vember 1922 that a group of refugees who were living in the neigh-
borhood of Tepecik75 in the Jewish quarter had complained about 
attempts at registering their houses as abandoned property. The re-
porter argued that the local councils of elders (heyet-i ihtiyariye) and 
the quarter headmen (muhtar) ought to be included in the process in 
order to prevent individual officials from taking arbitrary decisions: 
“No official should make inspections without a couple of local people 
being present.”76 In a similar manner, the newspaper claimed that 
abandoned property commissions, out of sheer ignorance of local 
conditions, were unable to distinguish between legitimate residents 
and squatters.77 Squatting clearly was a problem of governance, and 
the handling of it mirrored the stateʼs grip on society, which initially 
was rather weak. Over time, however, it was slowly tightened: In Jan-
uary 1923, the central government issued a regulation that allowed 
illegal occupants of abandoned property to legalize their status by 
paying rent. Only empty houses would be put on auction.78 This step 
 
74 See Arı, “Yunan.” 
75 Present-day Yenişehir. 
76 “Meʾmūrīn aʿidesi şübhelediği yerlerde taḥriyāt-ı icrāsında ḥaḳlıdır. Ancaḳ bu gibi 
taḥriyātıñ uṣūl ve niżāmı dairesinde ifāsı lāzım gelir. Maḥalle muḫtar ve heyet-i 
iḥtiyārisiniñdır. Bir ḳaç ḳişi bulunmadıḳça hiç bir meʾmūr şübhelediği bir ḫānede 
ḫodbeḫod taḥriyāt-ı icrā edemez ve maḥalle ḫalḳınıñ emvāl-ı metrūkeden olduğu-
na şehādet etmediği ufaḳ tefek eşyāyı da alamaz.” “Havadis-i Vilayet,” in: Ahenk, 
November 11, 1922. 
77 Ahenk, March 19, 1923, cited in Arı, “Yunan.”  
78 Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 242. 
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can be read both as an acknowledgment of the governmentʼs inability 
to evict every single squatter and as a step towards tighter state control. 
In a nutshell, it was a truce – a truce that was called into question 
once the first exchangees appeared on the scene, but nevertheless 
reverberated in many subsequent claims of local people.  
Despite the fact that the city was already affected by a severe housing 
crisis, İzmir (along with the surrounding province) was designated for 
settlement of 50,000 exchangees in the summer of 1923.79 The au-
thorities in İzmir now once again made plans for evictions, thus can-
celing the previous decision to let illegal occupants stay (which had 
only been taken in January 1923). This time, the forceful removal of 
inhabitants was no longer discussed as a prerequisite for auctions, but 
as a means of making room for the exchangees. In contrast to the 
earlier debate, criticism was now voiced less openly: Most articles no 
longer blamed the authorities for their plans, but for their failure to 
fulfill them. A reader of Ahenk remarked in October 1923 that a sub-
sequent order for the eviction of all illegal occupants had almost no 
effect and suggested that this failure was due to corruption.80 Even if 
they were relatively unsuccessful, it seems that government regula-
tions were taken seriously, causing people to fear the worst: Ahenk 
reported on November 23 on “information” (istihbarat) according to 
which all illegal occupants would soon be evicted in order to settle the 
exchangees. Moreover, those houses that were not inhabited illegally, 
i.e. by “officials, policemen, refugees, and others who have govern-
ment permission for staying there”, would still be inspected for their 
capacity to house even more people, every two current inhabitants 
would be entitled to share one room. All remaining rooms in houses 
would be used to accommodate exchangees.81 Several exchangee peti-
 
79 Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 149. 
80 Emin Ali, a combination of two very common names, literally means “trustworthy 
elevated”. This might be a veiled hint at a case of corruption that was too well 
known to require further explanation. Ahenk, October 14, 1923. 
81 “Aynı zamanda fużūli işgâl olmayıp memūrin, ẓâbıtân, muhâcirin vesaire gibi 
ḥükūmetçe ikâmetlerine müsâade edilmiş olan evleriñ de ne miḳdâr muhâcir isti-
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tions submitted over the following years indeed suggest that the au-
thorities eventually forced families to share houses with other families. 
Houses occupied by state officials were an especially delicate problem. 
As the Minister of Education İsmail Safa Bey himself pointed out in a 
petition that he sent from İzmir to the Prime Minister, the officials 
needed those houses in order to be able to do their job, because the 
housing crisis, combined with their low salaries, made it impossible 
for them to find any other affordable places to stay.82 The Prime Min-
istry simply forward the petition to the Minister for the Exchange, 
who, however, pointed out that the refugees’ legal right to settlement 
left no other option but to evict officials as well.83 The problem per-
sisted: Exchange Minister Mustafa Necati complained in March 1924 
that many refugees in the towns and villages of Turkey were still 
dwelling in mosques, while gendarmes, higher and lower state offi-
cials whose eviction he had repeatedly asked for before, continued to 
occupy abandoned houses.84 Necati’s staff depended on the coopera-
                                                                                                                      
aab edebileceği tesbît olunacaḳtır. İlaveten istiḫbârâtımıza göre her eviñ bir odası 
teneffüs için tefrik olunduḳtan soñra diğer odalarıñ her biri iki nüfusuñ (...) kâfi 
add olunacaḳ ve bir tedbir-i iḥtiyâtı olan bu suretten izdihâm (?) ve tekâlif 
vukuʿunda muhâcirinin istifâdesi temin edilecektir.” Ahenk, November 23, 1923. 
82 İzmir’de Maarif Vekili İsmail Safa, petition to the prime ministry CA 
130.10...123.876.15, (December 15, 1923), 3. It is noteworthy that he wrote not 
from Ankara, but from İzmir. He might either have been on a tour of inspection 
or have been illegally occupying an abandoned building himself (or both). In this 
respect, it is interesting to note that he had been Minister of the Interior in 1922, a 
post that would have made it easy for him to seize a house for himself.  
83 Ibid., 1.  
84 “Kaṣabalardaki emvāl-i metrūkeye aʿid ḫāneleriñ meşgūl bulunmasından dolayı 
mübādele ṣūretiyle gelmekte olan muḥācirlerden bir çoğunda iskān edilmeyerek 
camiʿi köşelerinde intiẓār edilmekte bulunmasında ve başta rüʾesā-yi meʾmūrīn-i 
mülkiye olduğu ḥālde meʾmūrīn ve żābıṭān ile polis ve jandarmanıñ emvāl-i 
metrūke ḫānelerinde iḳāmetleri fużūli işgāllara ḳarşı ḳaṭʿiyyetle ḥareketlerine icrā-
yi teʾsīr etmekte olmasına bināʾen meʾmūrīniñ iskānları altındaki ḫāneleri derḥāl 
taḥliye işleri ve aksi ḥālinde bulunacaklar ḥaḳḳında (...) daḫiliye vekāletine 
yazılmıştı.” Mustafa Necati to Prime Ministry, March 19, 1924, CA 
130.10.140.01.17.  
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tion of local law enforcement authorities, who seem to have been 
more than reluctant to help: the gendarmerie and police were not 
willing to evict themselves.  
It is likely that the houses and fields given to many exchangees via 
tefviz (preliminary distribution)85 were exactly the ones they had re-
ceived in the very first, rather chaotic distribution process. Those 
documents available to me, however, were produced whenever prob-
lems arose and only cover the first years of tefviz, i.e. 1925 to 1928. 
They were sent either from those neighborhoods and suburbs of 
İzmir that had been spared from the fire (most prominently from 
Karataş and Karşıyaka or from surrounding towns such as Urla and 
Söke). This considerable number of cases from surrounding areas 
may be explained by the fact that the majority of inhabitable aban-
doned houses were located outside of the city proper. But there was 
also another reason: it was exactly in these years that the authorities 
started to actually govern the places outside of İzmir proper, including 
villages such as Buca, Bornova and the suburb Karşıyaka, which were 
not yet part of the İzmir municipality. Illegal occupation of aban-
doned property was a massive challenge of the settlement policies 
during these early years. The administration, which had been able to 
draw up inventories of the abandoned property during or shortly after 
the re-conquest of the area, had completely lost track of the situation 
by 1925. As a settlement official pointed out in a report dated August 
6, 1925, the existing inventories of Greek and Armenian abandoned 
property had for various reasons “not been kept up to date, leading up 
to a situation in which the current condition of houses, as well as the 
identity of their occupants” were unknown.86 The report states that a 
completely new inventory of the approximately 10,000 abandoned 
 
85 This legal term and its implications are discussed in more depth later on.  
86 “Taṣfiye ḳomisyonlarınıñ defātirde tesbīt edilen Rūm ve Ermeni emvāl-ı 
metrūkesini (…) bugün ne vażʿiyette bulunduḳları ve kimler ṭarafından ne ṣūretle 
meşgūl olduḳları avāret-i inżibāṭı birçoḳ avāmil taḥt-ı (te...inde) mechūl olmuşdur. 
Bu mechūlāt devran-ı (...) devām etmektedir.” CA 272...10.02.14.01 (August 6, 
1925). 
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dwellings, as well as fruit orchards, gardens, vineyards and olive 
groves in the city of İzmir was necessary. The surrounding country-
side needed to be partitioned into five districts (probably following the 
scheme already applied in the city), and it was necessary to appoint 
“reasonable” and “serious” financial officials or gendarmes, “capable 
of establishing law and order” in each of these districts, where they 
would collaborate with the “refugee assistance committees.” 87  It 
needed to be made clear that anyone providing incorrect information 
would be subject to criminal charges and that any new attempt at 
illegal squatting would be followed by immediate eviction. Anyone 
who neither had a right to settlement (hakk-ı iskan) nor resident sta-
tus (mahal meriyeti) would be evicted, and the respective house would 
be handed over to those who were entitled to it. Whatever exceeded 
those rights would be given to the Treasury in order to be sold. Fol-
lowing the eviction of a house, it would be sealed by the officials. An-
yone who broke the seals and invaded the house needed to be report-
ed by local people or the council of elders to the nearest gendarmerie 
station. After that, they would immediately be thrown “out on the 
street” (derhal sokağa atılmakla beraber), and directly afterwards pun-
ished according to the law (hakklarında kanuni ceza müteakib olun-
malı). Those who occupied houses that had not yet been registered as 
abandoned property would be required to pay rent. The report closes 
with a time plan (two months) and a scheme for the payment of the 
officials.  
The document reads less like a plan and more like a description of 
popular squatting practices. By mentioning both insufficient registers 
and the necessity of immediate punishment, (lest people would not 
take orders seriously), the report hints at the interdependence of 
knowledge and power, and the miserable condition of an administra-
tion that lacked both. Indeed, the few available documents suggest 
 
87 “(B)ulunduḳları mınṭıḳanıñ żābıṭa ve māliye meʾmūrlarından muʿāvenet ve (...) ile 
çalışmaḳ üzere aklıbaşında ve bu bābda ḳavānin ve avāmiri ve (māʾmenetde?) cemʿ 
edebilecek ḳabiliyeti muḳtedir ciddî bir tesbit meʾmūru teʾmin edilmeli.” Ibid.  
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that it took years, rather than months, for the settlement agencies to 
gather the relevant information. A co-ed written in 1929 describes the 
situation between 1925 and 1927 as follows: 
A great part of the abandoned property is located here [in Buca, Bor-
nova and Karşıyaka]. When it was first recorded, nobody objected, and 
because of that it was occupied by people on a great scale. At that time, 
many houses, and in fact all houses were ownerless. The tefviz and 
temlik procedures had not really started yet, and the abandoned prop-
erty commission didn’t really care. But when estimates started to take 
shape, the tefviz and temlik procedures were started, triggering a flood 
of petitions. People who were allocated property in Karşıyaka, Borno-
va and Buca put great hopes in the procedure – in vain, as it turned 
out.88 
Abandoned property had been registered shortly after the end of the 
war in 1922 or 1923, but it had not been controlled by the administra-
tion, which preferred to turn a blind eye to widespread practices of 
unauthorized appropriation. The text suggests that the allocation of 
property, which started several years later, was in many cases a rather 
toothless administrative procedure, performed by authorities that 
were not in control of the property in question because the local popu-
lation did not obey their orders. A government unable to provide ref-
ugees with housing (which they were legally entitled to) certainly 
faced a severe loss of credibility, and thus, legitimacy. But apart from 
that, the allocation of property was much more than just a service 
provided to refugees: if performed successfully, it had the potential to 
provide the state with reliable data on the identity of property owners 
 
88 “Halbuki metruk mallardan mühim bir kısmı buradadır ve ilk tahrirde hiçbir 
taraftan itiraz görmediği için adam akıllı bunlar yüklenmiştir. O zaman birçok 
evler vehatta bütün evler sahipsizdi. Tefviz ve temlik muamelatı henüz yerinde 
sayıyordu. Metrük mallar müdürlüğü aldırış bile etmedi. Tahminler kat'i mahiyet 
aldıktan sonra vakta ki temlikler, tefvizler başladı, arkasından da istida tufanı 
başladı. Karşıyaka, Buca ve Bornova köylerinde ev temellük ve tefevvüz edenler bu 
son tadile bel bağlamışlardı, ümitleri boşuna çıktı.” Zeynel Besim: “İzmir küldür,” 
Hizmet, 29 Teşrinisani/November 1929, in: Arıkan, İzmir, 445.  
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and the value of the property in question and thus with the two sets of 
data indispensable for property taxation, which, in the absence of an 
income tax, was the most important tax in urban areas. It is therefore 
no coincidence that four different administrations (tax, agriculture, 
land/property registers, settlement) eventually cooperated in the allo-
cation process. 
4.5  Transport and settlement 
The transport and settlement of those Muslim exchangees who were 
still in Greece started in 1923. Until December 1924, 279,900 Muslim 
exchangees, about 11,000 of them from Crete, arrived in Turkey.89 
The immigrants, who soon came to be known as mübadil (exchangee), 
were mostly settled in the western and coastal parts of the country 
that had hitherto featured a high percentage of Rum inhabitants, in-
cluding İzmir. Ten settlement regions, often containing several prov-
inces, were earmarked for this purpose. For instance, the settlement 
region of “Samsun” covered the provinces of Sinop, Samsun, Ordu, 
Giresun, Trabzon, Gümüşhane, Amasya, Tokat and Çorum. 90  Ex-
change Minister Refet Bey declared in December 1924 that 73,502 
exchangees had been settled in Thrace, 62,564 in İzmir91, 38,564 in 
Karesi (Balıkesir), 38,076 in Samsun, 35,332 in Istanbul, 29,189 in 
Konya (which, as a settlement region, included Kayseri and Niğde, 
where the Greek Orthodox, but Turkish-speaking Karamanlides had 
lived), 26,578 in İzmit, 26,204 in Bursa, 20,856 in Adana,92 6,179 in 
 
89 Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 131. 
90 For a list of the settlement regions and the provinces they covered, see Arı, Büyük, 
53. 
91 The settlement region of İzmir included the provinces of Manisa, Aydın, Menteşe 
(present-day Muğla) and Afyon. See ibid. 
92 Adana covered Mersin, Silifke, Kozan, Antep and Maraş. Especially Adana, Antep 
and Maraş had been home to substantial Armenian populations prior to 1915. In 
those places, much of the property distributed to exchangees was indeed Armeni-
an. See Aslı E. Çomu, The Exchange of Populations and Adana, 1830– 1927 (Istan-
bul: Libra, 2011). 
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Antalya and 1,100 in Erzincan.93 By 1930, there were 90,000 exchang-
ees (possibly including Balkan War refugees) in the province of 
İzmir.94  
Upon their arrival in Turkey, exchangees were supposed to be quickly 
led to their settlement places. It was originally planned to only feed 
and shelter them for up to two months, after which period they were 
supposed to fend for themselves. This, however, turned out to be 
infeasible, and most exchangees remained dependent on government 
aid until September 1924.95 The provincial and local offices of the 
settlement ministry had only incomplete information on the villages 
and towns they were sending the exchangees to, and many ended up 
in places quite unsuitable for settlement. The British consul in İzmir 
commented that they were “greeted on arrival with tea and cake, 
speeches and flags, and then sent up country often to starve.”96 Those 
who stayed in the city and the surrounding towns “provided a wel-
come addition to the supply of labor.”97 Newspapers reported on high 
mortality among refugees, especially in Malaria-ridden lowlands.98  
4.6  Laws for property compensation: 1924 – 45  
Turkish settlement laws and administrative practice distinguished 
between mere assignment of land (or houses) (tahsis) and the subse-
quent granting of property rights. Assignment started right after the 
arrival of the exchangees, when the settlement authorities were strug-
gling to get a roof over every immigrantʼs head. At this point, they 
probably settled people wherever they could, not paying much atten-
tion to the value of the property in question. A comprehensive law for 
actual property compensation for exchangees was only issued in April 
 
93 The numbers are taken from İpek, Mübadele, 70. 
94 Anadolu, June 2, 1930, cited in Baran, Bir, 143. 
95 Arı, Büyük, 99. 
96 Edmonds to Lindsay, Exchange of populations: Position in western Anatolia. 
February 27, 1924. FO 371/10184/E 2119. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Haber, September 17, 1924, cited in Arı, Büyük, 151. 
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1924, four months after the first exchangees started to arrive in Tur-
key. Law no. 488 (whose details are discussed below) regulated a pro-
cedure known as tefviz, which only granted limited and revocable 
property rights. 99  These preliminary rights were either granted as 
compensation (in accordance with the documents that exchangees 
brought from Greece) or provided families with a bare minimum of 
land and housing. The latter procedure was known as default settle-
ment (iskan-ı adi).100 The application of this law continued until 1928, 
and even later legislation still required tefviz to be performed prior to 
the granting of more comprehensive rights. Earlier decisions for mere 
allocation had to be reviewed by special commissions, which often, 
but not always, gave people the houses they were already living in. 
The disputes I shall discuss here usually arose when the commissions 
revoked these decisions, asking people to leave houses they had al-
ready been living in for years. This happened especially in the years 
1925 and 1926.  
The next major law followed in 1928 with law no. 1331, which made it 
possible for exchangees to receive permanent property rights to hous-
es and land, including those they had already been given (or would be 
given) via tefviz. This second procedure was known as temlik (the 
process of granting private property rights, mülk), and law no. 1331 
was therefore often referred to as “granting as freehold law” (temlik 
kanunu). Subsequent legislation suggests that at least some exchang-
ees had to pay mortgages for land and houses they received from the 
settlement authorities: The provisions of law no. 1331 were further 
specified in law no. 1771, which was issued in 1931.101 It extensively 
discussed pending mortgage payments for land granted by tefviz, 
 
99 For a discussion of this term and its legal significance, see page 242. 
100 İpek, Mübadele, 135. These standards were spelled out in an annex to the 
subsequently passed law no. 1771, which, however, indicates that the procedure 
started earlier. See Mübadele ve teffiz (sic) işlerinin katʿi tasfiyesi ve intacı hakkın-
da kanun, in: Düstur, 3. Tertip: cild 12 (Ankara, 1931), 222–25. 
101 Mübadele ve teffiz (sic) işlerinin katʿi tasfiyesi ve intacı hakkında kanun, in: Düstur, 
3. Tertip: cild 12 (Ankara 1931), 222–25. 
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including land that had been assigned in the course of default settle-
ment (iskan-ı adi). The same law stipulated that open claims would be 
satisfied with bonds, which would be repayable over the coming years. 
The whole issue of compensation and final payment for government 
bonds was only clarified with a law issued in 1945 (no. 4796), which 
officially ended the population exchange in Turkey.102  
Although the idea of property compensation was introduced via the 
exchange agreement, the first law (no. 441) to frame distribution in 
this way was one that dealt with the compensation of locals. Parlia-
mentary resistance against the idea of a privileged status for exchang-
ees, which had already been manifest in November 1923, when the 
exchange law (mübadele kanunu) was issued, played an important role 
in shaping this law: The proposition of the 18 deputies who had de-
manded that Armenian property be reserved for local people in No-
vember 1923 reappeared from the financial commission on March 13, 
1924. It was issued as law number 441, which stipulated that all those 
who had lost property during the war would be given full property 
rights (temlik) to land out of “the property currently under control of 
the government which is owned by people not subject to the exchange.”103 
(Emphasis mine.) The law was the first to replace the war-time eu-
phemism for Armenians (“people deported to other places”) with one 
inspired by the population exchange (“people not subject to the ex-
change”). With regard to ownership, it openly stated that the property 
in question was indeed owned by these Armenians, and merely “un-
der control of the government” – which nevertheless transferred full 
 
102 Mübadele ve teffiz işlerinin kesin tasfiyesi hakkında kanun No 4796, July 10, 1945. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc027/
kanuntbmmc027/kanuntbmmc02704796.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
103 “Mübadeleye gayri tabi eşhasa ait olup Hükümet yedinde bulunan metruk emlâk 
ve arsa, düşman, usat ve hasbellüzum Hükümet tarafından hedim ve tahrip veya 
harp dolayısiyle ihrak edilmiş olan emlâk sahiplerine, muhtaç olanlar tercih 
edilmek şartiyle, zayiatlarının derecesi nisbetinde tevzi ve temlik olunur.” (§1)  
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc002/
kanuntbmmc002/kanuntbmmc00200441.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
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rights to it to people whose property had been destroyed during the 
war. The beneficiaries of this law were not framed as proxies of the 
real owners, but openly made owners themselves. The war-time mask 
of “custodian care” was taken down, and the state openly stole from 
Armenians (and mainland Greeks) in order to help the Muslim popu-
lation.  
A second law (no. 488) for the distribution of property to exchangees 
from Greece was issued on April 16, 1924, about a month following 
that for local people. While they are similar, the laws differ with re-
gard to the rights granted to their respective beneficiaries. Law no. 
441 for Armenian property stipulated that it would be distributed 
(tevzi) and that people would be given full property rights (temlik) for 
free – in accordance with their losses.104 Temlik involved the issuing 
of title deeds (tapu) and the right to freely alter, sell, or mortgage the 
assets in question, in short: full private property rights. The law for 
exchangees, on the other hand, did not mention the actual owners 
(Rum Greeks) at all and only granted limited usage rights (tefviz). The 
term goes back to pre-modern Ottoman land law: Prior to 1858, when 
the modern Ottoman Land Code was issued, tefviz was an administra-
tive procedure that transferred limited usage rights to state land (miri) 
to a person or several people while the actual title remained with the 
state.105 The law of 1924 apparently did the same, but with privately 
owned property.  
 
104 Temlik signifies the administrative act by which mülk rights were granted. The 
term can be traced back to the 16th century. At that time, the legal act of temlik es-
tablished freehold rights to state land (miri) or empty (mevāt) lands to especially 
loyal or deserving individuals. The land thus turned into freehold (mülk) and was 
officialy taken out of the state land records. See Halil İnalcık, “Land Possession 
Outside the Miri System,” in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: 
1300–1600, ed. Halil İnalcık, 120–31 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 120–22.  
105 Parallel to temlik (which established full property rights to mülk), tefviż traditional-
ly granted limited rights to miri land. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the actual title 
of the land stayed with the state. Over the course of the 19th century, notions of 
tefviż and tapu deeds issued for them underwent important changes. Tapu rights 
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Law no. 488 stated that the claims of the exchangees would be estab-
lished according to their documents of possession (tasarruf senedi) 
from Greece.106 However, they would only be given property of a val-
ue equal to 20 percent of those recorded in their documents. If it 
should later turn out that the exchangee’s claims did not match those 
of the allocated property, the law stipulated that property would either 
be taken back (istirdat, Art. 4) or the exchangee would have to pay rent 
for those parts he or she was not found eligible for. Up to the comple-
tion of the process, the recipients of property were not allowed to sell 
or mortgage it, nor to make any changes apart from minor mainte-
nance works (§7). People with claims of more than 50,000 Lira would 
only be considered after the completion of the process (§2). Exchang-
ees were only eligible for tefviz in the region they had been officially 
assigned to (§6). 
In an explanation which was read out in parliament prior to the dis-
cussion of the bill, the Prime Ministry declared that a preliminary 
distribution of property to exchangees had become necessary because 
people needed to settle down and start to make their own livelihoods. 
However, the appraisal and liquidation work of the Mixed Commis-
sion, which was supposed to establish the sum of all property subject 
to the population exchange, was not yet completed, and the govern-
ment did not know how much property was actually available for 
distribution. It was therefore declared that the proposed scheme was 
supposed to make sure that nobody would be left empty-handed until 
                                                                                                                      
were increasingly regarded as full property rights. See Minkov, “Ottoman”; Mundy 
and Smith, Governing. To the best of my knowledge, the only scholar of the popu-
lation exchange who has commented on the historical meaning of this term is 
Nedim İpek. He has, however, not attempted to establish the exact meaning in 
Republican times. See İpek, Mübadele, 135. 
106 Mübadeleye tâbi ahaliye verilecek emvali gayri menkule hakkında kanun, No. 488, 
16 Nisan/April 1340/1924: 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc002/
kanuntbmmc002/kanuntbmmc00200488.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
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more comprehensive data was available.107 As Celal Bayar Bey, the 
then Minister for the Exchange, pointed out, the government was of 
the opinion that the property left behind by Turks in Greece would 
turn out to be more valuable than that left behind by the Greeks in 
Turkey:  
I am not in a position to tell you the total value of the 
property left behind by our fellow Muslims in Greece. I 
have, however, had access to some general and some ra-
ther particular data, which, while it is not complete, in-
dicates that the property they have left behind in Greece 
is more valuable, and its total value greater, than that left 
behind by the Greeks here. We have accepted the 20 
percent rule on this basis.108  
Celal Bey (Bayar) was pointing at an important issue here. The total 
sum of property value involved in the exchange had not been estab-
lished yet, therefore, he argued, the compensation could not be per-
formed. This was correct in terms of article 14 of the exchange 
agreement, which prescribed that ownership of the property in ques-
tion would only be transferred to the respective government after the 
process of property liquidation was complete. This rule may indeed 
have been the reason for the difference in treatment of exchangees 
and non-exchangees: Armenian property was not subject to an inter-
national agreement and could therefore be distributed without inter-
ference from abroad. The ministerʼs statement suggests that, at this 
 
107 TBMM April 16, 1924, 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d02/c008/tbmm 
02008039.pdf, 784-85 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
108 “Rumeli’deki dindaşlarımızın bıraktığı emvalin kıymeti şudur diyebilecek bir 
mevkide değilim. Ancak, sureti umumiyede ve sureti hususiyede edinebildiğim 
bazı mütalâat ve malumat vardır ki, bunların katʿi olmadığını ifade etmekle be-
raber arz edebilirim ki herhalde Rumeli’den gelecek zevaddın memleketlerinde 
terk ettikleri mallar buradaki Rumların terk ettikleri maldan daha kıymetlidir ve 
kıymet itibariyle daha çoktur. Binaenaleyh bu esasa nazaran %20 nisbeti kabul 
ettik (...) " Ibid., 792. 
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point, plans for a full appraisal of exchangee property had not been 
given up, and that the government planned to transfer full property 
rights pending the completion of the Mixed Commissionʼs work. 
Exchangees therefore had reason to hope that they would eventually 
get more than the initial 20 percent. If the total value of property in 
Greece indeed turned out more valuable, they would also have reason 
to hope for monetary compensation out of the sum that the other side 
would have to pay.  
Celal Bayar also declared that the Mixed Commission had already 
collected 120,000 declarations of property (beyanname) which were 
currently “about to be checked.”109 Hasan Fehmi Bey, the Minister of 
Finance, severely criticized his colleague for his inability to come up 
with reliable data about abandoned property in Turkey. He also ob-
jected to the 20 percent rule: “[Let’s say] I leave behind property worth 
50,000 Lira, but you are only giving me 15,000. Such a law is totally 
inadequate.”110 This statement contradicted his own ministerial objec-
tives: It suggested that the state ought to give more abandoned prop-
erty to refugees (and thus keep less for the treasury). Hasan Fehmi 
Bey was possibly trying to blame his colleague rather than actually 
suggest a change in policy.  
Why were compensation laws designed the way they were? How did 
exchangees respond to the uncertainty that this legal framework cre-
ated for them? Was their situation different from that of other groups 
who received abandoned property? In order to answer these questions, 
it is important to consider the broader context of abandoned property 
distribution in early Republican Turkey. As will become clear in the 
following chapter, exchangees were but one group of beneficiaries, 
and their treatment was usually discussed along with that of others. 
 
109 “Şimdi aldığımız malumata göre Rumelide muhtelit mübadele heyetine verilmiş 
yüz yirmi bin tane beyanname vardırki bunlar tetkik olunmak üzeredir. Daha 
doğrusu tetkike başlanmak üzeredir.” Ibid. 
110 “Ben elli bin liralık mal terkedeceğim, bana 15 bin liralık mal vereceksiniz, bina 
enaleyh kâfi bir kanun değildir.” Ibid. 794. 
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The demands of local people (and their representatives in parliament) 
had important repercussions for the situation of exchangees, and for 
the legislation made for them. Moreover, it is possible to say that the 
distribution of abandoned property created direct relationships of 
dependency and indebtedness between the new state and vast num-
bers of its citizens. 
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5  The politics of property compensation in 
İzmir: 1924–34 
 
Günde bin istida bin tomar evrak 
Kimisi bağ ister, kimisi konak 
bıktım bu bitmeyen isteyişlerden  
İskan işlerini ikmal ede hak.1 
 
 
 
Münir Bey, the director of the settlement office in İzmir, published 
these lines in 1929. Though of questionable literary quality, his poem 
is interesting for showing that the settlement and compensation of 
exchangees, which had begun five years earlier, was far from accom-
plished by 1929. Only the physical transfer of the “exchangees” from 
one country to the other had been accomplished between 1922 and 
1924. The second, much more difficult task of property appraisal, 
distribution and compensation took much longer. Immigrants kept 
making demands for houses and other real estate, and the bureaucra-
cy, struggling to establish whether claims were legitimate or not, was 
drowning in red tape. On the international level, the exchange was 
officially completed in 1930, when the Greek and Turkish govern-
ments signed the Ankara Agreement. On the Turkish national level, 
the process of property compensation to exchangee immigrants con-
tinued well into the 1930s, and only officially ended with a law issued 
in 1945.2 Although the freehold law of 1928 made it possible for ex-
changees to get full and permanent property rights, it took more than 
another decade until this was accomplished for all of them. For İzmir, 
 
1 A thousand pledges a day, a thousand documents/ One wants a vineyard, the 
other a mansion/ I am sick of these never-ending claims/ Oh Lord, complete the 
settlement work! Cited in Baran, Bir, 151. 
2 Mübadele ve teffiz işlerinin kesin tasfiyesi hakkında kanun No 4796, July 10, 1945. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc027/
kanuntbmmc027/kanuntbmmc02704796.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
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we know that the tefviz commission had reviewed all relevant files by 
1930, and that many exchangees, unhappy with its decisions, chal-
lenged them in court.3  
Summing up several earlier studies, as well as his own research on 
the subject, Onur Yıldırım states that the Mixed Commission in Is-
tanbul (henceforth MC), which was officially in charge of property 
appraisal and indemnification, “was, one the whole, a failure.”4 Ra-
ther than the MC with its Greek, Turkish and international members, 
it was provincial and local settlement authorities that performed the 
task of property distribution and compensation in Turkey, often in 
ways that deviated greatly from the rules laid down in the exchange 
agreement. We already know that Turkish compensation policies 
largely failed to fulfill the expectations of most exchangees and were 
fiercely criticized in the contemporary press and parliament.5 Howev-
er, the details of distribution and compensation policies, as well as the 
reactions of individual exchanges to them, have hardly been studied.  
Those studies that do discuss shortcomings of the compensation 
process in Turkey usually explain them as a result of corruption, in-
complete information or lack of resources on the part of the govern-
ment. Implicitly, these apologetic explanations assume that the set-
tlement and compensation of exchangee immigrants was a top priori-
ty of the young Turkish nation-state, which, however, could not be 
performed properly due to structural reasons. 
This chapter offers a different explanation: Settlement and compensa-
tion were hampered not only by a lack of information, funds and 
corruption, but by their friction with a second top priority of the Turk-
ish state: revenue creation; or, more specifically, the desire to sell or 
rent out (rather than simply distribute) the property left behind by the 
Ottoman Greeks (Rum). The two objectives to settle refugees and 
create revenue for the state were initially irreconcilable with each 
 
3 See Baran, Bir, 136–38. 
4 See Yıldırım, Diplomacy, 176. 
5 For parliamentary criticism, see Aktar, “Homogenising”. Press reports are dis-
cussed in Arı, Büyük; Aghatabay, Mübadelenin. 
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other. They were also pursued by two different administrations: the 
settlement administration, which was a part of the Ministry of the 
Interior, and the Ministry of Finance. Both ministries’ local branches 
often worked against one another. The intrinsic conflict between rev-
enue creation and refugee settlement also sometimes surfaced on the 
national level, and most legislative changes that concerned refugee 
compensation were actually made in order to harmonize the two.  
Taking the city and province of İzmir as an example, this chapter 
contextualizes refugee compensation within the pre-existing politics 
of abandoned property in that area. The houses and fields left behind 
by the Greek and Ottoman Greek population had already been dis-
tributed in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars and squatted or sold in 
1922–23, and were therefore inhabited by local people (many of whom 
had only arrived a couple of years earlier as Balkan War refugees). 
Local commissions for abandoned property had been selling and 
renting these houses and fields since at least 1922. Their work cannot 
simply be regarded as a complicating factor in the settlement process. 
It is actually the other way around: the pre-existing politics of aban-
doned property (which continued after 1923) were complicated by the 
introduction of property compensation for exchangees. It is only 
against this background that the “failure” of the exchange can be 
properly understood.  
By considering claims of locals, refugees and different state bureau-
cracies, this chapter shows that the question of compensation con-
cerned not only so-called exchangees, but also other groups, which 
were at times quite successful in making claims for abandoned prop-
erty. It also demonstrates how both these conflicts and the inherent 
contradiction between refugee settlement and revenue creation were 
eventually reconciled – with a policy that is best described as com-
modification. The compensation policies that are studied here form 
an important site in which the principles of a state-controlled market 
economy based on private property rights were established in Turkey.  
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5.1  Property allocation (tefviz) from 1924 onwards  
By the spring of 1924, a distinct set of rules for the free distribution of 
Armenian (law no. 441) and temporary allocation of Greek abandoned 
property (law no. 488) had been re-established. Detailed rules for the 
allocation of property were laid down in a cabinet decision (kararname) 
issued in October 1924 which specified the application of law no. 
488.6 Unlike the law, which only mentioned the tasfiye talepnames 
brought from Greece, this decision listed various documents that 
would also be accepted in the compensation process, including tapu 
records dating from Ottoman times. Thirty percent of kıymetli (“with 
value”) and 40 percent of kıymetsiz (“without value”) Ottoman tapu 
records were accepted. (The distinction made here was probably one 
between tapu documents issued when real estate was sold – which 
therefore listed the purchase price – and ones issued for other reasons 
(inheritance, loss of older documents), which did not necessarily rec-
ord any information on values or only estimates for purposes of taxa-
tion.7 Tapu documents were apparently considered more trustworthy 
than those issued by the local mixed commissions back in Greece 
(these were called tasfiye talepname or beyanname, only 20 percent of 
the values recorded in them were accepted). For people who could 
produce no documents at all, the cabinet decision even stated that the 
testimony of trustworthy compatriots (kefaletname) would be accepted 
instead. According to the document, the maximum percentage of a 
property’s value back in Greece that could be granted with tefviz was 
50 percent.  
Tefviz (allocation) commissions were set up in all settlement regions 
to allocate property to the immigrants. Though they were also respon-
sible for the allocation of land and houses in the course of default 
 
6 Bazı muhacirine tasfiyei katiyeye değin icar mukabilinde emval ita ve bedeli 
icarinin tecili hakkındaki talimatnamenin meriyete vazʼına dair kararname, No. 
972, 8 Teşrinievvel 1340/ October 8, 1924, Düstur 3. Tertip, Cilt 5, Ankara 1948, 
658–62.  
7 I would like to thank the staff of the Tapu ve Kadastro Müdürlüğü in Selçuk/İzmir 
for offering this explanation (in January 2014). 
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settlement (iskan-i adi), the lionʼs share of their work certainly con-
cerned those exchangees who could claim more than the bare mini-
mum (and whose compensation therefore required much more pa-
perwork). The commissions received the applications of the exchang-
ees, scrutinized them, and, in accordance with the result, allocated 
houses and agricultural land to them. A tefviz commission was typi-
cally comprised of one member each from the settlement, tapu, agri-
cultural and financial administrations of a locality; its work concerned 
all these departments and required updates of all their records. The 
chairmanship was performed by the highest local civil official, i.e., 
either the district governor (kaymakam) or the provincial governor 
(vali), who usually sent a proxy. The allocation process in İzmir was 
painfully slow and only started in earnest after 1928. According to a 
report published in Anadolu, İzmir’s commission usually completed 
as little as four applications per session.8 Ahenk claimed (in Septem-
ber 1929) that only half of the 3000 tefviz applications from İzmir had 
been scrutinized.9 While contemporary newspapers usually suspected 
corruption or incompetence, it is more likely that the sheer number of 
documents that could be submitted in the process, and thus had to be 
scrutinized, overwhelmed the commissions. Those applications for 
property liquidation (tasfiye talepname) archived by the Mixed Com-
mission in Istanbul often contain a bewildering number of supple-
mentary documents, ranging from wills to purchase contracts, tapu 
and pious endowment records (vakfname), many of which were da-
ting back well into the 19th century. While the tasfiye talepnames and 
more recently issued tapu records were usually held in simple tabular 
form, other documents were of bewildering length and complexity. 
Applicants often owned only parts of certain assets, and it was com-
mon for people to list property that was registered in someone else’s 
name.10  
 
8 Cited in Baran, Bir, 130. 
9 Orhan Rahmi, “İskan,” cited in Arıkan, İzmir II/1, 79. 
10 Tasfiye talepnames are today (2015) accessible for research at the Republican Ar-
chives of the Prime Ministry’s Office (Cumhuriyet Arşivi) in Ankara.  
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The commissions were charged with establishing the value of an 
applicant’s claims (by calculating a certain percentage of the sums 
listed in their documents, depending on the kind of document pro-
vided). Exchangees could ask for a specific house, certain fields or 
gardens they wished to receive. The commissions then checked 
whether the value of the property in question matched the applicantʼs 
claims, and if not, found another, more appropriate piece of real es-
tate. A commission’s decision was then recorded in special registers 
(tefviz defterleri), as well as in the form of an official commission’s 
decision (komisyon kararı). This document was signed by all members 
of the commission. 
One of very few of these decisions that ended up in the archive of the 
settlement office was issued by the tefviz commission in Söke, a town 
in the province of Aydın about 100 km south of İzmir, on Janu-
ary/Kanunuevvel 2, 1926.11 This file consists of twelve pages, five of 
which contain correspondence between the central settlement office 
in Ankara and the provincial branch in Aydın. The remaining pages 
were produced by the tefviz commission in Söke and include not only 
the commissionʼs decision, but also a document in tabular form. The 
latter is organized in two parts, the first containing information on 
the applicants’ property in Greece, and the second on that allocated to 
them in Söke. The applicants were three exchanges from Florina in 
northern Greece: a certain Cavit Bey who worked as president of the 
local court of first instance (Asliye) in Söke, a woman named Nesmiye 
Hanım who might have been Cavit’s wife, and her father Eşref 
Efendi. 12  The threesome had produced kıymetsiz tapu records for 
“various buildings” and “various fields” in Florina (a town located 
close to the present-day border between Greece and the Republic of 
 
11  The late Ottoman province (vilayet) of Aydın was by 1914 comprised of the 
districts of Smyrna/İzmir (which was its administrative center), Saruhan (Manisa), 
Aydın, Menteşe (Muğla) and Denizli. These districts were re-organized as 
provinces in 1922. 
12 The relationship between the applicants is explained very differently later on in the 
file, as Nesmiye being Cavit’s daughter.  
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Macedonia). The total value of these properties is given as 2,235 Lira, 
40 percent or 894 Lira of which were accepted as claims. The tapu 
records for the party’s property dated from August 1336/1920 and had 
been confirmed by the local directorate of records and pious founda-
tions (kuyud-u vakfiye müdüriyeti) (it is not clear whether in Florina or 
Turkey). The second part of the document records the allocation of a 
house (value: 300 Lira) and a depot (value: 750 Lira) to the three ex-
changees. The values were given according to estimates from 
1328/1912. The buildings are further described as being located in the 
neighborhoods of Kemalpaşa and Uzunçarsı in Söke. The names of 
the former owners are given as “Avrankiha Kirini İstilya” for the 
house and “Aristides” for the depot. Both buildings had been regis-
tered in the tapu register in January 1280/1865 and August 1330/1913 
respectively. Further below, the difference between the total claim and 
the value of allocatable property was recorded as 156 Lira, for which 
the exchangees would have to pay rent.13  
5.2  Contested categories 
The ethno-religous identity of previous owners was usually men-
tioned in the documents dealing with property distribution. Laws 
issued from 1924 onwards re-affirmed the principle that Rum aban-
doned property ought to be used for the settlement and (preliminary) 
compensation of exchangees, while all other (i.e. Armenian, mainland 
Greek, and possibly Jewish) property could be used for the satisfac-
tion of other groups’ claims. This principle, however, was often called 
into question. Mehmet Şevki of Ahenk wrote in May 1924: 
The problem is quite simple, isn’t it? Yorgi deprives 
Mehmet of everything, he takes over his property, and in 
the end, he sets it on fire. When he flees, he thus leaves 
Mehmet home- and shelterless. Later, Mehmet does not 
 
13 CA 272...13.79.06.01, 5.  
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get the smallest part of Yorgi’s property. He is not even 
granted the right to live in Yorgi’s property as a tenant.14  
Operating with the stereotypical first names of “Mehmet” (a Muslim) 
and “Yorgi” (a local Greek), Mehmet Şevki, the main writer of Ahenk, 
argued that local people, having suffered from the hands of their for-
mer Greek neighbors, ought to be compensated with these neighbors’ 
property. However, the legislation in place at that time clearly stated 
that people who were not exchanges (especially local “fire-victims”) 
would be compensated out of “non-exchangeable” property, which, 
according to Şevki, was much too limited to allow for a satisfaction of 
local people’s claims: “There are only eight-and-a-half houses that 
were abandoned by Armenians, and they are only worth eight-and-a-
half kuruş. Whose Mehmet’s wounds are they supposed to heal?”15 
Şevki’s newspaper Ahenk also published a complaint of the Muslim 
population of Buca, a close-by village-turned-suburb: 
We are Turks, we are the old-established inhabitants of 
Buca. Our profession is grape-growing. When the ene-
my was in İzmir, the local Rum destroyed our country. 
After the reconquest, we rented some of the vineyards 
owned by those who had destroyed ours and repaired 
them. Now that we are approaching the point at which 
the vineyards will start to compensate us for our losses, 
they are taken away from us.16 
 
14 “Mesele gayet sarih ve basit değil mi? Torgi (sic) Mehmet’i soyuyor, emvalini gasp 
ediyor ve nihayet yakıyor. Mehmet’i meskensiz, mevasız bırakıp kaçıyor; sonra 
Yorgi’nin terk ettiği emvalden Mehmet’e hiçbir hisse düşmüyor. Veya Mehmet’e 
hiçbir şey verilmiyor. Hatta Mehmet’e Yorgi’nin evinde bedel-i icar ile oturabilmek 
hakkı bile verilmiyor.“ Mehmet Şevki, “Bir kusur,” in: Ahenk, May 16, 1924. First 
seen in Arı, “Yunan.” 
15 “Bilemeyiz, sekizbuçuk Ermeni’nin terkettiği sekizbuçuk kuruşluk emvalin hangi 
zarar gören Mehmet’in yarasını kapamaya yarayacak?” Ibid.  
16 “Biz Türküz, Bucanıñ ḳadim sākinleriyiz. Sanʿatımız bāğcılıḳdır. Düşman 
İzmir’de iken yerli Rumlar memleketimizi maḥv etdiler istirdādından ṣoñra 
māllarımızı maḥv edenleriñ terk etdikleri bağlardan baʿżılarını istîcār ederek iʿmār 
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This complaint suggests that the vineyards had been seized by an 
abandoned property commission, which had rented them out to the 
locals in 1922 or early 1923. By 1924, however, a settlement office was 
trying to take the vineyards away from the tenants, probably in order 
to give them to exchangees.  
Not only locals, but also Balkan War refugees made claims with refer-
ence to their suffering under the Greek occupation. A group of 800 
people who also wrote from Buca in November 1924 identified them-
selves as “we, who left our beloved homeland when we could no long-
er endure the injustice and oppression of those animals at the time of 
the occupation, left behind our property and came to the mother-
land.”17 This group claimed to have come to Buca (possibly from a 
nearby town or village) two years previously (i.e. in 1922, which would 
have been very shortly after the Turkish victory) upon a government 
decision. They claimed that the government, instead of settling them 
properly, collected taxes and took back vineyards, fields and olive-
groves that had first been officially allocated to them.18 The petition 
clearly implies that the government ought to stay faithful to its previ-
ous decisions.  
It seems possible that the two petitions from Buca were sent by more 
or less the same people – in that case, they would have presented 
themselves as Balkan War refugees in one text and “old-established 
inhabitants” in the other, which was sent only three months later. 
This should not be dismissed as a lie: the arrival of exchangees from 
1924 onwards may well have helped to transform those who had ar-
rived a mere ten years earlier into “locals” in their own eyes.  
                                                                                                                      
etdik. Tam żararlarımızı az çoḳ tellāḳiye başlayacağımız esnāda bu bağları 
ellerimizden alıyorlar. (...)” Ahenk, January 25, 1925. 
17 “Oniki sene evvel Balḳan ḥarbleri ẓarfına sevgili vaṭanımızıñ işgālı üzerine bu 
canavarlarıñ ẓulüm-ü iʿtisāfina taḥammül edemeyen bizler māl ve mülkleri terk 
anavaṭana ʿaʾilelerimiziñ perişān (…) nāmusu telaḳki ettik. Sekiz yüz kişiden ʿibāret 
bizler iki seneden beri ḥükūmet-i ʿāliyemiziñ sebeb ve ḳarārıyla Buca’ya iḳāmet 
(…)” CA 272...12.42.56.14, 2. 
18 Provided it was true, the villagers’ claim would testify to the existence of active 
government encouragement of internal migration to İzmir in the fall of 1922.  
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Indeed, local people quite often claimed Rum “exchangeable” property 
despite its being earmarked for exchangees, and they often did so 
with reference to legal relationships that had been established before 
the population exchange. Moreover, there were other laws that could 
be cited in favor of the local population, not only by themselves, but 
also by the directorate for “national property” (emlak-ı milliye müdüri-
yeti), a sub-division of the Treasury (Maliye) that was in charge of all 
non-exchangeable abandoned property. A remarkable case is that of 
the village Mahmudlar in the district of Tire. According to a letter that 
the governor (vali) of İzmir sent to Ankara in July 1925, the local 
peasants (who had so far been sharecroppers on the estate) success-
fully convinced their local administrative council that a Greek-owned 
agricultural estate (çiftlık) ought to be given to them rather than to 
exchangees, and the Ministry of Finance had also approved of the idea. 
The governor of İzmir, İhsan Bey in turn asked the settlement office 
in Ankara for final approval of this decision.19 The file at hand does 
not contain the reply of the Settlement Directorate, but the concerted 
efforts of local, provincial and central authorities might well have 
worked out. Only one year earlier, the Council of Ministers had ap-
proved of the general idea to distribute the abandoned land of big 
estates to the estate’s sharecroppers and workers against long-term 
credits.20 This principle was taken over into the budget law of 1925, 
which allowed for the sale of treasury land to landless peasants (up to 
200 dönüm per family).21 The governor cited this law in his letter. The 
 
19 İzmir Valisi İhsan to the settlement office, July 14, 1925, CA 272...12.45.75.14. 
20 “Emlāk-ı milliye derḥāl taṭbīḳi ve emlākı metrūkeden olan çiftlikler de hiç arāżiye 
ṣāḥib olmayan ve bu çiftliklerde yarıcı ve gündelikçi olarak çalışan çiftçileri ḫāne 
başına ve ʿaʾile nāmına ve maḥalleniñ vesait ve toprağın kabiliyetine göre ḳırḳtan 
seksen (...) ḳadar uzun vaʿdeli taḳsiṭlerle arāżi ṣaḥibi etmek eṣāṣı iʿtibāriyle ḳabūl 
edilmiş.” CA 30.18.01.01.11.48.3. 
21 “İçinde veya civarinda hic arazisi olmamak veya uhdei tasarruflarindaki miktari 
arazi iki yüz dönümünden noksan bulunmak sebebile topraga muhtac erbabi 
ziraat mevcut olan arazii milliye bedeli on senede mukassatan alinmak ve her 
haneye verilecek arazi miktari yedlerindeki arazi ile birlikte muhitin icabina göre 
azami iki yüz dönümü tecavüz etmemek üzere takdiri kiymet suretile tevzi ve 
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case is special insofar as locals petitioned before the land was assigned 
to exchangees. (This in itself might have helped them to get what they 
wanted.) Most other cases date from between 1926 and 1928, the time 
after the first allocations, and often involve both exchangees and lo-
cals. 
In December 1926, the Ministry of Finance received a petition from 
Kuşadası (a town 95 km south of İzmir) signed by the local chairman 
of the People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası) and his wife. The min-
istry forwarded the document to its local branch in the town. The local 
official wrote a lengthy report in which he explained that the matter 
concerned certain fruit-orchards in the villages Selçuk and Şirince 
that belonged to ‘exchangeable’ Greeks. On a previous visit to the 
village of Selçuk, the official had been approached by local people who 
complained that the orchards, which they had “been renting for a 
long time” had been taken away from them and given to “rich ex-
changees.” As a result, the locals had become “idle and unemployed.” 
They had expressed their wish to buy the gardens in question from 
the Treasury. The official approved of the idea since “the recorded 
value of the orchards is low, and so is the value of the exchangees’ 
claims.” Selling the orchards in auction would therefore be good “for 
the locals and help re-establish prosperity in that place.” 22  Even 
                                                                                                                      
füruht olunur.” Most of paragraph 23 of the 1925 budget law actually regulated the 
sale of property by the Treasury. For the law (no. 627) see  
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc003/
kanuntbmmc003/kanuntbmmc00300627.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
22 “(...) Geçende bil-münāsid Selçuḳda bulunduğum ṣırada maḥallī belediye heyʾeti 
ve bir ḳısım ḫalḳ (...) nezd-i ʿācizāneme gelerek ötedenberi bil-isticār irāde ettikleri 
bu baḥçeleriñ zengin birḳaç mübādile taḫṣiṣi ile kendileriniñ murād-ı 
maʿāşiyetleri olan bu baḥçelerden uzaḳlaştırılması naḥiye merkezi olan bu ḳaṣaba 
ḫalḳından pek çoḳlarında işsiz ve idāresiz ḳalaraḳ (...larını) mūcib olacağından 
baḫısla bu bağçeleriñ ʿameleni mezaidile(?) fürūḫtunu ṭaleb ve ricā eylemişlerdir. 
Selçuḳ’ta bulunduğum bir ḳaç sāʿat ẓarfında bir ḳaç mübādile taḫṣiṣi ve tefviżin-
den ṣarfınaẓar edilmesi merkezindedir. Esāsen bu baḥçeleriñ ḳıymet-i muḳayye-
desi dūn olmaḳla berāber mübādilleriñ ibrāz ettikleri evrāḳıñ māhiyeti daḫi (...) 
arż ve iżāʿa olduğundan pek dūn bedeliyle tefviżindense hem bir ḳasaba ḫalḳınıñ 
terfīhi hem de bu servet-i maḥalliyesinde devām-ı iʿmārisi içün bil-müzāyede 
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though the phrase “for a long time” is unspecific, it might indicate 
that, as in the case of the Mahmudlar farm, the local population had 
been renting the land from Rum landowners long before the popula-
tion exchange. Following the owners’ expulsion, the land was proba-
bly taken over by the Treasury, which continued to collect the rent. 
Thus, they probably lost their tenancy only when the land was distrib-
uted among exchangees, who, being small farmers themselves, had 
no intention to rent the gardens out.  
The report of the local financial official does not once mention the 
needs of the exchangees, nor does it suggest what they should be 
given instead of the orchards in question. The document was for-
warded to the Settlement Directorate, which turned down the sugges-
tion to sell the orchards to locals, pointing out that the claims of the 
exchanges were not low at all, but that the orchards’ values matched 
those 30 percent of the claims inscribed in the exchangees’ docu-
ments that had been recognized.23 The Settlement Directorate clearly 
considered property values from the perspective of individual ex-
changees, while the local tax official probably thought in much broad-
er dimensions. 
The Selçuk/Şirince case is unusual insofar as the financial admin-
istration did not point to any legal foundation for its suggestion to sell 
the orchards to locals. This is curious because there were a number of 
rules and even laws that could have been cited for this purpose: in 
March 1926, the Directorate of National Property (emlak-ı milliye 
müdüriyeti) asked for “about two hundred olive-trees located on the 
Greek cemetery and a field of about four dönüm” in the town of 
Bayındır. It asked the settlement office for permission to rent the 
                                                                                                                      
aḥāli-yi mahalliyeye ṣatılması pek muvaffaḳ ve müsāʿiddir. Cereyān-ı ḥal ve 
müracaʿata muṭābık olan bu maʿrūżātıñ isʿāf ve ʾemriniñ (...) ve tebliğine müsāʿade 
buyurulmasını ʿarż ve istirḥām eylerim efendim ḥażretleri.” CA 272...12.50.110.7, 
2. 
23 “Mübādil Rumlardan metrūk emlāk ve arāżiden mübādeleten vurūd eden aḥbāb-ı 
istiḥḳāḳa şimdiliḳ ve ... olaraḳ ancaḳ yüzde otuz derecesinde tefviż muʿamelesi iʿṭā 
olunmaḳta ve mütebāḳi yüzde yetmiş ise taṣfiye-yi ḳatʿiyeye taʿalif ... edilmekte.” 
CA 272...12.50.110.7, 3.  
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olive-grove out and to sell the field to the local branch of the Turkish 
hearths (Türk Ocağı) which planned to construct a playground on it. 
As a legal foundation, the office presented the budget law of 1925 
(muvayene-yi umumiye kanunu). The settlement agency forwarded the 
request to its provincial office in İzmir, asking whether the property 
had already been given to refugees or if any refugees had requested 
it.24 
If local administrations wanted to avoid distribution to exchangees, 
another possibility was to claim that no refugees interested in a cer-
tain house or piece of land could be found. The district administration 
(kaymakamlık) of Çeşme did so in the case of a house abandoned by a 
Greek named Dimitri Çelebiaki, asking for permission to sell the 
house to an “external bidder.” The governor of İzmir forwarded the 
request to Ankara in June 1926, explaining that the house was inhab-
ited by the local telegraph official. Ankara, however, ordered that the 
house be kept for exchangees from other settlement regions, who 
might be sent to Çeşme.25 A second, and quite common, argument 
was that a house was too derelict to be used for settlement purposes 
anymore, and therefore needed to be sold merely as building ground. 
In the case of the house of a certain Yanko Papadaki which was locat-
ed on the “Canki Elaki road” in Tire. According to a letter sent from 
the Maliye to the settlement office, things were further complicated by 
an unpaid mortgage on the house. The Maliye explained that the 
house “had been damaged badly in the latest earthquake.”26 It offered 
to pay off the mortgage and asked for permission to auction the 
 
24 CA 272...12.52.120.17.  
25 CA 272...12.48.96.14. 
26 “Eytām ṣandıġına merhūn bulunmasından dolayı ṣatılmasına tesbīt olunması 
üzerine ḫazinece bedel-ı rehnisi teʾdīye olunup rehni fekk ettirilmemiş olan 
mübādeleye tabiʿi Yanko Papadakiden metrūk Tire’de Canki Elaki caddesinde kāin 
ḫāneniñ köşe duvarı ṣoñ ḥareket-i arżlarda tehlikeli ṣūretde ḫasara uğradığı için 
(...) İzmir emvāl-i metrūke müdüriyetinden bildirilmiş olduğundan meẕkūr bi-
nanıñ bil-müzāyede ṣatılmaḳ üzere 781 numerolu ḳānūnuñ ikinci maddesine 
tevfīḳan acelen ḫazine emrine terkine müsāade buyurulması” CA 
272...12.59.164.12, 1.  
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house.27 In this case, the house had not been allocated to refugees 
because it was mortgaged to the orphans’ fund (eytam sandığı). Again, 
the settlement agency tried to avoid a sale, asking its provincial office 
to investigate whether the building really was in such a bad condition 
and if there “really is no refugee who could be given the debt”?28 The 
settlement agency apparently mistrusted the information given by the 
financial administration and preferred to check with its own local 
branches before anything was decided in the matter. Its suspicions 
probably had been triggered by reports like the following, which de-
scribes the situation in the town of Keskin in the Ankara province:  
For the past two months, the political administration 
here has been working with a pickaxe in one hand and a 
sledgehammer in the other. It is keen to take all of 
Keskin’s abandoned buildings. It continues to knock 
them down and dispose of [the rubble]. They also have 
sold more than fifty perfectly inhabitable houses to vari-
ous people, by labeling them as “ruins.”29  
Among the documents available to me, there is only one approval of a 
distribution of Rum abandoned property to non-exchangees, which 
dates from December 1926. In this case, the provincial administration 
of İzmir asked for permission to grant full ownership rights to non-
exchangeable people who had been settled in Rum houses, continued 
to inhabit them and had “submitted their documents.” The request 
 
27 Law number 781, which actually regulated the settlement of non-exchangee refu-
gees in Armenian houses, also stated that derelict houses, regardless of their own-
er’s ethnic identity, could be auctioned. The Maliye’s letter referred to the law as 
'istbdal' (replacement) law. See Mübadeleye gayri tabi eşhastan metruk olup hakkı 
iskânı haiz olanlara verilmiş ve verilecek emvali gayri menkule hakkında kanun, 
No. 781, 13 Mart 1926, in: Düstur, 3. Tertip, cild 7, 655. 
28 “Düyūnuñ mübādil ve muḥācire verilmek imkānı yoḳ mudur?” CA 
272...12.59.164.12, 2. 
29 “Bura idâre-i mülkiyesi iki aydan beridir bir eline kazma bir eline de başka vâsıta-i 
tahrib aldı. Keskin’in emlâk-ı metrūkiyesini (sic) kökünden söküp almak istiyor. 
Mütemâdiyen söküp atıyor. Bugüne kadar sağlam ve kâbil-i sekîne olmak üzere el-
liden fazla evi enkâz diyerek şuna buna sattılar (…).” Cited in Koraltürk, Erken, 81. 
 263 
amounted to a legalization of the settlement agency’s own illegal prac-
tice.30 
There were also conflicts between the Ministry of Finance and local 
people. The tenants of a commercial farm (çiftlik) called Tepeköy in 
the district of Torbalı complained in 1925 that the national property 
administration (emlak-ı milliye müdüriyeti) had miscategorized their 
land and treated them “like foreigners.” Their petition points at the 
complicated history of private pro-perty rights and tax-farming in the 
area: forty years ago, when the tax-farmer of the farm, a certain Bal-
tacıoğlu Aristides, was unable to pay the fees due, the Sultanic Treas-
ury (hazine-yi hassa) bought the tax-farm for 30,000 Lira. It was com-
prised of 19 villages and 30,000 dönüm of agricultural land. Over time, 
the petitioners’ grandfathers and fathers took more and more land 
under cultivation, but were unable to register it. Shortly before the 
[Greek] occupation, they finally succeeded in having the land distrib-
uted among the village dwellers, but in the chaos of war, the docu-
ments were never sent to Istanbul. After the restitution (istirdad) they 
“postponed” the matter “because we found it improper to bother our 
beloved government.” 31  The peasants (possibly with the help of a 
petition writer) skillfully presented themselves as people who had 
suffered for years under previous governments, first as tenants of the 
sultan, then under the Greek occupation, implying that there was 
reason to hope for better treatment by the republican regime. They 
claimed that they were struggling to pay the lease demanded of them, 
and were therefore forced to sell their sheep. A recent drought had 
further aggravated their lot, and they were therefore asking the gov-
ernment to finally treat them as rightful owners (rather than tenants) 
of their land.32 
 
30 CA 272...12.50.110.08.  
31 “(S)evdiğimiz ḥükūmetimizi böyle daha ziyāde meşgūl etmeği muvāffaḳ bulma-
dığımızdan şimdiye ḳadar müracaʿātımızı teʾḫīr eylemişdik.” “Torbalı çiftçileri 
mağsūb ḥaḳḳlarını istiyorlar,” Anadolu, July 6, 1924. 
32 “Torbalı çiftçileri mağsūb ḥaḳḳlarını istiyorlar”, Anadolu, July 6, 1924.  
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The claims of the villagers are interesting for the ways in which they 
differ from other petitions. The Tepeköy people made their claims 
with reference to the Ottoman Land Code, namely, the rule that any-
one taking fallow land under cultivation ought to be given usage 
rights to it. Like other locals, they blamed the previous owner of their 
land, only that, in their case, it was not a Greek (or Rum) landowner, 
but the sultanic treasury. 
5.2.1  A special case: pious endowments (evkaf)  
Unlike many locals, the overwhelming majority of exchangees accept-
ed the idea that they ought to be compensated exclusively out of Rum 
property. The following case is an interesting exception insofar as it 
brings into play another category of property that is (strangely) hardly 
ever mentioned in the sources: property that was part of pious en-
dowments (evkaf). 
In March 1925, two Sufis who identified themselves as Şeyh Yusuf 
Ziyaeddin and Şeyh Mehmet Ali “of the Salonica exchangees and the 
people of the Musa Baba Lodge” petitioned the Ministry of the Interi-
or, demanding to be compensated for the pious endowments of their 
dervish lodge in Salonica. These included “houses, shops, meadows, 
fields, vineyards and building land” which their “fathers had endowed 
for our support and concord in ancient times.” The petitioners 
claimed that the central settlement directorate had already decided in 
their favor and had ordered that people who had left behind vakf 
property in Greece be given property of the Greek Orthodox church, 
even though the National Assembly had not taken a final decision in 
the matter. The directorate’s İzmir branch, however, continued to 
postpone the matter, causing the petitioners to become recipients of 
welfare and “arrive with our many children and families at the lowest 
point of wretchedness and misery.” They asked that the republican 
government and the “glorious ministry” protect their “obvious” rights 
and bring an end to a situation in which “people like us” were “forced 
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to buy dry bread.”33 The şeyhs here made a point of their (lost) social 
status and demanded that they be compensated out of church proper-
ty, which, according to the exchange agreement, was indeed supposed 
to be exchanged against the property of Islamic pious endowments 
(evkaf) in Greece. Although the petitioners did not explicitly mention 
the exchange agreement it seems obvious that they base their claims 
on it. What they demanded of their government was that it not only 
help them as individual refugees, but implement a principle of the 
agreement in national law. They also cite a letter to the evkaf direc-
torate in support of their claims. The bureaucrats on the receiving end 
of the petition took the matter seriously and checked with the admin-
 
33 “Daḥiliye vekālet-i celilesine: Maʿrūż-u dāʾiyātımızdır. Daʾileriñiz esāsen Selānik 
şehri mübādillerinden ve dergāh-ı Yusufnişinlerinden olub Yunanistan 
dergāhlarımıza ʿaid ḫāne, dükkān çayır ve tarla ve bağ ve arṣalar ʿaḳārāt-ı mevḳūfe 
terk eylemiş ḥinelḳadim-i ittifāk ve ʿiāşemiz babalarimiz ṭarafından 
dergāhlarımıza meşruṭa ḳılınmış olan salif elzikr varidāta münḥaṣır bulunmuş ve 
muḳaddiman ʿimār ve iskān müdüriyet-i ʿāliyesine istidʿā ile vuḳuʿu bulan 
müracaʿāt ve teşebbüsümüze cevāben İzmir ʿiskān müdüriyetine iʿāde-yi vurūd 
iden derkenārda evḳāf mesʾelesiniñ meclīs-i milliyesinde henüz hāl-ı (...) 
ḳılınmadığından şimdiliḳ iʿāşemizin ...-i münāsibe ile teʾmini zikr-ü ityān edilmiş 
ḥużūr-u refāhımızı müstemsil vażʿiyete girmemizi daʾima (...) ve (...) buruyan 
vekālet-i celileleriniñ bu gibi ḳararları biz muḥācir ve mübādiller üzerinde büyük 
bir minnetdārı ve şükrān ḥuṣūle getirmiş ve (Ankara) müdüriyet-i 
ʿumūmiyesinden İzmir evḳāf şubesine vārid iden 21 ḳānūn-u evvelisine (1)340 
tariḥli ve 956?5/118 numerulü taḥrirāt–ı ʿumūmiyede ise Yunanistanda mebāni ve 
arażi-yi vaḳfiye terk idenleriñ Rumlardan ḳalan kilise ve aḳarātından tefriḳa-yi 
müstefid bulunmaları işʿār ḳılınmaḳda ise İzmir iskān müdüriyeti uzun za-
mandanberi dāʾileriñizi süründürmekde ve bu bābda ʿimār ve iskān müdüriyet-i 
ʿāliyesiniñ dāʾi ve (…) ḥaḳḳımızda inḳāẕ itmemekde olduğundan bizler kesir evlād 
ve ʿayālımızla sefālet ve perişāniyetiñ ṣoñ derecesine varmaḳda ve gün görmüş ve 
refāh eylemiş ile (…) (…) varmış. Bizim gibi kimseleriñ bir parça ḳuru ekmek 
almağa muḥtāç ḳalmaları vekālet-i celilelerince bit-tabbʿ mecbūriyet ḳılınma-
yacağını düşdüğümüz gerīve–yi sefālet ḥalimiz ḥaḳḳında ḥükūmet-i cumhūri-
yemizin ʿadl–ü ilticā ile vekālet-i celileleriniñ huḳūḳ-u sariḥimiziñ muhāfaẓa ve … 
ḥaḳḳında müşfikla(?) ve ʿadilāta ḳarārınıñ İzmir vāliliğine ʾemr-ü işʿārını niyāz-ı 
istirḥām eyleriz efendim hażretleri. Selānikte mekān-i Mūsa Baba dergāhi Yusuf-
nişin Şeyh Muhammed ʿAli, Selānikta mekān-i (…) dergāh-i Yusufnişin Şeyh 
Yusuf Ziyaeddin. 21 Mart 341. CA 272...12.44.69.07, 2.  
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istration of pious foundations how they could proceed in the matter.34 
The evkaf directorate answered with a copy of said document, which 
admitted to the principal necessity to use church property, but never-
theless stated that such distributions were not to take place by order of 
the Ministry of Finance. Exchangees, including those who had left 
behind property that was part of pious endowments, were to be com-
pensated in the course of tefviz, i.e., only out of privately owned Rum 
abandoned property.35  
Dervish lodges and Sufi orders would be outlawed and their property 
nationalized only eight months after the şeyhs’ petition, in November 
1925. This step certainly affected not only existing Sufi orders in Tur-
key, but also frustrated the attempts of exchangee Sufis (such as the 
petitioners) at obtaining property of the Greek-Orthodox church as 
compensation: a series of documents written in November 1928 at the 
Ministry of Pious Foundations explicitly states that all income-
generating abandoned property that belonged to endowments would 
continue to be administered by the Treasury (Maliye) (rather than the 
Ministry of Pious Foundations) – and that people who wanted to 
make claims to incomes generated by this property (possibly those 
few Greeks and Armenians who were still living in Turkey?) had to 
turn to the Maliye.36 Yet, the ambitions of the Treasury not to give 
church property to Islamic endowments were certainly not completely 
successful, especially not in the countryside. This is suggested by a 
case that was investigated in November 1927 in Selçuk: Local people 
challenged the allocation of certain fig orchards to exchangees, argu-
 
34 CA 272...12.44.69.07, 3. 
35 “Vekālet-i celilesinden istiʿnād vekālet-i müşarileyhden alınan cevābda Rum kilise 
ʿaḳāreti huḳūḳ-u taʿrīfiyesinde gelmiş ve gelecek muhācirine tefviż-i ḳānūn ile 
taṣdiḳ edilmesi mübādele-yi ahāli-yi muḳademesi muḳteżāsından olmasına 
naẓāran bunlara cihet-i vakfında? müdāhale etmesi lāzım geleceği beyān edilmiş 
olmaḳla mübādeleye tabiʿi Rumlardan ḳalacak kilise ve ʿaḳārātına evḳāf idārel-
erince vażʿiyed edilmemesi lüzūmu beyan olundu.“ Ibid., 1. 
36 “Emvāl-i metrūkeniñ Māliyece idāresi ḳanūn-u aḥḳāmından olmaḳla müdāḫale (...) 
olunması icārāt-ı (...) maḳāṭātından maṭlūbāt-ı (...) Maliyeden (...)” CA 
51.V28...3.26.2.  
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ing that the orchards were part of a pious endowment. An inspector 
of the settlement directorate found that some of the orchards in ques-
tion were indeed part of a vakf made by a Greek called Hacı Panayot, 
and therefore ought to have been excluded from tefviz because they 
were now part of the local [Islamic] pious endowments.37  
5.3  The importance of class 
Even if the status of property as abandoned by local Rum people was 
uncontested, exchangees still had to go through a highly bureaucratic 
process, only at the end of which they could hope to receive temporary 
rights to houses or agricultural land. The applications and petitions 
discussed in this section provide some insights into the strategies that 
exchangees developed in order to strengthen and substantiate their 
claims, and how they protested against decisions they found to be 
unfavorable to them.  
Apart from the status as exchangees, there were some sub-categories 
that were of importance when applications for property compensation 
were considered. One among these was social status (içtimai durum), 
which was, at least according to the regulations for iskan-i adi pub-
lished in 1931, considered when property was allocated to individual 
families. These rules prescribed that people with a high social status 
would be given bigger houses than those of a more humble back-
ground. Applicants for property allocation occasionally made specific 
reference to this non-material aspect of their class background. In the 
case of the former müftü of Kandiye (Hanya/Crete), the original peti-
tion has not survived. The settlement directorate in Ankara wrote to 
İzmir in January 1926, explaining that müftü Ahmet Kamil Efendi had 
 
37 “Bulundurduğu baḥçelerden yalñiz Haci Panayot’a ʿaʾid 16 dönümlük yer mülk-ü 
vaḳfa ʿaʾidiyeti muḳaddiman maḥkeme-i şeriyyece tesbīt ve taṣdīḳ (...) aktıran (...) 
olduğu ... ve diğer arāżiniñ evḳāfa ʿaʾidiyetine dāʾir vaḳıfnāmelerde ...gibi başkaca 
taṣdīḳi sābit vesāʾik daḫī ibrāz edilmemiş ve işbu emlāk vergü ve tapu ḳaydlerinde 
Rum emvāl-i metrūkesi olaraḳ muḳayyed bulunur olduğundan yalnız Haci Pa-
nayota ʿaʾid bahçeniñ istisnāsiyla diğerleriniñ tefviż muʿāmelesiniñ icrāsı ...olacağı 
anlaşılmıştır.” CA 272...12.56.142.25, 2-3. 
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“despite continuous efforts” not yet been settled, and ordered that the 
man be “given a house in accordance with the respective laws and his 
social position.”38  
Applications for property liquidation (tasfiye talepnameleri provide a 
particularly comprehensive picture of class matters and their im-
portance for exchangees. These documents were collected by the 
Mixed Commission, which was supposed to check them and later 
calculate the total sum of claims on both sides. Although this final 
calculation was never accomplished, the applications nevertheless 
form an interesting body of sources, 140,000 of which are accessible 
to researchers in the Republican Archive in Ankara.39 The samples I 
have worked with were written in 1925 (in Turkey, i.e. not, as had 
originally been planned, prior to the exchanges’ departure from 
Greece). They were reviewed and translated by the Mixed Commis-
sion in 1929. These tasfiye talepnames contained detailed information 
on the names, professions, places of residence and of origin of the 
applicant, usually the head of a household. The standard form asked 
for detailed information about movable and immovable property, 
their location, and the terms of ownership. Applicants were asked to 
provide copies of documents to substantiate this information, such as 
copies of title deeds or purchase contracts. The forms asked both 
about the value of property inscribed in title deeds, which might have 
been drawn up decades earlier, and the value estimated during the 
appraisal process based on the exchange agreement. Some talepnames 
contain copies of up to twenty additional documents, such as tapu 
 
38 “Birçoḳ seneden beri oraya gelerek vuḳūʿu bulan birçoḳ teşebbüsāt ve 
mürācaʿātına rağmen henüz iskān edilmediği ve ʿāʾile ṣāḥibi bulunması ḥasbiyle 
şayān-i himāye ve muʿāvenet bulunduğu añlaşılan mübādil muḥācirinden 
Ḳandiye’niñ sābıḳ müftüsü Aḥmed Kāmil Efendiniñ bil-taḥḳīḳ evṣāf-ı ḳānūniye ve 
ḥaḳḳ-ı iskāni tebeyyün etdiği taḳdīrde (…) ve mevḳiʿi ictimāʿisiyle mütenāsib bir 
ḫānede.“ CA 272.11.22.109.20. 
39 This most valuable group of sources has only recently become available, and has, 
to my knowledge, not yet been studied in detail. For an overview on this subject, 
see Çelebi, “Mübadillerin Yunanistandaki Mal Kayıtları ve Muhtelit Mübadele 
Komisyonu Tasfiye Talepnameleri”. 
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senedis, wills, vakıfnames, and witnesses’ statements, while others 
merely state the number of houses and fields applicants had left be-
hind in Greece. This difference in the depth of detail arguably forms a 
first marker of class difference: A higher social status often translated 
into bureaucratic literacy.  
Some exchangees provided detailed lists of movable property (such as 
bedsteads, silverware, linen, clothing, and books). Rather than just 
give the monetary value of these items, they specified brand names 
and materials, making a point of belonging to a middle-class that 
could afford to buy imported goods and used them for a lifestyle very 
different from that of poorer or more traditional people. 40  Fatma 
Hanım, a female exchangee from Chios/Sakız submitted her talep-
name in 1925. She reported to have left the island in 1912, at the be-
ginning of the first Balkan War, and migrated to nearby Çeşme. She 
was therefore one of those Balkan War refugees who were retroactive-
ly included in the exchange agreement between Greece and Turkey in 
1923. Fatma Hanım could not produce tapu documents for her prop-
erty on Chios. This was unusual among Chios exchangees since the 
island had been part of the mainland district of Çeşme until 1912: the 
relevant documents should have been available in the local court in 
Çeşme, rather than on nearby Chios. Fatma’s application for property 
liquidation gives an interesting reason for her failure to produce these 
documents. It contains a declaration (kefaletname) signed by ten male 
compatriots that stated: 
We hereby testify that (…) the tapu documents exist. 
When the Greek government performed a census, the 
hero Hüseyin Beyzade Seyyid Ağa brought them to Chi-
 
40 A certain Osman Efendi from Chios who worked as a clerk at the public debt 
administration in Çeşme, listed three sets of broadcloth suits (30 Lira), one lined 
oil-cloth raincape (müşemmaʿ ḳapuṭa maʿa çizme, 10 Lira), a set of porcellain plates 
(20 Lira), matching knifes, forks and spoons (10), a dozen napkins made of linen 
(keten peşkir dozina, 5 Liras), an iron bedstead (demir karyola, 10 Liras), underwear 
and long undershirts (iç çamaşirler ve fanelalar) (10 Liras). He did not list such pro-
fane items such as cups, socks and bedding. CA 130.16.13.2 / 35.260.7. 
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os and had them recognized by the Greek government. 
When he went back to Çeşme in his boat, he was fol-
lowed by Greek bandits, who killed him, destroyed the 
boat and stole all the cash and other valuables he had on 
him. In the course of this, the tapu records of Fatma 
Hanım, as well as her documents pertaining to her in-
heritance, were lost. They are, however, still kept at the 
land records office on Chios as well as in the tax offices 
there.41 
Instead of Ottoman documents, Fatma Hanım provided a story that 
probably resonated with Turkish nationalist narratives common at 
that time: Greek bandits killed the Muslim messenger and destroyed 
his cargo. On the other hand, the story involuntarily testifies to the 
trust of former Turkish inhabitants in the new Greek authorities on 
Chios by depicting the latter as ready and willing to recognize Otto-
man title deeds. Apparently, Fatma had been trying to have her prop-
erty rights on Chios recognized even after her migration to nearby 
Çeşme in 1912. Going even further, the document suggests that the 
Turkish authorities verify her information by checking them against 
those documents held by the Greek administration on the island.  
Tasfiye talepnames listed property left behind in Greece but do not 
provide any information on the houses, gardens and fields that ex-
changees were given as compensation. Their petitions are more re-
vealing in this respect, often showing which houses people wanted, 
 
41 “Tapu senedātları mevcūd olub bundan muḳaddem Yunan ḥükūmetiniñ vażʿ 
eylediği (...) -i muʿayyine ẓarfında senedāt-ı meẕkūreyi Çeşme’de muḳīm Saḳız 
muḥācirlerinden Ḳahraman Hüseyin Beyzāde Seyyid Ağa ile Saḳıza göndererek 
merḳūm Seyyid Ağa olvechle Saḳızda senedāt-ı meẕkūreyi ḥükūmet-i Yunāniyeye 
ḳayd ettirerek senedāt-ı meẕkūreyi (...) ḳayık ile Çeşmeye ʿavdet ederken eşḳiya-yı 
Yunaniye rākib olduğu ḳayığa hücūm ile kendisini şehīd ve ḳayığı gadıḳ ve 
berāberinde bulunan nuḳūd ve mālını (...) ve gāret eyledikleri cihetle bu meyānda 
meẕbūre/yure? Faṭma Ḥanımın emlāk ve arāżiye dāʾir olan ṭapu senedātı ve evrāḳ-
ı mıslıye? -i sāʾiresi daḫi maḥv ve żiyāʿa uğradığını ve ancaḳ Saḳız ḥaḳāni ve maʿa 
taḥrīr vergü idāreleri ḳuyudātında daḫi olvechle muḳayyed bulunduḳlarını işbu 
elim? vażʿiyetimizle maḳām-ı şehādetde taṣdīḳ ve beyān ederiz.” CA 130.16.3.2/ 
23.25.11, 13. 
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but didnʼt get, or which ones were taken away from them. Sometimes, 
two or more people applied for the same house. In the case of a house 
in Quay Street (iskele sokağı) in Karantina (a seaside district of down-
town İzmir), an exchangee from Drama named Ahmet petitioned in 
1925, complaining that a house that had first been allocated to him 
had then been given to another exchangee and his brother. Ahmet 
considered this unjust, because the other exchangee (a certain Hasan 
Tahsin from Kavala) had applied a full three weeks after him. He also 
accused the brothers of having already received another house in 
Karantina.42 A lady named Tevziye Hanım from Salonica received a 
house on the downtown seaside boulevard (Birinci Kordon, today’s 
Atatürk Caddesi)43 as early as 1923. The settlement administration 
reviewed her documents in 1927 and found her claims insufficient to 
match the house. Fevziye Hanım was asked to leave it to another lady 
from Salonica named Nuriye Hanım. Fevziye Hanım’s son Arif 
Beyzade sent a petition from Istanbul to the Ministry of the Interior 
in the matter. In it he argued that the house had been given to his 
mother as part of the regular settlement process and could therefore 
not be taken away from her. He claimed that Nuriye Hanım was none 
other than “the mother of Rahmi Bey, the former governor of İzmir,” 
and that “an allocation of the house to her is pursued even though it 
is contrary to all existing laws.”44 The claim about Nuriye Hanım’s 
 
42 “Ḥālbuki: bendelerinden yiğirmibir gün soñra müracaʿāt itdiği …deki vesāʾik-i 
resmiyye ve şaʿabātdaki … resmiyye ile sābıt olan mumaileyh. Ḥasān Efendi’den 
Mücerred ve meczūba? olduğu … taḥḳiḳātıyla sābit olduğu gibi ḳardeşi Süleymān 
Efendi ile bir ʿaʾile olaraḳ buraya gelerek Ḳarantinada 582 numerulü ḫānede iskān 
görüb işbu ḫāneyi daḫi ʿuhdelerine tefvīż itdirmeleri başḳaca ḫāne almalarına … 
olacağı ve bir ʿaʾileye ancaḳ bir ḫāne verilebileceğine naẓāran işbu muʿāmelesinde 
ḳānūna külliyen muḥālif olduğu (...)” CA 272...12.46.80.15, 2.  
43 According to the table of old/new street and neighborhood names in Baran, Bir, 
76. 
44 “Selānik Mübādillerinden ʿArif Beyzāde vālidem Fevziye Ḫānım dört sene evvel 
ḥaḳḳ-ı iskān edildiği ḫāneden çıḳarılması isteniyormuş. (...) Mevżūʿāt-ı ḳānūniyeye 
buña iskān biraḳamıyacaḳ derecede cerḥ olduğu ḥālde muṭbiḳan ḫāneniñ İzmir 
iskan müdüriyetince İzmir vāli-yi esbāḳı Raḥmi Beyiñ vālidesine tefviż olduğu (...) 
CA 272...13.79.8.21, 6.  
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family (which I have been unable to either verify or falsify) might have 
served two purposes: first, Fevziye Hanım’s son certainly meant to 
imply that the other lady had made use of her son’s contacts in the 
administration. Second, his emphasis on legal provisions might also 
have been a reference to the status of pre-1912 immigrants.45 These 
earlier immigrants, usually officers (including Mustafa Kemal) and 
rich landowners, had immigrated prior to the Balkan Wars and were 
therefore not part of the population exchange. They were also never 
regarded as “refugees” (muhacir), a term that was reserved for poor 
immigrants. 46  The question of Nuriye Hanım’s family and/or ex-
changee status was not taken up by the administration in İzmir and 
Ankara. The Ankara office regarded both women as exchangees and 
simply stated that Nuriye Hanım, having left behind two summer 
residences (yalı) on the seaside in Salonica, was perfectly eligible for 
the house in question. Fevziye Hanım’s claim was dismissed as con-
tradicting the principle that “houses in places as the first Kordon 
ought to be reserved to people who have left behind high-value real 
estate, and shall not be given to those who have only left behind win-
ter houses, fields and the like.”47 The arguments that her son present-
ed as working in her favor, i.e. (alleged) four years of continuous resi-
 
45 Rahmi Bey, governor of the Aydın province between 1913 and 1918, was indeed 
from Salonica and, like Mustafa Kemal and many others, had migrated to Anatolia 
prior to the First Balkan War. These early migrants from the city were not part of 
the population exchange (but they were compensated through protocol No. IX). I 
have been unable to find out the name of Rahmi Bey’s mother.  
46 See Erik J. Zürcher, “Who Were the Young Turks?” in The Young Turk Legacy and 
the National Awakening: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey. London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2010, 95–109. 
47 “Selānik’iñ mübādillerinden Fevziye Ragib Ḫānımıñ emvāl-i mevżūʿu baḥis 
ḫāneniñ cinsine ve ḳıymetine teḳābül etmediği ve bil-ḥaṣṣa İzmir’de birinci ḳor-
don gibi bir mevḳiʿideki ḫāneleriñ memleketlerinde pek yüksek ḳıymette 
müsaḳḳaf emvāl terk edenlere haṣredilerek böyle ḳışlaḳ tarla mesellü māl 
bıraḳmış olanlara verilemeyeceği esāsāt ve teblīgātımız icābından olmaḳla mu-
maileyhāniñ ḥakḳ-ı tercīhan iddiʿāsı hiç bir vechle vārid olamaz.” CA 
272...13.79.8.21, 4.  
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dence in the house and a previous settlement decision, were not taken 
into consideration.  
5.4  Allegations of corruption and fraud  
Many petitions dating from 1926 and 1927 are connected to cases in 
which the authorities revoked previous decisions and claimed proper-
ty back. An exchangee from Florina petitioned the TBMM in autumn 
1926, when he was asked to evacuate a vineyard in Karşıyaka which he 
had been given in 1924. His petition was forwarded to the Settlement 
Directorate in Ankara, which inquired about the case in İzmir, with 
results that cannot be traced in the documents available to me.48 Simi-
lar requests for more information were usually followed by investiga-
tions on the ground, which, however, often produced rather ambigu-
ous reports. In May 1927, Hatice Hanım, an exchangee from Gobran, 
accused a clerk at the settlement office in Urla of having sold a garden 
that had been allocated to her. According to the report of the governor 
(vali) in İzmir, the matter was investigated by the district governor 
(kaymakam) in Urla, who reported that no record of such a sale exist-
ed, concluding that Hatice Hanım had unjustly accused the clerk. The 
report also contains some incomprehensible information on fields 
being measured and rented out, and mentions “the possibility that 
vineyards which people had requested for tefviz might accidentally 
have been sold.”49 The Settlement Directorate in Ankara did not ac-
cept this confusing report, which did “not make it clear whether or 
not the vineyard was sold”, and asked, rather exasperatedly: “Has it 
been sold or not?” Moreover, Ankara asked for more information on 
the gardens that had admittedly been sold, for the names of those 
interested in getting them via tefviz, admonishing the provincial ad-
ministration that it was “absolutely out of the question to leave the 
issue undocumented.”50 At this point, the letter turns from the usual-
 
48 CA 272...12.50.105.30.  
49 “Tefvīżen ṭālibi bulunan bağlarıñ yañlışlıḳla ṣatılabildiği” CA 272...12.53.128.05. 
50 “Bāğınıñ ṣatılüb ṣatılmadığı añlaşılamamaḳtadır. Mūmāileyḥaniñ bāğı ṣatılmış 
mıdır. Ṣatılmamış mıdır. Ṣatılmış ise kimiñ ṭarafından ne sebeble ne ṣūretle 
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ly cold voice of a bureaucrat to one outraged by misconduct – a point 
that might be further explained by the fact that it was no longer a 
member of the own local staff that was blamed, but an employee of 
the financial administration.  
Local settlement offices often revoked tefviz decisions on the grounds 
that exchangees’ claims did not match the property they had been 
given earlier in the settlement process. A certain Ali Ağazade Kâzım 
from Drama anticipated this argument when he petitioned from Söke 
in 1927, after receiving an eviction notice for a house he had been 
given three years before. He claimed to be “a victim of arbitrary con-
duct” since the house was “appropriate to my social position” and he 
was “eligible [literally: strong enough] for its allocation.”51 Again, the 
outcome of the affair remains unclear: the only additional document 
in the file is a request for an investigation of the matter sent from 
Ankara to İzmir.  
5.5 Voluntary and involuntary cohabitation 
Whenever the value of previously allocated houses turned out to be 
too high to match exchangees’ compensation claims, the inhabitants 
faced either eviction or something the settlement offices referred to as 
“squeezing in” or “settlement by squeezing” (teksif/teksifen iskanı), 
meaning that several families were settled in one house. Thus, many 
people suddenly had to share a house they had long considered their 
own. Hasan Hüsnü, an exchangee from Drama, describes the situa-
                                                                                                                      
ṣatılmıştır. (...) Yañlışlıḳla ṣatılan bāğlarıñ bunlarıñ müteffevüż (…) ve ṭalibleriniñ 
isimlerinde ve bu vażʿiyet ḳarşısından vilāyetçe lā-ḳayd ḳalınmasına imkān olama-
yacağından bu bābda vilāyetince ne yapıldığınıñ işʿārı (...).” CA 272...12.53.128.05. 
51 “Üç senedenberi iskānıma taḫṣiṣ edilmiş ve imār ettiğim ḫānemden taḥliye 
edilmek üzere olduğum jandarma dairesiniñ tebligātdan añlaşılmıştır. Taḫṣiṣ 
edilen ḫāne mevḳi-i içtimāiyemle münāsib ve tefvīżine muḳtedir olduğum naẓār-ı 
diḳḳatına alınmıyor. Keyfī muʿāmeleye ḳurbān oluyorum. Mağdūriyetime meydān 
ḳalmamaḳ üzere taḥḳīki için icāb eyleyenlere ʾemir buyurulması ḥükūmeti cum-
hūriyemizden müsterḥimim.” Söke’de Drama mübādillerinden Ali Ağazade 
Kāẓım CA 272.12...54.131.19.  
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tion particularly colorfully in his complaint against this practice in 
June 1926:  
Despite my repeated telegraphic appeals, the unjust and 
illegal treatment I am subjected to has not been investi-
gated, and my cries for help remain unheard. This 
morning, at a moment when no member of my family 
was home, the door was broken down with the help of 
the police, and two people–one a Balkan refugee, the 
other an exchange–were squeezed in by force. Through-
out the two years I have been living in this house, I have 
never been at peace, and always been subject to harass-
ment by the settlement administration.52 
Hasan Hüsnü depicts the settlement administration as an institution 
that breaks down doors and trespasses into the private realm of the 
petitioner’s family – thus threatening to sever his honor. Judging 
from other files, this accusation should have sufficed for the Ankara 
office to initiate an investigation. But the petition continued with 
further accusations: 
Following the official announcement of the settlement 
administration that those houses that were supposed to 
be distributed as a whole in the course of default settle-
ment (iskan-i adi) will now be held back for repair works, 
this is the second blow aimed against all exchangees. 
Neither the documents that prove my property owner-
ship back home, nor my status as a new exchange [i.e., 
one who immigrated after 1922, not during the Balkan 
Wars], nor my status as a politically oppressed person 
[in Greece], nor, most important of all, the laws stating 
 
52 “Müteḳerrir telgraflarla müracaʿātıma rağmen ḥaḳḳımda yapılmaḳda olan ḥaḳḳsız 
ve ḳānūnsuz muʿāmeleyi tedḳīḳ ettirirmeden feryādımı iliştirirmeden mümkün 
olmaḳtadır. Bu ṣabāḥ evimiñ ʿāʾilemden kimse bulunmadığı bir ānda ḳapular polis 
maʿrifetiyle ḳırılaraḳ bir Balḳan muhāciri bir mübādil (…) cebren teksīf olun-
muştur. İki seneden berü iskān olduğum eviniñ rāḥat görmeyerek mütemādiyyen 
iskān idāresinden tecvīzāta maʿrūż ḳaldım.” CA 272...12.49.97.01, 1. 
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that property be allocated to exchangees in those places 
they arrive at – [none of this] is taken into account. But 
the point I complain about most is that a Balkan refugee 
and another exchangee are treated better than me.53 
The petition ends with a lament that stresses the petitioner’s identity 
as a citizen of the newly established Republic of Turkey. Hasan 
Hüsnü laments that out that he is unable to “distinguish this treat-
ment, which is incompatible with the holy values of our sacred Re-
public, from a violation of my humble personal rights.”54  
Hasan Hüsnü employed a variety of tactical arguments to support his 
claim to an undisturbed life with his family. The first is to present his 
family as one deserving of a private home. Moreover, he presents the 
violation of his home as one that was aimed not only at him, but at all 
exchangees. He thus presents himself as part of a collective of exchan-
gees that was harmed whenever one of them was treated unjustly. 
Within this collective identity, however, further sub-identities (and 
thus, in his opinion, claims to privileged treatment) were possible: 
Hasan Hüsnü was a “new” exchangee (i.e., one who only immigrated 
to Turkey after the exchange agreement had been signed) and he 
claims to have been oppressed for political reasons (with all likeliness 
in Greece). He presents both points as reasons for privileged treat-
ment, which he, however, did not get. The final sentence essentially 
states that the republican government was violating the petitioner’s 
 
53 “İskān-ı ʿādide ḳaṭʿiyyetinden baḥısla evlerini iʿmāra raʿvet iden iskān müdüri-
yetinden gazetelerdeki resmī ilānātından ṣoñra bu ḥareketi bütün mübādiller 
aleyḥine bir ḥarekettir. Elimdeki evrāḳ memlekette terk ettiğim mālıñ yeni 
mübādil olmaḳlığım mağdūriyeti siyāsiden bulunmaḳlığım ve eñ şāhāne 
mübādilleriñ girdikleri yerlerde mevḳiʿilerini tefvīże istihdāf eden ḳavānīn ve 
evāmir-i (…) ḳānūnî hiç bir şeyi naẓār-ı diḳḳat ve ehemmiyete alınmayaraḳ mesrūd 
edilmekteyim. Eñ ziyāde şayān-i teʿyīd olan noḳṭa bir Balḳan muḥācirinde bir 
mübādile bir müstehlikle bir müteḥaṣṣille (...) terciʿi her intiḥāma (…)“ CA 
272...12.49.97.01., 2. 
54 “Muḳaddes cumhūriyetimiziñ ḳudsī gāyeleriyle münāfī olan bu muʿāmele tek 
haḳḳ-ı ʿācizānemiñ tecvīzinden bir türlü aḳl ayırdayamıyorum.” CA 
272...12.49.97.01., 3. 
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rights, and thus failing to live up to its own “sacred” values – namely, 
the rule of law. 
The file does not offer any clues to the results of Hasan Hüsnü’s peti-
tion. Yet, the distinction between “old” and “new” exchangees also 
appears in a memo dated July 8, 1926, in which the then Minister of 
the Interior, Mehmet Cemil (Uybaydın) distinguishes between both 
groups, arguing that new exchangees ought to be preferred in the 
property allocation process because they “suffered both materially and 
immaterially in various ways, while the old ones have been around for 
quite a while, and therefore have been able to take over empty hous-
es.”55  
As many other petitioners, Hasan Hüsnü argues that respect for his 
personal personal was (or should be) a core value of the state. Such a 
congruence of interests, however, was questioned in a co-ed pub-
lished around the same time. Discussing protests of exchangees 
against sales of abandoned property in Istanbul, journalist Mehmet 
Şevki argued that “petitions to the Ministry of the Interior look as if 
they have the potential to seriously question [literally: to expose to an 
earthquake] a right that belongs to our state.” In Mehmet Şevki’s 
opinion, it was the state’s right to sell property and thereby secure 
income for the Treasury, especially since the values of abandoned 
property would eventually be balanced between Greece and Turkey. 
He depicts exchangee complaints against such sales as a threat to this 
right and reminded his readers that “it is the duty of all of us to pro-
tect the right of the state.”56 For him, state interests were superior to 
the right of individual citizens to compensation.  
 
55 “Çünkü yeni mübādiller her vechle māddī ve maʿnevī birçok żarārlara maʿrūż 
ḳalmışlar. Eski mübādiller ise birçok senelerden beri burada müʿnāsibleri boş ve 
müsaiṭ ? mülk bir vażʿiyetde bulunmuşlardır. Binaʾenaleyh tefvīż evrāḳıñ 
tedḳīḳinde böyle bir ḥālde vukūʿuyi sebeb (...) esbāb-i tercīh olarak ...nāmede ẕikr 
edilmiş ḫuṣūṣāt (...) mübādiller arasında şāyān-ı ... edilecekler.” CA 
272...13.79.03.06, 1.  
56 “Devletiñ ḥaḳḳını ḳorumaḳ cümlemiziñ vażifesi olduğundan ve muḫābirimiziñ 
bildirdiği vechle Dāḫiliye vekāletimize vuḳūʿubulan maʿrūżāt devletimize ʿaʾid bir 
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Hasan Hüsnü mentions that he had petitioned before, and it is likely 
that the local settlement office in İzmir had made other attempts at 
settling fellow refugees with him before it finally resorted to brute 
force. His petition is not only unusual in its length (which, as the 
document was sent via telegram, translated into high expenses on his 
part) and the explicit criticism, but also because it was sent right after 
the unwelcome housemates had been settled. Most petitions related 
to “squeezing in” (teksif), however, were sent by people who were 
trying to get rid of people they had been sharing a house with for 
quite some time. Moreover, it is often not clear who had been settled 
first. Arif, a teacher and exchangee from Salonica, had been assigned 
a house abandoned by a certain Doctor Yorgi Kozmadi. Later, a “fire-
victim” (harikzede) (i.e., a homeless person whose house had been 
destroyed during the war) called Osman Nuri Efendi had been 
“squeezed” in with him. According to a letter of inquiry sent from 
Ankara to İzmir, Arif claimed that Osman Nuri, owned a house in the 
provincial town of Kemalpaşa, and therefore ought to be evicted from 
the shared house in İzmir.57 Fraudulent use of settlement rights is 
frequently mentioned in the provincial press of those years, which 
spoke of people who “used the exchangee status as camouflage” 
(mübadil perdesi) – without ever naming culprits. But even if the legal 
status of people as exchangees was undisputed, they could still cheat 
in numerous ways (or be accused of cheating). In the documents 
available to me it is usually involuntary housemates who reported 
such cases. In June 1926, Makbule Hanım from Salonica and her 
husband Yusuf Zehdi Efendi from Yeniçe-i Vardar were “squeezed” 
into a house in Karşıyaka where İsmail Hakkı, an exchangee from 
Salonica, was already living with 14 (!) other people. İsmail Hakkı 
denounced the couple in November 1927, arguing that Makbule 
                                                                                                                      
ḥaḳḳı az çoḳ zelzele uğratacaḳ māhiyetde görüldüğünden.” Mehmet Şevki, 
“Devletiñ ḥaḳḳını ḳorumaḳ,” in: Ahenk, February 14, 1926. 
57 The document is dated October 30, 1926. Strangely, the house in İzmir is only 
characterized with the name of the Greek owner, no district or street is mentioned. 
CA 272...12.49.101.21.  
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ought to stay with her mother, who had been assigned another house 
in Karşıyaka. The investigation of the provincial settlement office 
brought to light that the couple not only had manipulated their doc-
uments in order to be settled in İzmir (rather than Denizli, their orig-
inal destination), but that they also had concealed their marriage in 
order to be compensated twice.58 The last point is curious, as it was 
very common for women to own their own property, and therefore to 
also apply for compensation in their own name. 
Hadi Bey, and employee of the İzmir post office, and Fatma Hanım 
were both exchangees from Nasliç/Neapolis were probably not mar-
ried, but simply desperate to find a house. They petitioned the settle-
ment administration in Ankara, asking for permission to combine 
their compensation claims for a house in Karşıyaka, in Selimiye street 
no. 41. The house was particularly hard to get because it was mort-
gaged (possibly still in the name of the Greek owner), and would only 
be given to people who were ready to take over the debt. In his peti-
tion, Hadi Bey identifies himself as “an exchangee from Nasliç whose 
file number in the allocation register is fifty.” He explained that he 
had, “despite all efforts and numerous inquiries”, not found another 
house, saw “no chance to finding one in the future” and therefore was 
“currently homeless.” After explaining the situation and his desire to 
team up with Fatma Hanım, he repeats:  
“my file number at the directorate is fifty. A brief con-
sideration of this fact will make clear how unjustly I 
have been treated. It is utterly impossible to find a house 
that matches my claims. It has happened before in 
İzmir that people teamed up, and I humbly ask the Set-
tlement Directorate to give permission in this matter.”59  
 
58 CA 272...12.50.109.08.  
59 “İzmir iskān müdüriyet-i ʿaliyesine. Nasliç mübādillerindenim. Tefvīż ḳısmında 
elli numerulü dosyam mevcūddur. Ṭālib-i tefvīżi olduğum Ḳarşıyaḳa’da Selimiye 
soḳağında 41 numerulü ḫāne merhūn bulunduğundan muʿāmele-yi tefvīżiyesi 
teʾḫīre uğramışdı. Pek çoḳ taḥriyāta ve taʿḳibātıma rağmen başḳa bir ḫāne bulmağa 
muvaffıḳ olamadım. Bundan ṣoñra bulmağa da imkān göremiyorum. Bu sebeble 
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Strangely, Hadi Bey did not ask for the mortgage to be waived. The 
debt appears as an unpleasant fact he simply had to accept (by declar-
ing his readiness to pay it) in order to eventually get the house he so 
desperately wanted. The settlement office in Ankara treated the mort-
gage in the same matter-of-factly way. In a first response to the pro-
vincial administration (vilayet), it accepted the idea to combine the 
two applicants’ claims, but suggested that, since a precedent for team-
ing up and taking over a mortgage could not be found, the İzmir of-
fice should allocate another house to them.60 A month later, it sent a 
second letter in which the vilayet was instructed to check whether or 
not the combined claims of the applicants were sufficient to liquidate 
the debt – an idea that had certainly crossed the minds of the provin-
cial officers as well. 
5.6 Squatting  
The assignment of a house to an exchangee did not necessarily mean 
that the settlement agency was able to actually hand it over to him or 
her. The houses often turned out to be occupied by other people, who 
could, for one reason or another, not be evicted in order to settle the 
exchangees. Current occupants were either able to make their own, 
equally legitimate claims, or were powerful enough to prevent their 
eviction. The administration therefore ended up negotiating the 
claims of current occupants and exchangees, not necessarily prefer-
                                                                                                                      
el-ān yerleşmemiş bulunmaḳdayım. (...) Müdüriyet-i ifʿā dosyamıñ numerusü el-
lidir. Bu numeruya göre ne ḳadar mağdūr ḳaldığım ufaḳ bir mulāḥaẓa ile 
añlaşılıyor. Yalñız kendi istiḥḳaḳım derecesinde ev bulmaḳ ʿadīmülimkāndır. 
İzmir’de emsāli mesbūḳ olduğu üzere teşrīk-i vāḳiʿiñ ifāsı için vekālet-i celileden 
müsāʿade-yi istiḥsālına delālet buldurulmasını ʿarż ve istirḥām eylerim efendim.” 
Date illegible. CA 272...13.79.07.11, 2. 
60 “Ancaḳ ṭālib-i tefviż bulunduğu İzmir’de Karşıyaka’da Selimiye sokağındaki 41 
numrolu ḫāneniñ merhūn bulunduğu cihetle bedeli rehin için taʿahhüd ṣenedi 
vermek üzere ḥaḳḳında muʿāmele yapılmasını ... eylediği anlaşıl… bu şekildeki 
muʿāmelesine esas... bulun… mezkūr ḫāneniñ tefvīżine ʿāʾid ṭālibi şāyān(?)... 
görülemediğinden istiḥḳāḳ ...yetlerine.... muʿaddel diğer bir ḫāne tefvīż olunması 
münāsibdir.” April 9, 1927. CA 272...13.79.07.11, 2, 4.  
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ring the newcomers. Some of these “squatters” had actually been 
given their houses by the state, which only later came to regard them 
as illegal occupants. In rare cases, it is possible to grasp the limited 
extent of central state control in rural areas and towns: in March 1926, 
two exchangees from Drama had their fields in Bergama taken away 
by a local gang leader, an Albanian called İştiripli Hakkı Bey. As they 
explained in their petition to the Ministry of the Interior, Hakkı Bey 
had been the local commander of the irregular nationalist army 
(kuvayı milliye kumandanı) during the war against the Greeks. Inter-
vening in such a case would have meant to seriously alter local power 
relations, and would have been possible only by means of military 
force. Ankara instructed İzmir to investigate the case, but a place as 
remote as Bergama might not have seemed important enough for the 
administration to follow up on the case.61  
In other cases, it seems that the settlement process was hampered by 
the early and rather chaotic registration practices of 1923 and 1924. 
For instance, in June 1926, a certain Hasan and his son Ahmet sent a 
petition from the town of Söke to the Ministry of the Interior in Anka-
ra. Identifying themselves as “exchangees from Salonica resident in 
Söke,” they explained that a settlement inspector had come to town 
and “witnessed the unlawful and corrupt decision of the local settle-
ment administration” for their eviction. 62  Ahmet complained that 
after the inspector’s departure, the local district governor (kaymakam) 
tried again, contrary to the inspector’s orders, to evict him, “insisting 
on the same treatment in order to destroy my home and family.”63 He 
 
61 “Bergama ḳażası daḫilinde … … mübādile tefvīz ederek ḳomisyon-u maḥṣūṣunuñ 
ḳarārıyla ṭarafımıza teslīm edilmiş arāżiye ḳuvvā-yi milliye sābıḳ ḳumandanların-
dan Arnavud İştiripli Ḥaḳḳı Bey başta topladığı mechūl …. Arnavudla ile birlikte 
cebren ve fużūlan … ve zirāʿat etmekte ve bizleri istifādeden maḥrūm eylemektel-
er.” CA 272... 12.48.92.01. 
62 “İskān müfettişi Nāmıḳ Bey Söke’ye geldi… İskān idāresinden ḥaḳḳımda taṭbiḳına 
ḳalḳıştığı ḳānūnsuz ve yolsuz taḫliye ḳararına şāhiddir.” CA 272...12.49.97.12.  
63 “Müfettiş Bey gidince Kaʾimakām Bey meskenimi ve yuvamı bozmaḳ için yine 
eski icrāda ıṣrār ediyor. Ḥuḳūḳ-u ʿadālet nāmına ḥuḳūḳ ve ḥayāt…? miz için serīʿ 
ve … müdāḥaleñiz …suz şeyle(re) istirḥām ederim.” Ibid. 
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asked “for immediate action in the name of law and justice” for the 
matter to be corrected. The said inspector’s report dated June 6, 1926 
narrates the affair quite differently. According to it, 48 houses in Söke 
had been allotted to exchangees in August 1924. During his tour, the 
inspector walked through the town with a list showing the previously 
allotted houses, only to find out that the data given there did not cor-
respond to the actual situation at all. As for the exchangee Ahmet, he 
was indeed part of the list, but there was a (more recent) decision in 
place to give the house to another exchangee. Apparently, many hous-
es, especially income-generating property such as hotels, depots, 
shops, etc. had been given to several people at once. The inspector 
stated that it was this point which had “caused conflict and com-
plaints.”64 He concluded his report with the suggestion that the set-
tlement agency claim the already distributed houses back and start the 
whole allotment process in Söke anew. He did, in other words, admit 
that some people had become squatters as a result of contradictory 
distribution policies. The Minister of the Interior, however, did not 
approve of such an extensive revision and instead suggested that ille-
gal occupants be asked to pay rent. Such cases of the authorities 
stumbling over their own records were not limited to the province of 
İzmir. A similar report on the settlement process in the nearby prov-
ince Manisa written in 1927 came to the conclusion that the admin-
istration had completely lost track of the situation, and that the exist-
ing records were worthless.65 As late as 1928, the allocation commis-
sion in İzmir had to revoke a decision it had previously taken because 
a house in Karşıyaka, which it had allocated to a certain Mehmet 
Derviş from Karaferye, turned out to be used as a school for hearing-
impaired children (dilsizler mektebi). Upon an order from Ankara 
 
64 “Iżṭırāb ve şikāyet bu noḳtadan doğmuştur.” CA 272...12.49.97.12., 2. 
65 See Mehmet Öz and Ferhat Berber, “Mübadele Sürecinde Yaşanan Sorunlar Ve 
Merkezden Müdahaleye Bir Örnek: 1927 Manisa Teftişi,” Atatürk Araştırma 
Merkezi Dergisi, no. 78 (2010) (no page numbers). 
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(possibly caused by a petition sent on behalf of the exchangee) the 
commission gave him another house located in the same street.66  
To be sure, many people were given the house they were already oc-
cupying. According to research conducted by Tülay Alim Baran, a 
register of assignment decisions (tahsis defteri) covering the years 
1928–30 recorded allocations to 280 families, 114 of whom were al-
ready occupying the houses in question, while 68 other houses were 
occupied or rented out to illegitimate (fuzuli) occupants.67 The term 
“rented out” in combination with the adjective fuzuli is curious. It 
might be a reference to cases of people who first illegally occupied 
houses and then started to rent them out to other people.68 On the 
other hand, it seems that some legal owners continued to collect the 
rent due to them despite their houses being considered as abandoned 
property (they might have been considered illegitimate landlords as 
well): as late as 1928, the British vice-consul was paying rent to the 
(mainland) Greek owner of a house despite the fact that the house 
was officially administered by the abandoned property authorities.69  
In January 1927, three exchangees from Kavala petitioned from the 
coastal town of Urla because the houses assigned to them continued 
to be occupied by fire victims (harikzedegan). The petitioners ex-
plained:  
A state order for their removal to their village has not 
been put into effect, making it impossible for exchang-
ees to be settled and bringing us into a most terrible 
condition. It has been decided to let the harikzede stay 
until March. Due to this, the exchangees, who, accord-
ing to the law, have a legal right to be settled, will face 
 
66 CA 272...11.23.123.06. Tevfiz commission’s decision, March 13, 1928.  
67 See Baran, Bir, 135. 
68 Mehmet Şevki criticized this practice in Ahenk: “Ceratkar Canbazlar”, October 14, 
1923.  
69 The contract explicitly stated that the rent was payable to the Greek owner unless 
the authorities stepped in, see FO 369/2172/K 2583, K 2829. 
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the danger of dying in the streets. We therefore ask for 
[your] mercy in this matter.70  
The exchangees’ argument here is twofold: pointing to their legal 
right to settlement (if necessary, to the disadvantage of others), they 
additionally stress the life-threatening situation they were in. This was 
an argument usually employed by their current adversaries, the 
harikzede, who were by definition homeless.  
Other documents in the same file show that both claims were suc-
cessfully contested by the harikzede. According to the governor’s re-
port, the Ministry of the Interior had ordered in September 1926 that 
the harikzede be allowed to stay. Upon this, the local settlement office 
resorted to “squeezing in”, trying to settle as many families as possi-
ble. Despite these efforts, 50 exchangee families were still “out in the 
open,” while 114 houses continued to be occupied by harikzede, who 
included some civil servants and gendarmes. Reversing its previous 
policy, the Ankara office therefore ordered in December that the 
harikzede be brought back to their village. At this point, the harikzede 
successfully turned to a local court, pointing to the previous order in 
their favor and arguing that the exchangees were not homeless at all. 
Since both the district governor and the municipality supported the 
harikzede, the governor was unable to enforce their eviction. 71  He 
 
70 Urla’da (...) emvāl-i metrūke ḫānelerinde iḳāmet eden Ḳuşçular ḳaryesi 
ḥariḳzedegānıñ hemān köylerine naḳlı ve ḫānelerine henüz iskān edilemeyen 
mübādillere iʿṭāsı ḥaḳḳındaki emr-ü devletleriñiz icrā eylemediklerinden iskān 
görmeyen mübādiller fecīʿi bir vażʿiyet içindedir. Ḥariḳzedegānıñ Marta ḳadar 
ḥānelerinde ḳalmaları için teʾsīsāt-ı icrā ḳılındığı işcār ḳılındı. Ḥariḳzedegānıñ 
ḥānelerinde taḥdīd-i iḳāmetine meʾzūniyet verildiği taḳdīrde ḳānūnen iskāna tābiʿi 
olan mübādiller açıḳlarda ölmek tehlīkesine maʿrūż ḳalacaḳtır. Emr-ü 
devletleriñiziñ … taṭbîḳi ḥaḳḳında … … işʿār-i keyfiyet buyurulması merḥamet 
17/1/27 Urla’da Ḳavala mübādillerinden Muṣṭafaoğlu Mūʿsā, İsmaʿiloğlu Ḥüseyin, 
Şerif Ḥüseyin. CA 272...12.51.114.06, 3-4. 
71 The vali’s telegram dated January 13, 1927 reads as follows: 20 Kanunuevvel 926 
ve … Urla’da Rum evlerine iskān edilmiş olan ḥariḳzedeleri Civār (…?) veyahūd ci-
var ḳurʾadaki ḥānelere çıḳarılaraḳ iskān elli ḫāne mübādiliñ bu evlere iskāniyeti 
maḥallına teblīġ ettim. Hariḳzedegān bu kere maḳāma mürācaʿātla evvelce bu 
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therefore wrote to Ankara again and was told that the harikzede would 
finally be evicted in March 1927. The last document in the file was 
written by the Minister of the Interior, Cemil Bey, himself. In it, he 
asks how many harikzede would need to be transported and re-settled 
back in their villages. 
The Urla case shows that “the” state (certainly not only in this locality) 
was in fact comprised of a multiplicity of actors with often contradic-
tory objectives. The exchangees’ claim to a privileged status appears to 
have resonated only with the central and provincial administrations, 
but not at all with the local ones (which were, at least partly, staffed by 
harikzede). To be sure, local authorities could not act completely inde-
pendently from the central ones. However, the harikzede were able to 
exploit the contradictory character of orders from the center, thus 
winning the support of the local court and municipality.  
As discussed above, illegal occupation of abandoned property by civil 
servants, army officers and gendarmes came to be tolerated when 
attempts of the settlement offices to evict these people turned out to 
be unenforceable. This policy was of special importance in İzmir, 
where housing prices skyrocketed in the 1920s. Living in abandoned 
property houses made it possible for public servants to live in a city 
that they would otherwise have been unable to afford. In fact, officials’ 
salaries were so low that free housing, together with corruption, must 
have been a tolerated (and possibly welcome) means of keeping state 
expenditure low. The main writer of Ahenk, Mehmet Şevki, devoted a 
long editorial to the situation of public servants in May 1928. In it, he 
explained that abandoned property, especially that owned by non-
                                                                                                                      
ḫanelerde iḳāmetlerini taṣvīb buyuran vekālet-i celīleleriniñ …. kendilerince ... 
olup ṣūret-i ḳaṭʿiyede taḥliye ve mübādillere teslīm edemeyecekleri ve ancaḳ bu kış 
köylerinde kendileriniñ bāğ mucib olacağından ve zāten bu evlere gelecek 
mübādiller açıḳta olmayıp (illegible line) (…) istirḥām etmişler ḳaʾimakamıñ ve 
maḥallî belediyeniñ (teʾ…-a) göre bu ḥariḳzedeler sākin olduḳları ḥaneleri arṭıḳ 
ḳaṭʿiyyen taḥliye edeceklerini görerek kendilerince? bir … ḳoyulmuşlardır. Elli 
ḥāne ḥalḳıñ (…?) ḳalmalarına … verilmemek için ṣoñ ve ḳaṭʿī olmaḳ üzere kendiler-
ine Mart on beşe… ḳadar … müsāʿadeleri ricā ederim efendim. CA 
272...12.51.114.06, 5. 
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exchangeable Greeks, had long served as a last resort for penniless 
officials, but that this category of houses, too, was now about to be 
rented out at market prices. These prices had recently fallen and were 
no longer as high as several years ago, but continued to be beyond the 
means of officials. How, Mehmet Şevki asked, was an official who 
made 600 Lira per year supposed to pay 250 Lira of rent for the most 
basic housing available?72  
Sırrı Bey was not a petty official, but the chief officer of İzmirʼs aban-
doned property administration (emval-i metruke müdürü). When a 
house on Tramvay Avenue73 in Karataş (the Jewish neighborhood) 
was allocated to a harikzede in 1928, it turned out that Sırrı Bey was 
already dwelling in it illegally. A decision to evict him from the house 
was revoked after he petitioned the national property administration 
in Ankara. (The house must therefore have been owned by a person 
not subject to the population exchange, probably an Armenian or Jew). 
The governor’s report on the matter mentions Sırrı Bey’s occupation 
of the house only in passing. The document instead extensively dis-
cusses how to settle the fire victim in another house. The document 
thus suggests that certain influential officials were very well able to 
stay in houses they were officially supposed to surrender by 1928. 
Considering his position, however, it is interesting to note that Sırrı 
Bey was not able to stop his eviction himself, but rather petitioned 
Ankara. It was upon an order from there that the provincial admin-
istration abandoned the idea to evict him and set upon the task of 
finding alternative housing for the internal refugee.74  
 
72 “Bugün basit bir eviñ bedel-i icārı ... liradan aşağı düşmüyor. Yılda.. lira alan bir 
meʾmūr ikiyüz ellisini … bedeli icārı olarak tefrīk (ederse) geride kalan 350 lira ile 
geçinebiliyor mu? Bunu taḳdīr etmek ... değildir.“ “...fetin temādisi,”, Ahenk, May 
2, 1928.  
73 Present-day İsmet İnönü Caddesi. See Baran, Bir, 76.  
74 “Osmaniye muḥācirlerinden (…) emvāl-i metrūke müdüriyeti muḫbiri Mehmed 
Beyiñ temlīke ṭāleb olduğu ve emvāl-i metrūke müdürü Sırrı Beyiñ taḥt-ı işgālında 
Karataş Tramvay Caddesinde kāʾin 355 numerulü ḫāneniñ ṭālib-i evveli olan 
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5.7 Citizens as customers? The “temlik” law of 1928  
In March 1926, the settlement scheme for internal refugees (“fire-
victims”/ harikzede) and other non-exchangees was changed from rent 
to purchase by mortgage, with a law applicable only to property 
“abandoned by people not subject to the population exchange.” Ac-
cording to the law (no. 781), this class of property would not be 
claimed by the state from people, “apart from those subject to the 
exchange, who have a legal right to settlement and have already been 
settled.” 75  Non-exchangeable people would be allowed to purchase 
real estate according to the rules of the law of obligations (borçlanma 
kanunu) issued in January 1926.76 The property’s 1915 value would be 
transferred to the custodian accounts of the former owners, the rest of 
the money being given “to the respective administrative units.”77 It 
seems likely that the application of law no. 781 was facilitated by the 
introduction of the new Turkish Civil Code (Türk Kanun-u Medeni) 
that had been issued in February 1926.78 Article 530 of the Civil Code 
empowered the Treasury to have absent property owners declared as 
“missing” (gaip) in court in order to take over their inheritance. (This 
was a principle of şeriat law which had been discussed in the TBMM 
in 1922). This procedure was made possible for property that had 
either been administered in accordance with a court decision for ten 
years (i.e. since 1915, the year of the Armenian Genocide) or for ab-
sent owners who were presumably over 100 years old. Article 639 
                                                                                                                      
Meḥmed Beyin haḳḳ-ı iskānında 800 kuruş maʿāşı aṣlısı bulunduğundan nāşi 
ġayr-i muḥtāc ʿadd olunaraḳ (...)” CA 272...12.61.177.05, 1. 
75 Mübadeleye gayri tabi eşhastan metruk olup hakkı iskānı haiz olanlara verilmiş ve 
verilecek emvali gayri menkule hakkında kanun, No. 781, 13 Mart 1926, in: Düstur, 
3. Tertip, cild 7, 655. 
76  Law no. 716. The text is available online at 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc004/
kanuntbmmc004/kanuntbmmc00400716.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
77 These were the “custodian accounts” introduced in the course of the Armenian 
deportations. On the whereabouts of this money, also see page 298. 
78 I would like to thank Afsin Umar (Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul) for pointing 
me towards these articles of the Civil Code.  
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made it possible for people who controlled property owned by a 
“missing” person to have that property recorded in their own name.79 
While law 781 for the sale of property to refugees did not mention the 
rules of the Civil Code, I think that the combination of both made it 
legally possible for the state to do away with the fiction of custodian 
care. It was hardly accidental that both laws were issued a little bit 
more than ten years after the genocide. 
It is hard to tell if and from when on law no. 781 was actually imple-
mented. Local migrants (harikzede) hardly ever appear in the files of 
the settlement office – they probably dealt directly with the Ministry 
of Finance, which was in charge of non-exchangeable property, the 
class of abandoned property in which they were supposed to be settled. 
The archive of the Ministry of Finance, however, is unfortunately not 
open for researchers.  
The one group that can be traced through the settlement authorities’ 
files consists of people who immigrated from the Kingdom of Yugo-
slavia in 1927 and 1928.80 Their files show a mixed picture: some 
documents explicitly state that the property they got as private proper-
 
79 §530: “Hayat ve mematı belli olmayıpta malları on seneden beri mahkeme ma-
rifetile idare edilen yahut mallarının bu suretle idaresi on seneden aşağı olmak-
laberaber yüz yaşını ikmal etmiş olan kimsenin gaipliğine, hazinenin talebi 
üzerine, hükmolunur. (…)“   
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc004/
kanuntbmmc004/kanuntbmmc00400743.pdf, 203 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
 § 639: “Tapu sicillinde mukayyet olmayan bir gayrimenkulu nizasız ve fasılasız 
yirmi sene müddetle ve malik sıfatı ile yedinde bulundurmuş olan kimse o gay-
rimenkulun kendi mülkü olmak üzere tescili talebindebulunabilir. Tapu sicillin-
den maliki kim olduğu anlaşılamayan veya yirmi sene evvel vefat etmiş yahut 
gaipliğine hüküm verilmiş bir kimsenin uhdesinde mukayyet olan bir gayrimen-
kulu ayni şerait altında yedinde bulunduran kimse dahi o gayrimenkulun, mülkü 
olmak üzere tescilini talep edebilir. Tescil ancak hâkimin emrile olur.” Ibd., 221. 
80 Most “Yugoslavian” refugees were from towns in present-day Macedonia such as 
İştip/Štip, Köprülü/Veles, Üsküp/Skopje and Tikveš. People from other places 
(such as Priština and Kolašin) appear with much less frequency. 
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ty would be mortgaged (borçlanma yoluyla temlik).81 In the case of the 
internal migrant whose house turned out to be occupied by a civil 
servant (see page 286) in 1928, however, the correspondence did not 
mention the idea of mortgage at first. Later on, however, the bureau-
crats in Ankara even included a circular of the Treasury in which all 
land registrar’s offices were urged to stop any free transfer of non-
exchangeable property, asking the provincial settlement office to act 
accordingly.  
Up until 1926, both exchangees and other groups (harikzede, muhacir) 
had been relatively irrelevant as buyers of abandoned property: ex-
changees received most of their property “for free” (i.e. in accordance 
with their claims), while internal migrants and other immigrants 
were treated merely as tenants of the Treasury. Law no. 781 changed 
this situation by turning non-exchangee migrants into prospective 
buyers in 1926. As the law granted the transfer of full property rights 
to them, this group was now able to mortgage the houses in question. 
Exchangees, on the other hand, were still subject to the tefviz legisla-
tion, which explicitly denied them the right to mortgage their houses. 
Seen from the perspective of the Treasury, it was now much more 
profitable to sell property to non-exchangees than to allocate it to ex-
changees.  
This new legislative situation soon became the reason for a conflict 
between the Ministry of Finance and that of the Interior. In January 
1928, Minister of the Interior Şükrü Kaya complained about accelerat-
ing sales of abandoned property which were jeopardizing his own 
ministry’s efforts at settling refugees.82 Almost simultaneously, the 
settlement directorate in İzmir evicted tenants from Armenian prop-
erty in order to allocate those houses to exchangees. According to a 
complaint of the National Property Directorate (emlak-ı milliye 
müdürlüğü) to the Directorate for Settlement, such cases had “lately” 
 
81 For instance, see the file of an immigrant from Köprülü/Veles who, two years 
after his application, got an Armenian house in Karşıyaka via mortgage in 1928: 
CA 272...12.57.147.22.  
82 Petition Şükrü Kaya to Prime Minister İnönü, January 14, 1928. CA 30.10.140.2.9. 
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started to occur (the letter was written in March 1928). The letter 
claimed that exchangees preferred Armenian property because it was 
“better ground for profits” [than Rum property]. Although there was a 
“legal foundation” for allocation of Armenian property to them, the 
letter argued that enough Rum property was available and urged the 
Settlement Directorate to keep their hands off Armenian houses. The 
Settlement Directorate forwarded the complaint to its office in İzmir, 
which apparently ignored it. By July 1928, the Ministry of Finance 
complained again, this time with more urgency: Tenants of Armenian 
houses, who were paying rent to the Treasury, had supposedly been 
evicted in order to make room for exchangees, and were now claiming 
their rent back from the Treasury.83  
When these documents were exchanged, the Ministers of Finance 
and Interior Affairs were already negotiating a new law that would 
eventually grant full property rights to exchangees. The Minister of 
the Interior, Şükrü Kaya, stated in his petition that he had only given 
his consent to renewed sale campaigns of the Ministry of Finance 
because he expected that new laws intended for property allocation to 
exchangees would be issued equally promptly. This, however, had not 
happened, while the sales were proceeding much more quickly than 
he had anticipated.84 Both policies were indeed interdependent inso-
far as law no. 1331, which was known as temlik kanunu and was final-
ly issued in May 1928, turned exchangees, too, into prospective buyers 
 
83 Rents were usually paid annually and in advance. FO 369/2172 K 2583, K 2829 
rent allowance for vice-consul in Smyrna. 
84 “(E)mri tażvīb devletleriyle iki milyonluk emlāk-ı metrūkeniñ derḥāl ṣatılmağa 
çıkarılması Maliye vekāletiyle tekerrür ettirilmiş ve Maliye vekāletinen mülḥaḳāta 
da emir verilmişti. Bu mesʾele haḳḳında ṣoñ irşād-ı devletlerini telaḳḳi edinceye 
kadar ṣatılmak muamelesine devam edilmekte olduğuna da ṣūret-i ḳaṭʿiyede zāhib 
idim. İzmir ġazetelerinde gördüğüm emlāk-ı metrūke ṣatılışlarını da bu ʾemrin 
infāẕına ʿaṭif etmekte idim. Ḥattā teʾḫīr-i tefvīż ḥaḳḳında verilmiş olan ʾemriñ geri 
alınması ḥaḳḳında Māliye vekīli beyefendiniñ aẓhar buyurduḳları arżunuñ 
taṭbīḳinden yeni ḳānūnuñ alacağı şekle teʾlīkan(?) ḥarfı naẓār edilmesini ricā eden 
de bendeñizdim. Petition Şükrü Kaya to Prime Minister İnönü, January 14, 1928. 
CA 30.10.140.2.9. 
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of abandoned property. In other words: It had the potential to end the 
conflict between the two ministries.  
The contemporary press reported on the bill for law no. 1331 while it 
was still discussed in parliament. Yunus Nadi, editor of Istanbul-
based Cumhuriyet and deputy for Muğla, predicted that it would 
“without any doubt be one of the most important projects of the third 
İsmet Paşa government” because it would “finally and completely 
clarify the situation of the exchangee citizens.”85 The law would “with 
greatest justice bring about the solution of a messy situation which 
has been [a nuisance] for a long time.” According to Nadi, the present 
state of affairs was not the responsibility of the Turkish, but of the 
Greek government, which had made it impossible to draw up a com-
plete inventory of the property in Greece. The implementation of the 
exchange convention had therefore failed. Although most exchangees 
had been settled, the property distribution had only been carried out 
in a temporary manner, a situation which had “caused a lot of bad 
talk.” After thus blaming the Greek government and explaining the 
policy that the Turkish government had followed so far, Nadi pro-
ceeded to an overview of the new law’s stipulations, which differs 
from the actual text of the law in one important aspect: according to 
him, exchangees would be given bonds corresponding to the value in 
their documents that were not accepted as direct claims (i.e. those 50 
or 60 percent so far not considered – the rule would not be applied to 
kefaletnames, i.e written testimonies of fellow exchangees stating the 
value of property in Greece, which were considered the least reliable 
 
85 “Daḫīliye vekīli Şükrü Kaya ve Maliye vekili Saraçoğlu Şükrü Beyleriñ ġayret-i 
vaḫāmetleri ile bu sene meclīsden mühim bir ḳānūn çıkmaḳ üzere bulunuyor: 
mübādeleye tabiʿi vaṭandaşlarımızıñ vażʿiyetlerini ḳaṭʿiyen intāc ve taṣfiye edecek 
olan ḳānūn. Üçüncü İsmet Paşa ḥükūmetiniñ eñ eṣāṣlı işlerinden birini de bu 
ḳānūnun teşkīl edeceğine şübhe yoḳdur. (...) bu lāyiḥa ḳarışıḳlığı çok devām etmiş 
bir vażʿiyeti aʿẓāmi-yi ʿadāletle taṣfiye ve tesvīye etmiş olacaḳtır. (...) 1: muvaḳḳat 
māhiyetli tefvīż senedlerine muḳābil ṭapu verilecekdir. 2: istiḥḳāḳ bāḳiyesi için 
māliye vekāletince bono verilecektir. 3: bu bonolar metrūk emlāk ṣatışında ʿaynen 
nāḳid gibi geçecektir.” Yunus Nadi, “Müḥim bir taṣfiye,” in: Cumhuriyet, April 30, 
1928. 
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class of documents). These bonds would be accepted in place of cash 
in property sales. The state would thus take a big step towards a just 
and rightful compensation, which had hitherto not been accom-
plished. By “accepting its devotion to fix this situation”, the state had 
“given proof of its desire to show the greatness of justice, which will 
put the refugee’s concerns to peace.”86 Yunus Nadi depicted the bill as 
refugee-friendly, and approved of it. 
Mehmet Şevki in İzmir had a completely different approach to the bill: 
his text displays outright hostility towards exchangees. Writing a week 
after Yunus Nadi, he depicted the bill as one that would make sure 
that “no one will end up with more property than he deserves.” The 
objective of the law was to “do away with the losses that have been 
inflicted on the Treasury.” The real estate that had been given to ex-
changees would be put on auction. Exchangees would be given prop-
erty of a value nine times as high as that inscribed in their tapu doc-
uments, while the rest would be given to the Treasury. Şevki did not 
mention bonds, but assured his readers that exchangees who had 
received more than they deserved (by applying for property distribu-
tion in several towns rather than only in one) would have to return the 
property.87 Şevki mentioned that other refugee groups were affected, 
 
86 “Devlet müşevveş bir vażʿiyetiñ ıṣlahı nāmına bu fedakārlığı ḳabūl etmekle 
fikirlere ve vicdānlara sükun verecek aʿẓāmi-yi ʿadālet ḥıssını göstermek istedi-
ğinin enbüyük delīlini vermiştir.” Yunus Nadi, “Müḥim bir taṣfiye,” in: Cumhuri-
yet, April 30, 1928.  
87 “Istanbul 7 Mayıs (muḥbiri maḫṣūṣumuzdan) Mübādilleriñ, muḥācirleriñ, 
muʿāmelelerine hemān hemān yeniden başlanmasına muʿaddil bir ḳānūn iḥżār 
edilmektedir. Şimdiye ḳadar gayrimemnūniyeti mūcib olmuş ve netīce iʿtibāriyle 
istiḥḳāḳlardan fażlā emlāk ve sāʾire alınması ṣūretiyle ḫazīne aleyḥine vaḳiʿi olmuş 
bulunan żarārlarıñ bu ḳānūniyle ortadan ḳaldırılması istihdāf olunmaḳtadır. Bu 
ḳānūna nażāran mübādillere tefvīż olunan emlāk müzāyedeye ḳonacaḳ, 
mübādiller ellerindeki ṭāpūlarda muḳayyed olan ḳısmıñ ṭoḳuz mıṣlına ṣāḥib 
olacaḳlardır. Ve mütebāḳi ḳısım ḫazīneye intiḳāl edecektir. Maʿlūmdur ki devlet 
mübādeleniñ netāyīcini tekeffül etmiştir. Her hangi bir kimseye istiḥḳāḳından ne 
māhiyetde olursa olsun fażlā bir şey verilmiş olmayacaḳtır. Eğer iki każāda māl 
almış mübādil olursa bunlarıñ da bir każādan aldıḳları emvāl ellerinden istirdād 
edilecek ve kendilerinde yalñız bir ḳażāda aldıḳları māl bıraḳılacaḳdır.” Mehmet 
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too, but only discussed those policies aimed at exchangees. His edito-
rial depicts them as an essentially fraudulent lot whose scandalous 
abuse of their rights was about to be curbed. 
The exchangees in İzmir were quick to react to Mehmet Şevki’s text. 
Only two days later, on May 10, 1928, they sent a collective petition to 
Ankara. 148 exchangees, both male and female, from towns all over 
New Greece signed the text, which might in fact have been the prod-
uct of a hastily held meeting. Without using any of the usual intro-
ductory phrases, the petitioners come right to the point of their con-
cern:  
We have learned from announcements in the newspa-
pers that the Ministry of Finance has made some last ad-
justments to the bill for an issuance of title deeds for 
property granted through tefviz, and that these adjust-
ments unfortunately either completely deny or ignore 
our most eminent rights.88 
The matter that had spread “anxiety and distress” (endişe ve heyecan 
düşürdüğü) among the refugees was the government’s (alleged) plan 
to compare the present-market value of property in Turkey to the 
value inscribed in the exchangees’ title deeds brought from Greece, 
merely assessing their present value as nine times of that recorded in 
the tapus. The argument of the petition follows the line that such a 
policy only made sense in rural areas. Anywhere else (i.e. in urban 
settings, and especially İzmir proper), where present market values 
were considerably higher than that, exchangees would effectively be 
                                                                                                                      
Şevki, “Mübādillere ʿāʾid bir ḳānūn hażırlanıyor. Ḥiç kimseniñ elinde istiḥḳāḳın-
dan fażlā māl bıraḳılmayacaḳtır,” in: Ahenk, May 8, 1928.  
88 “Mübādillere tefvīż edilen emlākıñ ṭāpūya rabṭı ḥaḳkında ḥażırlanan lāyiḥa aḫiran 
māliye vekāletince baʿżı taʿdīlāt yapıldığı ve maʿālesef bu taʿdīlātıñ eñ bāriz 
ḥaḳḳlarımızıñ açıktan ʿāciziye-yi inkār veya tecāhül māhiyetinden olduğunu baʿżı 
ġazetelerde intişār edilen ḫaberlerden anladıḳ.“ CA 30.10...123.878.07, 1.  
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stripped of their right to property allocation, because their documents 
would be worthless in the auctions.89  
The petition goes on to present such treatment as a clear violation of 
the Republican promise and as a threat to people’s loyalty to the gov-
ernment:  
However much our local government might be a peo-
ple’s government – it nevertheless harms us. The quick 
and lawful conclusion of the settlement process is a 
matter of the highest importance [for the government]. 
(...)[However,] things have come to a point where the 
idea of justice and legality, which once governed the pol-
icies towards us, is nothing more than a wish. This real-
ization has caused a lot of confusion among the people, 
who once believed that the Republic of Turkey would 
never become the scene of such conditions, and certain-
ly not [a place] where they take the form of laws.”90 
The petition does not only take up Mehmet Şevki’s information about 
the projected calculation of the petitioners’ claims, but also contests 
his depiction of the exchangees as a group of swindlers. Instead, the 
petitioners argued that their interests and those of the Treasury were 
essentially identical: if one citizen got more than he deserved, the 
 
89 “Bunlara inanmaḳ lāzım gelirse (...) mütefevviże ancaḳ bir ḳażā-yı dāḫiliyede māl 
tefvīżini ve bunuñ ḥāricinde şimdiye kadar merʿī olan ṣoñ ḳānūn ve niẓāmāta 
tevfīḳan tefvīżi istediği emvālıñ istirdādı (…) edildikten başḳa tefvīż edilen mālıñ 
ḳıymet-i ḥażırası tefvīżine esās olan ṭapu ḳıymetiniñ ṭoḳuz mıṣlına fāʾik olduğu 
taḳdīrde bunuñ bil-müzāyede fürūḥtu ile mütefevviż ancaḳ ṭapu ḳıymetiniñ ṭoḳuz 
mıṣlı derecesinde varaḳa-yı taḳdīr teʿdiyāt ile iktiżā edilmesi (...) tefvīż ḥaḳḳını 
fiʿilen ibṭāla muʿāddil (...)”CA 30.10...123.878.07, 2. 
90 “İfā-yi iskān işleminiñ aʿżāmi ṣūret ve ḥaḳāniyetle buyurulması eñ ziyāde maṭlūb-
u mültezem olan şu arada ḥükūmet-i maḥalliyemiziñ ḥalḳ ḥükūmeti her ne şekil 
ve ṣūretle olursa olsun iḫlāliyeden mesḥūḳ buluruz. Bir an siyāsetine ve 
mübādiller ḥaḳḳıñda öteden beri bir (…?) ve ibrāz eylediği yüksek ḥaḳāniyet ve 
fikr-i ʿadālete (...) maṭlūb düşmesi bu gibi (tadirātıñ?) cumhūriyet Türkiyesi’nde 
mevḳiʿi olmadığı ve hiç bir zamān ḳānūn şeklini (...) edemeyeceği düşüncesi (...).” 
CA 30.10...123.878.07, 2. 
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most immediate result was that another citizen did not get enough. 
Therefore, those having the most vital interest in a remedy to current 
shortcomings were the exchangees themselves. 91  The present bill, 
however, would revoke a practice that had sometimes been abused 
only to replace it with universal injustice.92 Auctions were an ill-suited 
instrument for the establishment of current market prices as long as 
the property in Greece was not appraised in the same way.93 Rather 
than that,  
we humbly ask [you] to let us remind [you] that the 
shortest and most logical way to arrive at the desired re-
sult, i.e., to give every citizen what he deserves without 
bringing harm to the Treasury, is to perform the univer-
sal appraisal projected in the exchange agreement, 
which has been accepted by the National Assembly and 
therefore has the status of a national law. 94 
Unfortunately, the file at hand doesn’t contain any additional docu-
ments that would offer clues for an assessment of the government’s 
reaction to this unusual and highly critical petition. 
 
91 “Mübādiller kitlesiniñ bu ḥaḳḳlarında ḥazine ile hem müteʿallik olduğu iskāndir. 
Çünkü her hangi vaṭandaş ḥaḳḳından fażla māl alması diğer baʿżı vaṭandaşlarıñ 
da ḥaḳḳını alamaması neticesini vermektedir ki bundan eñ ziyāde muteʾessir ve 
binaʾenaleyh bu vażʿiyetiñ izālesinde herkesden fażla ʿalāḳası olan şübhesiz ki 
mübādillerdir.” Ibid., 2-3. 
92 “Teklīf edilen taʿdīlāt ise maʿālesef ḥuḳūḳi baʿżı yolsuzluḳları temyīz için ʿumūmî 
bir ḥaḳḳsızlığı teʾsīye muʿaddil görünmektedir.” Ibid., 5. 
93 “Müzāyede uṣūlunuñ taḳdîr ḳıymete esās olabilmesi için Yunanistan’da metrūk 
Türk emlākıñ da aynı şekilde müzāyede ile ḳıymet taḳdīri icāb edeceği ve yoḳsa bir 
ṭarafından ṭāpū ḳıymeti mübādil mülkü için esās ʿadd ediliyorken diğer ṭarafında 
tefvīż edilecek māla müzāyede ile ḳıymet taḳdīriniñ ʿādilāne bir taḳdīr ḳıymetle hiç 
bir münāsebeti olamayacağı (...)” CA 30.10...123.878.07, 6. 
94 “Maṭlūb olan gāyeye yaʿni ḥazineyi müteżerrer etmeksizin her vaṭandaşa haḳḳını 
vermekte netīcesine varmaḳ için eñ ḳıṣa ve manṭıḳī yoluñ Büyük Millet Meclisince 
ḳabūl edilmiş bir ḳānūn māhiyetinde olan mübādele iʿtilāfnāmesiniñ müfred(?) 
“ʿumūmi” taḳdīr-i ḳıymet ve taṣdīḳ esāsına ṣūretden ibāret olduğunu ḥaṭırlat-
mamıza müsāʿade et(…menizi?) istirḥām eyleriz.” Ibid. 3.  
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Law no. 1331 “for the tapu registration of immovable property which 
has been granted or allotted in accordance with exchangee, non-
exchangee and other migrants’ legislation” was published on May 30, 
1928.95 It came to be known simply as “granting as freehold law” 
(temlik kanunu), and was supposed to regulate both such tefviz-
procedures that had already taken place and those that would be per-
formed in the future. Mübadil refugees were given the right to regis-
ter property in their name that had already been assigned to them, 
provided that the value did not exceed a certain percentage of the 
value recorded in their documents from Greece: 20 percent for guar-
antees drawn up according to tasfiye talepnames, 40 percent for title 
deeds without values (kıymetsız tapu) and 50 percent for those title 
deeds which included values (kıymetli tapu).96 (As these percentages 
were the same that had been accepted in the regulation for the appli-
cation of the 1924 tefviz law, the law basically transformed temporary 
rights into permanent ones.) According to §2, refugees who had not 
left behind any property, local homeless people (harikzede), and no-
madic tribes would also be given title deeds for the property that had 
been assigned to them, but in their case, the property would be mort-
gaged. With the exception of people whose documents were still un-
der review at the Mixed Commission (§3), people were given six 
months time to apply for the procedure. A distinction was made be-
tween people who had received property of a value between 2,000 and 
10,000 Lira and those who had been given more valuable property. 
While the title deeds of the former were to be issued by the local allo-
cation commissions (tefviz komisyonları), the tapus of those given 
more valuable property would only be issued by the Ministry of the 
Interior (§4). According to §5, the whole procedure was supposed to 
 
95 Mübadil, gayri mübadil, muhacir vesaireye kanunlarına tevfikan tefviz veya adiyen 
tahsis olunan gayri menkul emvalin tapuya raptına dair kanun, May 30, 1928, 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc006/
kanuntbmmc006/kanuntbmmc00601331.pdf ; Kardeş, “Tehcir ve emval-i metruke 
mevzuatı”, 107–9. 
96 For the (possible) difference between “kıymetli” and “kıymetsiz” tapu documents, 
see  page 260.  
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be finished within a year. With the exception of property abandoned 
by people subject to the population exchange (i.e., Ottoman Greeks), 
all abandoned property that had not yet been distributed among refu-
gees was given to the Treasury (§6).97 In the event of absent owners 
successfully reclaiming property rights, article 7 prohibited the resti-
tution of real property to them and stipulated that compensation 
would be paid by the Treasury.98 The migrants who received property 
rights would be asked to pay the usual fees for the issuing of tapu 
documents. Those who already lived in the houses were allowed to 
pay the fees in three installments over a period of three years (§8). 
It is important to note that the property to which full property rights 
were given with law no 1331 was never called state property. The law 
made it very clear that the issue at hand was not expropriation. Indeed, 
§7 mentions the possibility that the actual owners would successfully 
reclaim their rights. The law protected the settlers (and the Treasury) 
by outlawing the restitution of property to its real owners, who were 
not expropriated. The law did, in other words, illegally transfer rights 
from one owner (the absent non-Muslim) to a new one (a mübadil or 
another kind of migrant). The property had never been legally trans-
ferred from the Greek and Armenian owners to the state. This is most 
obvious for Armenian property, but also for that owned by Ottoman 
Greeks: The complete valuation of all exchangeable property had not 
been performed, therefore Rum property, too, had not passed into 
legal ownership of the Turkish state yet. Its transfer to the refugees 
was technically illegal, and yet another step in safeguarding the dis-
possession of the former owners.  
At a point in time when neither the legal status of abandoned proper-
ty in Greece and Turkey nor its amount and total value had been clari-
 
97 This was merely an affirmation of a rule that had been in place since 1924. A 
petition of Minister of the Interior Şükrü Kaya to Prime Minister İsmet indicates 
that he had been very upset about the Maliye’s continued and unabated sale of 
abandoned property in January 1928. CA 30.0.10...140.2.9. The paragraph appar-
ently once again marked the division of labor between the two ministries.  
98 This principle can already be found in article 4 of the “liquidation law” (tasfiye 
kanunu) of 1915: See chapter 1.6.4. 
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fied, this aspect (the safeguarding of the Armenian dispossession) 
might indeed have been the governments’ main objective for bringing 
the bill in: in the very same parliamentary session in which law no. 
1331 was issued, on May 24, 1928, the TBMM also issued law number 
1349, which transferred future incomes to the “abandoned property 
current accounts” (emval-i metruke hesab-ı carileri), which were held in 
the name of absent Armenians and Greeks, to the general budget.99 
300,000 Lira from these accounts were transferred to the 1928 budget 
of the Ministry of Finance. It is unknown how much money had been 
in these accounts in the first place, yet it is likely that this was the total 
sum, which was thus openly appropriated by the state. Likewise, we 
do not know the total value of the property whose rents and other 
incomes had been kept (certainly only partly) in these accounts. Law 
no. 1349 stipulated that the incomes of the sales projected in the tem-
lik kanunu as well as all future ones would effectively be transferred to 
the state. At the same time, §6 of the temlik kanunu stipulated that 
non-exchangeable property not used for refugee settlement was to be 
transferred to the Treasury: both laws mutually secured each other, 
making sure that neither property nor money would have to be re-
turned. Salahaddin Kardeş points at this function of the temlik law.100 
According to him, §6 of the temlik law effectively ended property resti-
tution (to Greek citizens) that had been possible between 1926 and 
1927. He cites two regulations that made restitution possible which 
were most likely issued in the context of negotiations with Greece (see 
chapter 4.2).101 However, there were also important domestic reasons 
for the project. Significant amounts of several million Lira that had 
been obtained by selling state-controlled property were recorded in 
the budgets of the following years.102 Onaran is probably correct in 
 
99 On law no. 1349, also see page 111. The full text is available at 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc006/
kanuntbmmc006/kanuntbmmc00601349.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
100 Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 9. 
101 These were kararname no 3753, issued on June 13, 1926, and no. 5451, issued July 
17, 1927. Both texts can be found in Kardeş, “Tehcir”, 141, 164. 
102 See Onaran, Emvâl-i Metrûke, 264–70. 
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assuming that much of this property had been owned by dispossessed 
Armenians and other minorities.  
Minister of the Interior Şükrü Kaya claimed in 1931, when follow-up 
law no. 1771 was discussed, that law number 1331 had been passed in 
order to speed up the distribution process to refugees: from 1928 on, 
the land in question was no longer measured and categorized accord-
ing to its characteristics, but solely judged according to its market 
value.103 It might be true that this change in policy accelerated the 
whole distribution process – on the other hand, it effectively turned 
houses, fields and gardens that had practical value for dwelling and 
making a livelihood into a commodity to be measured solely in terms 
of market prices. A petition sent in July 1928 exemplifies the devastat-
ing effects of this change and the problems that arose when property 
values were appraised from afar: sent by a former inhabitant of a 
village in the province of Salonica, it explains that the place had once 
been comprised of 375 dwellings, 50 shops, 8 mills, and 3,500 dönüm 
of arable land. The houses and fields of the village had been appraised 
and officially registered for the first and last time in 1291/1875–76. At 
that point, the value of houses had ranged from 3 to 60 Lira, those of 
shops from 3 to 25 Lira and those of mills from 10 to 60 Lira. The 
fields had uniformly been estimated at 4 Lira. 46 years later, the ap-
praisal prior to the villagers’ departure for Turkey (which was appar-
ently performed by a local mixed commission) had estimated dwell-
ings at 1,000 to 2,000, shops at 400 to 800, mills at 1,000 to 1,500, and 
fields at 100 to 150 Lira.  
Salonica and its hinterland had been integrated into world markets in 
the late 19th century, and these numbers probably indicate the spec-
tacular effect that this economic boom had on real estate and land 
prices. Even if the petitioner had brought his tapu records dating from 
 
103 Şükrü Kaya justified this shift towards a value-oriented distribution by pointing 
out that the previous procedure had been far too slow: He claimed that only 1200 
out of 40,000 applications had been checked between 1923 and 1928. See 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d03/c026/tbmm0302603
6.pdf (19 March 1931), 61 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
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the 1870s with him, they would have been nearly worthless in the 
compensation process. The tasfiye talepnames provided by local mixed 
commissions in Greece may have provided a more realistic picture of 
present-day values, but they were viewed with suspicion in Turkey. 
Applicants who presented this kind of document could, according to 
the temlik kanunu of 1928, only receive houses or fields whose value 
represented 20 percent of that inscribed in these documents.  
The petitioner, a certain Hasan Hüsnü, expressed his doubts about 
the widespread belief that some tasfiye talepnames contained exagger-
ated claims. He argued that even if they did, it had previously been 
decided to check them (and that it therefore was not necessary to 
universally accept parts of the sums only). He stressed that his claims 
were “accepted among the exchangees” and it was “clear as the day” 
that a just consideration of their claims would “also serve the glorious 
benefit of our national Treasury.”104  
People from the Salonica province indeed found themselves in a par-
ticularly difficult position. According to a memo of the Ministry of the 
Interior from July 1926, beyannames (another name for tasfiye talep-
names) of exchangees from there could only be considered after hav-
ing been scrutinized by the ministry because this group had received 
their documents from the Greek government. (This internal memo 
did not mention the otherwise popular accusation that people had 
filled in the forms by themselves.)105 The temlik kanunu of 1928 offers 
an alternative to considering these documents, namely, tapu and oth-
er ownership documents. However, when these were as old as those 
from the petitioner’s village, a consideration even of 50 percent of that 
value would indeed have left the exchangees with next to nothing. 
Even multiplication by factor nine (as discussed in Mehmet Şevki’s 
 
104 “ḥaḳḳ ve ḥiṣṣemde beynelmuḥācirīn ḳabūl (...) ḫazine-yi milliyemizin menfaʿat-ı 
ʿaẓīmeye nāʾil olacağı gün gibi aşikārdır.” CA 30.00.10...123.878.8.  
105 “Selānik ve... ... vilāyeti Yunan ḥükūmetince verilmiş ... beyānnāmelerde münde-
riç olduğu ṣūrette ....leri ...muʿāmeleye ḳonamaz. (?) Ancaḳ işbu ...lar ...den tanẓīm 
edilemeyen beyānnāmeleriyle vekālet-i celileye gönderilmesi (...) tedḳīḳāttan ṣoñra 
beyānnāmeler ... tefvīż muʿāmele ḳomisyonundaki ... gönderilir. Ancaḳ bu ṣūretle 
taṣdiḳ eyledikten ṣoñra... bir ḳıymet iktisāb edebilirler. CA 272...13.79.03.06. 
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editorial) would not have done justice to the (plausible) surge in prices 
that the petition claims.  
The available data suggests that the government did not come up with 
a solution to this problem, turning a deaf ear to refugee complaints. 
The İskan Tarihçesi, an overview over the settlement policies pub-
lished in 1932, merely states that refugees often presented tapus da-
ting from as far back as 1865, and that it was not clear how to deal 
with them.106  
Following its promulgation in May 1928, İzmir’s newspapers did not 
criticize the rules laid down in the temlik law, but merely complained 
about delays in its implementation. §5 of the law projects that the 
process of settlement and tapu granting be finished within a year. In 
1928, employees of the tapu office in İzmir were ordered to work until 
8 p.m. in order to meet the deadline, which could nevertheless not be 
met.107 Ahenk reported in 1929 that not even half of the 3,000 cases 
for İzmir had been finished and that of those finished, not even 10 
percent had been granted tapus. Worst of all, many decisions of the 
commission had ended up in court, where people were now “at each 
other’s throats.” The same article calls for a new settlement director, 
arguing that the present one was utterly incapable of doing the job.108 
An open letter to the governor even calls for a complete dissolution of 
the settlement agency:  
Your Excellency, unless you want to end up feeling re-
sponsible for this mess, knock down the whole settle-
ment machinery and replace it with one that actually 
works. You can be sure that the exchangees and refu-
 
106 Arı, Büyük Mübadele, 142; İskân Tarihçesi, 47. 
107 Anadolu, December 12, 1928, cited in Baran, Bir Kentin Yeniden Yapılanması 
(İzmir 1923-1938), 129. 
108 “Verilen bir çok kararlar ashabı mesalihi, mahkeme kapılarına sürüklemiş ve 
gırtlak gırtlağa mücadeleye düşürmüştür. Bugün İzmir iskan dairesinde. nefsi 
İzmir’e ait dosyaların adedi 3000 kadardır. Bunların daha nısfı bile tefviżden 
geçmemiştir. Geçenlerin de onda birine tapu verilmemiştir.” Orhan Rahmi, 
“İskan,” in: Ahenk, September 24, 1929, in: Arıkan, İzmir Basınından Seçmeler 
(1923-1938), 80. 
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gees will [out of gratefulness] build a memorial for 
you.109 
The Ministry of the Interior announced in 1930 that working hours in 
İzmir’s settlement office could be extended throughout the night.110 
The lagging settlement process continued to be a popular subject of 
the press in 1929–30.  
5.8 The issue of debt, old and new  
The application of law no. 1331 was far from satisfactory. Many of 
these problems can be triangulated from the follow-up law no. 1771, 
which was issued in March 1931, when Turkey was in the midst of 
the World Economic Crisis and large numbers of people were failing 
to repay their loans. It was known under the same name as the law 
that had regulated the dispossession of the deported Armenians in 
1915: “liquidation law” (tasfiye kanunu). Several of its stipulations 
make reference to practices that were not spelled out in previous laws, 
but nevertheless appear to have been common. Most notable is the 
apparent mortgaging of land that had been provided by default set-
tlement (iskan-ı adi). Moreover, law no. 1771 was the first law to men-
tion the issuance of bonds (kupon) for those parts of claims that had 
not been considered before. These bonds were secured with and 
would be paid out of rent revenues from property “under control of 
the treasury” – in all likeliness, Armenian and other abandoned prop-
erty that the state had illegally seized. 
Law no. 1771 dealt with the status of those houses and fields that had 
been given to refugees in accordance with the previous temlik kanunu 
of 1928: All previous decisions for property distribution were declared 
irrevocable. However, the outstanding debts and mortgages were 
 
109 “Paşa Hazretleri bu mühim konunun vicdani sorumluğu altında kalmak istemez-
seniz mevcut iskân makinasını temelinden yıkınız ve iş görecek bir hale koyunuz. 
Emin olunuz ki mübadil ve muhacirler heykelinizi yaparlar.” A. Kami in Ahenk, 
February 7, 1929, cited in: Baran, Bir Kentin Yeniden Yapılanması (İzmir 1923-
1938), 115. 
110 Anadolu, June 2, 1930. Ibid., 129.  
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equally declared valid and fully repayable (§1, §2).111  All those ex-
changees who were still occupying houses that exceeded their legal 
claims were obliged to either mortgage the house or leave it (§2). Peo-
ple who had received houses and/or fields in accordance with and up 
to the standards of the basic settlement procedure (iskan-ı adi) would 
be given full property rights. Standards for this basic amount of land 
deemed necessary for a family were spelled out in an annex to the law. 
Fire victims, regardless of the legal status of their occupancy (i.e., 
even if they were squatters) were given full rights to those properties 
up to the iskan-ı adi standards, but anything exceeding these stand-
ards would be given to them via mortgage (§5). Pending installments 
for mortgaged property that stayed below the limits of iskan-ı adi be-
came obsolete, however, installments that had already been paid 
would not be paid back (§6). No tapu fees would be demanded of ex-
changees, refugees and fire victims (§7). Those people who had ap-
plied according to the previous law but had not received property yet 
were given an additional three months to apply for the temlik proce-
dure (§9). A tasfiye delegation (in charge of the liquidation of claims), 
to be comprised of officials from the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Finance, was set up (§8), and charged with a review of all 
tefviz documents, which would be sent in by the provincial tefviz 
commissions. This inter-ministerial delegation would issue liquida-
tion documents for the claims (§10). Liquidation documents would be 
comprised of bonds (kupon) to be issued in three installments. The 
value of the bonds would be that of the verified sum of an applicant’s 
claims. Only those exchangees who had received less than a third of 
their legal claims in property would be given bonds of all three in-
stallments, the others either two (up to two thirds received) or only 
one (two thirds or more received) (§11). The bonds would be marketa-
ble and inheritable according to the general laws (§12). With the ex-
ception of real estate earmarked for temlik to claimants, all property 
still in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior was transferred back 
 
111 Mübadele ve teffiz işlerinin katʿi tasfiyesi ve intacı hakkında kanun no 1771, in: 
Düstur, 3. Tertip: cild 12 (Ankara, 1931), 222–25. 
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to the Treasury (§13). Real estate that should have been given to non-
exhangees (gayrimübadil), but had been distributed among fire vic-
tims and refugees (muhacir) would remain in the hands of the pre-
sent occupants, the non-exchangees would instead be given property 
of equal value. Exchangees who were still paying installments for 
mortgaged exchangeable property would be allowed to use their 
bonds for payments (§13). The Treasury would prepare the exchange-
able property for sale that had not been distributed yet, according to 
the legal claims of the exchangees (§14). In these sales, the documents 
issued to claimants would be accepted as equal to cash. (§15). The 
bonds were secured with the revenues of immovable property that 
was controlled by the Treasury (the lionʼs share of which must have 
been Armenian-owned). These revenues would be paid to the Agricul-
tural Bank, which would use them to cash the bonds (Art. 16). In the 
event of the first installment of bonds not being cashed or used in the 
auctions, the second installment would not be started. The same rule 
would apply for the third installment, depending on the second. If the 
money at the Agricultural Bank or the property at hand should turn 
out insufficient, those bonds issued last would be served first (§17). If 
either money or property remained, it would be transferred to the 
Treasury (§18). All previous legislation that contradicted the present 
regulations was declared void (§20). 
It seems possible that the rules for property appraisal that had already 
been laid down in previous laws only came to be fully implemented in 
1931. This might explain why the newspapers in İzmir only started to 
really criticize the under-evaluation of exchangee property in Greece 
at this point. A certain Mehmet Sırrı masterfully linked the issue of 
values to those of ethnicity and citizenship. Interestingly, he made a 
terminological distinction between the Greeks’ status as Ottoman 
citizens (teba'a) and that of the contemporary Türk (Türk vatandaşı):  
Do you really consider a Turkish house with six rooms 
equal to a Greek one with only one? You seem to think 
that Turks are a bunch of tramps who have never seen a 
proper house, let alone lived in one, but spent all their 
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life in the streets. Asked how they can possibly appraise 
a Turkish house [in Greece] at twenty, but a Greek one 
[in Turkey] at 1,500 Liras, they tell us: “We also see the 
absurdity of it, but this is the order, decision, and law 
that came from Ankara.” We would like to ask the in-
spector: does the nation pay you for bringing their 
claims down to zero? Seeing the wrongness of these or-
ders, why don’t you point it out to Ankara?112 
In 1931, when law no. 1771 was issued, Turkey was in the midst of 
the World Economic Crisis, suffering heavily from the massive slump 
in prices for agricultural raw products (which had started as early as 
1928 in Turkey). Prices of agricultural land, but also those of real 
estate in the cities, had dropped dramatically, while property taxes 
stayed the same, driving great numbers of people into bankruptcy.113 
Not only taxes, but also installments for property that people had 
purchased in the auctions of abandoned property that had taken place 
since 1922 needed to be paid. One deputy at the TBMM actually 
claimed in 1931 that the run on abandoned property in the early 
1920s had caused the current crisis. Şevket (Akyazı), deputy for Ordu, 
brought in a bill on this issue. He pointed out that abandoned proper-
ty had usually been sold against down payments, the full prices to be 
paid in eight annual installments. High demand had led to fierce 
competition among potential buyers in towns and villages, leading to 
 
112 “Nazarınızda bir Türkün altı odalı bir evi, bir Rum evinin tek odasına karşılık 
gelecek kadar kıymetsız itibarsız mıdır? Nazarınızda Türk vatandaşlarınız hiç ev 
görmemiş, iyice bir ev de yatmamış, bütün hayatlarını sokak ortasında geçirmiş 
bir alay serseri midir ki, onun evine 20 lira verilsin tebasının her evine bin beşyüz 
lira kıymet takdir ediyorsunuz? Denildiği zaman size şu cevabı verirler: Bu karar-
ların saçmalığını biz de biliyoruz fakat, Ankaradan gelen emir, karar, kanun 
böyledir. Bir gün Müfettişe sormak istedik. Millet size maaşınızdan başka bu 
yevmiyeleri milletin hakkını sıfıra, hiçe indirmek için mi veriyor? Saçmalığını si-
zin de görüp itiraf ettiğiniz bu yanlış ve sonu çıkmaz emirler için Ankara’nın dik-
katını çekemez misiniz?” Mehmet Sırrı in Halkın Sesi, June 24, 1931. Cited in 
Baran, Bir, 149. 
113 Emrence, “Turkey”. 
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many properties being bought for five to six times the former prices. 
Not only were people now, in the midst of the crisis, struggling to pay 
their debts (and the high interest, which amounted to almost the 
same as the original purchase price), but the property rush itself could 
be seen as a cause of the crisis.114 115 Şevket Bey further explained that 
the Treasury was now once again auctioning property (in order to 
collect tax debts) to prices lower than before, handing the houses over 
to new tenants, but nevertheless demanding the first buyers to pay the 
difference.116 Şevket Bey’s bill therefore foresaw that the Treasury, 
which had “already pocketed the recorded prices of the abandoned 
property”, would cancel all remaining debts.117 The bill was indeed 
taken up by the assembly. However, the resulting law did not provide 
 
114 “Hazīneye intikal eden emval-i gayri mekūlenin (sic) satış bedelleri bidayeten 
peşinen alınmakta idi. Bilahara sekiz sene müddet ve sekiz taksitte ödenmesi (...) 
kabul edilmiştir (...) taksitlerin vakti zamanile ve müşkilat çekilmeksizin ödeye-
bilmek hususunda memleketin her tarafında fezi bereket meşhut olması hasebile 
emvali gayri menkuleye olan ihtiyaçlarını tatmin etmek kastile köyli ve kasabalı bir 
çok halk tarafından gayri menkul emval müzayedesine iştirak ve ekseriyetle 
görüldüğü üzere saikai rekabetle değer kıymetinden (...) beş altı mıslı fazlasına 
iştira edilmiştir. Müddeti hulūl eden taksitlerin tediyesi için alakadarların istikrazı 
dahil tahvilatı mübayaasına tehacümü bu tahvilin yükseldikçe yükselmesine ve 
nihayet evrakı naktiye ile hemen hemen başa baş bir dereceye tereffuuna sebep 
olmuştur. Şu suretle emlâk olarak taksitlerini ümit ve hesap ettikleri tarzda 
ödeyeceklerini zan edenler ağır bir yük altında kalarak şaşaladılar. (...) iktisadi 
buhran bu taksitlerin tediyesi imkanını selp edecek dereceye gelmiştir. Hatta 
kuvvetle iddia ve dermeyan olunabilirki iktisadî buhranin en mühim amillerinden 
birisi halkın gayri menkul emval almağa teşebbüs ve tehacümleri olmuştur.” Jan-
uary 27, 1931. CA 30.10...3.18.6, 3. 
115 Reports about the rush on Muslim property in Serbia after 1877–78 made a very 
similar argument, pointing out that the auctions had led to mounting indebted-
ness among the remaining population. Höpken, “Flucht”, 18. 
116 In this respect, the treasury acted exactly as Spanish banks do today: “Hazinede 
olbabdaki kanuna tevfikan sattığı emlâki yeniden müzayedeye çıkarmak ve talibine 
ihale ederek noksan satılanların fazlasını ilk alıcısından talep ve evvelce verilmiş 
olan taksitleri hazine lehine irat kayt etmek vaziyetinde kaldı.” CA 30.10...3.18.6, 4.  
117 “Halbuki hazine almış olduğu ilk bir kaç taksitle emlâkin mukayyet kiymetini 
istifa etmiş bulunuyordu.” CA 30.10...3.18.6, 4. 
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for a cancellation of the outstanding installments, but merely for their 
postponement for a period of up to 12 years. The remaining sums 
were even raised by one installment (bir misli?) and made subject to 
an additional interest of 5 percent.118 Subsequent laws issued in 1933 
and 1936 show that repayments were stretched even further, and that 
the government insisted on the payment of these debts throughout 
the following years.119  
Urban property that had been allocated to refugees had been ap-
praised when prices were at their peak in the mid-1920s, and those 
sums that could not be covered by their claims had been mortgaged. 
The governments’ insistence on these debts (in §2 of law No. 1771) 
caused considerable unrest in İzmir. The newspaper Halkın Sesi (“the 
voice of the people”) criticized that the prices estimated in ongoing 
appraisals were far beyond the actual market prices: 
Who has given the government the right to appraise a 
Turkish house at 50, and a Greek house at 1,000 Lira, 
leaving the citizen (vatandaş) with a debt of 950? Do the 
people in Ankara actually understand what a sum of 
1,000 or 10,000 Lira means in İzmir today? Do they 
know that even a big house on the first kordon with sev-
eral shops and depots in it is sold for only 10,200 Liras? 
How are refugees supposed to pay tens of thousands of 
Liras when they already lose their sleep whenever tax 
payments are due?120 
 
118 Hazine’den taksitle gayrimenkul satın almış olanlarının taksit bedellerinin tescili 
hakkında kanun No. 1773, March 26, 1931, 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc009/
kanuntbmmc009/kanuntbmmc00901773.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
119 These were law no. 2222 (issued on 25 May, 1933) 
  http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/2417.pdf, and no. 3031, (issued on June 11, 
1936): http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/3333.pdf. 
120 “Hükümete bir Türk’ün evine 50, bir Rum evine 1000 lira kıymet takdir ederek 
vatandaşları bu işlemden 950 altın borçlandırmak hakkını kim verdi? Bin altının, 
on binlerce liranın bugünkü İzmir için ne demek olduğunu Ankara’dakiler biliyor-
lar mı? Bugün İzmir’in en itibarlı yerinde, Birinci Kordonun en işlek bir nok-
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Possibly as a reaction to growing criticism, those debts below the line 
of iskan-ı adi (i.e. the amount of land or housing deemed absolutely 
necessary for a family’s subsistence) were canceled in July 1931.121 
İzmir governor Kâzım Paşa (Dirik) announced in the same month 
that 9,000 families in the province had been settled with iskan-ı adi. 
4,700 of these had applied for a liquidation of their debts, which had 
already been granted in 2,000 cases.122 Debts of people who had been 
settled according to other rules, however, stayed in place. According to 
nationwide statistics of the cadastral office (tapu kadastro müdürlüğü), 
745,686 pieces of property were allocated to exchangees and other 
refugees or immigrants until 1937. For 61,484 of these, no tapu doc-
uments were issued, mostly because the real estate in question had 
exceeded the legal claims of the refugees and had therefore been 
mortgaged (the other reason were incomplete application docu-
ments).123 The numbers indicate that most of the property that was 
given to exchangees was cheap enough to be matching their claims. 
Unfortunately, the data does not make a distinction between exchang-
ees and other people, it is therefore hard to estimate how many ex-
changees actually had to mortgage houses and land.  
Both the Ankara agreement of 1930 and the issuing of bonds in 1931 
left a number of problems unsolved that were all related to debts. The 
following discussion is devoted to a small sample of cases that ended 
up in the Council of State (Şurayi Devlet). The cases were either re-
ferred there by lower-level courts or because conflicts between minis-
                                                                                                                      
tasında iki kahvehaneyi, bir büyük depoyu, muazzam yazıhaneleri ve otuz kırk ka-
dar odayı içeren üç katlı bir binanın yalnız on bin iki yüz liraya satıldığını biliyor-
lar mı? Vergisinin taksidi yaklaştığı günlerde uykularını kaybeden muhacirlerden 
bu on binlerce lira nasıl alınacak?” Mehmet Sırrı in Halkın Sesi, June 24, 1931. 
Cited in Baran, Bir, 149. 
121 Mübadele ve tefviz işlerinin katʿi tasfiyesi ve intacı hakkındaki 19-III-1931 tarih ve 
1771 numaralı kanuna müzeyyel kanun, July 21/26, 1931. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc010/
kanuntbmmc010/kanuntbmmc01001866.pdf. 
122 Baran, Bir, 150. 
123 CA 30.10...123.879.6. 
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tries had occurred. The council’s decisions can be traced through 
copies sent to the Prime Ministry.  
Tapu registration was the essential step in obtaining (relative) legal 
security of property rights. Without this document, the authorities 
could, and did, withdraw rights very easily, with potentially disastrous 
results for the exchangees: For instance, in 1931, in the midst of the 
tapu registration process (and the economic crisis) the Ministry of 
Finance started to sell property that had been allocated several years 
before in order to secure tax debts of the former owners. It could do 
so because the new inhabitant had not obtained full property rights 
yet. This practice led to a renewed conflict with the Ministry of the 
Interior. In the course of the argument, the Maliye demanded that the 
refugees pay the outstanding debts of the former owners, lest their 
houses be auctioned. The matter was brought to the Council of State, 
which conceded that tax claims of the state vis-à-vis “disappeared” and 
exchanged people may still be in place. However, the council ruled 
that these should have been secured in the process of liquidation 
(which had been performed in accordance with the liquidation law of 
1915). In the meantime, the property had been handed over to the 
refugees in the process of tefviz, and was therefore no longer subject 
to treasury law (with the possible exception of those assets that refu-
gees were still paying off).124 The council ruled unanimously that the 
debts of former owners could therefore not be recovered from the 
newly settled refugees.125 By focusing on the legal act of liquidation, 
the council elegantly avoided to discuss the legal significance of the 
tefviz procedure, which, after all, did not amount to a full transfer of 
property rights.  
The court cases also show that the bonds issued in 1928 and after 
1931 were, as permitted by law, frequently sold to other parties (far 
below their nominal value). 126  By 1937, this practice was causing 
trouble: some bonds had been declared invalid after the compensation 
 
124 CA 30.10...140.2.11. 
125 Şurayi Devlet, March 28, 1932, CA 30.10...140.2.11, 4-7. 
126 Baran, Bir, 151. 
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claims of exchangees had turned out to be lower than originally 
thought. Their bonds, which had therefore been declared invalid, had 
nevertheless been sold. Now, third parties who had purchased them 
in the meantime were trying to cash the bonds. The Treasury argued 
that the bonds were invalid, and refused to pay, causing claimants to 
turn to the courts. Several courts came up with different opinions on 
the question if and to what degree the Treasury was obliged to cash 
these bonds. The matter went to the court of appellation, which ruled 
that the state was indeed obliged to pay, unless it could prove that the 
people now holding the bonds had been ill-intentioned. Both the Min-
istry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice argued that this situation 
ought to be clarified with a new law.127  
In 1941, the Directorate of National Property (milli emlak müdürlüğü) 
approached the Prime Ministry and the Council of State with another 
question connected to debts. The Directorate explained that many 
people holding debts of exchangeable Greeks had turned to the 
Treasury in order to secure their debts. Although all property rights to 
the Greeks’ land had been transferred to the government in 1930, no 
legal regulation for the status of their debts had been drawn up, and 
the ministry asked for instructions in the matter.128  
Even in cases in which full property rights were granted, the Treasury 
made attempts at revoking them. In the case of a certain Fatma Zehra 
Hanım from Salonica, such an attempt failed for an interesting rea-
son. She was at first treated as an exchangee and given a house via 
tefviz. (Neither place nor time are mentioned in the available docu-
ment.) Based on this earlier decision, Fatma Zehra Hanım later re-
ceived full ownership rights (temlik) and the property was registered 
in her name and that of her children. When she and her family 
turned out not to be subject to the exchange, the Ministry of the Inte-
rior went to court in order to have her tapu registration canceled. 
 
127 Correspondence between the Ministries of Finance, Justice and the Prime Minis-
try, January-April 1937. Pages 13 and 14 contain copies of the court decisions. CA 
30.10.123.879.7. 
128 Maliye to Şurayi Devlet, September 22, 1941. CA 30.10.124.881.5.  
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Interestingly, the legal act in question was not that of the tapu regis-
tration, but that of tefviz. The tefviz commission in charge of the mat-
ter revoked its decision. Fatma Hanım went to court against this revo-
cation and won. Following her success, the Treasury abstained from 
further pursuing the case.129 
5.9 The official end of the compensation process 
Open questions related to the tefviz and temlik processes (among 
them several that came up in the above-mentioned court cases) were 
finally regulated in 1945.130 According to the law for the “definite 
clarification of the exchange and allotment procedures,” government 
bonds would be cashed at 15 percent of the nominal value (§1), a very 
low percentage. In the parliamentary discussion of the law, deputy for 
Istanbul Ziya Karamursal claimed that 90 percent of the bonds had 
ended up in the hands of “fortune-makers”, and that the low rates of 
payment therefore helped to keep a substantial part of the money out 
of their hands.131 (This in itself is an indication that the Treasury had 
hardly ever cashed the bonds, as well as a hint at the low market pric-
es paid for the documents.) Holders of bonds were given a period of 
six months to make their claims. Bonds that had been declared invalid 
in the meantime, including those currently held by third parties, were 
not accepted (§2). Paragraph 5 allowed the state to review previous 
allocation decisions (and possibly revoke them) within a period of six 
months. This point again created uncertainty for refugees, and was 
 
129 Maliye Vekaleti Müşavirliği, July 22, 1940, CA 30.0.11.001.000.140.25.1 
130 Mübadele ve teffiz işlerinin kesin tasfiyesi hakkında kanun No 4796, July 10, 1945. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc027/
kanuntbmmc027/kanuntbmmc02704796.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
131 “bu bonolara verilecek olan paraların istihkak erbabının ceplerini değil, bir falcım 
istismarcıların kasalarını dolduracağını, uzun uzadıya arzettikten sonra bunlara 
tahsas edilen paradan cüzi bir miktarı bunların tediyesine hasredilerek kalacak 
kısmının memleket ve milletin menfaatlı, hayırlı işlere sarf edilmesini arzet-
miştim.” Ziya Karamursal, July 10, 1945, 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d07/c019/tbmm0701908
5.pdf, 115 (accessed September 2, 2016). 
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severely criticized in the parliamentary discussion of the law.132 The 
property rights and income generated by those assets that had served 
as security for the issuing of the bonds in 1931, along with any sum 
exceeding 1.5 million Lira in the custodian account for exchangees set 
up at that time, were transferred to the Treasury.133 The remaining 
sum was earmarked for the construction of a tuberculosis hospital in 
Ankara (§6.1). Receivables held against exchangeable Rum would be 
served out of the property transferred to the Treasury, provided that 
real estate had been used as collateral against the debts, and that that 
transaction dated from a time prior to the exchange agreement of 
1923. The creditor also had to prove that he had sued the debtor prior 
to that date (§6.2). The Treasury renounced any responsibility for 
debts that exceeded the earmarked funds and real estate (§6.3). The 
money transferred to the Treasury as well as the sums due to the 
exchangees would be accounted for in the 1945 budget. The stipula-
tions of this law indicate that the Turkish state did not distribute all 
the property that had been part of the exchange, and that a considera-
ble sum of money was paid to the state coffers rather than to the ex-
changees.134  
5.10 Compensation for non-exchangees  
On the inter-governmental level, a compensation of non-exchangees 
(i.e. people who had either left Greece or Turkey for the other country 
before the beginning of the First Balkan War or were absentees who 
owned property in one country while residing in the other) was first 
regulated by the document known as declaration No. IX (an appendix 
 
132 Rıfat Vardar, deputy for Zonguldak, commented that this was basically an invita-
tion to all financial officials to harass exchangees as much as they wanted: “Bu, o 
demektir ki, ey Maliye memurları, karşınızda bulduğunuz bütün mübadilleri 
istediğiniz kadar izaç edebilirsiniz.” TBMM July 10, 1945, 117.   
133  Such an account for exchangees is never mentioned in any other document.  
134 Mübadele ve teffiz işlerinin kesin tasfiyesi hakkında kanun No 4796, July 10, 1945. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc027/
kanuntbmmc027/kanuntbmmc02704796.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
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to the exchange convention of 1923) and subsequently by the Agree-
ment of Athens signed in 1926.135 Existing research generally regards 
both agreements as equally abortive, and therefore argues that pend-
ing questions of property compensation for this group were not 
solved before 1930, when the Ankara Agreement was signed. While 
this might be true for the inter-governmental level, documents from 
the Republican Archive in Turkey strongly suggest that the Turkish 
government started to indemnify non-exchangees in 1929, when ne-
gotiations for the Ankara Agreement were still going on, but could 
not finish the process until after 1934. Moreover, the government 
appears to have done so in cooperation with a “society of non-
exchangees” (gayrimübadiller cemiyeti). This point is remarkable be-
cause it has generally been assumed that such pressure groups did 
not exist in post-1925 Turkey.136 
The society of the non-exchangees held its first congress in Istanbul 
on November 6, 1926, when negotiations for the Agreement of Ath-
ens were still in progress.137 In a report to the Prime Ministry dated 
August 29, 1929 the societyʼs administrative council gave an account 
of the association’s activities since 1926.138 According to this docu-
ment, the society had held several congresses, which had repeatedly 
asked the government to start the implementation of the Athens 
Agreement, in vain. Moreover, they had asked the government to 
 
135 On the declaration and follow-up negotiations, see chapter 4.2. 
136 In her article on the repercussions of the Ankara Agreement, D. Demirözü has 
stated that “[t]here is no information to indicate that—in contrast to the immi-
grants to Greece—the immigrants to Turkey organized a pressure group for their 
assets left in Greece.” D. Demirozu, “The Greek-Turkish Rapprochement of 1930 
and the Repercussions of the Ankara Convention in Turkey,” Journal of Islamic 
Studies 19, no. 3 (2008): 314. M.A. Gökaçtı has found traces of a nationwide associ-
ation of exchangees from 1923–24, but not for the time after 1925: Gökaçtı, Nüfus, 
217–18. 
137 On that occasion, the group sent a telegram to İsmet Paşa, asking him to protect 
their rights in the negotiations. See CA 130.00.10.140.3.4. 
138 CA 30.10.140.3.6. I see no reason to doubt the authenticity of the document. 
However, it is the only document I have come across that indicates such a cooper-
ation between governmental and non-governmental institutions.  
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seize property of non-exchangeable Greeks in Turkey (as an act of 
“reciprocity” for the mistreatment of Muslims in Greece) and to re-
voke decisions for distributions of non-exchangeable property to ex-
changeable Muslims in Turkey. Comprised of a list of unanswered 
petitions and ignored demands, the first part of the report radiates 
disappointment. By July 1928, however, the government’s attitude 
towards the group apparently changed: the society was asked by the 
Turkish delegation to the Mixed Commission to participate in a 
“commission for [property] distribution to non-exchangees” (gayri-
mübadiller tevziat komisyonu). The commission was formed by two 
members of the Turkish delegation and one member of the gayri-
mübadiller cemiyeti. Later, a representative of a similar society of non-
exchangee Muslims from Western Thrace, the Garbi Trakyalılar cemi-
yeti, joined the commission. 
According to the report, public administrations had handed close to 
1,000 pieces of real estate over to the commission. Of these, 347 were 
the property of Greek citizens who had fled the country (mütegayyip 
Yunan tebaası emlâkinden). This property had been seized by the pre-
vious government. The 700 remaining pieces of real estate had been 
seized from March 1929 onwards, in line with the principle of “reci-
procity.” 139  (This means that the property was owned by Rum or 
Greeks who continued to live in Turkey with établis status). Of these 
more than 1,000 estates transferred to the commission, some were 
big and worth hundreds of Lira a month, but most were too small to 
yield any significant income (with rents of only a few Lira a month). 
In February 1929, the official members were withdrawn, and the task 
to distribute the property was transferred to the gayrimübadiller society. 
Since then, two councils, comprised exclusively of non-exchangees 
 
139 “Komisyon bidayeti emirde mukaddema hükümet tarafından vazʿiyet edilmiş 
mütegayyip Yunan tebaası emlākinden 250 parça emlaki Defterdarlıktan tesellüm 
etmiş (...). Müteakiben Teşrini evvel gayesinde komisyona daha yüze karip emlāk 
devr edilmiş ve bu yekun 347 ye baliğ olmuştur. Hükümetin yine mukabele 
bilmisil kanunu mucibince bu senenin Mart ayı zarfında yeniden vazʿiyededüp 
komisyona devr ettiği emlākte takriben 700 parçadır.” CA 30.10.140.3.6., 4.  
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and Western Thracians, had met between two and four times a week, 
reviewing a total of 596 applications. Of these, 330 had been decided 
upon by 1929. Decisions had been made on the basis of tapu records 
from Greece. In order to calculate the present value of property in 
Greece, the value recorded in the documents had been doubled (for 
tapus issued between 1314/1899 and 1328/1912), tripled for the years 
1302/1886 to 1314/1898 and quadrupled for any records older than 
1302/1886. These values had then been divided by factor 15 in order 
to calculate the monthly income of the said property. The sum of 
claims that had been accepted was 25,518 Lira. Property of a value of 
21,401 Lira had been distributed, the remaining real estate was about 
to be handed over (emirlerine amade bulundurulmaktadır). The real 
estate that had been handed over had yielded a total income of 91,214 
Lira. The society reported to have spent 15,590 Lira on repair works, 
salaries, taxes, bills and office materials. 
The report of the society of non-exchangees was written in 1929, 
when negotiations for a new and final agreement between the Greek 
and Turkish governments were in full swing. It shows that contempo-
rary complaints of the Greek government about ongoing seizures of 
Greek-owned property in Turkey were justified and that these were 
legitimized as “reciprocal” measures in Turkey. The document also 
hints at a remarkable shift in government policy: between 1926 and 
1928, the demands of the organization were apparently ignored. By 
1928, however, selected members were first invited to cooperate in the 
distribution process and later entrusted with the task of property dis-
tribution to non-exchangees. This shift can only be explained in the 
light of ongoing negotiations with Greece. The Turkish side was 
probably eager to create a fait accompli in the question of Greek prop-
erty in Turkey. By handing over the task of reviewing applications to 
people who were themselves affected (and who had both a good 
knowledge of local conditions in Greece and an interest in a quick 
procedure) the government made sure that the task was finished rela-
tively quickly. (The state itself was always short on capable staff). The 
distributions already accomplished by 1929 might have helped to 
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negotiate the final stipulations of the Ankara Agreement, which fore-
saw that a restitution of non-exchangee property would take place only 
in Greece, but not in Turkey (although, as the report makes clear, 
such seizures had taken place in Turkey as well). This last point 
strongly suggests that Turkey was able to dictate her conditions on 
Greece in this issue. Moreover, the process appears to have been 
completely cost-neutral for the government, which merely handed 
over real estate (real estate it had illegally seized, not expropriated), 
the rents of which maintained the work of the commission. As far as 
the report goes, only property, but no money was handed over to the 
claimants. 
No other source available to me mentions the distribution process 
outlined in this report. It has therefore not been possible to establish 
if these distributions took place at all. It is clear that the question of 
compensation remained on the agenda well into the 1930s, as did 
complaints of the non-exchangees. 
5.11 Compensation policies for “non-exchangees” 
With the Ankara Agreement signed on June 30, 1930, all property of 
non-exchangee Greeks in Turkey (excluding those located in Istanbul) 
passed into the hands of the Turkish government. Moreover, Greece 
agreed to pay a sum of 425,000 £ Sterling, out of which the Turkish 
government would indemnify the Greeks of Istanbul, as well as Greek 
citizens, whose property had been seized and could not be returned. 
The agreement was welcomed in the Turkish press and seen as a step 
towards the solution of the problems related to the population ex-
change.140 The non-exchangees, however, disliked the agreement: On 
July 17, the general congress of non-exchangees sent a telegram to 
Prime Minister İsmet Paşa in which they expressed their gratitude 
and joy over the conclusion of the agreement. They did, however, also 
make it clear that they now expected to be compensated fully and 
 
140 See Demirozu, “Greek-Turkish.” 
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quickly. The telegram was signed by Hüseyin Bey141, TBMM deputy 
for Istanbul and chairman of the society’s congress.142 
By December 1930, the government had received the first installment 
of the Greek payment (62,000 £ Sterling, worth 600,000 T£) and had 
handed that sum over to the Agricultural Bank in order to be distrib-
uted by a commission in Istanbul.143 Apart from this cash payment, 
the Ministry of Finance was working on a system, which, similar to 
previous policies for exchangees, was based on the issuing of gov-
ernment bonds, which would be accepted in auctions of Greek prop-
erty in Turkey. In the course of this process, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), 
after personally receiving a delegation of non-exchangees,144 suggest-
ed that Turkish delegations be sent to Greece in order to appraise the 
value of the property in question.145 There is no indication that this 
idea was ever put into practice.  
By May 1931, a commission for the appraisal of claims had been es-
tablished in Istanbul as part of the Ministry of Finance.146 In July 
1931, a law (No. 1885) was issued that dealt with property that needed 
 
141 Hüseyin Hüsnü (Kavalalı) (1881-1960) was deputy for Istanbul between 1927 and 
1931. Originally from Kavala, he was a member of the local CUP branch and 
served as mayor for his hometown. Later (in Istanbul) he became a member of the 
Mixed Commission in charge of the Greco-Turkish population exchange. See 
TBMM Albümü, 153. 
142 CA 30.10.140.3.7. All documents concerned with this group suggest that the 
average gayrimübādil had, as a rule, a higher social status and was politically better 
connected than the mübādils. This point may partly be explained by the fact that 
many among the gayrimübādils had either left Greece before 1912 (thus having 
more time to adapt) or had been absentee landlords who lived in Thrace or Anato-
lia already.  
143 CA 30.10.140.3.8, Milli Emlak Müdürlüğü to Başvekalet, December 10, 1930, 7. 
144 Technically, Mustafa Kemal himself was a non-exchangee: He had left his native 
Salonica prior to the Balkan Wars. 
145 CA 30.10.140.3.8., 2, Mustafa Kemal to İsmet Paşa, October 12, 1930.  
146 With a letter dated May 5, 1931, the commission (gayrimübādil takdir-i kıymet 
komisyonu) informed the Prime Ministry that it had furnished two wives of a cer-
tain Abdülhamit with documents (bonds?) for their claims, which amounted to 
19,532 T£ each. CA 30.10.140.3.9. (Note that polygamy had officially been abol-
ished in 1926).  
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to be given back according to the Ankara Agreement (i.e. Greek and 
Rum-owned property in Istanbul only). It prescribed that all people 
presently resident in these houses would be evicted. Those who had 
been given full rights to such property would be expropriated and 
compensated in government bonds bearing an interest of 5 percent. 
The Treasury was entitled to issue bonds up to a total value of 1,5 
million T£ (§4). These bonds would be accepted as cash in govern-
ment auctions of “national property” (milli emlak), but only in those. 
They would be cashed until the end of the financial year 1933. Such 
refugees who had a legal right to settlement and were at present living 
in the above-mentioned houses would be given full rights to property 
of a character and size to be established by the rules of iskan-ı adi. 
Tapu documents for them would be issued for free. Istanbul and 
İzmir were excluded from this rule (§5).147  
İzmir was a place where many Greek citizens had lived and owned 
property. Their counterparts, the non-exchangeable Muslims from 
Greece, had mostly ended up in Istanbul. When the authorities’ grip 
first on Armenian and then on Ottoman Greek property in İzmir 
tightened, Greek-owned property remained as a last resort for free 
housing, particularly for state employees. According to a co-ed pub-
lished in May 1928, the Ministry of Finance was at that point starting 
to demand rent from these occupants as well.148 Around the same 
time, it also started to auction Greek-owned houses that were occu-
pied by people who had officially been settled in them by the provin-
cial settlement administration. These residents successfully contested 
their eviction notices in the local court, which accepted their assign-
ment documents (tahsis vesaiki) as proof of their rightful claims. In 
August 1928, the Directorate of National Property (emlak-ı milliye 
 
147 10 haziran 1930 tarihli mukavelenameye göre iadesi lâzım gelen emval hakkında 
kanun, August 3, 1931, 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc010/
kanuntbmmc010/kanuntbmmc01001885.pdf (accessed September 2, 2016). 
148 Mehmet Şevki, “...fetin temadisi,” in: Ahenk, May 2, 1928. 
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müdüriyeti) was still waiting for the court of appeal to decide on the 
matter.149  
After 1930, the compensation for non-exchangees from Greece was 
performed along very similar lines as those for occupants of houses in 
Istanbul, with the important difference that the non-exchangees’ 
bonds did not bear any interest. The Agricultural Bank started to put 
Greek property on auction in November 1931.150 Anadolu reported in 
December 1931 that many non-exchangees from Istanbul came to 
İzmir especially in order to take part in the auctions held there. The 
prices reached in these auctions were exceptionally high.151 Details of 
the bond policy and the auctions can be deduced from a petition that 
twenty-six non-exchangees sent to the TBMM (and in copies to the 
Prime Minister, the President and the Ministry of Finance) in the 
summer of 1932 and an explanation subsequently written at the Min-
istry of Finance. The petitioners, several of them represented by their 
lawyers, complained that bonds were only issued for 20 percent of 
their claims, with the result that the bonds did by far not suffice to pay 
the “extortionate prices unheard of in any other part of the world.”152 
Moreover, the bonds did not bear interest and did not specify a date of 
repayment. Therefore, many gayrimübadils saw no other way but to 
sell their bonds for as little as 17 percent of their nominal value. The 
group fiercely criticized that they could only use their bonds in auc-
tions of Greek (Yunanlı) abandoned property, which was scattered in 
 
149 “Yunanlı emvālınıñ tefvīżi ḥaḳḳındaki emre müsteniden tefvīż edilen emvāl 
ḥaḳḳında iskān muḳarrerātınıñ intācında vilāyetçe ıṣrār edilmektedir. Her ne 
ḳadar bu ḫāneler ṭarafımızdan müzāyedeye çıḳarılmaḳta ve baʿżı ṭāliblere iḥāle 
edilmekte ise de İzmir birinci ḥuḳūḳ maḥkemesi şāgiller ṭarafından vesāʾiḳ-i 
taḫṣīṣiye ve tefvīżiye irāʿe edildiği taḳdīrde taḫliye iddiʿāsı redd edilmekte ve temyīz 
edilen iʿlāmāt ḥaḳḳında maḥkeme temyīz ḳararları gelmediğinden temyīz 
maḥkemesi muḳarrerātınıñ ne merkezden tecellī edeceği mechūl bulunmaḳta (...)” 
CA 272...12.60.169.24. 
150 Baran, Bir, 157. 
151 Ibid. 
152 “(D)ünyanin hiç bir tarafında görülmemiş fahış kiymetler takdir edilmesi,” CA 
30.10.140.3.11, 4. 
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remote areas all over the country, a point, they claimed, that had often 
forced them to re-sell whatever they could purchase with their bonds 
in order to buy other property that was easier to manage, at 
“stupefying prices.”153 They compared the governmentʼs policy to pay 
only installments of the sums due to them to “the payment of allow-
ances to schoolchildren.”154 Far from being schoolchildren, however, 
the non-exchangees (unlike virtually all other petitioners, who never 
dared to makes references to developments in Greece) were up-to-date 
on the policies of the arch-enemy: on the other side of the Aegean, 
they argued, the Greek government was compensating refugees from 
Turkey with bonds that were traded at the Athens stock market at 95 
percent of their nominal value, while citizens of other countries 
whose property had been seized received full payments from 
Greece.155 The Treasury was pursuing a course of profit-maximization, 
“unable to get it in their head that the pockets of the Treasury and 
those of the nation are one and the same.”156 In conclusion, the peti-
tioners demanded that the Treasury pay interest on the bonds and set 
a date of repayment, or, alternatively, accept the bonds as down pay-
ment in all auctions of real estate and as payment for tax obligations 
(at 50 percent of their nominal value). 
The demands of the non-exchangees fell on deaf ears at the Ministry 
of Finance. In a letter to the Prime Ministry, the Minister of Finance, 
 
153 “(A)kılları durduracak yüksek fiyatlara almak mecburiyetinde kalmışlardır.” Ibid., 
5. 
154 “(B)onoların temamını defʿaten vermeyipte mektep çocuklarına verilen haftalık 
gibi tevzii” Ibid.  
155 “Halbuki Akdenizin diğer sahilinde Yunan devleti 'compensation' suretile kendis-
ine terkolunan Türk emlakini karşılık ittihaz ederek (kendi tebʿasına berayı tazmin 
(Türkiyadan giden Yunanlılara) verdiği eshamın kiymeti % mevzuasile 95.e yani 5% 
noksanına satıldığı Atına (sic) borsasının yevmi 'bulletin'lerinde görülmektedir.” 
CA 30.10.140.3.11 
156 “(M)illetin kesesile devlet hazinesinin bir olduğuna bir türlü erdiremeyerek sözde 
hazineyi kazandırmak” Ibid., 5-6. 
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Abdülhalik (Renda)157, argued that a complete compensation was no 
longer possible since partial sums had already been distributed in the 
form of bonds. Admitting that very high prices had been paid in the 
auctions of non-exchangeable property, he argued that these had sole-
ly come about as a result of high demand among potential buyers – 
and were therefore inevitable. In the question of tax payments, he 
simply argued that they belonged to a different category of payments 
and could therefore not be mixed up with the bonds.158 
The compensation of non-exchangees stayed on the agenda until 1934 
and after. In that year, the Council of Ministers, apparently as a result 
of a prolonged argument between the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Finance, decided that Greek and établis land (land owned 
by Greeks who were resident in Istanbul) in Anatolia that had been 
sold to other immigrants (mübadil, muhacir, mülteci) would not be 
given to non-exchangeable Turks. (The Ministry of Finance had de-
manded exactly that.) Instead, the sums of the sales would be used to 
balance the compensation paid in accordance with law no. 1885 (this 
was the fund deemed for the cashing of bonds issued to people ex-
propriated in the course of property restitution to Greeks in Istanbul). 
They would also be used to balance free property distribution to refu-
gees (again according to law no. 1885). Anything remaining would be 
paid to a custodian account of the exchangees.159  Only real estate 
 
157 Abdülhalik Renda (1881–1957) was born in Yanya/İannina but left when Epirus 
was ceded to Greece in 1913. On the prominence of men hailed from the Balkans 
among Republican elites (who were nevertheless not considered to be “refugees”) 
see Zürcher, Young, 196. During World War I, Renda was responsible for large-
scale massacres of Armenians in Muş and in charge of deportations to Der Ez-Zor. 
After the war, he was among the perpetrators arrested and sent to Malta. See Ka-
ragueuzian, Perfect, 129. Renda served as Minister of Finance four times between 
1924 and 1934. He also was active in early Republican policies of forced settlement 
and assimilation against the Kurds: Polatel and Üngör, Confiscation, 103–4.  
158 CA 30.10.140.3.11, 2-3. 
159 “Türk Mübadilleri hesabi carisine geçirilmesi”. Decision of the Council of Minis-
ters dated March 22, 1934: CA 30.18.01.02.43.12.16. As far as I can see, this is the 
first document to mention such an account. It re-appears in §6 of law no. 4796, 
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owned by Greeks and Istanbul Rums in Anatolia that would become 
available in the future (possibly due to emigration?) would be used for 
distribution among non-exchangees.160 Around June 1934, the Turk-
ish government received 25,000 £ Sterling, a part of the second in-
stallment of 47,500 repayable upon completion of the restitution pro-
cess in Istanbul. This number indicates that a major part of the 
Greek-owned property in Istanbul had not been restored. The Turkish 
Council of Ministers decided to distribute this money among non-
exchangees.161 
                                                                                                                      
(issued in 1945), which formally ended the process of property distribution to ex-
changees and other refugees. 
160 Decision of the Council of Ministers dated March 22, 1934: CA 
30.18.01.02.43.12.16. 
161 Ibd. 
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6 Conclusion 
The metaphor of abandoned property as the “dowry of the state” is 
fitting insofar as Armenian and Greek land and houses were used in 
order to establish a new relationship between the Turkish nation state 
and its Muslim population. It is, however, important to note that 
these assets were stolen and illegally appropriated before they could 
be used to make not only the new national bourgeoisie, but a great 
number of people “beholden to the state.” 1  The Armenians and 
Greeks who were killed or expelled between 1913 and 1922 were also 
dispossessed, and among them only the Ottoman Greeks, who were 
later made part of the population exchange with Greece, had an op-
portunity to claim compensation. The dowry metaphor has been used 
here not to cover up this first, violent part of the story, but to shed 
light on its second, hitherto untold part. 
Unlike a dowry, abandoned property was not handed over in a single 
instant, and negotiations over its amount and character cannot be 
clearly distinguished from its distribution. This distribution often 
took on rather tumultuous, and at times violent, forms. Abandoned 
property constituted a major bone of contention among various 
groups and individuals in Turkish society, such as local power-holders 
(first members of the CUP and later deputies at the TBMM), 
homeless people, Balkan War refugees and exchangees. There was 
also a great deal of debate and conflict between these people and 
government bodies, which have been traced here through petitions 
and administrative documents of the settlement directorate. 
The debate over these assets, which accompanied their physical and 
legal appropriation, was a crucial part of the process whereby Otto-
man Anatolia was transformed into a modern nation-state, and its 
Muslim population into Turkish citizens. Apart from its economic 
importance as agricultural land, income-generating property and 
 
1 Keyder, “Consequences”, 45. 
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houses, abandoned property also helped Muslim people to make 
sense of the death and expulsion of their non-Muslim neighbors by 
framing the takeover of their assets as “compensation”, either for 
wartime losses or for property left behind in Greece.  
The abandoned property debate helped to establish a conception of 
private property that recognized such rights for Muslims only. The 
rights of Armenians and Rum were at first openly, and later implicitly, 
denied, and these groups were thus excluded from the body politic. In 
this regard, the debate marks a crucial part of the transition from the 
Ottoman Empire to the Turkish nation-state, a process that started at 
least a de- cade before the Republic was formally established. The 
exclusion of Armenians and Ottoman Greeks from the body politic 
was a crucial part of this transition. Its demographic part was accom-
plished through the Armenian Genocide and the expulsion of the 
Ottoman Greeks. The discursive part lasted longer and was in full 
swing during the War of Independence. One part of this discourse 
has been traced here in the parliamentary debates from those years.  
Apart from a handful of early critics in the Ankara parliament, none 
of the parliamentarians, journalists, administrators, and petitioners 
writing and speaking in the course of the debate recognized the rights 
of Armenian and Rum owners anymore. Their speeches and texts 
show that they considered the theft, sale and occupation of non-
Muslim property as perfectly legitimate – providing these acts served 
“the nation”. While early debates in the TBMM also quite openly ad-
mitted that Armenians had been killed (with most speakers legitimat-
ing the killings), this point was quickly covered up with the fiction of 
custodian care. The Ankara government thus became the official legal 
proxy of Armenian and Greek property owners. While fictitious inso-
far as the government did not really represent their interests, this idea 
of representation nevertheless had important implications for politics 
of property distribution.  
The identity of the Muslim or Turkish nation was highly ambiguous, 
especially in the years prior to 1923: government claims to abandoned 
property, and the revenue it generated, were vehemently challenged 
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in parliament as well as by ordinary people who had simply appropri-
ated houses and fields. The parliamentary debates, and the public 
debates on the phenomenon of squatting in İzmir, are evidence of 
strong support for an understanding of the “the nation” as synony-
mous with “the people”, whose interests were deemed superior to the 
(financial) interest of the state, at least in 1920–24. Texts and docu-
ments analyzed here show how the government was gradually able to 
enforce its claim to full control of abandoned property. By 1926, when 
protests against policies of compensation began, they could no longer 
seriously challenge existing legislation. Eventually, it was the instru-
ments of mortgages and bonds that helped solve the conflict of the 
earlier years by serving the financial interests of both the treasury and 
the exchangees.  
My following discussion sums up the results of this study with regard 
to five problems: the emergence of abandoned property as a legal 
concept in Ottoman times, the importance of Armenian and Greek 
property for the establishment of new relationships between state and 
(Muslim) people, the impact of the population exchange on property 
distribution policies in Turkey, arguments about the relationship 
between nation, state and the people, and the conceptualization of 
land and houses as commodities.  
6.1 The emergence of “abandoned property” 
Abandoned property as a legal category could only be developed 
against the backdrop of private property rights in land on the one 
hand and forced mass migration on the other. These two phenomena, 
in turn, emerged very much in tandem over the course of the second 
half of the 19th century in Ottoman and post-Ottoman lands.  
The meaning of abandoned property differs from the older Ottoman 
concept of mahlul land, which was defined as land the title to which 
had fallen back to the state after its owner had either died without 
leaving heirs or had been absent and failed to work the land for more 
than three years in a row. Abandoned property, on the other hand, 
referred to land or buildings that continued to be owned by an absent 
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person or institution who was represented by the state, even after 
three years had expired. The idea of abandoned property thus de-
pended on the pre-existence of a modern conception of private, un-
limited property rights, which, in the Ottoman rural context, was 
established throughout the 19th century. Towards the end of the cen-
tury, this conception of property was further extended to include 
ownership in absentia. Tellingly, the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 recog-
nized this possibility for people owning land in the newly created 
Balkan states, but not for those whose homelands in eastern Anatolia 
were now to become a part of imperial Russia. On the other hand, we 
do know that even people from further away in the Russian Caucasus 
managed to keep their property rights by traveling back and forth 
between the Ottoman and Tsarist Empires.  
Illegal appropriation of privately owned land, while certainly practiced 
before, reached unprecedented levels with the establishment of the 
Hamidiye cavalry in eastern Anatolia, whose members stole not only 
from Armenians, but from the peasantry in general. It further in-
creased during the Hamidian massacres of 1894–96, when Kurdish 
warlords (and especially those who were part of the Hamidiye) appro-
priated private and communal lands of Armenians. The first appear-
ance of the term “abandoned property” in 1901 is probably a reference 
to land “abandoned” during the massacres. Demands for restitution 
of this stolen property (rather than monetary compensation) became a 
major issue after the revolution of 1908, and the desire to keep this 
land may actually have been one among many reasons for local mili-
tias to participate in the genocide of 1915.  
It was in the Bulgarian principality that the first administrations for 
abandoned property were created in 1877–78. I have argued that these 
administrations further developed the idea of ownership in absentia 
into that of an absent owners’ representation by the nation state. This 
legal construct was deeply contradictory from the very beginning: the 
state that supposedly took custodian care of a person’s property in 
their absence was the very same state whose raison dʼetre was that 
person’s removal from its territory. It therefore comes as no surprise 
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that the CUP government (after all, a nationalist government of an 
imperial state) expelled Christians and promptly settled Muslim refu-
gees in their houses and on their land after the Balkan Wars. Custodi-
an care of that property became a legal fiction, which, however, was 
held up for a long time, carrying along its inherent contradiction.  
My discussion of the research literature on the fate of Armenian 
property and my close reading of laws and regulations have shown 
that the laws and regulations issued with regard to buildings, fields, 
household items, and even money, were drawn up after specific 
practices had already emerged. These practices were refugee 
settlement (either for free or against payment of rents) and auctions, 
usually at exceptionally low prices. Special commissions for the sale 
and liquidation of Armenian property were formed, and the revenues 
of sales were paid into “custodian accounts” which were officially 
transferred to the budget of the Treasury in 1928. The institutions 
dealing with Rum and Greek property rights in post-1922 Turkey were 
very similar to those in operation during World War I. The 
abandoned property commissions in charge of registering and selling 
movable and immovable property were regarded as notoriously 
unreliable and corrupt. The advertisements of this property published 
by the commissions working in İzmir are proof of their work and 
interesting for their reference to the actual ownersʼ names. 
6.2 (Absent) Christian property owners, Muslims, and 
the nation state  
As argued in chapters Two and Five, the Greek and Armenian identity 
of property owners continued to be an issue for a long time after their 
death or their forced departure from what was to become Turkey. In 
this, their names resemble ghosts who continued to haunt deputies, 
administrators, local people and exchangees alike with their contin-
ued presence in the registers. While the owners were either physically 
absent or dead, their rights and obligations remained in place and 
were administered as such by the emerging Turkish nation state. 
Hasan (Saka), the Minister of Finance in 1921, commented on this 
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dichotomy of physical absence and legal presence when he argued 
that abandoned property was “ownerless in reality”, but not according 
to the tapu registers, where the owners’ names remained in place. 
The state no longer dealt with real people, but with their specters in 
the registers, collecting their rents and receivables, and selling off 
their property in order to pay back their (real or invented) debts, in-
cluding tax debts. It is remarkable that these ghostly residues of the 
departed remained in the documentation: In rural contexts, it would 
have been possible to perform a wholesale expropriation of all aban-
doned property owners or simply apply the old rule that land fell back 
to the sovereign after three years’ time. Instead, a ten-year rule that 
was arguably inspired by Islamic law (and also covered urban property 
and buildings) was introduced with the Civil Code of 1926.  
It is remarkable that the early republican governments chose to up-
hold the legal fiction of custodianship and to later replace individual, 
absent owners with individual (as well as institutional) new ones. In 
this manner, the transfer of rights from “exchangeable” Rum to Mus-
lim exchangees was performed starting from 1928. It is not entirely 
clear whether the same was conducted for Armenian property, which 
was administered by the “Administration for National Property” (em-
lak-ı milliye müdüriyeti). However, the transfer of all custodian ac-
counts to the Treasury in 1928 suggests that the fiction of these ac-
counts, and thus the specters of Armenian owners, had been held in 
place until that time.  
My explanation for this continued “presence in absence” of Armenian 
and Greek owners is that it had an important function in the process 
of Turkification. Turkish nationalism, and the bureaucratic machin-
ery that translated it into everyday practices, needed the non-Turkish 
Other in order to produce Turkish people, a Turkish economy and a 
Turkish state. Property categories that carried references to the ethno-
religious identity of non-Turkish owners allowed deputies, journalists, 
bureaucrats, petition-writers and petitioners to stress their antago-
nism to these former owners, and thus to confirm their own Turkish-
ness. They did so in group-specific ways: Fire-victims (harikzede) and 
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Balkan War refugees stressed their suffering under the Greeks in 
order to obtain houses. Tenants of a Greek-owned farm stressed the 
Greekness of the estate by listing the owner’s family members in 
order to obtain the farm. The former tenants of a farm that was part 
of sultanic private property (emiriye), however, did not mention ill-
treatment by the Greeks, but claimed to have been unable to register 
their legal use of the land prior to the Greek occupation, now de-
manding that the Republican government finally perform the regis-
tration. The petitions of Balkan War refugees stressed that they fled 
from the “ill-treatment” of “monsters” and had come to the “mother-
land” for this reason. All these narratives evoked some variation of the 
adversaries of the Turkish nation state: Ottoman Greeks, the Greek 
nation state, and the corrupted, ineffective Ottoman Empire, assisting 
the petitioners to frame themselves as Turkish. The references to 
property categories were not always clear, and indeed, many of these 
letters were written in order to claim property belonging to a category 
that was earmarked for another group of claimants. In this sense, the 
petitions were all part of a larger struggle over these categories and 
their meaning. Of couse, if all Greek and Armenian property had 
been expropriated and labeled “state property”, references to former 
owners would still have been possible. However, the property category 
itself would not have evoked memories, and thus not have invited 
people to invest property with notions of their own national identity.  
The petitions of exchangee migrants provide remarkably scant refer-
ence to property categories, and hardly ever recount stories of loss and 
deprivation from Greek hands. They usually operate with a notion of 
rights which the state was obliged to grant them, and depict its failure 
to do so as cases of corruption. The remarkable exception is the tasfiye 
talepname from Çeşme in which an applicant declared to have lost all 
documents of ownership to Greek pirates and had her compatriots 
testify to the truthfulness of the story. This story hints at the im-
portance of Ottoman (and, in some cases, Greek) documents in the 
process of property compensation for exchanges in Turkey. These 
documents provided the second part of “otherness” required in the 
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process: only the house and the (accepted) document together allowed 
exchangees to become property-owning, tax-paying citizens of Turkey. 
As my analysis of the abandoned property debate in the first Turkish 
National Assembly (TBMM) has shown, there was still a variety of 
interpretations of the term in 1920 and 1921. In the midst of a war 
they had not yet won, the deputies’ specific conceptualizations of 
abandoned property mirrored their idea of the future relationship 
between themselves and Ottoman non-Muslims. I have argued that 
these ideas were influenced by their individual experience in war (and 
possibly their involvement in the Armenian Genocide and the later 
ethnic cleansing of survivors): deputies from the eastern provinces, 
military officers, and deputies from Rumelia and Greek-occupied 
western Anatolia rejected the idea of custodian care and advocated an 
outright state seizure of Armenian and Greek property. This group 
argued that the rights of non-Muslims in Anatolia had ceased to exist.  
A minority among the deputies continued to regard non-Muslims and 
their property rights through the lens of Ottoman and Islamic law. 
They argued that Christians who had fled the territories now under 
control of the nationalist movement and who had left their property 
behind were still zimmi: adherents of another book religion who were 
protected by the state and who, even after a temporary fall-out, could 
return and submit again to Muslim rule and protection. This minority 
interpreted the abandoned property bill they were discussing in a 
literal manner, and took its stipulations about custodian care seriously. 
They argued that the state could indeed oversee the property of an 
absent owner, but would give it back after this owner’s return. How-
ever, they rejected the idea of the state as universal custodian, arguing 
that the right to appoint a legal proxy was protected both by Ottoman 
positive and Islamic jurists’ law (fikh). 
The other faction in the TBMM conceptualized Christians and the 
state they themselves would eventually live in radically differently. In 
their eyes, all those who had fled had done so as a result of their own 
treason on the very state that had once protected them. The “traitors” 
therefore had irretrievably lost their right to live in Anatolia, and to 
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own property there. In the eyes of these radicals, the old-established 
relationship between zimmis and the Muslim state had been 
irreparably severed. The Christians’ rights no longer existed, while 
their property rights had automatically passed over to the state. This 
group repeatedly challenged the idea of custodian care laid down in 
the bill at hand, arguing that the property ought to be handed over to 
the state. Furthermore, they saw no reason to hide the real objective 
of the law, which indeed was full state seizure of Armenian and Greek 
property. As I have shown, many deputies openly admitted to this real 
objective of the law. 
The liberal Islamic conception of property and minority rights ap-
pears to have been completely silenced with the eventual Turkish 
victory in 1922. None of the Turkish sources written after that year 
defend the property rights of Christian owners anymore. In the İzmir 
press, the possibility of the Christians’ return was discussed as a 
threat that needed to be fended off by all means. Those who managed 
to remain (Levantines and Jews) were depicted as a thorn in the side 
of the new, national state. 
One important arena of a positioning towards absent Greeks and 
Armenians were the legal terms developed to refer to them. The eu-
phemism “people deported to other places” (başka mahallere 
nakledilen eşhas) for Armenians was developed during the Armenian 
Genocide and already in place when Greeks and Armenians were first 
forced out of Cilicia and then of western Anatolia and eastern Thrace 
in 1921 and 1922. The laws issued after 1920 referred to them as “the 
disappeared” (mütegayyip, actually: “those made to disappear”) and 
“fugitive” (firari). These terms, which evoked memories of violence 
and forced migration, were in turn gradually replaced by new ones 
developed in the course of the population exchange. From 1924 on, 
laws used the terms “subject to the population exchange” for Rum 
and “not subject to the population exchange” for all other absent 
owners. To be clear, “deported to other places”, “fugitive” and “disap-
peared” were also euphemisms. These terms, however, still carried 
references to the state-sanctioned violence that had led to property 
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becoming “abandoned.” The terminological shift to “exchangeable” 
and “non-exchangeable” property and people no longer carried such a 
reference, and thus helped to cover up the violence of the previous 
decade.  
6.3 The impact of the 1923 exchange convention 
My discussion of the negotiations between Greece and Turkey be-
tween 1923 and 1930, and of the distribution policies in Turkey dur-
ing the same period, has shown that the convention on a population 
exchange with Greece had a – somewhat delayed – impact on the 
politics of abandoned property in Turkey. The terminological distinc-
tion between people who were or were not subject to the exchange 
(and thus, between property according to the identity of the actual 
owners) has already been mentioned. A similar distinction also made 
its way into the legislation for those groups who were to receive aban-
doned property from the state. These legal categories were taken over 
by petitioners: exchangees presented themselves as such, and some-
times explicitly demanded to be treated better than other groups, 
while others presented themselves as Balkan War refugees or non-
exchangees. While very few petitions of local homeless people 
(harikzede) have been available to me, frequent discussions of their 
fate as well as other petitions mentioning this category suggest that 
there was a group identity built around this term as well.  
The procedures followed by the Turkish government had strikingly 
little to do with the stipulations either of the 1923 convention or later 
agreements with Greece. Those documents that were explicitly men-
tioned in the convention, the declarations of property (beyan-
name/tasfiye talepname), ended up being least valued by the Turkish 
government, and there is some evidence that it was not their ostensi-
ble inaccuracy, but the fact that they had been filled out by Greek 
authorities, that made them suspicious in the Turkish authorities’ 
eyes. Tapus, vakfnames and other documents from imperial Ottoman 
times were more readily accepted. In this regard, one can indeed ar-
gue that the Turkish authorities treated the exchange not so much as 
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a Greco-Turkish but as an Ottoman-Turkish affair, as an administra-
tive endeavor in the course of which Ottoman property rights were 
translated into Turkish ones. As Chapter Four has shown, the Turkish 
side was in a relatively advantageous position during the years of the 
follow-up negotiations with Greece and eventually was the country to 
receive money from the other side of the Aegean. These payments 
were made even though the total values of property on both sides had 
not been appraised. Despite earlier announcements, which had de-
picted the temporary granting of property rights to exchangees as 
dictated by the terms of the population exchange, the Turkish gov-
ernment started to grant full property rights to exchangees with the 
temlik law of May 30, 1928. i.e., two years prior to the final settlement 
with Greece. The law (no. 1331) was probably not only motivated by 
the negotiations with Greece (i.e., the desire to create facts), but by the 
Treasury’s desire to turn exchangeable property, which had so far not 
been tradeable, into a commodity that could be sold and mortgaged, 
in order to finally turn it into a source of income for the state. Since 
the property in question was not (yet) legally owned by the state, the 
law-makers resorted to a trick: law number 1349 (also passed in 1928) 
transferred the revenues from those sales which would subsequently 
be made in the names of the non-Muslim owners to the Treasury. 
The 1930 Ankara Agreement, which transferred all property rights of 
Rum to the Turkish state, merely legalized this step.  
As discussed in Chapter One, the Ottoman Empire was forced to ma-
nage large-scale immigration, and thus the problem of settling large 
numbers of people, as early as the 1860s. Lack of available settlement 
land and conflicts with the local population were a problem through-
out the second half of the century. It was, however, only under CUP 
rule, during the Balkan Wars and World War I, that the government 
started to settle refugees in towns. At the same time, it started to ac-
tively force non-Muslims to emigrate and proceeded to settle Muslims 
in their houses. According to the regulation for the settlement of ref-
ugees (muhacirin nizamnamesi) of 1913, houses and land were either 
sold to refugees in installments, or rented out, or, if the refugees were 
334 
really destitute, distributed for free. We know that abandoned proper-
ty was used for refugee settlement at this point, but the term did not 
yet appear in the regulation, which only earmarked state-owned land 
for that purpose. There is no indication that the state institutions 
treated houses and fields as compensation for the property that Bal-
kan War refugees had left behind. 
My analysis of the relevant laws issued after 1922 and of discussions 
surrounding them has shown that it was the population exchange that 
introduced the idea of compensation into refugee settlement policies 
in Turkey. At first, this invention was not welcomed: when the law for 
the new Exchange Ministry was discussed in November 1923, a depu-
ty in parliament openly renounced the idea because it would create a 
privilege for exchangees over other refugees, arguing that all refugees 
ought to be treated according to the familiar pattern of charity. The 
first Minister for the Exchange, Mustafa Necati, welcomed such a 
privileged treatment, expressing his hope that compensation would 
give exchangees (unlike previous refugees) a chance at gaining eco-
nomic independence from government support. It was in the course 
of this debate that deputies started to re-frame their demands for 
distribution of abandoned property along the lines of compensation. 
Interestingly, the first law that eventually sanctioned such a practice 
(law no. 441, issued in March 1924) was designed for the compensa-
tion of local people. It went further than that for exchangees (law no. 
444, issued one month later) insofar as it allowed for an immediate 
transfer of full private property rights (temlik). The few petitions of 
Balkan refugees that I have analyzed here (such as the petition by the 
village population of Buca) worked with this notion of compensation 
(rather than ask for charity). However, as I have indicated, the legisla-
tion for property distribution to people not party to the population 
exchange subsequently gravitated away from the principle of full 
compensation for free, instead stipulating that property would be sold, 
usually against mortgaging (law no. 781, March 1926). The local set-
tlement office in İzmir nevertheless continued to distribute property 
for free as late as 1928, a practice which led to conflicts with the Ad-
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ministration of National Property, (emlak-ı milliye müdüriyeti) which 
repeatedly attempted to enforce the application of the new law. This 
case illustrates that even outdated legislation could continue to have 
an impact on (local) policies. 
6.4 Nation, state and people  
As shown in Chapter One, policies with regard to abandoned property 
were marred by two mutually contradictory objectives, namely to set-
tle refugees and to secure revenue for the Treasury. The CUP gov-
ernment came up with a relatively handy solution to this problem: the 
regulations issued during World War I earmarked Greek and Rum 
property for refugee settlement only and increased the tendency to 
sell or rent, rather than just distribute, Armenian property. This deci-
sion may also have been motivated by the existence of the Greek na-
tion state and the desire to keep it from joining the war on the side of 
the Entente. On the other hand, however, there is no indication that 
CUP policies towards Greek and Rum property were changed after 
Greece had indeed joined the war in June 1917.  
The TBMM and Republican governments of the post-Ottoman period 
inherited this inherent problem from the CUP. Chapter Five has 
shown that the settlement policies of the 1920s were characterized by 
a constant conflict between the Ministry of Finance on the one hand 
and the Ministry of Exchange, and its successor, the Directorate for 
Settlement Affairs at the Ministry of the Interior, on the other. The 
first was eager to sell abandoned property (or rent it out), while the 
second and third prioritized refugee settlement. There was no con-
sistent state policy, and by implication, no monolithic state, but rather 
conflicting objectives institutionalized in the form of the two minis-
tries (and their directorates). My discussion has shown that the Minis-
try of Exchange had difficulty enforcing the far-reaching competences 
that the Law for Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement (no. 368, 
issued in November 1923) bestowed on it: it was unable to gain full 
control of abandoned property, which it held only in theory because 
336 
other ministries, local police and the gendarmerie refused to cooper-
ate. 
The renewed distinction between Greek and Armenian property from 
1924 onwards was negotiated as a reaction to demands for compensa-
tion of local people and harikzede. At first, law no. 441 allowed for full 
compensation of these losses, which were to be made from “special 
funds” to be obtained from the budget. I have argued that this was a 
veiled reference to the “custodian accounts” held in the name of ab-
sent non-Muslims, which were officially transferred to the budget in 
1928. Law no. 441 permitted the Treasury to sell someone’s property 
to someone else, have the original owner pay for the transfer, and 
pocket the money. The law also effectively established a renewed divi-
sion of competences between the Ministry of Finance and the Minis-
try of the Exchange. This division, however, did not appease the con-
flict between the two ministries. My discussion in Chapter Five has 
illustrated that both ministries were eager to use the respective other 
category of property for their ends. The conflict was partially ended 
with the conceptualization of all classes of property as commodities in 
1928. This aspect will be discussed further below.  
While it was certainly enhanced by a chronic lack of money on the 
side of the governments, the question of refugee settlement versus 
revenue was rooted in the more general question whether the state 
served the people or the people served the state. This was not a philo-
sophical question, but one of major importance in a freshly declared 
republic, the general population of which was living in dire poverty. 
The conflict ma- nifested itself in everyday politics, and particularly in 
the question of legal versus illegal appropriation of abandoned prop-
erty. A government claiming to represent the nation, and to exercise 
full sovereignty in its name, was challenged by every instance in 
which individual people, and even populations of whole towns, chose 
to occupy abandoned property for their own ends. This study has 
shown that people expected the government to provide them with 
abandoned property, and when these expectations were frustrated, 
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either helped themselves to it or argued that failure to fulfill their 
needs contradicted the idea of a republican government.  
The Treasury’s desire to use abandoned property mainly as a source 
of revenue was contested throughout the period I have studied here, 
but on the whole the intensity of these conflicts decreased over time, a 
deve- lopment that corresponded to the general increase in govern-
ment control. During the discussion of the first abandoned property 
bill, deputies still openly voiced their criticism and distrust of the 
government, instead advocating its free distribution among refugees. 
Only six months later, in November 1922, criticism was voiced much 
less openly. Deputies no longer presented the interest of the people 
and that of the government as antagonistic, but merely criticized the 
authorities’ failure to prevent the looting of İzmir. There was some 
open sympathy for Muslim looters, and especially for the ordinary 
soldiers among them, but the interests of this group were no longer 
presented as more important than those of the Treasury. State reve-
nue was now depicted as the first priority, and distribution among the 
people merely as a welcome alternative. This depiction was usually 
accompanied by accusations against other groups (Jews, foreigners, 
profiteers) for having taken the booty instead.  
The exchangee petitions written between 1925 and 1928 often depict 
the interests of exchangees and the state as essentially identical, argu-
ing that prosperity among the exchangees would eventually serve the 
public good, and that a violation of their own rights amounted to a 
violation of the very principles of the republic. Petitioning refugees 
often presented themselves as citizens endowed with a certain set of 
rights which the government was obliged to recognize. An İzmir-
based journalist, however, openly renounced the idea of exchangee 
rights, instead arguing for a need to protect the right of the state 
against its citizens.  
My research has further supported previous studies which argue that 
petitions remained an important instrument of communication in 
early Republican times: Exchangee petitions were not taken lightly, 
but usually forwarded to the provincial administration for further 
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investigation. The claim of the petitioners that their treatment by the 
settlement administration was “contrary to the holy values of the sa-
cred republic” or that they had “never expected that injustice would 
rule” probably raised red flags in Ankara, and helped to monitor the 
rising disappointment in İzmir with the republican government. 
Apart from this monitoring function, however, the few inspectors’ 
reports and more detailed administrative correspondence that I have 
come across indicate that local administrations were rather inflexible 
in their treatment of refugee complaints. In accordance with the offi-
cial function of the petitioning system, petitioners usually claimed to 
have fallen victim to some kind of misconduct on the part of the local 
administration. These allegations could not always be verified. The 
one clear case of corruption that I have come across (the house that 
was revealed to be occupied by the director of the abandoned property 
administration) was solved by finding new houses for the two peti-
tioners. The squatter himself was apparently too powerful to be evict-
ed from the house. The available sources leave the impression that 
corruption among the highest echelons of the state was simply too 
widespread to be fought, possibly because everybody else was involved 
as well. That said, it is noteworthy that two active ministers, Hasan 
Fehmi (Ataç) and Kâzım Paşa (Özalp), were openly accused of having 
occupied abandoned houses in İzmir in the 1922 debate. İsmail Safa, 
who had been Minister of the Interior in 1922 and served as Minister 
of Education in 1926, petitioned from İzmir against the eviction of 
penniless state officials from abandoned houses. His petition raises 
questions about his own possible involvement in illegal squatting. 
There were many cases in which exchangees’ understanding of “in-
justice” and “corruption” apparently did not match that of the admin-
istrators. An exchangee’s argument that his low application number 
(i.e., the fact that his application had still not been considered) was a 
sign of ill-treatment was ignored, while his request for permission to 
“team up” with another exchangee was heard. Overall, the administra-
tive correspondence displays a desire to stick to the rules and enforce 
their application, even if this application disappointed most exchang-
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ees. Several petitions presented this disappointment as a collective 
experience, and thus point at the emergence of a collective identity 
among exchangees. 
Chapter Five has shown that the local administration only gradually 
came to control abandoned property in İzmir. Illegal squatting clearly 
was commonplace in the surrounding towns by 1925. The inspector’s 
report from Söke (written in 1926) gives a similar impression. How-
ever, the general drift of legislative changes suggests that government 
control increased over the years: Illegal squatting of Armenian houses 
was legalized in 1924 by making former squatters pay rent. By 1926, 
this category of people got the opportunity to buy the houses by mort-
gaging them: Practices that at first had to be tolerated were thus grad-
ually brought under control. There is some indirect evidence for suc-
cessful appeals of occupants to local courts (as in the Urla case in 
1927, and the successful resistance against evictions in 1928). Unfor-
tunately, the inaccessibility of court records, municipal and provincial 
documents has made it impossible to track down more of such cases. 
The Urla case, however, suggests that local courts were not complete-
ly independent, but ready and able to exploit inconsistencies in cen-
tral state orders and legislation for the benefit of the local population.  
The bureaucratic procedure of tefviz established a special relationship 
of dependency between the state and the migrants who came to be 
known as exchangees, who were left with limited, temporary and 
revocable property rights for much longer time than any other group. 
Many of the petitions that were analyzed here show that exchangees 
were not aware of the revocable character of their rights, but felt that 
they really owned the houses allocated to them, and therefore protest-
ed against the settlement agency’s decisions to evict them. The clus-
tering of such cases in the years 1926 and 1927 also suggests that the 
authorities started to really control abandoned property at about this 
time. The eventual granting of full property rights in 1928 could be 
understood as an improvement for the exchangees. However, the law 
also marked the final disappointment of all hopes for a full compen-
sation for the property they had left behind in Greece.  
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6.5 Abandoned property as a commodity  
Very much like that of local harikzede, the compensation of exchang-
ees was characterized by an increasing commercialization over time 
(which eventually appeased the inter-ministerial conflict between the 
objectives of refugee settlement and income generation). The very 
first phase of exchangee settlement in 1923 and 1924 could unfortu-
nately not be traced directly through the documents that were availa-
ble for this study. Judging from cases of exchangees who were ex-
pelled from houses between 1925 and 1927 because the houses were 
found not to match their claims, however, it seems that the category 
of value gained importance around this time. With the tefviz proce-
dure, which started in 1924, exchangees were (temporarily) compen-
sated with houses worth certain percentages of the value shown in 
their documents. During this first period (up to 1928) the main fea-
ture of these policies was that the exchangees would not get title 
deeds for the property in question, and thus could not mortgage the 
assets. They were thus excluded from the circle of people who could 
buy property from the abandoned property administration (which 
usually sold against payment of the first of eight annual installments).  
Indeed, it seems that the Ministry of Finance and its local administra-
tions (in İzmir and elsewhere) turned one group after another into 
buyers, and debtors, for abandoned property. This process can be 
described as a credit bubble which eventually burst in the late 1920s, 
prior to the World Economic Crisis: Shortly after the conquest of the 
İzmir area, buyers were local people and resident aliens who could 
afford to pay a first installment in government auctions. From 1926 
onwards, Armen-ian houses were sold to their inhabitants, who were 
allowed to mortgage the houses. Exchangees were included by 1928, 
being given bonds that they could use as vouchers in government 
auctions. Beginning from 1931 non-exchangees (who apparently for 
the most part resided in Istanbul) were able to use their compensa-
tion bonds as vouchers in auctions of “abandoned property”, includ-
ing those in İzmir. This ever-growing circle of new groups as buyers 
is especially significant in the light of reports mentioning that many 
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people were struggling to pay the installments for property they had 
bought shortly before. The economic situation in İzmir remained 
tense throughout the 1920s and further deteriorated towards the end 
of the decade, with debtors often struggling or failing to pay. This 
suggests that the purchase power of each group was depleted quickly 
after their inclusion into the circle of buyers, and that the Treasury 
therefore strove to further enlarge that circle. It is important to note 
that all groups apart from those who bid in 1922 had some form of 
government aid for their first installment: exchangees (1928) and non-
exchangees (1931) received bonds/vouchers, while the inhabitants of 
Armenian property were able to mortgage the houses they already 
inhabited. Despite this help, people soon started to face difficulty in 
paying, and programs to extend the number of installments started as 
early as 1925 (nationwide for peasant exchangees). After 1930, the 
installments due for exchangees’ credits were gradually extended as 
far as 1945. It seems that İzmir became the scene of a government-
created speculation bubble that was re-inflated several times over the 
1920s before it eventually burst in 1930. The bonds issued had the 
function of a paper-currency which, however, failed to kick-start the 
economy in the way so desired. Despite this short-time failure, in the 
long run the whole affair must have created two things: a steady, even 
if low, income for the treasury, and property titles for the buyers that, 
thanks to subsequent economic development and rising real estate 
prices, eventually paid off.  
Most of the petitions that have been discussed here did not openly 
challenge the principle that compensation ought to be performed in 
accordance with property values. The two remarkable exceptions are 
the petitions written in 1928, shortly before and after the issuing of 
the temlik law no. 1331. Both transgressed the usual frame of a peti-
tion insofar as they did not claim to report a case of corruption, but 
openly criticized government policy. The collective exchangee petition 
(discussed in Chapter Five) sent from İzmir is most remarkable in 
this respect. The petitioners did not only point out that a comparison 
between pre-war values in Greece and present-day values in İzmir 
342 
would result in an almost complete devaluation of their claims, but 
went so far as to suggest a different procedure for the appraisal of real 
estate, namely that laid down in the exchange convention. The group 
of exchangees presented themselves not as supplicants, but rather as 
citizens willing and able to pass judgment openly and to criticize the 
policies of their government. Their explicit criticism exudes much 
more confidence than previous individual petitions. Though certainly 
rooted in a profound sense of disappointment and discontent, the 
petition also appears to address the government at eye-level. Similar 
petitions might have followed if the introduction of the Latin script 
had not blocked this traditional means of communication between 
administrations and the population. Its introduction blocked the tra-
ditional safety valve of petitioning, effectively silencing a population 
that may have just begun to articulate themselves as citizens of the 
new state. 
6.6 Prospects for future research 
This study has brought up several questions that could not be further 
investigated due to the inaccessibility of the relevant sources: It has 
largely been impossible to establish how the provincial office of the 
Directorate of Settlement Affairs proceeded after it had received in-
structions from Ankara. Likewise, the role of local courts and their 
handling of conflicts between exchangees, locals and state institutions 
would be a promising field of research – provided that the relevant 
sources were available. Furthermore, the few accessible documents 
discussing the administration of Armenian, Greek and pious en-
dowments (mevkufe) property suggest that these categories, too, were 
the subject of major struggles. However, these categories remain 
largely out of reach pending the opening of the archives of the Minis-
try of Finance.  
The period after 1930 has only been cursorily discussed in this study. 
However, it has turned out that much, if not most of the policies 
aimed at a full granting of property rights to exchangees were only 
performed from 1931 onwards. If studied through newspapers, peti-
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tions and court records, these conflicts would provide further insights 
into the development of state-society relations after the introduction 
of the Latin script, and of statist economic policies in the 1930s. Such 
a study would certainly offer interesting insights into the character of 
the regime, which, just as that of the mid-to-late 1920s, has been de-
scribed as authoritarian and utterly unwilling to communicate with 
the population. 
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When the Greeks and surviving Armenians of present-day 
Turkey were forced to leave their homeland in 1922, the movable 
and immovable property they had to leave behind became known 
as „abandoned property“(emval-i metruke). In theory, this legal 
term implied that the absent owners continued to enjoy their 
property rights and were represented by the state. In practice, 
however, their houses, fields and belongings were stolen. They 
were used for the immediate housing needs of the remaining 
population, distributed among the rich and powerful and sold in 
public auctions. 
Initially, only a small part of abandoned property was under 
control of the new Ankara government, which was eager to use 
it as a source of revenue for the empty state coffers. Before it 
could do so, however, the government had to deal with various 
forms of active and passive resistance: homeless people and 
refugees squatted „abandoned“ homes and fields, and members 
of parliament initially refused to pass laws that would have 
legalized government administration of „abandoned“ property. 
From 1924 onwards, the property compensation for incoming 
migrants from Greece (the so-called exchangees) threatened the 
financial interests of the state and pitted the newcomers against 
the existing population. 
By focusing on all these aspects of the „abandoned property“ 
question this book offers unique insights into the socio-economic 
and political history of early republican Turkey.
